History of Vietnam and Socialist Republic of Vietnam-Ed. Oğuzhan Yılmaz

History of Vietnam and Socialist Republic of Vietnam ed. Oğuzhan Yılmaz

Contents 1

History of Vietnam

1.1

Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.1

Etymology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.2

History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.3

Government and politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.4

Geography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.5

Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.6

Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.7

Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.8

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.9

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.10 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.11 Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.12 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Names of Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2.1

Origin of the “Vietnam” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2.2

Other names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2.3

Names in other languages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2.4

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

History of Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.3.1

Prehistory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.3.2

Early dynastic epoch (c. 2879–111 BC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.3.3

The long eclipse: Chinese millennium (111 BC – 938 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.3.4

Late dynastic epoch (939–1945) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.3.5

Republican period (from 1945) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.3.6

Changing names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.3.7

Vietnamese nationalist historiography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.3.8

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.3.9

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.3.10 Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.3.11 Primary sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.3.12 In Vietnamese . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2

1.3

CONTENTS

1.4

1.5

1.6

1.7

1.8

1.3.13 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Đông Sơn culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.4.1

Origins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.4.2

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.4.3

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.4.4

External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cochinchina Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.5.1

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.5.2

Tourane and Saigon

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.5.3

Ky Hoa and Mỹ Tho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.5.4

Qui Nhon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.5.5

Bien Hoa and Vĩnh Long . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.5.6

The peace

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.5.7

Aftermath

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.5.8

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.5.9

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sino-French War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.6.1

Prelude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.6.2

French intervention in Tonkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.6.3

The Sino-French War, August 1884 to April 1885 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.6.4

French attempts to secure an alliance with Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.6.5

French oﬃcers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.6.6

Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.6.7

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.6.8

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.6.9

Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.6.10 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

French Indochina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.7.1

First French interventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.7.2

Establishment of French Indochina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.7.3

Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.7.4

Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.7.5

World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.7.6

First Indochina War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.7.7

Geneva Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.7.8

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.7.9

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.7.10 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.7.11 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Empire of Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.8.1

History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CONTENTS

1.9

iii

1.8.2

Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.8.3

Decline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.8.4

Viet Minh takeover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.8.5

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.8.6

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.8.7

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

First Indochina War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.9.1

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.9.2

Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.9.3

Geneva Conference and Partition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.9.4

Ho Chi Minh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.9.5

French domestic situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.9.6

War crimes and re-education camps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.9.7

Other countries' involvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.9.8

Popular culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.9.9

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.9.10 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.9.11 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.9.12 Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 1.9.13 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 1.10 North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 1.10.1 Presidency of Hồ Chí Minh (1945–69) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 1.10.2 Consolidation of Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 1.10.3 Land reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 1.10.4 Presidency of Tôn Đức Thắng (1969–76) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 1.10.5 Foreign relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 1.10.6 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 1.10.7 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 1.10.8 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 2

State of Vietnam 2.1

2.2

106

State of Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 2.1.1

History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

2.1.2

Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

2.1.3

Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

2.1.4

Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

2.1.5

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

2.1.6

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

State of Vietnam referendum, 1955 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 2.2.1

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

2.2.2

Organization of the referendum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

2.2.3

Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

CONTENTS

2.3

2.4

2.2.4

Other opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

2.2.5

Logistics and voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

2.2.6

Counting and results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

2.2.7

Reaction and aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

2.2.8

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

2.2.9

Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Operation Passage to Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 2.3.1

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

2.3.2

Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

2.3.3

Propaganda campaign

2.3.4

Communist prevention of emigration

2.3.5

Media and public relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

2.3.6

Social integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

2.3.7

Diﬃculties and criticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

2.3.8

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

2.3.9

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

Vietnam War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 2.4.1

Names for the war . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

2.4.2

Background to 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

2.4.3

Exit of the French, 1950–54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

2.4.4

Transition period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

2.4.5

Diệm era, 1955–63 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

2.4.6

Kennedy's escalation, 1961–63 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

2.4.7

Johnson's escalation, 1963–69 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

2.4.8

Vietnamization, 1969–72 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

2.4.9

Opposition to U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War: 1962–1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

2.4.10 Exit of the Americans: 1973–75 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 2.4.11 Other countries' involvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 2.4.12 United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races (FULRO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 2.4.13 War crimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 2.4.14 Women in the Vietnam War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 2.4.15 Black servicemen in Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 2.4.16 Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 2.4.17 Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 2.4.18 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 2.4.19 Annotations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 2.4.20 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 2.4.21 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 2.4.22 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 2.5

Role of the United States in the Vietnam War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 2.5.1

Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178

CONTENTS

2.6

2.5.2

Under the Kennedy Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

2.5.3

Americanization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

2.5.4

Vietnamization, 1969–75 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

2.5.5

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190

2.5.6

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190

2.5.7

External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

2.5.8

Declassiﬁed Primary Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

Doi Moi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 2.6.1

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

2.6.2

Early reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

2.6.3

Subsequent reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

2.6.4

Ideology behind reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

2.6.5

Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

2.6.6

Alternative views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

2.6.7

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

2.6.8

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

2.6.9

Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196

2.6.10 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196 2.7

Politics of Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197 2.7.1

Legal framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

2.7.2

State ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

2.7.3

The Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198

2.7.4

Vietnamese Fatherland Front . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

2.7.5

Executive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

2.7.6

Legislative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

2.7.7

Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

2.7.8

Judiciary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

2.7.9

Local government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202

2.7.10 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202 2.7.11 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204 2.7.12 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204 2.8

People's Army of Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204 2.8.1

Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

2.8.2

French Indochina War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

2.8.3

Vietnam War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

2.8.4

Military activities (1975–1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

2.8.5

Peacetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

2.8.6

International presence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

2.8.7

Organisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

2.8.8

Service branches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

2.8.9

Ranks and insignia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

CONTENTS 2.8.10 Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212 2.8.11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212 2.8.12 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 2.8.13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 2.8.14 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 2.9

Foreign relations of Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 2.9.1

Soviet era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

2.9.2

'Doi Moi' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

2.9.3

Current issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

2.9.4

Southeast Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215

2.9.5

East Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216

2.9.6

Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

2.9.7

Rest of world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

2.9.8

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

2.9.9

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

2.9.10 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218 2.10 Provinces of Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218 2.10.1 Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218 2.10.2 List and statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218 2.10.3 Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 2.10.4 Historical provinces of Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 2.10.5 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 2.10.6 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 2.10.7 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 2.11 Municipalities of Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 2.11.1 Subdivisions

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220

2.11.2 Current Vietnamese municipalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 2.11.3 Proposed municipalities

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220

2.11.4 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 2.11.5 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 2.12 List of districts of Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 2.12.1 An Giang Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 2.12.2 Bà Rịa–Vũng Tàu Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 2.12.3 Bắc Giang Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 2.12.4 Bắc Kạn Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 2.12.5 Bạc Liêu Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222 2.12.6 Bắc Ninh Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222 2.12.7 Bến Tre Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222 2.12.8 Bình Định Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222 2.12.9 Bình Dương Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222 2.12.10 Bình Phước Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222

CONTENTS

vii

2.12.11 Bình Thuận Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222 2.12.12 Cà Mau Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223 2.12.13 Cần Thơ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223 2.12.14 Cao Bằng Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223 2.12.15 Đà Nẵng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223 2.12.16 Đắk Lắk Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223 2.12.17 Đắk Nông Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 2.12.18 Điện Biên Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 2.12.19 Đồng Nai Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 2.12.20 Đồng Tháp Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 2.12.21 Gia Lai Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 2.12.22 Hà Giang Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 2.12.23 Hà Nam Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 2.12.24 Hà Nội . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 2.12.25 Hà Tĩnh Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 2.12.26 Hải Dương Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 2.12.27 Hải Phòng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226 2.12.28 Hậu Giang Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226 2.12.29 Hồ Chí Minh City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226 2.12.30 Hòa Bình Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226 2.12.31 Hưng Yên Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 2.12.32 Khánh Hòa Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 2.12.33 Kiên Giang Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 2.12.34 Kon Tum Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 2.12.35 Lai Châu Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 2.12.36 Lâm Đồng Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 2.12.37 Lạng Sơn Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228 2.12.38 Lào Cai Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228 2.12.39 Long An Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228 2.12.40 Nam Định Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228 2.12.41 Nghệ An Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228 2.12.42 Ninh Bình Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 2.12.43 Ninh Thuận Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 2.12.44 Phú Thọ Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 2.12.45 Phú Yên Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 2.12.46 Quảng Bình Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 2.12.47 Quảng Nam Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 2.12.48 Quảng Ngãi Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230 2.12.49 Quảng Ninh Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230 2.12.50 Quảng Trị Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230 2.12.51 Sóc Trăng Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230

viii

CONTENTS 2.12.52 Sơn La Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230 2.12.53 Tây Ninh Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231 2.12.54 Thái Bình Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231 2.12.55 Thái Nguyên Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231 2.12.56 Thanh Hóa Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231 2.12.57 Thừa Thiên–Huế Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231 2.12.58 Tiền Giang Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232 2.12.59 Trà Vinh Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232 2.12.60 Tuyên Quang Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232 2.12.61 Vĩnh Long Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232 2.12.62 Vĩnh Phúc Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232 2.12.63 Yên Bái Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232 2.12.64 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

Geoghrapy and Economy 3.1

3.2

3.3

233

Geography of Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 3.1.1

Physiography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234

3.1.2

Terrain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234

3.1.3

Climate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235

3.1.4

Area and boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236

3.1.5

Resources and land use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236

3.1.6

Environmental concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

3.1.7

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

3.1.8

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

3.1.9

Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

Environmental issues in Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237 3.2.1

History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

3.2.2

Clean water accessibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

3.2.3

Air pollution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238

3.2.4

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238

3.2.5

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238

Economy of Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238 3.3.1

History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

3.3.2

Economic sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241

3.3.3

Currency, exchange rate and inﬂation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242

3.3.4

Mergers and acquisitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

3.3.5

Foreign economic relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

3.3.6

Major economic areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

3.3.7

Economic indicators and international rankings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

3.3.8

Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

3.3.9

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

3.3.10 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246

CONTENTS 3.4

Five-Year Plans of Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246 3.4.1

The Three-Year Plan (1958–1960) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

3.4.2

The First Five-Year Plan (1961–1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

3.4.3

The Second Five-Year Plan (1976–80) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

3.4.4

The Third Five Year Plan (1981–85) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

3.4.5

The Fourth Five-Year Plan (1986–90) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

3.4.6

The Fifth Five-Year Plan (1991–95) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

3.4.7

The Sixth Five-Year Plan (1996–2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

3.4.8

The Seventh Five-Year Plan (2001–05) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

3.4.9

The Eighth Five-Year Plan (2006–10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

3.4.10 The Ninth Five-Year Plan (2011–15) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248 3.4.11 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248 3.4.12 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248 3.5

Transport in Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249 3.5.1

Railways

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

3.5.2

Highways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250

3.5.3

Pipelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252

3.5.4

Ports and harbors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252

3.5.5

Merchant marine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252

3.5.6

Airports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252

3.5.7

Cars in Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252

3.5.8

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

3.5.9

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

3.5.10 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253 3.6

3.7

Air transport in Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253 3.6.1

History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

3.6.2

Airlines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254

3.6.3

Airports and infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254

3.6.4

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254

Rail transport in Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254 3.7.1

Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

3.7.2

History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

3.7.3

Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258

3.7.4

High-speed rail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

3.7.5

Subways and light rail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260

3.7.6

Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260

3.7.7

Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261

3.7.8

Railway management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262

3.7.9

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262

3.7.10 Notes and references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262 3.7.11 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264

CONTENTS 3.8

Water supply and sanitation in Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265 3.8.1

Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265

3.8.2

Water resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265

3.8.3

Service quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265

3.8.4

Responsibility for water supply and sanitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266

3.8.5

Eﬃciency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268

3.8.6

Financial aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268

3.8.7

External cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

3.8.8

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

Culture o Vietnam 4.1

4.2

4.3

4.4

271

Demographics of Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271 4.1.1

Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271

4.1.2

Vital statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271

4.1.3

Ethnic groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271

4.1.4

Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272

4.1.5

Religions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272

4.1.6

CIA World Factbook demographic statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272

4.1.7

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272

4.1.8

Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272

4.1.9

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272

Vietnamese people . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273 4.2.1

Origins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273

4.2.2

Legend and early history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273

4.2.3

Early historical period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276

4.2.4

Diaspora . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276

4.2.5

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277

4.2.6

Notes and references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277

List of ethnic groups in Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278 4.3.1

List of ethnic groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278

4.3.2

Ethnic groups not included in oﬃcial list . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278

4.3.3

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278

4.3.4

Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278

4.3.5

External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278

Vietnamese language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279 4.4.1

Geographic distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279

4.4.2

Linguistic classiﬁcation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280

4.4.3

Lexicon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280

4.4.4

Phonology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280

4.4.5

Language variation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282

4.4.6

Grammar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283

4.4.7

Writing systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283

CONTENTS

4.4.8

History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284

4.4.9

Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287

4.4.10 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287 4.4.11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287 4.4.12 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289 4.4.13 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291 4.5

Religion in Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291 4.5.1

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291

4.5.2

History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292

4.5.3

Indigenous religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292

4.5.4

Buddhism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293

4.5.5

Christianity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294

4.5.6

Cao Đài . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295

4.5.7

Đạo Dừa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295

4.5.8

Hinduism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295

4.5.9

Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296

4.5.10 Judaism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297 4.5.11 Bahá'í Faith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297 4.5.12 Religious freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297 4.5.13 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298 4.5.14 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298 4.5.15 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300 4.5.16 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300 4.6

Education in Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300 4.6.1

Types of educational establishments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301

4.6.2

School grades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301

4.6.3

Academic grading

4.6.4

Pre-primary education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301

4.6.5

Primary education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301

4.6.6

Intermediate/ Lower secondary education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301

4.6.7

High school and middle school education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302

4.6.8

Higher education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303

4.6.9

Teaching quality issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301

4.6.10 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304 4.6.11 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305 4.6.12 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305 4.7

Health in Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305 4.7.1

Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305

4.7.2

Maternal and Child Healthcare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306

4.7.3

Providers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306

4.7.4

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306

xii

CONTENTS 4.7.5 4.8

External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306

Culture of Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306 4.8.1

Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307

4.8.2

Kinship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307

4.8.3

Marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307

4.8.4

Funeral ceremony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308

4.8.5

Religion and philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309

4.8.6

Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309

4.8.7

Visual arts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310

4.8.8

Performing arts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310

4.8.9

Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313

4.8.10 Cuisine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313 4.8.11 Clothing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313 4.8.12 Martial arts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314 4.8.13 Holidays and other important days . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314 4.8.14 World and intangible cultural heritage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315 4.8.15 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315 4.8.16 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315 4.8.17 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316 4.9

Media of Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316 4.9.1

Television . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316

4.9.2

Radio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317

4.9.3

Newspapers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317

4.9.4

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318

4.9.5

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318

4.10 Tourism in Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318 4.10.1 Tourism in the economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318 4.10.2 Tourism statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319 4.10.3 Destinations and attractions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319 4.10.4 International tourist arrivals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320 4.10.5 Military history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320 4.10.6 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320 4.10.7 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320 4.10.8 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320 4.11 Vietnam at the Olympics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320 4.11.1 Medal tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320 4.11.2 Medalists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320 4.11.3 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320 4.11.4 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320 4.12 Sport in Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320 4.12.1 Team sports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320

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4.12.2 Individual sports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321 4.12.3 Martial arts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322 4.12.4 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322 4.13 Vietnamese cuisine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322 4.13.1 Philosophical importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323 4.13.2 Cultural importance

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324

4.13.3 Regional variations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324 4.13.4 Cooking techniques

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325

4.13.5 Typical Vietnamese family meal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325 4.13.6 Feast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326 4.13.7 Imperial cuisine 4.13.8 Popularity 4.13.9 Proverbs

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327

4.13.10 Food in relation to lifestyle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327 4.13.11 Popular dishes

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328

4.13.12 Condiments and sauces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331 4.13.13 Food colourings

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331

4.13.14 Herbs and spices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331 4.13.15 Beverages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332 4.13.16 Exotic dishes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332 4.13.17 Common ingredients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333 4.13.18 Vietnamese utensils

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333

4.13.19 Historical inﬂuences

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334

4.13.20 Tet Holiday specialty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334 4.13.21 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334 4.13.22 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334 4.13.23 Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335 5

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Chapter 1

History of Vietnam 1.1 Vietnam

the highest in the world,* [8] and, in 2011, it had the highest Global Growth Generators Index among 11 major economies.* [9] Its successful economic reforms resulted in its joining the World Trade Organization in 2007.

Coordinates: 16°10′N 107°50′E / 16.167°N 107.833°E Vietnam (UK /ˌvjɛtˈnæm, -ˈnɑːm/, US * i/ˌviːətˈnɑːm, ˈnæm/;* [6] Vietnamese: Việt Nam [viət˨ næm˧]), officially the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV; Vietnamese: Cộng Hòa Xã Hội Chủ Nghĩa Việt Nam ( listen)), is the easternmost country on the Indochina Peninsula in Southeast Asia. With an estimated 90.5 million inhabitants as of 2014, it is the world's 14th-mostpopulous country, and the eighth-most-populous Asian country. The name Vietnam translates as “Southern Viet”(synonymous with the much older term Nam Viet); it was first officially adopted in 1802 by Emperor Gia Long, and was adopted again in 1945 with the founding of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh. The country is bordered by China to the north, Laos to the northwest, Cambodia to the southwest, and Malaysia across the South China Sea to the southeast.* [lower-alpha 5] Its capital city has been Hanoi since the reunification of North and South Vietnam in 1975.

1.1.1 Etymology Main article: Names of Vietnam The name Việt Nam (Vietnamese pronunciation: [viə̀ t naːm]) is a variation of Nam Việt (Chinese: 南越; pinyin: Nányuè; literally Southern Việt), a name that can be traced back to the Triệu Dynasty of the 2nd century BC.* [10] The word Việt originated as a shortened form of Bách Việt (Chinese: 百越; pinyin: Bǎiyuè), a word applied to a group of peoples then living in southern China and Vietnam.* [11] The form“Vietnam”(越南) is ﬁrst recorded in the 16th-century oracular poem Sấm Trạng Trình. The name has also been found on 12 steles carved in the 16th and 17th centuries, including one at Bao Lam Pagoda in Haiphong that dates to 1558.* [12] Between 1804 and 1813, the name was used oﬃcially by Emperor Gia Long.* [lower-alpha 6] It was revived in the early 20th century by Phan Bội Châu's History of the Loss of Vietnam, and later by the Vietnamese Nationalist Party.* [13] The country was usually called Annam until 1945, when both the imperial government in Huế and the Viet Minh government in Hanoi adopted Việt Nam.* [14]

Vietnam was part of Imperial China for over a millennium, from 111 BC to AD 939. The Vietnamese became independent in 939, following the Vietnamese victory in the Battle of Bạch Đằng River. Successive Vietnamese royal dynasties flourished as the nation expanded geographically and politically into Southeast Asia, until the Indochina Peninsula was colonized by the French in the mid-19th century. Following a Japanese occupation in the 1940s, the Vietnamese fought French rule in the First Indochina War, eventually expelling the French in 1954. Thereafter, Vietnam was divided politically into two rival states, North and South Vietnam. Conflict between the two sides intensified, with heavy intervention from the United States, in what is known as the Vietnam War. The war ended with a North Vietnamese victory in 1975.

1.1.2 History Main article: History of Vietnam

Prehistory and ancient history

Vietnam was then uniﬁed under a communist government but remained impoverished and politically isolated. In 1986, the government initiated a series of economic and political reforms which began Vietnam's path towards integration into the world economy.* [8] By 2000, it had established diplomatic relations with all nations. Since 2000, Vietnam's economic growth rate has been among

Main article: Đông Sơn culture Archaeological excavations have revealed the existence of humans in what is now Vietnam as early as the Paleolithic age. Homo erectus fossils dating to around 500,000 BC have been found in caves in Lạng Sơn and Nghệ An provinces in northern Vietnam.* [15] The oldest 1

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM

A Đông Sơn bronze drum, circa 800 BC

Homo sapiens fossils from mainland Southeast Asia are of Middle Pleistocene provenance, and include isolated tooth fragments from Tham Om and Hang Hum.* [16] Teeth attributed to Homo sapiens from the Late Pleistocene have also been found at Dong Can,* [17] and from the Early Holocene at Mai Da Dieu,* [17] Lang Gao* [18] and Lang Cuom.* [19] By about 1000 BC, the development of wet-rice cultivation and bronze casting in the Ma River and Red River floodplains led to the flourishing of the Đông Sơn culture, notable for its elaborate bronze drums. At this time, the early Vietnamese kingdoms of Văn Lang and Âu Lạc appeared, and the culture's influence spread to other parts of Southeast Asia, including Maritime Southeast Asia, Map of Vietnam showing the conquest of the south (the Nam tiến), 1069–1757 throughout the first millennium BC.* [20]* [21]* [22] Dynastic Vietnam The Hồng Bàng dynasty of the Hùng kings is considered the first Vietnamese state, known in Vietnamese as Văn Lang. In 257 BC, the last Hùng king was defeated by Thục Phán, who consolidated the Lạc Việt and Âu Việt tribes to form the Âu Lạc, proclaiming himself An Dương Vương. In 207 BC, a Chinese general named Zhao Tuo defeated An Dương Vương and consolidated Âu Lạc into Nanyue. However, Nanyue was itself incorporated into the empire of the Chinese Han dynasty in 111 BC after the Han–Nanyue War. For the next thousand years, Vietnam remained mostly under Chinese rule.* [23] Early independence movements, such as those of the Trưng Sisters and Lady Triệu, were only temporarily successful, though the region gained a longer period of independence as Vạn Xuân under the Anterior Lý dynasty between AD 544 and 602.* [24] By the early 10th century, Vietnam had gained autonomy, but not true independence, under the Khúc family.

900 1100 1475 1650 1760

a millennium of Chinese domination.* [25] Renamed as Đại Việt (Great Viet), the nation enjoyed a golden era under the Lý and Trần dynasties. During the rule of the Trần Dynasty, Đại Việt repelled three Mongol invasions.* [26] Meanwhile, Buddhism ﬂourished and became the state religion.

Following the 1406–7 Ming–Hồ War which overthrew the Hồ dynasty, Vietnamese independence was brieﬂy interrupted by the Chinese Ming dynasty, but was restored by Lê Lợi, the founder of the Lê dynasty. The Vietnamese dynasties reached their zenith in the Lê dynasty of the 15th century, especially during the reign of Emperor Lê Thánh Tông (1460–1497). Between the 11th and 18th centuries, Vietnam expanded southward in a process known as nam tiến ("southward expansion"),* [27] of Champa and part In AD 938, the Vietnamese lord Ngô Quyền defeated the eventually conquering *the kingdom * Khmer Empire. [28] [29] of the forces of the Chinese Southern Han state at Bạch Đằng River and achieved full independence for Vietnam after From the 16th century onwards, civil strife and frequent

1.1. VIETNAM

political inﬁghting engulfed much of Vietnam. First, the Chinese-supported Mạc dynasty challenged the Lê dynasty's power. After the Mạc dynasty was defeated, the Lê dynasty was nominally reinstalled, but actual power was divided between the northern Trịnh lords and the southern Nguyễn lords, who engaged in a civil war for more than four decades before a truce was called in the 1670s. During this time, the Nguyễn expanded southern Vietnam into the Mekong Delta, annexing the Central Highlands and the Khmer lands in the Mekong Delta.

itary conquests between 1859 and 1885. In 1862, the southern third of the country became the French colony of Cochinchina. By 1884, the entire country had come under French rule and was formally integrated into the union of French Indochina in 1887. The French administration imposed significant political and cultural changes on Vietnamese society. A Western-style system of modern education was developed, and Roman Catholicism was propagated widely. Most French settlers in Indochina were concentrated in Cochinchina, particularly in the region of Saigon.* [31] The royalist Cần Vương moveThe division of the country ended a century later when the Tây Sơn brothers established a new dynasty. How- ment rebelled against French rule and was defeated in the 1890s after a decade of resistance. Guerrillas of the Cần ever, their rule did not last long, and they were defeated of Vietnam's by the remnants of the Nguyễn lords, led by Nguyễn Ánh Vương movement murdered around a third * [32] Christian population during this period. * and aided by the French. [30] Nguyễn Ánh unified Vietnam, and established the Nguyễn dynasty, ruling under Developing a plantation economy to promote the export the name Gia Long. of tobacco, indigo, tea and coffee, the French largely ignored increasing calls for Vietnamese self-government and civil rights. A nationalist political movement soon 1862–1945: French Indochina emerged, with leaders such as Phan Bội Châu, Phan Chu Trinh, Phan Đình Phùng, Emperor Hàm Nghi and Ho Chi Minh fighting or calling for independence. However, the 1930 Yên Bái mutiny of the Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng was suppressed easily.* [33] The French maintained full control of their colonies until World War II, when the war in the Pacific led to the Japanese invasion of French Indochina in 1940. Afterwards, the Japanese Empire was allowed to station its troops in Vietnam while permitting the pro-Vichy French colonial administration to continue. Japan exploited Vietnam's natural resources to support its military campaigns, culminating in a full-scale takeover of the country in March 1945 and the Vietnamese Famine of 1945, which caused up to two million deaths.* [34]

1946–54: First Indochina War Main articles: First Indochina War, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, State of Vietnam, State of Vietnam referendum, 1955 and Operation Passage to Freedom In 1941, the Viet Minh – a communist and nationalist liberation movement – emerged under the Marxist–Leninist revolutionary Ho Chi Minh, who sought independence for Vietnam from France and the end of the Japanese occupation. Following the military defeat of Japan and the fall of its puppet Empire of Vietnam in August 1945, the Viet Minh occupied Hanoi and proclaimed a provisional government, which asserted national independence on 2 September. In the same year, the Provisional Government of the French Republic sent the French Far East French Indochina in 1913 Expeditionary Corps to restore colonial rule, and the Viet Main articles: Cochinchina Campaign, Sino-French Minh began a guerrilla campaign against the French in War, French Indochina and Empire of Vietnam late 1946.* [35] The resulting First Indochina War lasted until July 1954.* [36] Vietnam's independence was gradually eroded by France The defeat of French and Vietnamese loyalists in the – aided by large Catholic militias – in a series of mil- 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu allowed Ho Chi Minh to

4 negotiate a ceaseﬁre from a favorable position at the subsequent Geneva Conference. The colonial administration was ended and French Indochina was dissolved under the Geneva Accords of 1954, which separated the loyalist forces from the communists at the 17th parallel north with the Vietnamese Demilitarized Zone.* [lower-alpha 7] Two states formed after the partition – Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the north and Emperor Bảo Đại's State of Vietnam in the south. A 300-day period of free movement was permitted, during which almost a million northerners, mainly Catholics, moved south, fearing persecution by the communists.* [40]

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM gious opposition, imprisoning or executing tens of thousands.* [49]* [50]

In 1963, Buddhist discontent with Diệm's regime erupted into mass demonstrations, leading to a violent government crackdown.* [51] This led to the collapse of Diệm's relationship with the United States, and ultimately to the 1963 coup in which Diệm and Nhu were assassinated.* [52] The Diệm era was followed by more than a dozen successive military governments, before the pairing of Air Marshal Nguyễn Cao Kỳ and General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu took control in mid-1965. Thieu gradually outmaneuvered Ky and cemented his grip on power The partition of Vietnam was not intended to be per- in fraudulent elections in 1967 and 1971.* [53] Under manent by the Geneva Accords, which stipulated that this political instability, the communists began to gain Vietnam would be reunited after elections in 1956.* [41] ground. However, in 1955, the State of Vietnam's Prime Minis- To support South Vietnam's struggle against the comter, Ngô Đình Diệm, toppled Bảo Đại in a fraudulent ref- munist insurgency, the United States began increasing erendum organised by his brother Ngô Đình Nhu, and its contribution of military advisers, using the 1964 proclaimed himself president of the Republic of Viet- Tonkin Gulf incident as a pretext for such intervention. nam.* [42] US forces became involved in ground combat operations in 1965, and at their peak they numbered more than 500,000.* [54]* [55] The US also engaged in a sus1954–1975: Vietnam War tained aerial bombing campaign. Meanwhile, China and signifiMain articles: Vietnam War and Role of the United States the Soviet Union provided North Vietnam with * * cant material aid and 15,000 combat advisers. [56] [57] in the Vietnam War Communist forces supplying the Viet Cong carried supThe pro-Hanoi Viet Cong began a guerrilla camplies along the Ho Chi Minh trail, which passed through Laos.* [58] The communists attacked South Vietnamese targets during the 1968 Tet Offensive. Although the campaign failed militarily, it shocked the American establishment, and turned US public opinion against the war.* [59]* [60] Facing an increasing casualty count, rising domestic opposition to the war, and growing international condemnation, the US began withdrawing from ground combat roles in the early 1970s. This process also entailed an unsuccessful effort to strengthen and stabilize South Vietnam.* [61]

U.S. helicopter spraying chemical defoliants (probably Agent Orange) over the Mekong Delta, 1969

paign in the late 1950s to overthrow Diệm's government.* [43] In the North, the communist government launched a land reform program,* [44] and executed between 50,000* [45] and 172,000* [44] people in campaigns against wealthy farmers and landowners, amid broader purges.* [44]* [46]* [47]* [48] In 1960 and 1962, the Soviet Union and North Vietnam signed treaties providing for further Soviet military support. In the South, Diệm went about crushing political and reli-

Following the Paris Peace Accords of 27 January 1973, all American combat troops were withdrawn by 29 March 1973. In December 1974, North Vietnam captured the province of Phước Long and started a full-scale offensive, culminating in the Fall of Saigon on 30 April 1975.* [62] South Vietnam was briefly ruled by a provisional government while under military occupation by North Vietnam. On 2 July 1976, North and South Vietnam were merged to form the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.* [2] The war left Vietnam devastated, with the total death toll standing at between 800,000 and 3.1 million.* [34]* [63]* [64] 1976–present: reunification and reforms Main article: Doi Moi In the aftermath of the war, under Lê Duẩn's administration, the government embarked on a mass campaign of collectivization of farms and factories.* [65] This caused economic chaos and resulted in triple-digit in-

1.1. VIETNAM

5 mented a series of free-market reforms – known as Đổi Mới “ ( Renovation”) – which carefully managed the transition from a planned economy to a "socialist-oriented market economy".* [81]* [82] Though the authority of the state remained unchallenged under Đổi Mới, the government encouraged private ownership of farms and factories, economic deregulation and foreign investment, while maintaining control over strategic industries.* [82] The Vietnamese economy subsequently achieved strong growth in agricultural and industrial production, construction, exports and foreign investment. However, these reforms have also caused a rise in income inequality and gender disparities.* [83]* [84]* [85]

1.1.3 Government and politics Main articles: Politics of Vietnam and Military of Vietnam The Socialist Republic of Vietnam, along with China,

Saigon Trade Center, one of the ﬁrst skyscrapers to be built in Ho Chi Minh City after the Doi Moi reforms

flation, while national reconstruction efforts progressed slowly. At least one million South Vietnamese were sent to reeducation camps, with an estimated 165,000 prisoners dying.* [66]* [67] Between 100,000* [66]* [68]* [69] and 200,000* [70] South Vietnamese were executed in The Presidential Palace in Hanoi, formerly the Palace of The extrajudicial killings;* [71] another 50,000 died perform- Governor-General of French Indochina. ing hard labor in “New Economic Zones”.* [66]* [72] In the late 1970s and early 1980s, millions of people fled the country in crudely built boats, creating an international humanitarian crisis;* [73]* [74] hundreds of thousands died at sea.* [75] In 1978, the Vietnamese military invaded Cambodia to remove from power the Khmer Rouge, who had been attacking Vietnamese border villages.* [76] Vietnam was victorious, installing a government in Cambodia which ruled until 1989.* [77] This action worsened relations with the Chinese, who launched a brief incursion into northern Vietnam in 1979.* [78] This conflict caused Vietnam to rely even more heavily on Soviet economic and military aid. At the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in December 1986, reformist politicians replaced the “old guard”government with new leadership.* [79]* [80] The reformers were led by 71-year-old Nguyễn Văn Linh, who became the party's new general secretary.* [79]* [80] Linh and the reformers imple-

The Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum in Hanoi.

Cuba, and Laos, is one of the world's four remaining oneparty socialist states oﬃcially espousing communism. Its current state constitution, 2013 Constitution, asserts the

6 central role of the Communist Party of Vietnam in all organs of government, politics and society. The General Secretary of the Communist Party performs numerous key administrative and executive functions, controlling the party's national organization and state appointments, as well as setting policy. Only political organizations affiliated with or endorsed by the Communist Party are permitted to contest elections in Vietnam. These include the Vietnamese Fatherland Front and worker and trade unionist parties. Although the state remains officially committed to socialism as its defining creed, its economic policies have grown increasingly capitalist,* [86] with The Economist characterizing its leadership as“ardently capitalist communists”.* [87]

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM courts possess special jurisdiction in matters of national security. Vietnam maintains the death penalty for numerous oﬀences; as of February 2014, there are around 700 inmates on death row in Vietnam.* [88] Military

The Vietnam People's Armed Forces consists of the Vietnam People's Army, the Vietnam People's Public Security and the Vietnam Civil Defense Force. The Vietnam People's Army (VPA) is the oﬃcial name for the active military services of Vietnam, and is subdivided into the Vietnam People's Ground Forces, the Vietnam People's Navy, the Vietnam People's Air Force, the Vietnam Border Defense Force and the Vietnam Coast Guard. The VPA has an active manpower of around 450,000, but its Legislature total strength, including paramilitary forces, may be as The National Assembly of Vietnam is the unicameral high as 5,000,000.* [89] In 2011, Vietnam's military exlegislature of the state, composed of 498 members. penditure totalled approximately US$2.48 billion, equivHeaded by a Chairman, it is superior to both the execu- alent to around 2.5% of its 2010 GDP.* [90] tive and judicial branches, with all government ministers being appointed from members of the National AssemInternational relations bly. Executive

Main article: Foreign relations of Vietnam Throughout its history, Vietnam's key foreign relation-

Vietnamese President Trương Tấn Sang with his ﬁrst lady during the Moscow Victory Day Parade, 9 May 2015

Vietnamese troops on one of the disputed Spratly Islands in 2009.

The President of Vietnam is the titular head of state and the nominal commander-in-chief of the military, serving as the Chairman of the Council of Supreme Defense and Security. The Prime Minister of Vietnam is the head of government, presiding over a council of ministers composed of three deputy prime ministers and the heads of 26 ministries and commissions.

ship has been with its largest neighbour and one-time imperial master, China. Vietnam's sovereign principles and insistence on cultural independence have been laid down in numerous documents over the centuries, such as the 11th-century patriotic poem Nam quốc sơn hà and the 1428 proclamation of independence Bình Ngô đại cáo. Though China and Vietnam are now formally at peace, signiﬁcant territorial tensions remain between the two countries.* [91]

Judiciary The Supreme People's Court of Vietnam, headed by a Chief Justice, is the country's highest court of appeal, though it is also answerable to the National Assembly. Beneath the Supreme People's Court stand the provincial municipal courts and numerous local courts. Military

Currently, the formal mission statement of Vietnamese foreign policy is to: “Implement consistently the foreign policy line of independence, self-reliance, peace, cooperation and development; the foreign policy of openness and diversiﬁcation and multi-lateralization of international relations. Proactively and actively engage in international economic integration while expanding inter-

1.1. VIETNAM

national cooperation in other ﬁelds.”* [92] Vietnam furthermore declares itself to be“a friend and reliable partner of all countries in the international community, actively taking part in international and regional cooperation processes.”* [92] By December 2007, Vietnam had established diplomatic relations with 172 countries, including the United States, which normalized relations in 1995.* [93]* [94] Vietnam holds membership of 63 international organizations, including the United Nations, ASEAN, NAM, Francophonie and WTO. It also maintains relations with over 650 non-government organizations.* [95] Administrative subdivisions Main articles: Provinces of Vietnam, Municipalities of Vietnam and Districts of Vietnam Vietnam is divided into 58 provinces (Vietnamese: tỉnh, from the Chinese 省, shěng). There are also ﬁve municipalities (thành phố trực thuộc trung ương), which are administratively on the same level as provinces. A clickable map of Vietnam exhibiting its 58 provinces and 5 centrally controlled municipalities.

The provinces are subdivided into provincial municipalities (thành phố trực thuộc tỉnh), townships (thị xã) and Topographic map of Vietnam. counties (huyện), which are in turn subdivided into towns (thị trấn) or communes (xã). The centrally controlled municipalities are subdivided into districts (quận) and counties, which are further subdivided into wards (phường). relatively ﬂat plateaus of basalt soil, the highlands account for 16% of the country's arable land and 22% of its total forested land. The soil in much of southern Vietnam is 1.1.4 Geography relatively poor in nutrients. Main article: Geography of Vietnam Vietnam is located on the eastern Indochina Peninsula between the latitudes 8° and 24°N, and the longitudes 102° and 110°E. It covers a total area of approximately 331,210 km2 (127,881 sq mi),* [3] making it almost the size of Germany. The combined length of the country's land boundaries is 4,639 km (2,883 mi), and its coastline is 3,444 km (2,140 mi) long.* [3] At its narrowest point in the central Quảng Bình Province, the country is as little as 50 kilometres (31 mi) across, though it widens to around 600 kilometres (370 mi) in the north. Vietnam's land is mostly hilly and densely forested, with level land covering no more than 20%. Mountains account for 40% of the country's land area, and tropical forests cover around 42%.

The Red River Delta, a ﬂat, roughly triangular region covering 15,000 km2 (5,792 sq mi),* [96] is smaller but more intensely developed and more densely populated than the Mekong River Delta. Once an inlet of the Gulf of Tonkin, it has been ﬁlled in over the millennia by riverine alluvial deposits. The delta, covering about 40,000 km2 (15,444 sq mi), is a low-level plain no more than 3 meters (9.8 ft) above sea level at any point. It is criss-crossed by a maze of rivers and canals, which carry so much sediment that the delta advances 60 to 80 meters (196.9 to 262.5 ft) into the sea every year.

The northern part of the country consists mostly of highlands and the Red River Delta. Phan Xi Păng, located in Lào Cai Province, is the highest mountain in Viet- A panorama of Vietnam's Hạ Long Bay, a UNESCO World Hernam, standing 3,143 m (10,312 ft) high. Southern Viet- itage Site. nam is divided into coastal lowlands, the mountains of the Annamite Range, and extensive forests. Comprising ﬁve

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM

Climate Main article: Climate of Vietnam Because of diﬀerences in latitude and the marked variety

The saola, one of the world's rarest mammals, is native to Vietnam. Mai Châu village

in topographical relief, the climate tends to vary considerably from place to place. During the winter or dry season, extending roughly from November to April, the monsoon winds usually blow from the northeast along the Chinese coast and across the Gulf of Tonkin, picking up considerable moisture. Consequently, the winter season in most parts of the country is dry only by comparison with the rainy or summer season. The average annual temperature is generally higher in the plains than in the mountains, and higher in the south than in the north. Temperatures vary less in the southern plains around Ho Chi Minh City and the Mekong Delta, ranging between 21 and 28 °C (69.8 and 82.4 °F) over the course of the year. Seasonal variations in the mountains and plateaus and in the north are much more dramatic, with temperatures varying from 5 °C (41.0 °F) in December and January to 37 °C (98.6 °F) in July and August.

Vietnam is furthermore home to 1,438 species of freshwater microalgae, constituting 9.6% of all microalgae species, as well as 794 aquatic invertebrates and 2,458 species of sea ﬁsh.* [97] In recent years, 13 genera, 222 species, and 30 taxa of ﬂora have been newly described in Vietnam.* [97] Six new mammal species, including the saola, giant muntjac and Tonkin snub-nosed monkey have also been discovered, along with one new bird species, the endangered Edwards's pheasant.* [98] In the late 1980s, a small population of Javan rhinoceros was found in Cát Tiên National Park. However, the last individual of the species in Vietnam was reportedly shot in 2010.* [99] In agricultural genetic diversity, Vietnam is one of the world's twelve original cultivar centers. The Vietnam National Cultivar Gene Bank preserves 12,300 cultivars of 115 species.* [97] The Vietnamese government spent US$49.07 million on the preservation of biodiversity in 2004 alone, and has established 126 conservation areas, including 28 national parks.* [97]

Ecology and biodiversity See also: Environmental issues in Vietnam

1.1.5 Economy

Main articles: Economy of Vietnam and Five-Year Plans Vietnam has two World Natural Heritage Sites – Hạ Long of Vietnam Bay and Phong Nha-Kẻ Bàng National Park – and six In 2012, Vietnam's nominal GDP reached US$138 bilbiosphere reserves, including Cần Giờ Mangrove Forest, Cát Tiên, Cát Bà, Kiên Giang, the Red River Delta, and Western Nghệ An. Vietnam lies in the Indomalaya ecozone. According to the 2005 National Environmental Present Condition Report.* [97] Vietnam is one of twenty-five countries considered to possess a uniquely high level of biodiversity. It is ranked 16th worldwide in biological diversity, being home to approximately 16% of the world's species. 15,986 species of flora have been identified in the country, of which 10% are endemic, while Vietnam's fauna include 307 nematode species, 200 oligochaeta, 145 acarina, 113 springtails, 7,750 insects, 260 reptiles, 120 amphibians, 840 birds and 310 mammals, of which 100 Paddy fields in Sa Pa. birds and 78 mammals are endemic.* [97]

1.1. VIETNAM

9 forms as part of the Đổi Mới reform program. Private ownership was encouraged in industries, commerce and agriculture.* [103] Thanks largely to these reforms, Vietnam achieved around 8% annual GDP growth between 1990 to 1997, and the economy continued to grow at an annual rate of around 7% from 2000 to 2005, making Vietnam one of the world's fastest growing economies. Growth remained strong even in the face of the late-2000s global recession, holding at 6.8% in 2010, but Vietnam's year-on-year inﬂation rate hit 11.8% in December 2010, according to a GSO estimate. The Vietnamese dong was devalued three times in 2010 alone.* [104]

Hanoi's Keangnam Hanoi Landmark Tower, the tallest building in Vietnam.

lion, with a nominal GDP per capita of $1,527, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).* [4] According to a December 2005 forecast by Goldman Sachs, the Vietnamese economy will become the world's 21st-largest by 2025, with an estimated nominal GDP of $436 billion and a nominal GDP per capita of $4,357.* [100] According to a 2008 forecast by PricewaterhouseCoopers, Vietnam may be the fastestgrowing of the world's emerging economies by 2025, with a potential growth rate of almost 10% per annum in real dollar terms.* [101] In 2012, HSBC predicted that Vietnam's total GDP would surpass those of Norway, Singapore and Portugal by 2050.* [102] Vietnam has been, for much of its history, a predominantly agricultural civilization based on wet rice cultivation. There is also an industry for Bauxite mining in Vietnam, an important material for the production of aluminum. However, the Vietnam War destroyed much of the country's agrarian economy, leading the post-war government to implement a planned economy to revitalise agriculture and industrialise the nation. The collectivization of farms, factories and economic capital was implemented, and millions of people were put to work in government programs. For a decade following the Vietnam War, Vietnam's economy was plagued with ineﬃciency and corruption in state programs, poor quality and underproduction, and restrictions on economic activity. It also suﬀered from the post-war trade embargo instituted by the United States and most of Europe. These problems were compounded by the erosion of the Soviet bloc, which included Vietnam's main trading partners, in the late 1980s.

Manufacturing, information technology and high-tech industries now form a large and fast-growing part of the national economy. Though Vietnam is a relative newcomer to the oil industry, it is currently the third-largest oil producer in Southeast Asia, with a total 2011 output of 318,000 barrels per day (50,600 m3 /d).* [105] In 2010, Vietnam was ranked as the 8th largest crude petroleum producers in the Asia and Pacific region.* [106] Like its Chinese neighbours, Vietnam continues to make use of centrally planned economic five-year plans. Deep poverty, defined as the percentage of the population living on less than $1 per day, has declined significantly in Vietnam, and the relative poverty rate is now less than that of China, India, and the Philippines.* [107] This decline in the poverty rate can be attributed to equitable economic policies aimed at improving living standards and preventing the rise of inequality; these policies have included egalitarian land distribution during the initial stages of the Đổi Mới program, investment in poorer remote areas, and subsidising of education and healthcare.* [108] According to the IMF, the unemployment rate in Vietnam stood at 4.46% in 2012.* [4] Trade

Floating market of Cần Thơ

Since the early 2000s, Vietnam has applied sequenced trade liberalisation, a two-track approach opening some In 1986, the Sixth National Congress of the Communist sectors of the economy to international markets while Party introduced socialist-oriented market economic re- protecting others.* [108]* [109] In July 2006, Vietnam up-

10 dated its intellectual property legislation to comply with TRIPS, and it became a member of the WTO on 11 January 2007. Vietnam is now one of Asia's most open economies: two-way trade was valued at around 160% of GDP in 2006, more than twice the contemporary ratio for China and over four times the ratio for India.* [110] Vietnam's chief trading partners include China, Japan, Australia, the ASEAN countries, the United States and Western Europe. Vietnam's Customs oﬃce reported in July 2013 that the total value of international merchandise trade for the ﬁrst half of 2013 was US$124 billion, which was 15.7% higher than the same period in 2012. Mobile phones and their parts were both imported and exported in large numbers, while in the natural resources market, crude oil was a top-ranking export and high levels of iron and steel were imported during this period. The U.S. was the country that purchased the highest amount of Vietnam's exports, while Chinese goods were the most popular Vietnamese import.* [111]

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM Vietnamese scholars developed many academic fields during the dynastic era, most notably social sciences and the humanities. The country boasts a millennium-deep legacy of analytical histories, such as the Đại Việt sử ký toàn thư of Ngô Sĩ Liên. Vietnamese monks led by the abdicated Emperor Trần Nhân Tông developed the Trúc Lâm Zen branch of philosophy in the 13th century. Arithmetics and geometry have been widely taught in Vietnam since the 15th century, using the textbook Đại thành toán pháp by Lương Thế Vinh as a basis. Lương Thế Vinh introduced Vietnam to the notion of zero, while Mạc Hiển Tích used the term số ẩn (en:“unknown/secret/hidden number”) to refer to negative numbers. Vietnamese scholars furthermore produced numerous encyclopedias, such as Lê Quý Đôn's Vân đài loại ngữ. In recent times, Vietnamese scientists have made many significant contributions in various fields of study, most notably in mathematics. Hoàng Tụy pioneered the applied mathematics field of global optimization in the 20th century, while Ngô Bảo Châu won the 2010 Fields Medal for his proof of fundamental lemma in the theory of automorphic forms. Vietnam is currently working to develop an indigenous space program, and plans to construct the US$600 million Vietnam Space Center by 2018.* [114] Vietnam has also made significant advances in the development of robots, such as the TOPIO humanoid model.* [115] In 2010, Vietnam's total state spending on science and technology equalled around 0.45% of its GDP.* [116]

As a result of several land reform measures, Vietnam has become a major exporter of agricultural products. It is now the world's largest producer of cashew nuts, with a one-third global share; the largest producer of black pepper, accounting for one-third of the world's market; and the second-largest rice exporter in the world, after Thailand. Vietnam is the world's second largest exporter of coffee.* [112] Vietnam has the highest proportion of land use for permanent crops – 6.93% – of any nation in the Greater Mekong Subregion. Other primary exports include tea, rubber, and fishery products. However, agriculture's share of Vietnam's GDP has fallen in recent Transport decades, declining from 42% in 1989 to 20% in 2006, as production in other sectors of the economy has risen. Main article: Transport in Vietnam In 2014 Vietnam negotiated a free trade agreement with the European Union, giving the country access to the EU's Much of Vietnam's modern transport network was origiGeneralized System of Preferences. This provides prefnally developed under French rule to facilitate the transerential access to European markets for developing counportation of raw materials, and was reconstructed and ex* tries through reduced tariffs. [113] tensively modernized following the Vietnam War. Science and technology

The TOPIO 3.0 humanoid robot

Air Main article: Air transport in Vietnam Vietnam operates 21 major civil airports, including three international gateways: Noi Bai in Hanoi, Da Nang International Airport in Da Nang, and Tan Son Nhat in Ho Chi Minh City. Tan Son Nhat is the nation's largest airport, handling 75% of international passenger traﬃc. According to a state-approved plan, Vietnam will have 10 international airports by 2015 – besides the aforementioned three, these include Lien Khuong International Airport, Phu Bai International Airport, Cam Ranh International Airport, Phu Quoc International Airport, Cat Bi International Airport, Cần Thơ International Airport and Long Thanh International Airport. The planned Long Thanh International Airport will have an annual service capacity of 100 million passengers once it becomes fully operational in 2020.

1.1. VIETNAM

11 Rail

Main article: Rail transport in Vietnam

Vietnam's primary cross-country rail service is the Reuniﬁcation Express, which runs from Ho Chi Minh City to Hanoi, covering a distance of nearly 2,000 kilometres. From Hanoi, railway lines branch out to the northeast, north and west; the eastbound line runs from Hanoi to Hạ Long Bay, the northbound line from Hanoi to Thái Nguyên, and the northeast line from Hanoi to Lào Cai.

A Vietnam Airlines Boeing 777 at Tan Son Nhat International Airport

Vietnam Airlines, the state-owned national airline, maintains a ﬂeet of 69 passenger aircraft,* [117]* [118] and aims to operate 150 by 2020. Several private airlines are also in operation in Vietnam, including Air Mekong, Jetstar Paciﬁc Airlines, VASCO and VietJet Air.

In 2009, Vietnam and Japan signed a deal to build a high-speed railway using Japanese technology; numerous Vietnamese engineers were later sent to Japan to receive training in the operation and maintenance of high-speed trains. The railway will be a 1,630-km-long* [120] express route, serving a total of 26 stations, including Hanoi and the Thu Thiem terminus in Ho Chi Minh City.* [121] Using Japan's Shinkansen technology,* [122] the line will support trains travelling at a maximum speed of 360 kilometres (220 mi) per hour. The high-speed lines linking Hanoi to Vinh, Nha Trang and Ho Chi Minh City will be laid by 2015. From 2015 to 2020, construction will begin on the routes between Vinh and Nha Trang and between Hanoi and the northern provinces of Lào Cai and Lạng Sơn.

Water As a coastal country, Vietnam has many major sea ports, including Cam Ranh, Da Nang, Hai Phong, Ho Chi Minh City, Hong Gai, Qui Nhơn, Vũng Tàu and Nha Trang. Further inland, the country's extensive network of rivers play a key role in rural transportation, with over 17,700 kilometres (11,000 mi) of navigable waterways carrying ferries, barges and water taxis.* [123]* [124] In addition, the Mekong Delta and Red River Delta are vital to Vietnam's social and economic welfare – most of the country's population lives along or near these river deltas, and the major cities of Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi A section of the North–South Expressway linking Cầu Giẽ and are situated near the Mekong and Red River deltas, reNinh Bình spectively. Further out in the South China Sea, Vietnam currently controls the majority of the disputed Spratly Road Vietnam's road system includes national roads Islands, which are the source of longstanding disagreeadministered at the central level; provincial roads man- ments with China and other nearby nations.* [125] aged at the provincial level; district roads managed at the district level; urban roads managed by cities and towns; and commune roads managed at the commune level. Bi- Water supply and sanitation cycles, motor scooters and motorcycles remain the most popular forms of road transport in Vietnam's urban ar- Main article: Water supply and sanitation in Vietnam eas, although the number of privately owned automobiles is also on the rise, especially in the larger cities. Public Water supply and sanitation in Vietnam is characterized buses operated by private companies are the main mode by challenges and achievements. Among the achieveof long-distance travel for much of the population. ments is a substantial increase in access to water supply Road safety is a serious issue in Vietnam – on average, 30 people are killed in traﬃc accidents every day.* [119] Traﬃc congestion is a growing problem in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, as the cities' roads struggle to cope with the boom in automobile use.

and sanitation between 1990 and 2010, nearly universal metering, and increased investment in wastewater treatment since 2007. Among the challenges are continued widespread water pollution, poor service quality, low access to improved sanitation in rural areas, poor sustain-

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM

ability of rural water systems, insufficient cost recovery for urban sanitation, and the declining availability of foreign grant and soft loan funding as the Vietnamese economy grows and donors shift to loan financing. The government also promotes increased cost recovery through tariff revenues and has created autonomous water utilities at the provincial level, but the policy has had mixed success as tariff levels remain low and some utilities have engaged in activities outside their mandate.

1.1.6

Demographics

According to the 2009 census, the dominant Viet or Kinh ethnic group constituted nearly 73.6 million people, or 85.8% of the population. The Kinh population is concentrated mainly in the alluvial deltas and coastal plains of the country. A largely homogeneous social and ethnic group, the Kinh possess signiﬁcant political and economic inﬂuence over the country. However, Vietnam is also home to 54 ethnic minority groups, including the Hmong, Dao, Tay, Thai, and Nùng. Many ethnic minorities – such as the Muong, who are closely related to the Kinh – dwell in the highlands, which cover two-thirds of Vietnam's territory. Before the Vietnam War, the population of the Central Highlands was almost exclusively Degar (including over 40 tribal groups); however, Ngô Đình Diệm's South Vietnamese government enacted a program of resettling Kinh in indigenous areas.* [128] The Hoa (ethnic Chinese)* [129] and Khmer Krom people are mainly lowlanders. As Sino-Vietnamese relations soured in 1978 and 1979, some 450,000 Hoa left Vietnam.* [130]

Languages Main article: Vietnamese language

Hmong women in traditional dress in Sa Pa, northern Vietnam.

Main article: Demographics of Vietnam As of 2014, the population of Vietnam as standing at approximately 90.7 million people. The population had grown signiﬁcantly from the 1979 census, which showed the total population of reuniﬁed Vietnam to be 52.7 million.* [126] In 2012, the country's population was estimated at approximately 90.3 million.* [4] Currently, the total fertility rate of Vietnam is 1.8 (births per woman),* [127] which is largely due to the government's family planning policy, the two-child policy.

The oﬃcial national language of Vietnam is Vietnamese (Tiếng Việt), a tonal Mon–Khmer language which is spoken by the majority of the population. In its early history, Vietnamese writing used Chinese characters. In the 13th century, the Vietnamese developed their own set of characters, referred to as Chữ nôm. The folk epic Truyện Kiều (“The Tale of Kieu”, originally known as Đoạn trường tân thanh ) by Nguyễn Du was written in Chữ nôm. Quốc ngữ, the romanized Vietnamese alphabet used for spoken Vietnamese, was developed in the 17th century by the Jesuit Alexandre de Rhodes and several other Catholic missionaries.* [131] Quốc ngữ became widely popular and brought literacy to the Vietnamese masses during the French colonial period.* [131] Vietnam's minority groups speak a variety of languages, including Tày, Mường, Cham, Khmer, Chinese, Nùng, and H'Mông. The Montagnard peoples of the Central Highlands also speak a number of distinct languages.* [132] A number of sign languages have developed in the cities.

The French language, a legacy of colonial rule, is spoken by many educated Vietnamese as a second language, especially among the older generation and those educated in the former South Vietnam, where it was a principal language in administration, education and commerce; Vietnam remains a full member of the Francophonie, and education has revived some interest in the lanEthnicity guage.* [133]* [134] Russian – and to a much lesser extent German, Czech and Polish – are known among some Main articles: Vietnamese people and Ethnic groups in Vietnamese whose families had ties with the Soviet bloc during the Cold War.* [135] In recent years, as Vietnam's Vietnam contacts with Western nations have increased, English has

1.1. VIETNAM become more popular as a second language. The study of English is now obligatory in most schools, either alongside or in many cases, replacing French.* [135]* [136] Japanese and Korean have also grown in popularity as Vietnam's links with other East Asian nations have strengthened.

13 Church. Two-thirds of Vietnam's Protestants are reportedly members of ethnic minorities.* [142] Although a small religious minority, Protestantism is claimed to be the country's fastest-growing religion, expanding at a rate of 600% in the previous decade.* [143]

Religion Main article: Religion in Vietnam According to an analysis by the Pew Research Cen-

The main Cao Đài temple in the city of Tây Ninh

The Vietnamese government is widely seen as suspicious of Roman Catholicism. This mistrust originated during the 19th century, when some Catholics collaborated with the French colonists in conquering and ruling the country and in helping French attempts to install Catholic emperors, such as in the Lê Văn Khôi revolt of 1833. Furthermore, the Catholic Church's strongly Bell Tower of Bái Đính Temple in Ninh Bình Province anti-communist stance has made it an enemy of the Vietnamese state. The Vatican Church is officially banned, ter, in 2010 about 45.3% of the Vietnamese adhere and only government-controlled Catholic organisations to indigenous religions, 16.4% to Buddhism, 8.2% to are permitted. However, the Vatican has attempted to neChristianity, 0.4% to other faiths, and 29.6% of the popgotiate the opening of diplomatic relations with Vietnam ulation isn't religious.* [137] in recent years.* [144] According to the General Statistics Office of Vietnam's Several other minority faiths exist in Vietnam. A signifireport for 1 April 2009, 6.8 million (or 7.9% of the cant number of people are adherents of Caodaism, an intotal population) are practicing Buddhists, 5.7 million digenous folk religion which has structured itself on the (6.6%) are Catholics, 1.4 million (1.7%) are adherents model of the Catholic Church. Sunni and Cham Bani Isof Hòa Hảo, 0.8 million (0.9%) practise Caodaism, and lam is primarily practiced by the ethnic Cham minority, 0.7 million (0.9%) are Protestants. In total, 15,651,467 though there are also a few ethnic Vietnamese adherents Vietnamese (18.2%) are formally registered in a reliin the southwest. In total, there are approximately 70,000 gion.* [138] According to the 2009 census, while over 10 Muslims in Vietnam,* [145] while around 50,000 Hindus million people have taken refuge in the Three Jewels of and a small number of Baha'is are also in evidence. Buddhism,* [139]* [140] the vast majority of Vietnamese people practice ancestor worship in some form. Accord- The Vietnamese government rejects allegations that it ing to a 2007 report, 81% of the Vietnamese people do does not allow religious freedom. The state's official position on religion is that all citizens are free to their benot believe in God.* [141] lief, and that all religions are equal before the law.* [146] About 8% of the population are Christians, totalling Nevertheless, only government-approved religious organaround six million Roman Catholics and fewer than one isations are allowed; for example, the South Vietnammillion Protestants. Christianity was first introduced to founded Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam is banned Vietnam by Portuguese and Dutch traders in the 16th in favour of a communist-approved body.* [147] and 17th centuries, and was further propagated by French missionaries in the 19th and 20th centuries, and to a lesser extent, by American Protestant missionaries during the Education Vietnam War, largely among the Montagnards of South Vietnam. Main article: Education in Vietnam The largest Protestant churches are the Evangelical Vietnam has an extensive state-controlled network of Church of Vietnam and the Montagnard Evangelical schools, colleges and universities, and a growing num-

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM 250,000 hospital beds, or 14.8 beds per 10,000 people, according to the World Bank.* [154] Since the early 2000s, Vietnam has made signiﬁcant progress in combating malaria, with the malaria mortality rate falling to about 5% of its 1990s equivalent by 2005, after the country introduced improved antimalarial drugs and treatment. However, tuberculosis cases are on the rise, with 57 deaths per day reported in May 2004. With an intensiﬁed vaccination program, better hygiene, and foreign assistance, Vietnam hopes to reduce sharply the number of TB cases and annual new TB infections.* [154]

The University of Medicine in Hanoi.

ber of privately run and partially privatised institutions. General education in Vietnam is divided into ﬁve categories: kindergarten, elementary schools, middle schools, high schools, and universities. A large number of public schools have been constructed across the country to raise the national literacy rate, which stood at 90.3% in 2008.* [148] A large number of Vietnam's most acclaimed universities are based in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. Facing serious crises, Vietnam's education system is under a holistic program of reform launched by the government. Education is not free; therefore, some poor families may have trouble paying tuition for their children without some form of public or private assistance. Regardless, school enrollment is among the highest in the world,* [149]* [150] and the number of colleges and universities increased dramatically in the 2000s, from 178 in 2000 to 299 in 2005.

As of September 2005, Vietnam had diagnosed 101,291 HIV cases, of which 16,528 progressed to AIDS, and 9,554 died. However, the actual number of HIV-positive individuals is estimated to be much higher. On average, 40–50 new infections are reported every day in Vietnam. As of 2007, 0.5% of the population is estimated to be infected with HIV, and this ﬁgure has remained stable since 2005.* [156] In June 2004, the United States announced that Vietnam would be one of 15 nations to receive funding as part of a US$15 billion global AIDS relief plan.* [154]

1.1.7 Culture Main article: Culture of Vietnam See also: Vietnamese art, theatre, dance, literature and List of Vietnamese traditional games Vietnam's culture has developed over the centuries from

Health Main article: Health in Vietnam In 2009, Vietnam's national life expectancy stood at 76 years for women and 72 for men,* [151] and the infant mortality rate was 12 per 1,000 live births.* [152] By 2009, 85% of the population had access to improved water sources.* [151] However, malnutrition is still common in the rural provinces.* [153] In 2001, government spending on health care corresponded to just 0.9% of Vietnam's gross domestic product (GDP), with state subsidies covering only about 20% of health care expenses.* [154] In 1954, North Vietnam established a public health system that reached down to the hamlet level.* [155] After the national reuniﬁcation in 1975, a nationwide health service was established. In the late 1980s, the quality of healthcare declined to some degree as a result of budgetary constraints, a shift of responsibility to the provinces, and the introduction of charges. Inadequate funding has also contributed to a shortage of nurses, midwives, and hospital beds; in 2000, Vietnam had only

The Municipal Theatre in Ho Chi Minh City

indigenous ancient Đông Sơn culture with wet rice agriculture as its economic base. Some elements of the national culture have Chinese origins, drawing on elements of Confucianism and Taoism in its traditional political system and philosophy. Vietnamese society is structured around làng (ancestral villages); all Vietnamese mark a common ancestral anniversary on the tenth day of the third lunar month.* [157] The inﬂuences of immigrant peoples – such as the Cantonese, Hakka, Hokkien and Hainan cultures – can also be seen, while the national religion of Buddhism is strongly entwined with popular culture. In recent centuries, the inﬂuences of Western cultures, most notably France and the United States, have

1.1. VIETNAM

become evident in Vietnam. The traditional focuses of Vietnamese culture are humanity (nhân nghĩa) and harmony (hòa); family and community values are highly regarded. Vietnam reveres a number of key cultural symbols, such as the Vietnamese dragon, which is derived from crocodile and snake imagery; Vietnam's National Father, Lạc Long Quân, is depicted as a holy dragon. The lạc – a holy bird representing Vietnam's National Mother, Âu Cơ – is another prominent symbol, while turtle and horse images are also revered.* [158] In the modern era, the cultural life of Vietnam has been deeply inﬂuenced by government-controlled media and cultural programs. For many decades, foreign cultural inﬂuences – especially those of Western origin – were shunned. However, since the 1990s, Vietnam has seen a greater exposure to Southeast Asian, European and American culture and media.* [159] Media Main article: Media of Vietnam

The Vietnamese dan bau a monochord zither instrument

opera troupe.* [166] Throughout its history, Vietnamese has been most heavily impacted by the Chinese musical tradition, as an integral part, along with Korea, Mongolia and Japan.* [167] Nhã nhạc is the most popular form of imperial court music. Chèo is a form of generally satirical musical theatre. Xẩm or Hát xẩm (Xẩm singing) is a type of Vietnamese folk music. Quan họ (alternate singing) is popular in Hà Bắc (divided into Bắc Ninh and Bắc Giang Provinces) and across Vietnam. Hát chầu văn or hát văn is a spiritual form of music used to invoke spirits during ceremonies. Nhạc dân tộc cải biên is a modern form of Vietnamese folk music which arose in the 1950s. Ca trù (also hát ả đào) is a popular folk music. “Hò" can not be thought of as the southern style of Quan họ. There are a range of traditional instruments, including the Đàn bầu (a monochord zither), the Đàn gáo (a two-stringed ﬁddle with coconut body), and the Đàn nguyệt (a two-stringed fretted moon lute).

Vietnam's media sector is regulated by the government in accordance with the 2004 Law on Publication.* [160] It is generally perceived that Vietnam's media sector is controlled by the government to follow the official Communist Party line, though some newspapers are relatively outspoken.* [161] The Voice of Vietnam is the official staterun national radio broadcasting service, broadcasting internationally via shortwave using rented transmitters in other countries, and providing broadcasts from its website. Vietnam Television is the national television broadLiterature casting company. Since 1997, Vietnam has extensively regulated public Internet access, using both legal and technical means. The resulting lockdown is widely referred to as the "Bamboo Firewall".* [162] The collaborative project OpenNet Initiative classifies Vietnam's level of online political censorship to be “pervasive”,* [163] while Reporters Without Borders considers Vietnam to be one of 15 global “internet enemies”.* [164] Though the government of Vietnam claims to safeguard the country against obscene or sexually explicit content through its blocking efforts, many politically and religiously sensitive websites are also banned.* [165] Music

The Temple of Literature in Hanoi.

Traditional Vietnamese music varies between the country's northern and southern regions. Northern classical music is Vietnam's oldest musical form, and is traditionally more formal. The origins of Vietnamese classical music can be traced to the Mongol invasions of the 13th century, when the Vietnamese captured a Chinese

Vietnamese literature has a centuries-deep history. The country has a rich tradition of folk literature, based on the typical 6–to-8-verse poetic form named ca dao, which usually focuses on village ancestors and heroes.* [168] Written literature has been found dating back to the 10th-

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM

century Ngô dynasty, with notable ancient authors in- Tourism cluding Nguyễn Trãi, Trần Hưng Đạo, Nguyễn Du and Nguyễn Đình Chiểu. Some literary genres play an impor- Main article: Tourism in Vietnam tant role in theatrical performance, such as hát nói in ca Vietnam has become a major tourist destination since trù.* [169] Some poetic unions have also been formed in Vietnam, such as the Tao Đàn. Vietnamese literature has in recent times been inﬂuenced by Western styles, with the ﬁrst literary transformation movement – Thơ Mới – emerging in 1932.* [170]

Festivals Main article: List of festivals in Vietnam Vietnam has a plethora of festivals based on the lunar

Hội An's Ancient Town, a UNESCO World Heritage Site.

the 1990s, assisted by significant state and private investment, particularly in coastal regions.* [171] About 3.77 million international tourists visited Vietnam in 2009 alone.* [172] Popular tourist destinations include the former imperial capital of Hué, the World Heritage Sites of Phong NhaKẻ Bàng National Park, Hội An and Mỹ Sơn, coastal regions such as Nha Trang, the caves of Hạ Long Bay and the Marble Mountains. Numerous tourist projects are under construction, such as the Bình Dương tourist complex, which possesses the largest artificial sea in Southeast Asia.* [173] On 14 February 2011, Joe Jackson, the father of American pop star Michael Jackson, attended a ground breaking ceremony for what will be Southeast Asia's largest entertainment complex, a five-star hotel and amusement park called Happyland. The US$2 billion project, which has been designed to accommodate 14 million tourists annually, is located in southern Long An Province, near Ho Chi Minh City. It is expected that the complex will be completed in 2014.* [174] Clothing The áo dài, a formal girl's dress, is worn for special occasions such as weddings and religious festivals. White áo dài is the required uniform for girls in many high schools across Vietnam. Áo dài was once worn by both genders, but today it is mostly the preserve of women, although men do wear it to some occasions, such as traditional weddings.* [175] Other examples of traditional A traditional Tết (Lunar New Year) tree. Vietnamese clothing include the áo tứ thân, a four-piece woman's dress; the áo ngũ, a form of the thân in 5-piece calendar, the most important being the Tết New Year form, mostly worn in the north of the country; the yếm, celebration. Traditional Vietnamese weddings remain a woman's undergarment; the áo bà ba, rural working widely popular, and are often celebrated by expatriate "pyjamas" for men and women;* [176] the áo gấm, a formal brocade tunic for government receptions; and the áo Vietnamese in Western countries.

1.1. VIETNAM

the, a variant of the áo gấm worn by grooms at weddings. southern dishes, as the colder northern climate limits the Traditional headwear includes the standard conical nón production and availability of spices. Black pepper is lá and the “lampshade-like”nón quai thao. used in place of chilis to produce spicy flavors. The use of such meats as pork, beef, and chicken was relatively limited in the past, and as a result freshwater fish, Sport crustaceans – particularly crabs – and mollusks became widely used. Fish sauce, soy sauce, prawn sauce, and See also: Vietnam at the Olympics and Sport in Vietnam limes are among the main flavoring ingredients. Many signature Vietnamese dishes, such as bún riêu and bánh The Vovinam and Bình Định martial arts are widespread cuốn, originated in the north and were carried to central in Vietnam,* [177] while soccer is the country's most pop- and southern Vietnam by migrants.* [183] ular team sport.* [178] Its national team won the ASEAN Football Championship in 2008. Other Western sports, such as badminton, tennis, volleyball, ping-pong and 1.1.8 See also chess, are also widely popular. • Vietnam Coast Guard Vietnam has participated in the Summer Olympic Games • Vietnam People's Public Security since 1952, when it competed as the State of Vietnam. After the partition of the country in 1954, only South • Outline of Vietnam Vietnam competed in the Games, sending athletes to the 1956 and 1972 Olympics. Since the reunification of Viet• Corruption in Vietnam nam in 1976, it has competed as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, attending every Summer Olympics from • Index of Vietnam-related articles 1988 onwards. The present Vietnam Olympic Commit• CIVETS, a grouping of emerging economies includtee was formed in 1976 and recognized by the Inter* ing Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey national Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1979. [179] As and South Africa of 2014, Vietnam has never participated in the Winter Olympics. • ASEAN Cuisine

• Agent Orange's Eﬀects on the Vietnamese People

Main article: Vietnamese cuisine Vietnamese cuisine traditionally features a combination 1.1.9

Notes

[1] Only the first verse of the “Army March”is recognized as the official national anthem of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. [2] Or (formerly) Saigon [3] Also called Kinh people* [1] [4] In effect since 1 January 2014 [5] The South China Sea is referred to in Vietnam as the East Sea (Biển Đông).* [7] Pho, one of the most popular Vietnamese dishes.

of five fundamental taste “elements”(Vietnamese: ngũ vị): spicy (metal), sour (wood), bitter (fire), salty (water) and sweet (earth).* [180] Common ingredients include fish sauce, shrimp paste, soy sauce, rice, fresh herbs, fruits and vegetables. Vietnamese recipes use lemongrass, ginger, mint, Vietnamese mint, long coriander, Saigon cinnamon, bird's eye chili, lime and basil leaves.* [181] Traditional Vietnamese cooking is known for its fresh ingredients, minimal use of oil, and reliance on herbs and vegetables, and is considered one of the healthiest cuisines worldwide.* [182] In northern Vietnam, local foods are often less spicy than

[6] At ﬁrst, Gia Long requested the name Nam Việt, but the Jiaqing Emperor refused.* [10] [7] Neither the United States government nor Ngô Đình Diệm's State of Vietnam signed anything at the 1954 Geneva Conference. The non-communist Vietnamese delegation objected strenuously to any division of Vietnam; however, the French accepted the Viet Minh proposal* [37] that Vietnam be united by elections under the supervision of “local commissions”.* [38] The United States, with the support of South Vietnam and the United Kingdom, countered with the “American Plan,”* [39] which provided for United Nations-supervised uniﬁcation elections. The plan, however, was rejected by Soviet and other communist delegations.* [39]

1.1.10

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM

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• Tonnesson, Stein; Antlov, Hans (1996). Routledge. Forms of the Nation. 0700704426.

Asian ISBN

1.2. NAMES OF VIETNAM

1.1.11

See also

[19] Taylor (1983), p. 70

• Economic history of Vietnam

[20] Taylor (1983), p. 135

• History of East Asia

[21] Andaya (2006), p. 23

• History of Asia

[22] Ngô Sĩ Liên 2009, pp. 154

• History of Southeast Asia

[23] Ngô Sĩ Liên 2009, pp. 155

• Politics of Vietnam

[24] Ngô Sĩ Liên 2009, pp. 160

• President of Vietnam

[25] Ngô Sĩ Liên 2009, pp. 193

• Prime Minister of Vietnam

[26] Ngô Sĩ Liên 2009, pp. 197 [27] Cœdès (1966), p. 84

1.3.9

References

[1] Origin of Vietnamese people [2] History of Vietnam [3] Hoa Binh Culture [4] Ancient time Archived November 29, 2014 at the Wayback Machine [5] Lê Huyền Thảo Uyên, 2012-13. Welcome to Vietnam. International Student. West Virginia University. [6] Handbook of Asian Education: A Cultural Perspective, p. 95 [7] The Human Migration: Homo Erectus and the Ice Age [8] Kha and Bao, 1967; Kha, 1975; Kha, 1976; Long et al., 1977; Cuong, 1985; Ciochon and Olsen, 1986; & Olsen and Ciochon, 1990 [9] Cuong, 1986 [10] Colani, 1927 [11] Demeter, 2000 [12] Administration of Văn Lang - Âu Lạc. Retrieved 201409-05. [13] Ancient calendar unearthed. Retrieved 2014-09-05.

[28] Tsai (1996), p. 15 [29] Dardess (2012), p. 5 [30] Brief History of Vietnam [31] Davidson, Jeremy H. C. S.; H. L. Shorto (1991). Austroasiatic Languages: Essays in Honour of H.L. Shorto. p. 95. [32] (1902-03) “Nachrichten aus den Missionen,” Die katholischen Missionen. Illustrierte Monatschrift 31, pp. 255-257. [33] Fourniau, Annam–Tonkin, pp. 39–77 [34] Bui Minh Dung (July 1995). “Japan's Role in the Vietnamese Starvation of 1944-45”. Modern Asian Studies (Cambridge University Press) 29 (3): 573–618. doi:10.1017/s0026749x00014001. [35] Neale, Jonathan The American War, pp. 23-24; ISBN 1898876-67-3 [36] Jean-Louis Margolin, “Vietnam and Laos: the impasse of war communism”in The Black Book of Communism pp. 568–569. [37] “Ngo Dinh Diem”. Encyclopaedia Britannica. Retrieved 26 November 2012.

[14] Nguyen Ba Khoach 1978

[38] “China saved Vietnam”. Bob Seals. Retrieved 23 September 2008.

[15] Pierre-Yves Manguin, A. Mani, Geoﬀ Wade. “Early Interactions Between South and Southeast Asia: Reﬂections on Cross-cultural Exchange”. Institute of Southeast Asian, 2011; p.5

[39] Charles Hirschman et al.“Vietnamese Casualties During the American War: A New Estimate”. Population and Development Review (December 1995).

[16] Chapuis, Oscar (1995-01-01). “A History of Vietnam: From Hong Bang to Tu Duc”. ISBN 9780313296222.

[40] Shenon, Philip (23 April 1995).“20 Years After Victory, Vietnamese Communists Ponder How to Celebrate”. The New York Times. Retrieved 24 February 2011.

[17] Keat Gin Ooi. Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia, from Angkor Wat to East Timor, Volume 1. ABC-CLIO, Jan 1, 2004; p.933-34

[41] Associated Press (3 April 1995).“Vietnam Says 1.1 Million Died Fighting For North.”

1.3. HISTORY OF VIETNAM

See also

[13] Eastman, 57–65 [14] Marolles, 178–92

• France–Asia relations

[15] Huard, 26–30

• Franco–Siamese War of 1893

[16] Eastman, 62–9

1.6.8

References

Citations [1] Bruce A. Elleman (2001). Modern Chinese warfare, 1795-1989 (illustrated ed.). Psychology Press. p. 90. ISBN 0-415-21474-2. Retrieved 2012-01-18. “who

[17] John King Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 251. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Retrieved 2012-01-18. For over a year prior to China's 'unofficial' declaration of war in 1884, Liu Yung-fu's 'Black Flag' forces effectively harassed the French at Tongking, at times fighting behind entrenched defences or else laying skilful ambushes.

1.6. SINO-FRENCH WAR

[18] Marolles, 193–222; Duboc, 123–39; Huard, 6–16; Thomazi, Histoire militaire, 55–8 [19] Huard, 103–22; Loir, 13–22; Thomazi, Histoire militaire, 62–4; Conquête, 165–6 [20] Eastman, 76–84 [21] Eastman, 85–7 [22] Lung Chang, 180–3 and 184–94 [23] De Lonlay, Au Tonkin, 111–16; Duboc, 207; Huard, 164– 70 [24] Huard, 180–7 and 202–31; Thomazi, Conquête, 171–7; Histoire militaire, 68–72 [25] Technically the Army of the Two Guangs (Guangdong and Guangxi), but invariably called the Guangxi Army in French and other European sources. [26] Huard, 252–76; Thomazi, Histoire militaire, 75–80 [27] Thomazi, Conquête, 189–92 [28] Thomazi, Conquête, 192–3 [29] Lecomte, Guet-apens, 102–75 [30] Duboc, 261–3; Garnot, 45–7; Loir, 184–8 [31] Lung Chang, 280–3; Thomazi, Conquête, 204–15 [32] Chere, Diplomacy of the Sino-French War, 108–15; JHKBRAS, 20 (1980), 54–65 [33] Bruce A. Elleman (2001). Modern Chinese warfare, 1795-1989 (illustrated ed.). Psychology Press. p. 89. ISBN 0-415-21474-2. Retrieved 2012-01-18. Following this setback, the Qing court officially declared war on France on 26 August 1884. On 1 October, Admiral Courbet landed at Jilong with 2,250 men, and the city fell to the French. Chinese forces continued to encircle Jilong throughout the rest of the War. Although a French blockade thwarted all subsequent Chinese efforts to send a fleet to relieve Taiwan, the French troops never succeeded in taking the riverside town of Danshui (Tamsui) in Taiwan's northwestern coastal plain, immediately north of modernday Taipei. As a result, French control over Taiwan was limited merely to the northern coast. China's central fleet, based in Jiangsu Province, proved unable to break through Admiral Courbet's blockade of Taiwan. Although the south quickly requested assistance from the northern fleet, Li Hongzhang refused to place his own ships in danger. This decision almost guaranteed that China's coastal waters would be dominated by the French. [34] Bruce A. Elleman (2001). Modern Chinese warfare, 1795-1989 (illustrated ed.). Psychology Press. p. 88. ISBN 0-415-21474-2. Retrieved 2012-01-18. While the Chinese Army enjoyed limited victories in Annam and on Taiwan, the Chinese Navy was not so successful. [35] Bruce A. Elleman (2001). Modern Chinese warfare, 1795-1989 (illustrated ed.). Psychology Press. p. 87. ISBN 0-415-21474-2. Retrieved 2012-01-18. Not surprisingly, considering Li Hongzhang's political power,

many of the best and most modern ships found their way into Li's northern fleet, which never saw any action in the Sino-French conflict. In fact, fear that he might lost control over his fleet led Li to refuse to even consider sending his ships southward to aid the Fuzhou fleet against the French. Although Li later claimed that moving his fleet southward would have left northern China undefended, his decision has been criticized as a sign of China's factionalized government as well as its provincial north-south mindest. [36] Bruce A. Elleman (2001). Modern Chinese warfare, 1795-1989 (illustrated ed.). Psychology Press. p. 87. ISBN 0-415-21474-2. Retrieved 2012-01-18. By 1883, therefore, at the outset of the Sino-French War, China's navy was poorly trained, especially in southern China. Although many of China's modern ships were state of the art, the personnel manning them were relatively unskilled: according to Rawlinson, only eight of the fourteen ship captains that saw action in the war had received any modern training at all. In addition, there was little, if any, coordination between the fleets in north and south China. The lack of a centralized admiralty commanding the entire navy meant that at any one time France opposed only a fraction of China's total fleet. This virtually assured French naval dominance in the upcoming conflict. [37] Bruce A. Elleman (2001). Modern Chinese warfare, 1795-1989 (illustrated ed.). Psychology Press. p. 87. ISBN 0-415-21474-2. Retrieved 2012-01-18. While China possessed much of the equipment for a modern navy by the early 1880s, it still did not have a sufficiently large pool of qualified sailors. One of the major training grounds during the early 1870s was at the Fuzhou shipyears, which had hired foreign experts to conduct training classes. By the late 1870s, many of the foreigners had left Fuzhou and a new naval academy was opened at Tianjin, in northern China. This academy lured many of the best-trained Chinese sailors away from southern China. [38] Duboc, 274–93; Loir, 245–64; Lung Chang, 327–8; Thomazi, 220–25; Wright, 63–4 [39] Loir, 277–9; Lung Chang, 328 [40] Bonifacy, 7–8; Harmant, 91–112; Lecomte, Lang-Son, 149–55 [41] Armengaud, 2–4; Bonifacy, 8–9; Harmant, 113–37; Lecomte, Lang-Son, 155–76 [42] Armengaud, 21–4; Harmant, 157–8; Lecomte, Lang-Son, 288–98 and 304–5 [43] Armengaud, 24–8; Bonifacy, 17–18; Lecomte, Lang-Son, 298–305 [44] Harmant, 159–64; Thomazi, Conquête, 237–41 and 246– 8; Histoire militaire, 102–3 and 107–8 [45] Lecomte, Lang-Son, 324–9; Thomazi, Conquête, 247–8; Histoire militaire, 107–8; [46] Lecomte, Lang-Son, 337–49 [47] Armengaud, 40–58; Bonifacy, 23–6; Harmant, 211–35; Lecomte, Lang-Son, 428–53 and 455

[48] Bruce A. Elleman (2001). Modern Chinese warfare, 1795-1989 (illustrated ed.). Psychology Press. p. 89. ISBN 0-415-21474-2. Retrieved 2012-01-18. The Qing coury whole-heartedly supported the war, and from August to November 1884 the Chinese military prepared to enter the conflict. During the early months of 1885, the Chinese Army once again took the offensive as Beijing repeatedly ordered it to march on Tonkin. However, the shortage of supplies, poor weather, and illness devastated the Chinese troops; one 2,000 man unit reportedly lost 1,500 men to disease. This situation led one Qing military official to warn that fully one-half of all reinforcements to Annam might succumb to the elemnts. The focus of the fightin soon revolved around Lạng Sơn, Pan Dingxin, the Governor of Guangxi, succeeded in establishing his headquarters there by early 1885. In February 1885 a French campaign forced Pan to retreat, and the French troops soon reoccupied the town. the French forces continued the offensive, an on 23 March they temporarily occupied and then hastily torched Zhennanguan, a town on the China-Annam border, before pulling back once again to Lạng Sơn. Spurred on by the French attack, General Feng Zicai led his troops southward against General François de Négrier's forces. The situation quickly became serious for the French, as their coolies deserted, interrupting the French supply lines, and ammunition began to run short. Even though the training of the Qing troops was inferior to the French and the Chinese officer corps was poor, their absolute number were greater. This precarious situation worsened for the French when General Negrier was wounded on 28 March. Lieutenant Colonel Paul Gustave Herbinger, [49] Armengaud, 61–7; Bonifacy, 27–9; Harmant, 237–52; Lecomte, Lang-Son, 463–74; Thomazi, Histoire militaire, 111–12 [50] Armengaud, 74–6; Bonifacy, 36–8 and 39–40; Harmant, 274–300; Lecomte, Lang-Son, 501–12 [51] Bruce A. Elleman (2001). Modern Chinese warfare, 1795-1989 (illustrated ed.). Psychology Press. p. 90. ISBN 0-415-21474-2. Retrieved 2012-01-18. who had been in Tonkin for only three months, took command. He immediately ordered the evacuation of Lang Són. Although Herbinger may have been retiring to the more strongly fortified positions further south, the retreat seemed to many to be the result of panic. Widely interpreted as a Chinese victory, the Qing forces were able to capture the strategic northern city of Lang Són and the surrounding territory by early April 1885. China's forces now dominated the battefield, but fighting ended on 4 April 1885 as a result of peace negotiations. China sued for peace because Britain and Germany had not offered assistance as Beijing had hoped, and Russia and Japan threatened china's northern borders. Meanwhile, China's economy was injured by the French “naval interdiction of the seaborne rich trade."197 Negotiations between Li Hongzhang and the French minister in China were concluded in June 1885. Although Li did not have to admit fault for starting the war, Beijing did recognize all of the French treaties with Annam that turned it into a French protectorate.

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM

[52] Bonifacy, 37–8; Lecomte, Lang-Son, 329–30 and 515– 16; Lung Chang, 340 [53] Thomazi, Conquête, 258–61 [54] Huard, 800–12; Lung Chang, 369–71; Thomazi, Conquête, 261–2 [55] Eastman, 196–9; Lecomte, Lang-Son, 405–8 and 531–6 [56] John King Fairbank (1978). The Cambridge History of China: Late Chʻing, 1800-1911, pt. 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 251–. ISBN 978-0-521-22029-3. [57] John King Fairbank (1978). The Cambridge History of China: Late Chʻing, 1800-1911, pt. 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 252–. ISBN 978-0-521-22029-3. [58] Garnot, 147–72 [59] Garnot, 179–95; Loir, 291–317 [60] Garnot, 195–206 [61] Lecomte, Lang-Son, 524–6 [62] Lecomte, Lang-Son, 513–24 [63] Garnot, 214–23; Loir, 338–45 [64] Lessard 2015, pp. 58-9. [65] Richard Sims French policy towards the Bakufu and Meiji Japan 1854-95 p.122 [66] Richard Sims French policy towards the Bakufu and Meiji Japan 1854-95 p.123 [67] Richard Sims French policy towards the Bakufu and Meiji Japan 1854-95 p.125 [68] Richard Sims French policy towards the Bakufu and Meiji Japan 1854-95 p.128 [69] Richard Sims French policy towards the Bakufu and Meiji Japan 1854-95 p.130 [70] Richard Sims French policy towards the Bakufu and Meiji Japan 1854-95 p.131 [71] Richard Sims French policy towards the Bakufu and Meiji Japan 1854-95 p.136 [72] Richard Sims French policy towards the Bakufu and Meiji Japan 1854-95 pp.138-139 [73] Richard Sims French policy towards the Bakufu and Meiji Japan 1854-95 p.142 [74] Elliott 2002, p. 195. [75] Bruce A. Elleman (2001). Modern Chinese warfare, 1795-1989 (illustrated ed.). Psychology Press. p. 90. ISBN 0-415-21474-2. Retrieved 2012-01-18. By means of this peace teaty, France agreed to evacuate its troops from Taiwan and the Pescadores in return for China's accepting that Annam had become a French protectorate. . .

1.7. FRENCH INDOCHINA

[76] Bruce A. Elleman (2001). Modern Chinese warfare, 1795-1989 (illustrated ed.). Psychology Press. p. 92. ISBN 0-415-21474-2. Retrieved 2012-01-18. China did not have to pay France an indemnity

69 • Bernard, H., L'Amiral Henri Rieunier (1833–1918) Ministre de la Marine - La Vie Extraordinaire d'un Grand Marin (Biarritz, 2005)

[77] Huard, 1,113–74; Thomazi, Conquête, 277–82

• Thomazi, A., La conquête de l'Indochine (Paris, 1934)

[78] Rodolfo Severino (2011). Where in the World is the Philippines?: Debating Its National Territory. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. pp. 76–. ISBN 978-981-4311-71-7.

• Thomazi, A., Histoire militaire de l'Indochine français (Hanoi, 1931)

Bibliography

1.6.9 Further reading

• Armengaud, J., Lang-Son: journal des opérations qui ont précédé et suivi la prise de cette citadel (Paris, 1901)

• James F. Roche, L. L. Cowen (1884). The French at Foochow. SHANGHAI: Printed at the “Celestial Empire”Oﬃce. p. 49. Retrieved 2011-0706.(Original from the University of California)

• Bonifacy, A propos d’une collection des peintures chinoises représentant diverse épisodes de la guerre franco-chinoise de 1884-1885 (Hanoi, 1931)

• Olender, Piotr (2012). Sino-French Naval War, 1884–1885. MMP Books.

• Chere, L. M., 'The Hong Kong Riots of October 1884: Evidence for Chinese Nationalism?', Journal 1.6.10 External links of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Soci• 'Times' 1883 about Franco-Chinese war ety, 20 (1980), 54–65 • Chere, L. M., The Diplomacy of the Sino-French War (1883–1885): Global Complications of an Undeclared War (Notre Dame, 1988)

1.7 French Indochina

* • Duboc, E., Trente cinq mois de campagne en Chine, French Indo-China [1] (now commonly known as French Indochina) (French: Indochine franau Tonkin (Paris, 1899) çaise; Khmer: សហភាពឥណ្ឌូចិន; Vietnamese: Đông • Eastman, L., Throne and Mandarins: China's Search Dương thuộc Pháp, pronounced [ɗoŋm zɰəŋ tʰuə̀ k for a Policy during the Sino-French Controversy fǎp], frequently abbreviated to Đông Pháp; Lao: (Stanford, 1984) ຝຣັ່ງແຫຼັມອິນດູຈີນ; Cantonese: 法屬印度支那; faat3 suk6 jan3 dou6 zi1 naa5), oﬃcially known as the Indo• Elleman, B., Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795–1989 Chinese Union (Union indochinoise)* [2] after 1887 and (New York, 2001) the Indo-Chinese Federation (Fédération indochinoise) • Garnot, L'expédition française de Formose, 1884– after 1947, was a grouping of French colonial territories 1885 (Paris, 1894) in Southeast Asia.

• Harmant, J., La verité sur la retraite de Lang-Son (Paris, 1892)

A grouping of the three Vietnamese regions of Tonkin (north), Annam (centre), and Cochinchina (south) with Cambodia was formed in 1887. Laos was added in 1893 • Huard, L., La guerre du Tonkin (Paris, 1887) and Kwangchow Wan (Kouang-Tchéou-Wan) in 1898. The capital was moved from Saigon (in Cochinchina) to • Lecomte, J., Le guet-apens de Bac-Lé (Paris, 1890) Hanoi (Tonkin) in 1902 and again to Da Lat (Annam) in • Lecomte, J., Lang-Son: combats, retraite et négocia- 1939. In 1945 it was moved back to Hanoi. tions (Paris, 1895) After the Fall of France during World War II, the colony was administered by the Vichy government and was under Japanese occupation until March 1945, when the • Lung Chang [龍章], Yueh-nan yu Chung-fa chan- Japanese overthrew the colonial regime. Beginning in cheng [越南與中法戰爭, Vietnam and the Sino- May 1941, the Viet Minh, a communist army led by Hồ Chí Minh, began a revolt against the Japanese. In AuFrench War] (Taipei, 1993) gust 1945 they declared Vietnamese independence and • Marolles, Vice-amiral de, La dernière campagne du extended the war, known as the First Indochina War, Commandant Henri Rivière (Paris, 1932) against France. • Loir, M., L'escadre de l'amiral Courbet (Paris, 1886)

• Randier, J., La Royale (La Falaise, 2006) [ISBN 235261-022-2]

In Saigon, the anti-Communist State of Vietnam, led by former Emperor Bảo Đại, was granted independence in

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM on until 1802 in the French assistance to Nguyễn Ánh. 19th century France was heavily involved in Vietnam in the 19th century; protecting the work of the Paris Foreign Missions Society in the country was often presented as a justification. For its part, the Nguyễndynasty increasingly saw Catholic missionaries as a political threat; courtesans, for example, an influential faction in the dynastic system, feared for their status in a society influenced by an insistence on monogamy. In 1858, the brief period of unification under the Nguyễn dynasty ended with a successful attack on Da Nang by French Admiral Charles Rigault de Genouilly under the orders of Napoleon III. Diplomat Charles de Montigny's mission having failed, Genouilly's mission was to stop attempts to expel Catholic missionaries. His orders were to stop the persecution of missionaries and assure the unimpeded propagation of the faith.* [4]

Indochina in 1891 (from Le Monde illustré). 1. Panorama of Lac-Kaï. 2. Yun-nan, in the quay of Hanoi. 3. Flooded street of Hanoi. 4. Landing stage of Hanoi Palace of the Governor-General (Norodom Palace) in Saigon,

1949. On 9 November 1953, the Kingdom of Laos and about 1875 the Kingdom of Cambodia became independent. Following the Geneva Accord of 1954, the French evacuated In September 1858, fourteen French gunships, 3,000 men Vietnam and French Indochina came to an end. and 300 Filipino troops provided by the Spanish* [5] attacked the port of Tourane (present day Da Nang), causing signiﬁcant damage and occupying the city. After a 1.7.1 First French interventions few months, Rigault had to leave the city due to supply issues and illnesses.* [4] Main articles: France–Vietnam relations and French Sailing south, de Genouilly then captured the poorly deassistance to Nguyễn Ánh fended city of Saigon on 18 February 1859. On 13 April France–Vietnam relations started as early as the 17th century with the mission of the Jesuit missionary Alexandre de Rhodes At this time, Vietnam was only just beginning to occupy the Mekong Delta, former territory of the Indianised kingdom of Champa which they had defeated in 1471.* [3] European involvement in Vietnam was conﬁned to trade during the 18th century. In 1787, Pierre Pigneau de Behaine, a French Catholic priest, petitioned the French government and organised French military volunteers to aid Nguyễn Ánh in retaking lands his family lost to the Tây Sơn. Pigneau died in Viet Nam but his troops fought

1862, the Vietnamese government was forced to cede the three provinces of Biên Hòa, Gia Định and Định Tường to France. De Genouilly was criticised for his actions and was replaced by Admiral Page in November 1859, with instructions to obtain a treaty protecting the Catholic faith in Vietnam, but refrain from territorial gains.* [4] French policy four years later saw a reversal, with the French continuing to accumulate territory. In 1862, France obtained concessions from Emperor Tự Đức, ceding three treaty ports in Annam and Tonkin, and all of Cochinchina, the latter being formally declared a French territory in 1864. In 1867 the provinces of Châu Đốc, Hà Tiên and Vĩnh Long were added to French-controlled

1.7. FRENCH INDOCHINA

territory. In 1863, the Cambodian king Norodom had requested the establishment of a French protectorate over his country. In 1867, Siam (modern Thailand) renounced suzerainty over Cambodia and oﬃcially recognised the 1863 French protectorate on Cambodia, in exchange for the control of Battambang and Siem Reap provinces which oﬃcially became part of Thailand. (These provinces would be ceded back to Cambodia by a border treaty between France and Siam in 1906).

1.7.2

Establishment of French Indochina

The expansion of French Indochina (in blues).

French marine infantrymen in Tonkin, 1884

ments intensiﬁed in Vietnam, especially during and after World War I, but all the uprisings and tentative eﬀorts failed to obtain any concessions from the French overseers.

France obtained control over northern Vietnam following its victory over China in the Sino-French War (1884– Franco-Siamese war (1893) 85). French Indochina was formed in October 1887 from Annam, Tonkin, Cochinchina (which together form modMain article: Franco-Siamese War ern Vietnam) and the Kingdom of Cambodia; Laos was Territorial conflict in the Indochinese peninsula for the added after the Franco-Siamese War in 1893. The federation lasted until 1954. In the four protectorates, the French formally left the local rulers in power, who were the Emperors of Vietnam, Kings of Cambodia, and Kings of Luang Prabang, but in fact gathered all powers in their hands, the local rulers acting only as figureheads. Vietnamese rebellions French troops landed in Vietnam in 1858 and by the mid1880s they had established a firm grip over the northern region. From 1885 to 1895, Phan Đình Phùng led a rebellion against the colonising power. Nationalist senti- Siamese army in the disputed territory of Laos in 1893.

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM

expansion of French Indochina led to the Franco-Siamese War of 1893. In 1893 the French authorities in Indochina used border disputes, followed by the Paknam naval incident, to provoke a crisis. French gunboats appeared at Bangkok, and demanded the cession of Lao territories east of the Mekong River. King Chulalongkorn appealed to the British, but the British minister told the King to settle on whatever terms he could get, and he had no choice but to comply. Britain's only gesture was an agreement with France guaranteeing the integrity of the rest of Siam. In exchange, Siam had to give up its claim to the Thai-speaking Shanregion of north-eastern Burma to the British, and cede Laos to France. Further encroachments on Siam (1904–07)

French Indochina in 1930.

In the 1930s, Siam engaged France in a series of talks concerning the repatriation of Siamese provinces held by the French. In 1938, under the Front Populaire administration in Paris, France had agreed to repatriate Angkor Wat, Angkor Thom, Siem Reap, Siem Pang and the associated provinces (approximately 13) to Siam. Meanwhile, Siam took over control of those areas, in anticipation of the upcoming treaty. Signatories from each country were dispatched to Tokyo to sign the treaty repatriating the lost provinces.

Yên Bái mutiny (1930) Further information: Yên Bái mutiny Occupation of Trat by French troops in 1904.

The French, however, continued to pressure Siam, and in 1906–07 they manufactured another crisis. This time Siam had to concede French control of territory on the west bank of the Mekong opposite Luang Prabang and around Champasak in southern Laos, as well as western Cambodia. France also occupied the western part of Chantaburi. In 1904, to get back Chantaburi Siam had to give Trat to French Indochina. Trat became part of Thailand again on 23 March 1907 in exchange for many areas east of the Mekong like Battambang, Siam Nakhon and Sisophon.

On 10 February 1930, there was an uprising by Vietnamese soldiers in the French colonial army's Yên Bái garrison. The Yên Báimutiny was sponsored by the Việt Nam ốc Dân Đảng (VNQDĐ). The VNQDĐ was the Vietnamese Nationalist Party. The attack was the largest disturbance brewed up by the Cần Vương monarchist restoration movement of the late 19th century. The aim of the revolt was to inspire a wider uprising among the general populace in an attempt to overthrow the colonial authority. The VNQDĐ had previously attempted to engage in clandestine activities to undermine French rule, but increasing French scrutiny of their activ-

1.7. FRENCH INDOCHINA

ities led to their leadership group taking the risk of staging a large scale military attack in the Red River Delta in northern Vietnam.

CHINE

Tonkin BIRMANIE

French-Thai War (1940–1941)

Kouang-Tchéou-Wan Golfe du Tonkin

Main article: Franco-Thai War During World War II, Thailand took the opportunity of French weaknesses to reclaim previously lost territories, resulting in the Franco-Thai War between October 1940 and 9 May 1941. The Thai forces generally did well on the ground, but Thai objectives in the war were limited. In January, Vichy French naval forces decisively defeated Thai naval forces in the Battle of Ko Chang. The war ended in May at the instigation of the Japanese, with the French forced to concede territorial gains for Thailand.

1.7.3

Population

The Vietnamese, Lao and Khmer ethnic groups formed the majority of their respective colony's populations. Minority groups such as the Muong, Tay, Chams, and Jarai, were collectively known as Montagnards and resided principally in the mountain regions of Indochina. Ethnic Han Chinese were largely concentrated in major cities, especially in Southern Vietnam and Cambodia, where they became heavily involved in trade and commerce. Around 95% of French Indochina's population was rural in a 1913 estimate, although urbanisation did slowly grow over the course of French rule.* [6]

Laos

SIAM

Annam Tonlé Sap

Cambodge

Golfe du Siam

Cochinchine

(km)

(mi)

500 300

The subdivisions of French Indochina.

and media and French was widely introduced to the general population. French became widespread among urban and semi-urban populations and became the principal language of the elite and educated. This was most notable in the colonies of Tonkin and Cochinchina (Northern and The principal religion in French Indochina was Southern Vietnam respectively), where French influence Buddhism, with MahayanaBuddhism influenced by was most heavy, while Annam, Laos and Cambodia were Confucianism more dominant in Vietnam, while less influenced by French education.* [7] TheravādaBuddhism was more widespread in Laos and Cambodia. In addition, active Catholic missionaries Despite the dominance of the French language, local popwere widespread throughout Indochina and roughly 10% ulations still largely spoke their native languages. After of Tonkin's population identified as Catholic by the end French rule ended, the French language was still largely of French rule. Cao Đài's origins began during this used among the new governments (with the exception of North Vietnam) but since then English, increasingly period as well. taught in schools across the country, has massively reUnlike Algeria, French settlement in Indochina did not placed French as the second language. Today, less than occur at a grand scale. By 1940, only about 34,000 0.5% of the population of Vietnam can speak French.* [7] French civilians lived in French Indochina, along with a smaller number of French military personnel and government workers. The principal reasons why French settle- 1.7.4 Economy ment didn't grow in a manner similar to that in French North Africa (which had a population of over 1 mil- French Indochina was designated as a colonie lion French civilians) were because French Indochina was d'exploitation (colony of economic interests) by the seen as a colonie d'exploitation économique (economic French government. Funding for the colonial governcolony) rather than a colonie de peuplement (settlement ment came by means of taxes on locals and the French colony helping Metropolitan France from being overpop- government established a near monopoly on the trade of ulated), and because Indochina was distant from France opium, salt and rice alcohol. The French administration itself. established quotas of consumption for each Vietnamese During French colonial rule, the French language was village, thereby compelling villagers to purchase and the principal language of education, government, trade, consume set amounts of monopolised goods, including

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM

alcohol and opium.* [8] The trade of those three products formed about 44% of the colonial government's budget in 1920 but declined to 20% by 1930 as the colony began to economically diversify. The colony's principal bank was the Banque de l'Indochine, established in 1875 and was responsible for minting the colony's currency, the Indochinese piastre. Indochina was the second most invested-in French colony by 1940 after Algeria, with investments totalling up to 6.7 million francs. Beginning in the 1930s, France began to exploit the region for its natural resources and to economically diversify the colony. Cochinchina, Annam and Tonkin (encompassing modern-day Vietnam) became a source of tea, rice, coffee, pepper, coal, zinc and tin while Cambodia became a centre for rice and pepper crops. Only Laos was seen initially as an economically unviable colony, although timber was harvested at a small scale from there. At the turn of the 20th century, the growing automobile industry in France resulted in the growth of the rubber industry in French Indochina, and plantations were built throughout the colony, especially in Annam and Cochinchina. France soon became a leading producer of rubber through its Indochina colony and Indochinese rubber became prized in the industrialised world. The success of rubber plantations in French Indochina resulted in an increase in investment in the colony by various firms such as Michelin. With the growing number of investments in the colony's mines and rubber, tea and coffee plantations, French Indochina began to industrialise as factories opened in the colony. These new factories produced textiles, cigarettes, beer and cement which were then exported throughout the French Empire.

Musée Louis Finot in Hanoi, built by Ernest Hébrard in 1932, now National Museum of Vietnamese History

pore as the region's busiest commercial centre. By 1937 Saigon was the sixth busiest port in the entire French Empire. In 1936, the Trans-Indochinoisrailway linking Hanoi and Saigon opened. Further improvements in the colony's transport infrastructures led to easier travel between France and Indochina. By 1939, it took no more than a month by ship to travel from Marseille to Saigon and around five days by aeroplane from Paris to Saigon. Underwater telegraph cables were installed in 1921. French settlers further added their influence on the colony by constructing buildings in the form of Beaux-Arts and added French-influenced landmarks such as the Hanoi Opera House and Saigon Notre-Dame Basilica. The French colonists also built a number of cities and towns in Indochina which served various purposes from trading outposts to resort towns. The most notable examples include Đà Lạt in southern Vietnam and Pakse in Laos.

Infrastructure

1.7.5 World War II Main articles: French Indochina in World War II and 1940–46 in the Vietnam War In September 1940, during World War II, the newly created regime of Vichy France granted Japan's demands for military access to Tonkin following the Japanese occupation of French Indochina, which lasted until the end of the Paciﬁc War. This allowed Japan better access to China in the Second Sino-Japanese War against the forces of Chiang Kai-shek, but it was also part of Japan's strategy for dominion over the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Thailand took this opportunity of weakness to reclaim previously lost territories, resulting in the Franco-Thai When French Indochina was viewed as an economically War between October 1940 and 9 May 1941. important colony for France, the French government set On 9 March 1945, with France liberated, Germany in a goal to improve the transport and communications net- retreat, and the United States ascendant in the Paciﬁc, works in the colony. Saigon became a principal port Japan decided to take complete control of Indochina. in Southeast Asia and rivalled the British port of Singa- On 8 April, the Japanese pressured Lao Crown Prince Paul Doumer Bridge, now Long BiênBridge

1.7. FRENCH INDOCHINA

Members of the 1st Foreign Parachute Heavy Mortar Company during the Indochina War.

dochina north of the 16th parallel to accept the surrender of Japanese occupying forces, and remained there until 1946.* [10] The Chinese used the VNQDĐ, the Vietnamese branch of the Chinese Kuomintang, to increase their inﬂuence in Indochina and put pressure on their opponents.* [11] Chiang Kai-shek threatened the French with war in response to manoeuvering by the French and Ho Chi Minh against each other, forcing them to come to a peace agreement, and in February 1946 he also forced the French to surrender all of their concessions in China A propaganda painting in Hanoi, 1942. and renounce their extraterritorial privileges in exchange for withdrawing from northern Indochina and allowing Sisavang Vatthana to declare the independence of Laos, French troops to reoccupy the region starting in March then launched the Second French Indochina Campaign. 1946.* [12]* [13]* [14]* [15] The Japanese kept power in Indochina until the news of After persuading Emperor Bảo Đại to abdicate in his their government's surrender came through in August. favour, on 2 September 1945 President Ho Chi Minh

1.7.6

First Indochina War

Main article: First Indochina War

declared independence for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. But before September's end, a force of British and Free French soldiers, along with captured Japanese troops, restored French control. Bitter ﬁghting ensued in the First Indochina War. In 1950 Ho again declared an independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which was recognised by the fellow Communist governments of China and the Soviet Union. Fighting lasted until May 1954, when the Viet Minh won the decisive victory against French forces at the gruelling Battle of Điện Biên Phủ.

After the World War, France petitioned for the nullification of the 1938 Franco-Siamese Treaty and attempted to reassert itself in the region, but came into conflict with the Viet Minh, a coalition of Communist and Vietnamese nationalists under French-educated dissident Hồ Chí Minh. During World War II, the United States had supported the Viet Minh in resistance against the Japanese; the group had been in control of the country1.7.7 side since the French gave way in March 1945. American President Roosevelt and General Stilwell privately made it adamantly clear that the French were not to reacquire French Indochina after the war was over. He told Secretary of State Cordell Hull the Indochinese were worse off under the French rule of nearly 100 years than they were at the beginning. Roosevelt asked Chiang Kaishek if he wanted Indochina, to which Chiang Kai-shek replied: “Under no circumstances!".* [9]

Geneva Agreements

On 27 April 1954, the Geneva Conference produced the Geneva Agreements between North Vietnam and France. Provisions included supporting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Indochina, granting it independence from France, declaring the cessation of hostilities and foreign involvement in internal Indochina aﬀairs, delineating northern and southern zones into which opposing troops were to withdraw, they mandated uniﬁcation on After the war, 200,000 Chinese troops under General the basis of internationally supervised free elections to be Lu Han sent by Chiang Kai-shek invaded northern In- held in July 1956.* [3]

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM

'Indochine', instead of 'Indo-Chine', was commonly used in French); contemporary oﬃcial publications also adopt the spelling of 'Indo-China'. [2] Decree of 17 October 1887. [3] Kahin, George McTurnin; Lewis, John W. (1967). The United States in Vietnam: An analysis in depth of the history of America's involvement in Vietnam. Delta Books. [4] Tucker, Spencer C. (1999). Vietnam (Google Books). University Press of Kentucky. p. 29. ISBN 0-8131-09663. [5] Chapuis, Oscar (1995). A History of Vietnam: From Hong Bang to Tu Duc (Google Books). Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 195. ISBN 0-313-29622-7. [6] Le Vietnam compte à lui seul cinquante quatre ethnies, présentées au Musée Ethnographique de Hanoi. [7] Approximately 100,000 people. “Vietnam”. L'aménagement linguistique dans le monde (in French).

Indochina in 1954.

[8] Peters, Erica (2012). Appetites and Aspirations in Vietnam. AltaMira Press. [9] Barbara Wertheim Tuchman (1985). The march of folly:

from Troy to Vietnam. Random House. p. 235. ISBN It was at this conference that France relinquished any 0-345-30823-9. Retrieved 28 November 2010. claim to territory in the Indochinese peninsula. The United States and South Vietnam rejected the Geneva [10] Larry H. Addington (2000). America's war in Vietnam: a Accords and never signed. South Vietnamese leader short narrative history. Indiana University Press. p. 30. Diem rejected the idea of nationwide election as proISBN 0-253-21360-6. Retrieved 28 November 2010. posed in the agreement, saying that a free election was impossible in the communist North and that his government [11] Peter Neville (2007). Britain in Vietnam: prelude to disaster, 1945–6. Psychology Press. p. 119. ISBN 0-415was not bound by the Geneva Accords. France did with35848-5. Retrieved 28 November 2010. draw, turning the north over to the Communists while the Bảo Đại regime, with American support, kept control of [12] Van Nguyen Duong (2008). The tragedy of the Vietnam the South. War: a South Vietnamese oﬃcer's analysis. McFarland. p. 21. ISBN 0-7864-3285-3. Retrieved 28 November 2010. The events of 1954 marked the beginnings of serious United States involvement in Vietnam and the ensuing [13] Stein Tønnesson (2010). Vietnam 1946: how the war beVietnam War. Laos and Cambodia also became indegan. University of California Press. p. 41. ISBN 0-520pendent in 1954, but were both drawn into the Vietnam 25602-6. Retrieved 28 November 2010. War.

1.7.8

See also

• East Indies • French protectorate of Laos • List of Governors-General of French Indochina • Political administration of French Indochina • List of French possessions and colonies

1.7.9

Notes

[1] While both 'Indo-China' and 'Indochina' can be found in contemporary English-language sources, 'Indo-China' is the most commonly used spelling (even though

[14] Elizabeth Jane Errington (1990). The Vietnam War as history: edited by Elizabeth Jane Errington and B.J.C. McKercher. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 63. ISBN 0275-93560-4. Retrieved 28 November 2010. [15] “The Vietnam War Seeds of Conﬂict 1945–1960”. The History Place. 1999. Retrieved 28 December 2010.

1.7.10 References • Brocheux, Pierre, and Daniel Hemery. Indochina: An Ambiguous Colonization, 1858–1954 (University of California Press; 2010) 490 pages; a history of French Indochina. • Chandler, David (2007). A History of Cambodia (4th ed.). Boulder, Colorado:: Westview Press. ISBN 0-8133-4363-1.

1.8. EMPIRE OF VIETNAM • Duiker, William (1976). The Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam, 1900-1941. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. ISBN 0-8014-0951-9.

77 • Zinoman, Peter (2001). The Colonial Bastille: A History of Imprisonment in Vietnam, 1862–1940. Berkeley: University of California Press. ISBN 0520-22412-4.

• Edwards, Penny (2007). Cambodge: The Cultivation of a Nation, 1860–1945. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. ISBN 0-8248-2923-9. 1.7.11 • Evans, Grant (2002). A Short History of Laos. Crow's Nest, Australia: Allen and Unwin. ASIN B000MBU21O.

External links

• (English) (French) The Colonization of Indochina, from around 1892

• (English) (French) Indochina, a tourism book pub• Forbes, Andrew; Henley, David (2012). Vietnam lished in 1910 Past and Present: The North (History of French colonialism in Tonkin). Chiang Mai: Cognoscenti Coordinates: 21°02′00″N 105°51′00″E / 21.0333°N Books. ASIN B006DCCM9Q. 105.8500°E • Marr, David (1971). Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885–1925. Berkeley: University of California Press. ISBN 0-520-01813-3. 1.8 Empire of Vietnam • Marr, David (1982). Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920–1945. Berkeley: University of California The Empire of Vietnam (Vietnamese: Đế quốc Việt Nam; Hán tự: 越南帝國; Japanese: ベトナム帝国) was Press. ISBN 0-520-04180-1. a short-lived client state of Imperial Japan* [1] governing • Marr, David (1995). Vietnam 1945: The Quest for the whole of Vietnam between March 11 and August 23, Power. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1945. ISBN 0-520-07833-0. • McLeod, Mark (1991). The Vietnamese Response 1.8.1 History to French Intervention, 1862–1874. New York: Praeger. ISBN 0-275-93562-0. During World War II, after the fall of France and establishment of Vichy France, the French had lost prac• Murray, Martin J. (1980). The Development of Cap- tical control in French Indochina to the Japanese, but italism in Colonial Indochina (1870–1940). Berke- Japan stayed in the background while giving the Vichy ley: University of California Press. ISBN 0-520- French administrators nominal control. This changed on 04000-7. 9 March 1945 when Japan oﬃcially took over. To gain • Osborne, Milton (1969). The French Presence in the support of the Vietnamese people, Imperial Japan deCochinchina and Cambodia: Rule and Response clared it would return sovereignty to Vietnam. Emperor (1859–1905). Ithaca, New York: Cornell Univer- Bảo Đại declared the Treaty of Huế (1884) made with France in 1884 void. Trần Trọng Kim, a renowned hissity Press. ASIN B000K13QGO. torian and scholar, was chosen to lead the government as • Perkins, Mandaley (2006). Hanoi, Adieu: A bitter- prime minister.* [2] sweet memoir of French Indochina. Sydney: Harper Perennial. ISBN 978-0-7322-8197-7.

1.8.2 Policies

• Stuart-Fox, Martin (1997). A History of Laos. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Constitutional issues ISBN 0-521-59235-6. Kim and his ministers spent a substantial amount of time • Tarling, Nicholas (2001). Imperialism in Southeast on constitutional matters at their first meeting in Huế on Asia: “A Fleeting, Passing Phase”. London and 4 May 1945. One of their first resolutions was to alNew York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-23289-9. ter the national name to Việt Nam. This was seen as • Tully, John (2003). France on the Mekong: A His- a significant and urgent task. It implied territorial unity; tory of the Protectorate in Cambodia, 1863–1953. “Việt Nam”had been Emperor Gia Long's choice for the Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America. name of the country since he unified the modern territory of Việt Nam in 1802. Furthermore, this was the first ISBN 0-7618-2431-6. time that Vietnamese nationalists in the northern, central • Woodside, Alexander (1976). Community and Rev- and southern regions of the country officially recognized olution in Modern Vietnam. Boston: Houghton Mif- this name. In March, activists in the North always menflin. ISBN 0-395-20367-8. tioned Đại Việt (Great Việt), the name used prior to the

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM rate entities, implying a lack of national culture or political integration, Kim's first acts were seen not only as symbolic but the end of generations of frustration among Vietnamese intelligentsia and revolutionaries. On 12 June 1945, Kim selected a new national flag-a yellow, rectangular banner with three horizontal red stripes modeled after the Li Kwai in the Book of Changes - and a new national anthem, the old hymn Dang Dan Cung (The King Mounts His Throne). This decision ended a threemonth-long period of speculation concerning a new flag for Vietnam.* [3] Educational reform

Kim's government strongly emphasised educational reform, focusing on the development of technical training, particularly the use of romanised script (quốc ngữ) as the primary language of instruction. After less than two months in power, Kim organized the first primary examinations in Vietnamese, the language he intended to use in the advanced tests. Education minister Hoang Xuan Han strove to Vietnamise public secondary education. His reforms took more than four months to achieve their results, and have been regarded as a stepping stone for the Bảo Đại, previously emperor of Annam, was the nominal ruler successor Viet Minh government's launch of compulsory of the 1945 Empire of Vietnam. mass education. In July, when the Japanese decided to grant Vietnam full independence and territorial unification, Kim's government was about to begin a new round 15th century used by the Lê Dynasty and its predeces- of reform, by naming a committee to create a new na* sors, while those in the South used Vietnam, and the cen- tional education system. [4] tral leaders used An Nam (Peaceful South) or Đại Nam (Great South, which was used by the Nguyễn Lords). Judicial reform Kim also renamed the three regions of the country-the northern (former Tonkin or Bắc Kỳ) became Bắc Bộ, The Justice minister Trịnh Đình Thảo launched an atthe central region (former Annam or Trung Kỳ) became tempt at judicial reform. In May 1945, he created the Trung Bộ, and the southern areas (former Cochinchina or Committee for the Reform and Unification of Laws in Nam Kỳ) became Nam Bộ. Kim did this even though at Huế, which he headed. His ministry reevaluated the senthe time the Japanese had only given him direct authority tences of political prisoners, releasing a number of antiover the northern and central regions of Vietnam. When French activists and restoring the civil rights of others. France had finished its conquest of Vietnam in 1885, only This led to the release of a number of Communist cadres southern Vietnam was made a direct colony under the who returned to their former cells, and actively particiname of Cochinchina, while the northern and central repated in the destruction of Kim's government.* [4] gions were designated as protectorates as Tonkin and Annam. When the Empire of Vietnam was proclaimed, the Japanese retained direct control of Cochinchina, in the Encouragement of mass political participation same way as their French predecessors.* [3] Thuận Hóa, the pre-colonial name for Huế, was restored. One of the most notable changes implemented by Kim's Kim's officials also worked to find a French substitute for government was the encouragement of mass political the word “Annamite”, which was used to denote Viet- participation. In memorial ceremonies, Kim honoured namese people and their characteristics as described in all national heroes, ranging from the legendary national French literature and official use. “Annamite”was con- founders, the Hùng kings to slain anti-French revolutionsidered to be derogatory and it was replaced with “Viet- aries such as Nguyễn Thái Học, the leader of the Vietnamien”(Vietnamese). Apart from Thuận Hóa, these namese Nationalist Party (Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng) in 1930 in the terms have been internationally accepted since Kim or- who was executed with twelve comrades * Yên Bái mutiny. [4] aftermath of the dered the changes. Given that the French colonial authorities emphatically distinguished the three regions of A committee was organised to select a list of national “Tonkin”, “Annam”, and “Cochinchina”as sepa- heroes for induction into the Temple of Martyrs (Nghia

1.8. EMPIRE OF VIETNAM Liet Tu). City streets were renamed. In Huế, Jules Ferry was replaced on the signboards of a main thoroughfare by Lê Lợi, the founder of the Lê Dynasty who expelled the Chinese in 1427. General Trần Hưng Đạo, who twice repelled Mongol invasions in the 13th century, replaced Paul Bert. On August 1, the new mayor of Hanoi, Tran Van Lai, ordered the demolition of French built statues in the city parks in his campaign to Wipe Out Humiliating Remnants. Similar campaigns were enacted in southern Vietnam in late August. Meanwhile, the freedom of the press was instituted, resulting in the publication of the pieces of anti-French movements and critical essays on French collaborators. Heavy criticism was even extended to Nguyen Huu Do, the great grandfather of Bảo Đại who was notable in assisting the French conquest of Dai Nam in the 1880s.* [4] Kim put particular emphasis on the mobilisation of youth. Youth Minister Phan Anh, attempted to centralise and heavily regulate all youth organizations, which had proliferated immediately after the Japanese coup. On May 25, an imperial order decreed an inclusive, hierarchical structure for youth organizations. At the apex was the National Youth Council, a consultative body, which advised the minister. Similar councils were to be organised down to the district level. Meanwhile, young people were asked to join the local squads or groups, from provincial to communal levels. They were given physical training and were charged with maintaining security in their communes. Each provincial town had a training centre, where month-long paramilitary courses were on oﬀer.* [4]

79 Japanese authorities were not enthusiastic about the territorial unification of Vietnam. However, after the formation of Kim's cabinet in April, Japan quickly agreed to return what was then Tonkin and Annam to Kim's authority, although it retained control of the cities of Hanoi, Haiphong, and Da Nang. Meanwhile, southern Vietnam remained under direct Japanese control, just as Cochinchina had been under French rule.* [5] Beginning in May 1945, Foreign Minister Tran Van Chuong entered into negotiations with the Japanese in Hanoi for the return of the three cities to Vietnamese rule, but the Japanese stalled because Hanoi and Haiphong were seen as strategic points in their war defence. It was only in June and July that the Japanese allowed the process of national unification to take place. On June 16, Bảo Đại issued a decree proclaiming the impending reunification of Vietnam. On June 29, General Tsuchihashi signed a series of decrees transferring some of the duties of the government general-including customs, information, youth and sports- to the governments of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, effective July 1. This was followed by Bảo Đại's issuing of four imperial orders: establishment of the National Consultative Committee (Hoi dong Tu van Quoc Gia); a committee of fifteen to work on the creation of a constitution; a fifteen-member committee to examine administrative reform, legislation, and finance; and a committee for educational reform. For the first time, leaders from southern regions were invited to join these committees.* [5]

Territorial uniﬁcation

Other developments in southern Vietnam in early July were seen as preparatory Japanese steps towards granting territorial reunification to Vietnam. In early July, when southern Vietnam was abuzz with the spirit of independence and mass political participation due to the creation of the Vanguard Youth organizations in Saigon and other regional centres, Governor Minoda announced the organisation of the Hoi Nghi Nam (Council of Nam Bo) to facilitate his governance. This council was charged with advising the Japanese based on questions submitted to it by the Japanese and for overseeing provincial affairs. Minoda underlined that its primary aim was to make the Vietnamese population believe that they had to closely collaborate with the Japanese, because “if the Japanese lose the war, the independence of Indochina would not become complete.”At its inauguration of the Council of Nam Bo on July 21, Minoda implicitly referred to the unification of Vietnam. Tran Van An was appointed as the president of the Council, and Kha Vang Can, a leader of the Vanguard Youth, was appointed to be his deputy.* [6]

The most notable achievement of Kim's Empire of Vietnam was the successful negotiation with Japan for the territorial uniﬁcation of the nation. The French had subdivided Vietnam into three separate regions: Cochinchina (in 1862) and Annam and Tonkin (both in 1884). Cochinchina was placed under direct rule while the latter two were oﬃcially designated as protectorates. Immediately after the coup which terminated French rule, the

On July 13, Kim arrived in Hanoi to directly conduct negotiations with Governor-General Tsuchihashi. Tsuchihashi assented to return control of Hanoi, Haiphong, and Da Nang to Kim's government, taking eﬀect on July 20. After protracted negotiation, it was also agreed that Nam Bo was to be reintegrated into Vietnam and that Kim would journey to Saigon to attend the reuniﬁcation ceremonies on August 8.* [7]

The government also established a national center for the Advanced Front Youth (Thanh nien tien tuyen) in Huế. It was inaugurated on June 2, with the intention of being the centrepiece for future oﬃcer training. In late July, regional social youth centers were established in Hanoi, Huế, and Saigon. In Hanoi, the General Association of Students and Youth (Tong Hoi Sinh vien va Thanh Nien) was animated by the fervor of independence. The City University in Hanoi became a focal point of political agitation. By May and June, there was evidence that communist Cadres of the Viet Minh front, had inﬁltrated the university's youth and famine relief associations. In the face of the rising Viet Minh front, the Japanese attempted to contact its leaders, but their messengers were killed by the Viet Minh. The Kempeitai retaliated, arresting hundreds of pro-communist Vietnamese youths in late June.* [5]

1.8.3

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM

Decline

Kim's historic achievement was immediately overshadowed by external pressure and domestic infighting. On July 26, the leaders of the Allies issued a declaration demanding the unconditional surrender of Japan. Japan was on the defensive and quickly losing ground, and its aim was no longer to win the war, but simply to find an honorable ceasefire. On the Vietnamese front, the possibility of future punishment by the Allied forces for collaboration with the Japanese discouraged many possible supporters of Kim. His ministers and public servant corps began to dwindle in number. The Imperial Commissioner of Bac Bo, Phan Ke Toai, accompanied by his son and other Viet Minh sympathisers and secret communists such as Nguyen Manh Ha and Hoàng Minh Giám, submitted his resignation. Nguyen Xuan Chu, a leader of the Vietnamese Patriotic Party (Viet-Nam Ai Quoc Dang) and one of the five members of Cường Để's National Reconstruction Committee, refused the offer of replacing Toai. Returning to Thuận Hóa, Kim arrived to find increasing conflict among his ministers. Chuong wanted credit for arranging the integration of the three ceded cities and southern Vietnam to Kim's government and was regarded as having Prime Ministerial designs himself. The government meetings of August 5 and 6 were headlined by personal disputes and the resignation of the ministers of interior, economy, and supplies. Ho Ta Khanh, the economic minister, went further and demanded the resignation of the government. Khanh proposed that the Viet Minh be given a chance to govern because of its strength. The government resigned on August 7. Bảo Đại asked Kim to form a new government, but the end of the war made this impossible.* [7] On August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and invaded Manchuria. The following day, a second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, and Japan's resistance to the Allies was quickly ended. Japan decided to give Kim and Vietnamese nationalists the full independence and territorial unification that they had sought for decades. Kim was urged many times to come to Saigon to officially accept control of Nam Bo. Multiple factors prevented Kim from leaving the capital. From August 8 onward, Pham Khac Hoe, Bảo Đại's office director, was instructed by Ton Quang Phiet (the future chairman of the Viet Minh's Revolutionary Committee in Huế) to persuade the Emperor to abdicate voluntarily.* [8] In order to carry out his mission, Hoe persistently disrupted Kim's activities, particularly by citing Kim's failure to call the most influential figures to Thuận Hóa to form a new government. Meanwhile, Interior Minister Nam, cited the communist uprisings in Thanh Hóa and Quảng Ngãi in central Vietnam to discourage Kim from traveling to Saigon. The acceptance of the handover of Nam Bo was thus temporarily placed at the feet of the Council of Nam Bo.* [9] On August 14, Bảo Đại appointed Nguyen Van Sam, for-

mer president of the Journalists' Syndicate, to the post of Imperial Commissioner of Nam Bo. Sam left Thuận Hóa for Saigon. However, he was delayed en route as the Viet Minh had taken advantage of the military power vacuum caused by the Japanese surrender to launch a general insurrection with the aim of seizing control of the country.* [9]

1.8.4 Viet Minh takeover In August, Vietnam went through a period regarded as one of its most eventful phases, amidst the backdrop of rapid change in global politics. On the one hand, the Allies began to put into effect their postwar plans for Vietnam, which included the disarmament of Japanese troops and the division of Vietnam into spheres of influence. The Japanese military and civilian personnel in Vietnam were hamstrung by the unconditional surrender of their government and the possibility of Allied retribution. With respect to the Vietnamese, the Japanese were split psychologically and ideologically. Some Japanese favoured the Viet Minh, releasing Communist political prisoners, arming the Viet Minh front, and even volunteering their services. Others, including senior military officers, wanted to use their forces to support Kim's government and to crush the communists. Amid the political confusion and power vacuum engulfing the country, a race to power by diverse Vietnamese political groups took place.* [9] On the eve of Japan's surrender, Kim and his supporters tried to take control of the situation. On August 12, Kim's outgoing government was retained as “Provisional Government”to oversee the day-to-day running of the country. Kim asked Bảo Đại to issue an imperial order on August 14 repealing the treaties of 1862 and 1874, thus removing the last French claims to sovereign rights over Vietnam. Messengers were sent from the central capital to northern and southern Vietnam to reunify diverse groups under the central government in Thuận Hóa, but they were apprehended en route by the Viet Minh.* [9] Even though Bảo Đại's messengers were cut off, noncommunist leaders in northern and southern Vietnam attempted to challenge the Viet Minh. In Bac Bo, Nguyen Xuan Chu obtained Kim's approval to form the Committee for National Salvation, and he was appointed by Kim as chairman of the Political Directorate of Bac Bo. In Nam Bo, on August 17, it was announced that all nonViet Minh factions, including Trotskyites and the southern religious sects of Cao Đài and Hòa Hảo, had joined forces to create the Mặt trận Quốc gia Thống nhất (National Unified Front).* [10] Trần Quang Vinh, the Cao Đài leader, and Huỳnh Phú Sổ, the founder of the Hòa Hảo, also issued a communique proclaiming an alliance. On August 19 in Saigon, the Vanguard Youth organised their second official oath-taking ceremony, vowing to defend Vietnamese independence at all costs. The next day, Ho Van Nga assumed the interim office of Imperial Com-

1.9. FIRST INDOCHINA WAR

missioner and appointed Kha Vang Can, the Vanguard [11] Chieu, pp. 312–313. Youth leader, commander of Saigon and Cholon. Nguyen [12] Chieu, p. 313. Van Sam's arrival in Saigon on August 22 provided the National Unified Front with the official declaration of national independence and territorial reunification.* [11] 1.8.7 References Nevertheless, the Viet Minh prevailed in the power struggle with their August Revolution. On August 17, Viet Minh cadres in Hanoi took control of a mass demonstration organised by the General Association of Civil Servants. The rally was originally aimed at celebrating independence and territorial reunification and supporting Kim's government. Two days later, Nguyen Xuan Chu was forced to hand over authority to the Viet Minh. Combined with the official cease-fire of the Japanese army on August 21, this threw Kim's government into disarray and it collapsed. On August 23, the Viet Minh seized power in Huế. Two days later, Bảo Đại officially abdicated, and Nguyen Van Sam handed over power to the Viet Minh in Saigon. The Empire of Viet-Nam had fallen along with Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.* [12]

• Vu Ngu Chieu (February 1986). “The Other Side of the 1945 Vietnamese Revolution: The Empire of Viet-Nam”. Journal of Asian Studies 45 (2).

1.9 First Indochina War “Indochina War”redirects here. For other uses, see Indochina Wars.

The First Indochina War (generally known as the Indochina War in France, and as the Anti-French Resistance War in contemporary Vietnam) began in French Indochina on 19 December 1946 and lasted until 1 August 1954. Fighting between French forces and their Viet Minh opponents in the South dated from Septem1.8.5 See also ber 1945. The conflict pitted a range of forces, includ• Annam (French protectorate) ing the French Union's French Far East Expeditionary Corps, led by France and supported by Emperor Bảo • Tonkin Đại's Vietnamese National Army against the Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh and its People's Army of Vietnam • Cochinchina led by Vo Nguyen Giap. Most of the fighting took place • Proclamation of Independence of the Democratic in Tonkin in Northern Vietnam, although the conflict Republic of Vietnam engulfed the entire country and also extended into the neighboring French Indochina protectorates of Laos and • Vietnam during World War II Cambodia. • Invasion of French Indochina At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, the Combined Chiefs of Staff decided that Indochina south of latitude 16° North was to be included in the Southeast Asia 1.8.6 Notes Command under British Admiral Mountbatten. Japanese [1] Lebra, Joyce C. Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity forces located south of that line surrendered to him and Sphere in World War II: Selected Readings and Docu- those to the north surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang ments. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 157, Kai-shek. In September 1945, Chinese forces entered 158, 160 Tonkin and a small British task force landed at Saigon. The Chinese accepted the Vietnamese government under [2] Chieu, p. 301. Ho Chi Minh, created by resistance forces of the Viet [3] Chieu, pp. 303–304. Minh, then in power in Hanoi. The British refused to do likewise in Saigon, and deferred to the French there from [4] Chieu, p. 309. the outset, against the ostensible support of the Viet Minh [5] Chieu, p. 310. by American OSS representatives. On V-J Day, September 2, Ho Chi Minh had proclaimed in Hanoi the estab[6] Chieu, pp. 310–311. lishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). [7] Chieu, p. 311. The DRV ruled as the only civil government in all of Vietnam for a period of about 20 days, after the abdication [8] Chieu, pp. 311–312. of Emperor Bảo Đại, who had governed under Japanese [9] Chieu, p. 312. rule and thus was considered by Vietminh a “Japanese [10] Jessica M. Chapman Cauldron of Resistance: Ngô Đình puppet”. On 23 September 1945, with the knowledge Diệm, the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam 2013 of the British Commander in Saigon, French forces overp28 “On August 17, a group of non–Viet Minh parties threw the local DRV government, and declared French and organizations in the south, including the Trotskyites, authority restored in Cochinchina. Guerrilla warfare began around Saigon immediately.* [22] the politico-religious organizations, Catholics, ..”

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM

The first few years of the war involved a low-level ru- Vietnam War ral insurgency against French authority. However, af- Vietnam was absorbed into French Indochina in stages ter the Chinese communists reached the northern border of Vietnam in 1949, the conflict turned into a conventional war between two armies equipped with modern weapons supplied by the United States and the Soviet Union.* [23] French Union forces included colonial troops from the whole former empire (Moroccan, Algerian, Tunisian, Laotian, Cambodian, and Vietnamese ethnic minorities), French professional troops and units of the French Foreign Legion. The use of metropolitan recruits was forbidden by the government to prevent the war from becoming even more unpopular at home. It was called the “dirty war”(la sale guerre) by the Leftist intellectuals in France.* [24] The strategy of pushing the Viet Minh into attacking a well-defended base in a remote part of the country at the end of their logistical trail was validated at the Battle of Nà Sản. However this base was relatively weak by the lack of construction materials like concrete and steel, limited usefulness of armored tanks in a jungle environment, lack of strong air forces for air cover and carpet bombing and use of recruited foreign forces from other French colonies (mainly from Algeria, Morocco and even Vietnam), caused by the unpopularity of this war in France which proscribed the use of regular French recruits. On the other hand, Giap used efficient and novel tactics of direct fire artillery, convoy ambushes and amassed antiaircraft guns to impede land or air supply deliveries together with a strategy based on recruiting a sizable regular army facilitated by wide popular support, a guerrilla warfare doctrine and instruction developed during China revolution and the use of simple and reliable war maFrench Indochina (1913) terial provided by the Soviet Union. This combination proved fatal for this base defenses, culminating in a deci- between 1858 and 1887 with European influence and sive French defeat at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu.* [25] education. Nationalism grew until World War II proAt the International Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954 vided a break in French control. Early Vietnamese resisthe new socialist French government and the Viet Minh tance centered on the intellectual Phan Bội Châu. Châu made an agreement that was denounced by the govern- looked to Japan, which had modernized and was one of ment of Vietnam and by the United States, but which ef- the few Asian nations to resist European colonization. fectively gave the Communists control of North Vietnam With Prince Cường Để, Châu started two organizations above the 17th parallel. Control of the north was given to in Japan, the Duy Tân hội (Modernistic Association) and the Viet Minh under Ho Chi Minh, and the south contin- Vietnam Cong Hien Hoi. ued under Emperor Bảo Đại. A year later, Bảo Đại would Due to French pressure, Japan deported Phan Bội Châu be deposed by his prime minister, Ngô Đình Diệm, creat- to China. Witnessing Sun Yat-sen's 1911 nationalist reving the Republic of Vietnam. Soon an insurgency backed olution, Châu was inspired to commence the Viet Nam by the North developed against Diệm's government. The Quang Phục Hội movement in Guangzhou. From 1914 conflict gradually escalated into the Vietnam War. to 1917, he was imprisoned by Yuan Shikai's counterrevolutionary government. In 1925, he was captured by French agents in Shanghai and spirited to Vietnam. Due 1.9.1 Background to his popularity, Châu was spared from execution and Further information: Vietnam Expedition, Franco-Thai placed under house arrest until his death in 1940. War, Second French Indochina Campaign, Empire of In September 1940, shortly after Phan Bội Châu's death, Vietnam, August Revolution, Vietnamese Famine of Japan launched its invasion of French Indochina, mirror1945, Proclamation of Independence of the Democratic ing its ally Germany's conquest of metropolitan France. Republic of Vietnam, French Far East Expeditionary Keeping the French colonial administration, the Japanese Corps, War in Vietnam (1945–46) and 1940–1946 in the ruled from behind the scenes in a parallel of Vichy

1.9. FIRST INDOCHINA WAR France. As far as Vietnamese nationalists were concerned, this was a double-puppet government. Emperor Bảo Đại collaborated with the Japanese, just as he had with the French, ensuring his lifestyle could continue. From October 1940 to May 1941, during the FrancoThai War, the Vichy French in Indochina were involved with defending their colony in a border conﬂict which saw the forces of Thailand invade, while the Japanese sat on the sidelines. Thai military successes were limited to the Cambodian border area, and in January 1941 Vichy France's modern naval forces soundly defeated the inferior Thai naval forces in the Battle of Ko Chang. The war ended in May, with the French agreeing to minor territorial revisions which restored formerly Thai areas to Thailand.

83 ter their defeat, the Japanese Army gave weapons to the Viet Minh. In order to further help the nationalists, the Japanese kept Vichy French officials and military officers imprisoned for a month after the surrender. OSS officers met repeatedly with Ho Chi Minh and other Viet Minh officers during this period and on September 2, 1945, Ho Chi Minh declared independence from France for Vietnam.* [28] The Viet Minh had recruited more than 600 Japanese soldiers and given them roles to train or command Vietnamese soldiers.* [29]* [30]

Ho Chi Minh claimed in a speech in September 1945 that due to a combination of ruthless Japanese exploitation and poor weather, a famine occurred in which approximately two million Vietnamese died. The Viet Minh arIn March 1945, Japan launched the Second French In- ranged a relief eﬀort in the north and won wide support dochina Campaign and ousted the Vichy French and there as a result. formally installed Emperor Bảo Đại in the short-lived American President Franklin D. Roosevelt and General Empire of Vietnam. Joseph Stilwell privately made it adamantly clear that the Japanese forces surrender (August 1945)

Japanese troops lay down their arms to British troops in a ceremony in Saigon 1945

On August 22, 1945, OSS agents Archimedes Patti and Carleton B. Swift Jr. arrived in Hanoi on a mercy mission to liberate allied POWs and were accompanied by Jean Sainteny, a French government oﬃcial.* [26] The Japanese forces informally surrendered (the oﬃcial surrender took place on September 2, 1945, in Tokyo Bay) but being the only force capable of maintaining law and order, the Japanese Imperial Army remained in power while keeping French colonial troops and Sainteny detained.* [27]

French were not to reacquire French Indochina (modern day Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) after the war was over. Roosevelt oﬀered Chiang Kai-shek to place all of Indochina under Chinese rule. Chiang Kai-shek supposedly replied: “Under no circumstances!".* [31] Roosevelt died shortly thereafter and U.S. resistance to French rule weakened, eventually capitulating to intense pressure from Charles de Gaulle.* [32] In mid-September, 200,000 troops of the Chinese 1st Army arrived in what would become North Vietnam (Indochina above the 16th parallel). They had been sent by Chiang Kai-shek under General Lu Han to accept the surrender of Japanese forces occupying that area which had been designated to Chiang Kai-Shek under Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers General Order no. One.* [33] The Chinese forces remained there until 1946* [34] and initially kept the French Colonial soldiers interned with the acquiescence of the Americans.* [27] The Chinese used the VNQDĐ, the Vietnamese branch of the Chinese Kuomintang, to increase their inﬂuence in Indochina and put pressure on their opponents.* [35] Chiang Kai-shek threatened the French with war in response to manoeuvering by the French and Ho Chi Minh against each other, forcing them to come to a peace agreement, and in February 1946 he also forced the French to surrender all of their concessions in China and renounce their extraterritorial privileges in exchange for withdrawing from northern Indochina and allowing French troops to reoccupy the region starting in March 1946.* [36]* [37]* [38]* [39]

Ho Chi Minh was able to persuade Emperor Bảo Đại to abdicate on August 25, 1945. Bảo Đại was appointed “supreme advisor”to the new Vietminh-led government in Hanoi, which asserted independence on September 2. Deliberately borrowing from the Declaration of IndepenJapanese forces allowed the Viet Minh and other nationaldence of the United States of America, Ho Chi Minh proist groups to take over public buildings and weapons withclaimed on September 2:“We hold the truth that all men out resistance, which began the August Revolution. Af-

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM ﬁcials.* [42]

1.9.2 Timeline 1946

Commando of the C.L.I. (Corps Léger d'Intervention) in Indochina after the surrender of Japan.

are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, among them life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”* [40]

Ho Chi Minh and Marius Moutet shaking hands after signing

With the fall of the short-lived Japanese colony of the modus vivendi 1946 after Fontainebleau Agreements Empire of Vietnam, the Provisional Government of the French Republic wanted to restore its colonial rule in French Indochina as the ﬁnal step of the Liberation of France. An armistice was signed between Japan and the United States on August 20. CEFEO Expeditionary Corps leader General Leclerc signed the armistice with Japan on board the USS Missouri on behalf of France, on September 2. On September 13, a Franco-British task force landed in Java, main island of the Dutch East Indies (for which independence was being sought by Sukarno), and Saigon, capital of Cochinchina (southern part of French Indochina), both being occupied by the Japanese and ruled by Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi, Commander-inChief of Japan's Southern Expeditionary Army Group based in Saigon.* [41] Allied troops in Saigon were an airborne detachment, two British companies of the Indian 20th Infantry Division and the French 5th Colonial Infantry Regiment, with British General Sir Douglas Gracey as supreme commander. The latter proclaimed martial law on September 21. The following night the Franco-British troops took control of Saigon.* [42]

"Envoys probe Indo-China rebellion" (January 16, 1947), Universal Newsreel

Fighting broke out in Haiphong after a conflict of interest in import duty at the port between the Viet Minh government and the French.* [43] On November 23, 1946, the French fleet began a naval bombardment of the VietAlmost immediately afterward, the Chinese Govern- namese sections of the city that killed over 6,000 Vietment, as agreed to at the Potsdam Conference, occupied namese civilians in one afternoon.* [44]* [45]* [46] The French Indochina as far south as the 16th parallel in or- Viet Minh quickly agreed to a cease-fire and left the cities. der to supervise the disarming and repatriation of the There was never any intention among the Vietnamese to Japanese Army. This effectively ended Ho Chi Minh's give up, as General Võ Nguyên Giáp soon brought up nominal government in Hanoi. 30,000 men to attack the city. Although the French were General Leclerc arrived in Saigon on October 9, with him was French Colonel Massu's March Group (Groupement de marche). Leclerc's primary objectives were to restore public order in south Vietnam and to militarize Tonkin (north Vietnam). Secondary objectives were to wait for French backup in view to take back Chineseoccupied Hanoi, then to negotiate with the Viet Minh of-

outnumbered, their superior weaponry and naval support made any Viet Minh attack unsuccessful. In December, hostilities also broke out in Hanoi between the Viet Minh and the French, and Ho Chi Minh was forced to evacuate the capital in favor of remote mountain areas. Guerrilla warfare ensued, with the French controlling most of the country except far-ﬂung areas.

1.9. FIRST INDOCHINA WAR 1947 In 1947, General Võ Nguyên Giáp retreated his command to Tan Trao deep in the hills of Tuyên Quang Province. The French sent military expeditions to attack his bases, but Giap refused to meet them head-on in battle. Wherever the French troops went, the Viet Minh disappeared. Late in the year the French launched Operation Lea to take out the Viet Minh communications center at Bắc Kạn. They failed to capture Ho Chi Minh and his key lieutenants as intended. The French claimed 9,000 Viet Minh soldiers KIA during the campaign which, if true, would represent a major blow for the insurgency. 1948

85 Vietnamese National Army to be commanded by Vietnamese officers. These troops were used mostly to garrison quiet sectors so French forces would be available for combat. Private Cao Đài, Hòa Hảo and the Bình Xuyên gangster armies were used in the same way. The Vietnamese Communists in return obtained outside support in 1949 when Chairman Mao Zedong succeeded in taking control of China by defeating the Kuomintang, thus gaining a major political ally and supply area just across the border. In the same year, the French also granted independence (within the framework of the French Union) to the other two nations in Indochina, the Kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia. The United States began to give military aid to France in the form of weaponry and military observers. Chinese assistance to the Viet Minh began after the communist victory in China. Giap re-organized his local irregular forces into five full conventional infantry divisions, the 304th, 308th, 312th, 316th and the 320th. The war began to intensify when Giap went on the offensive, attacking isolated French bases along the Chinese border.

In 1948, France started looking for means of opposing the Viet Minh politically, with an alternative government in Saigon. They began negotiations with the former emperor Bảo Đại to lead an“autonomous”government within the French Union of nations, the State of Vietnam. Two years before, the French had refused Ho's proposal of a similar status, albeit with some restrictions on French power and 1950 the latter's eventual withdrawal from Vietnam. However, they were willing to give it to Bảo Đại as he had freely collaborated with French rule of Vietnam in the past and was in no position to seriously negotiate or impose demands (Bảo Đại had no military of his own, but soon he would have one).

(3 November 1950) Areas in which Communist-led rebels are challenging government authority. Areas in which Communist-instigated guerilla attacks have recently occurred.

Lai Chau

1949

Moncay gtung

Hanoi Haiphong

Hon Gay

HAINAN

A Dong Hoi

Hué

T H A I L A N D

Tourane

Quang Ngai

BANGKOK

Qui Nhon

C A M B O D I A

French Marine commandos wade ashore oﬀ the Annam coast

In 1949, France oﬃcially recognized the“independence” of the State of Vietnam as an associated state within the French Union under Bảo Đại. However, France still controlled all foreign relations and every defense issue as Vietnam was only nominally an independent state within the French Union. The Viet Minh quickly denounced the government and stated that they wanted “real independence, not Bảo Đại independence”. Later on, as a concession to this new government and a way to increase their numbers, France agreed to the formation of the

Nha Trang Dalat

PNOMPENH SAIGON

A map of dissident activities in Indochina in 1950

In February 1950, Giap seized the vulnerable 150-strong French garrison at Lai Khê in Tonkin just south of the border with China. Major general Thái attacked Đông

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM

Khê on September 15.* [47] Đông Khê fell on September 18, and Cao Bằng finally fell on October 3. Lạng Sơn, with its 4,000-strong French Foreign Legion garrison, was attacked immediately after. The retreating French on Route 4, together with the relief force coming from That Khe, were attacked all the way by ambushing Viet Minh forces. The French air-dropped a paratroop battalion south of Cao Bằng to act as diversion only to see it quickly surrounded and destroyed. On October 17, Lạng Sơn, after a week of intense fighting, finally fell. By the time the remains of the garrisons reached the safety of the Red River Delta, 4,800 French troops had been killed, captured or missing in action and 2,000 wounded out of a total garrison force of over 10,000. Also lost were 13 artillery pieces, 125 mortars, 450 trucks, 940 machine guns, 1,200 submachine guns and 8,000 rifles destroyed or captured during the fighting. China and the Soviet Union recognized Ho Chi Minh as the legitimate ruler of Vietnam and sent him more and more supplies and material aid. The year 1950 also marked the first time that napalm was ever used in Vietnam (this type of weapon was supplied by the U.S. for the use of the French Aéronavale at the time). The military situation improved for France when its new commander, General Jean Marie de Lattre de Tassigny, built a fortified line from Hanoi to the Gulf of Tonkin, across the Red River Delta, to hold the Viet Minh in place and use his troops to smash them against this barricade, which became known as the De Lattre Line. This led to a period of success for the French.

1951 On January 13, 1951, Giáp moved the 308th and 312th Divisions, made up of over 20,000 men, to attack Vĩnh Yên, 20 miles (32 km) northwest of Hanoi, which was manned by the 6,000-strong 9th Foreign Legion Brigade. The Viet Minh entered a trap. Caught for the first time in the open and actually forced to fight the French headon, without the ability to quickly hide and retreat, they were mown down by concentrated French artillery and machine gun fire. By January 16, the Battle of Vĩnh Yên ended as Giáp was forced to withdraw, with over 6,000 of his troops killed, 8,000 wounded and 500 captured.

General Trình Minh Thế

ered by the 320th Division at Phat Diem south of Hanoi. The attacks fared no better and the three divisions lost heavily. Taking advantage of this, de Lattre mounted his counteroffensive against the demoralized Viet Minh, driving them back into the jungle and eliminating the enemy pockets in the Red River Delta by June 18, costing the Viet Minh over 10,000 killed.* [48] Every effort by Võ Nguyên Giáp to break the De Lattre Line failed and every attack he made was answered by a French counter-attack that destroyed his forces. Viet Minh casualties rose alarmingly during this period, leading some to question the leadership of the Communist government, even within the party. However, any benefit this may have reaped for France was negated by the increasing domestic opposition to the war in France.

On July 31, French General Charles Chanson was assassinated during a propaganda suicide attack at Sa Đéc in South Vietnam that was blamed on the Viet Minh although it was argued in some quarters that Cao Đài naOn March 23, Giáp tried again, launching an attack tionalist Trình Minh Thế could have been involved in its against Mạo Khê, 20 miles (32 km) north of Haiphong. planning. The 316th Division, composed of 11,000 men, with the On November 14, 1951, the French seized Hòa Bình, 25 partly rebuilt 308th and 312th Divisions in reserve, went miles (40 km) west of the De Lattre Line, by a parachute forward and were beaten in bitter hand-to-hand ﬁght- drop and extended their perimeter. ing against French troops. Giap, having lost over 3,000 (French estimation) / ~500 (Viet Minh information) dead and wounded by March 28, withdrew. 1952 Giáp launched yet another attack, the Battle of the Day River, on May 29 with the 304th Division at Phủ Lý, the In January, General de Lattre fell ill from cancer and had 308th Division at Ninh Bình, and the main attack deliv- to return to France for treatment. He died there shortly

1.9. FIRST INDOCHINA WAR

87 to withdraw back to the De Lattre Line. The only major ﬁghting during the operation came during the withdrawal, when the Viet Minh ambushed the French column at Chan Muong on November 17. The road was cleared after a bayonet charge by the Indochinese March Battalion, and the withdrawal could continue. The French lost around 1,200 men during the whole operation, most of them during the Chan Muong ambush. The operation was partially successful, proving that the French could strike out at targets outside the De Lattre Line. However, it failed to divert the Viet Minh oﬀensive or seriously damage its logistical network.

French foreign airborne 1st BEP ﬁring with a FM 24/29 light machine gun during an ambush (1952).

1953

thereafter and was replaced by General Raoul Salan as the overall commander of French forces in Indochina. Viet Minh launched attacks on Hòa Bình, forcing the French to withdraw back to their main positions on the De Lattre line by February 22, 1952. Each side lost nearly 5,000 men in this campaign, and it showed that the war was far from over. Throughout the war theater, the Viet Minh cut French supply lines and began to seriously wear down the resolve of the French forces. There were continued raids, skirmishes and guerrilla attacks, but through most of the rest of the year each side withdrew to prepare itself for larger operations. Starting on October 2, the Battle of Nà Sản saw the first use of the French commanders’"hedgehog" tactics consisting in setting up a well-defended outpost to get the Viet Minh out of the jungle and force it to fight a conventional battle instead of ambushes. At first this strategy was successful for the French Union but it ended with a fiasco in 1954. On October 17, 1952, Giáp launched attacks against the French garrisons along Nghĩa Lộ, northwest of Hanoi, and overran much of the Black River valley, except for the airfield of Nà Sản where a strong French garrison entrenched. Giáp by now had control over most of Tonkin beyond the De Lattre line. Raoul Salan, seeing the situation as critical, launched Operation Lorraine along the Clear River to force Giáp to relieve pressure on the Nghĩa Lộ outposts.

A Bearcat naval ﬁghter aircraft of the Aéronavale drops napalm on Viet Minh Division 320th's artillery during Operation Mouette (November 1953)

On April 9, 1953, Giáp, after having failed repeatedly in direct attacks on French positions in Vietnam, changed strategy and began to pressure the French by invading Laos, surrounding and defeating several French outposts such as Muong Khoua. In May, General Henri Navarre replaced Salan as supreme commander of French forces in Indochina. He reported to the French government "... that there was no possibility of winning the war in IndoChina,”saying that the best the French could hope for was a stalemate. Navarre, in response to the Viet Minh attacking Laos, concluded that “hedgehog”centers of defense were the best plan. Looking at a map of the area, Navarre chose the small town of Điện Biên Phủ, located about 10 miles (16 km) north of the Lao border and 175 miles (282 km) west of Hanoi as a target to block the Viet Minh from invading Laos. Điện Biên Phủ had a number of advantages: it was on a Viet Minh supply route into Laos on the Nam Yum River, it had an old airstrip for supply, and it was situated in the Tai hills where the Tai tribesmen, still loyal to the French, operated.

On October 29, 1952, in the largest operation in Indochina to date, 30,000 French Union soldiers moved out from the De Lattre line to attack the Viet Minh supply dumps at Phú Yên. Salan took Phú Thọ on November 5, and Phu Doan on November 9 by a parachute drop, and finally Phú Yên on November 13. Giáp at first did not react to the French offensive. He planned to wait until their supply lines were overextended and then cut them Operation Castor was launched on November 20, 1953, off from the Red River Delta. with 1,800 men of the French 1st and 2nd Airborne BatSalan correctly guessed what the Viet Minh were up to talions dropping into the valley of Điện Biên Phủ and and cancelled the operation on November 14, beginning sweeping aside the local Viet Minh garrison. The para-

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM

troopers gained control of a heart-shaped valley 12 miles (19 km) long and 8 miles (13 km) wide surrounded by heavily wooded hills. Encountering little opposition, the French and Tai units operating from Lai Châu to the north patrolled the hills. The operation was a tactical success for the French. However, Giáp, seeing the weakness of the French position, started moving most of his forces from the De Lattre line to Điện Biên Phủ. By mid-December, most of the French and Tai patrols in the hills around the town were wiped out by Viet Minh ambushes. The ﬁght for control of this position would be the longest and hardest battle for the French Far East Expeditionary Corps and would be remembered by the veterans as “57 Days of Hell”. 1954 VOLKSREPUBLIK CHINA

Franco-Vietnamese medics treating a wounded Viet Minh POW at Hưng Yên (1954)

Yen Bai Dien Bien Phu

BURMA

French Far East Expeditionary Corps, supported by Indochinese allies. The battle was fought near the village of Điện Biên Phủ in northern Vietnam and became the last major battle between the French and the Vietnamese in the First Indochina War.

Hanoi Hai Phong Samneua

Ninh Binh

Luang Prabang

Vinh

Vientiane Hue Tourane

THAILAND

Binh Dinh Siem Reap

Da Lat

Nha Trang

Phnom Penh

Indochinakrieg

Erster Indochinakrieg, Anfang 1954 unter französischer Kontrolle unter Kontrolle der Viet Minh Gebiete der Guerillakämpfe Französisch-Indochina Grenzen innerhalb Indochinas autonome Gebiete Südvietnam und Pays Montagnard

My Tho Can Tho

Saigon

Rach Gia

Map of the war in 1954. Orange = Areas under Viet Minh control. Purple = Areas under French control. White-dotted hatch = Areas of Viet Minh guerilla encampment and ﬁghting.

By 1954, despite official propaganda presenting the war as a "crusade against communism",* [49]* [50] the war in Indochina was still growing unpopular with the French public. The political stagnation of the Fourth Republic meant that France was unable to extract itself from the conflict. The United States initially sought to remain neutral, viewing the conflict as chiefly a decolonization war.

The battle began on March 13 when a preemptive Viet Minh attack surprised the French with heavy artillery. The artillery damaged both the main and secondary airfields that the French were using to fly in supplies. The only road into Điện Biên Phủ, already difficult to traverse, was also knocked out by Viet Minh forces. With French supply lines interrupted, the French position became untenable, particularly when the advent of the monsoon season made dropping supplies and reinforcements by parachute difficult. With defeat imminent, the French sought to hold on until the opening of the Geneva peace meeting on April 26. The last French offensive took place on May 4, but it was ineffective. The Viet Minh then began to hammer the outpost with newly supplied Soviet Katyusha rockets and other weaponry provided by Communist allies. The final fall took two days, May 6 and 7, during which the French fought on but were eventually overrun by a huge frontal assault. General Cogny, based in Hanoi, ordered General de Castries, who was commanding the outpost, to cease fire at 5:30 pm and to destroy all materiél (weapons, transmissions, etc.) to deny their use to the enemy. A formal order was given to not use the white flag so that the action would be considered a ceasefire instead of a surrender. Much of the fighting ended on May 7; however, the ceasefire was not respected on Isabelle, the isolated southern position, where the battle lasted until May 8, 1:00 am.* [51]

The Battle of Dien Bien Phu occurred in 1954 between Viet Minh forces under Võ Nguyên Giáp, supported by At least 2,200 members of the 20,000-strong French China and the Soviet Union, and the French Union's forces died, and another 1,729 were reported missing af-

1.9. FIRST INDOCHINA WAR ter the battle. Of the 50,000 or so Vietnamese soldiers thought to be involved, there were an estimated 4,800 to 8,000 killed and another 9,000–15,000 wounded. The prisoners taken at Điện Biên Phủ were the greatest number the Viet Minh had ever captured: one-third of the total captured during the entire war. One month after Điện Biên Phủ, the composite Groupe Mobile 100 (GM100) of the French Union forces evacuated the An Khê outpost and was ambushed by a larger Viet Minh force at the Battle of Mang Yang Pass from June 24 to July 17. At the same time, Giap launched some oﬀensives against the delta, but they all failed. The Viet Minh victory at Điện Biên Phủ heavily inﬂuenced the outcome of the 1954 Geneva accords that took place on July 21. In August Operation Passage to Freedom began, consisting of the evacuation of Catholic and loyalist Vietnamese civilians from communist North Vietnamese persecution.

1.9.3

Geneva Conference and Partition

Further information: Geneva Conference (1954) and Partition of Vietnam Negotiations between France and the Viet Minh started

89 placed on our country an unbearable burden. And here appears today a new and formidable threat: if the Indochina conflict is not resolved —and settled very fast —it is the risk of war, of international war and maybe atomic, that we must foresee. It is because I wanted a better peace that I wanted it earlier, when we had more assets. But even now there is some renouncings or abandons that the situation does not comprise. France does not have to accept and will not accept settlement which would be incompatible with its more vital interests [applauding on certain seats of the Assembly on the left and at the extreme right]. France will remain present in Far-Orient. Neither our allies, nor our opponents must conserve the least doubt on the signification of our determination. A negotiation has been engaged in Geneva ... I have longly studied the report ... consulted the most qualified military and diplomatic experts. My conviction that a pacific settlement of the conflict is possible has been confirmed. A “cease-fire”must henceforth intervene quickly. The government which I will form will fix itself —and will fix to its opponents —a delay of 4 weeks to reach it. We are today on 17th of June. I will present myself before you before the 20th of July ... If no satisfying solution has been reached at this date, you will be freed from the contract which would have tied us together, and my government will give its dismissal to the President of the Republic.” * [52] The Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954, recognized the 17th parallel as a "provisional military demarcation line,” temporarily dividing the country into two zones, Communist North Vietnam and pro-Western South Vietnam.

The 1954 Geneva Conference.

in Geneva in April 1954 at the Geneva Conference, during which time the French Union and the Viet Minh were fighting a battle at Điện Biên Phủ. In France, Pierre Mendès France, opponent of the war since 1950, had been invested as Prime Minister on June 17, 1954, on a promise to put an end to the war, reaching a ceasefire in four months: “Today it seems we can be reunited in a will for peace that may express the aspirations of our country ... Since already several years, a compromise peace, a peace negotiated with the opponent seemed to me commanded by the facts, while it commanded, in return, to put back in order our finances, the recovery of our economy and its expansion. Because this war

Student demonstration in Saigon, July 1964, observing the tenth anniversary of the July 1954 Geneva Agreements.

The Geneva Accords promised elections in 1956 to determine a national government for a united Vietnam. Nei-

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM

ther the United States government nor Ngo Dinh Diem's State of Vietnam signed anything at the 1954 Geneva Conference. With respect to the question of reunification, the non-communist Vietnamese delegation objected strenuously to any division of Vietnam, but lost out when the French accepted the proposal of Viet Minh delegate Pham Van Dong,* [53] who proposed that Vietnam eventually be united by elections under the supervision of“local commissions”.* [54] The United States countered with what became known as the “American Plan”, with the support of South Vietnam and the United Kingdom.* [55] It provided for unification elections under the supervision of the United Nations, but was rejected by the Soviet delegation.* [55] From his home in France, Emperor Bảo Đại appointed Ngô Đình Diệm as Prime Minister of South Vietnam. With American support, in 1955 Diem used a referendum to remove the former Emperor and declare himself the president of the Republic of Vietnam. When the elections failed to occur, Viet Minh cadres who stayed behind in South Vietnam were activated and started to fight the government. North Vietnam also invaded and occupied portions of Laos to assist in supplying the guerilla fighting National Liberation Front in South Vietnam. The war gradually escalated into the Second Indochina War, more commonly known as the Vietnam War in the West and the American War in Vietnam. Võ Nguyên Giáp and Ho Chi Minh (1942)

1.9.4

Ho Chi Minh

Main article: Ho Chi Minh In 1923, Ho Chi Minh moved to Guangzhou, China. In 1925–26, he organized the 'Youth Education Classes' and occasionally gave lectures at the famous Whampoa Military Academy on the revolutionary movement in Indochina. He stayed there in Hong Kong as a representative of the Communist International organization. In June 1931, he was arrested and incarcerated by British police until his release in 1933. He then made his way back to the Soviet Union, where he spent several years recovering from tuberculosis. In 1938, he returned to China and served as an adviser with the Chinese Communist armed forces. In 1941, Ho Chi Minh, seeing communist revolution as the path to freedom, returned to Vietnam and formed the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi (League for the Independence of Vietnam), better known as the Viet Minh. He spent many years in Moscow and participated in the International Comintern. At the direction of Moscow, he combined the various Vietnamese communist groups into the Indochinese Communist Party in Hong Kong in 1930. Ho created the Viet Minh as an umbrella organization for all the nationalist resistance movements, de-emphasizing his communist social revolutionary background.

ership of Bảo Đại. Around the same time, the Japanese arrested and imprisoned most of the French officials and military officers left in the country. After the French army and other officials were freed from Japanese prisons in Vietnam, they began reasserting their authority over parts of the country. At the same time, the French government began negotiations with both the Viet Minh and the Chinese for a return of the French army to Vietnam north of the 16th parallel. The Viet Minh were willing to accept French rule to end Chinese occupation. Ho and others had fears of the Chinese, based on China's historic domination and occupation of Vietnam. The French negotiated a deal with the Chinese where pre-war French concessions in Chinese ports such as Shanghai were traded for Chinese cooperation in Vietnam. The French landed a military force at Haiphong in early 1946. Negotiations then took place about the future for Vietnam as a state within the French Union. These talks eventually failed and the Viet Minh fled into the countryside to wage guerrilla war. In 1946, Vietnam created its first constitution.

The British had supported the French in ﬁghting the Viet Minh, armed militias from the religious Cao Đài and Hòa Hảo sects and the Bình Xuyên organized crime groups, which were all individually seeking power in the country. In 1948, as part of a post-colonial solution, the French reLate in the war, the Japanese created a nominally inde- installed Bao Dai as head of state of Vietnam under the pendent government of Vietnam under the overall lead- French Union. The Viet Minh were militarily ineﬀective

1.9. FIRST INDOCHINA WAR

1.9.5 French domestic situation The 1946 Constitution creating the Fourth Republic (1946–1958) made France a Parliamentary republic. Because of the political context, it could find stability only by an alliance between the three dominant parties: the Christian Democratic Popular Republican Movement (MRP), the French Communist Party (PCF) and the socialist French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO). Known as tripartisme, this alliance briefly lasted until the May 1947 crisis, with the expulsion from Paul Ramadier's SFIO government of the PCF ministers, marking the official start of the Cold War in France. This had the effect of weakening the regime, with the two most significant movements of this period, Communism and Gaullism, in opposition.

Telegram from Ho Chi Minh to U.S. President Harry S. Truman requesting support for independence (Hanoi, February 28, 1946)

in the ﬁrst few years of the war and could do little more than harass the French in remote areas of Indochina. In 1949, the war changed with the triumph of the communists in China on Vietnam's northern border. China was able to give almost unlimited support in terms of weapons and supplies to the Viet Minh, which transformed itself into a conventional army. After World War II, the United States and the USSR entered into the Cold War. The Korean War broke out in 1950 between communist North Korea (DPRK) supported by China and the Soviet Union, and South Korea (ROK) supported by the United States and its allies in the UN. The Cold War was now turning 'hot' in East Asia, and the American government feared communist domination of the entire region would have deep implications for American interests. The US became strongly opposed to the government of Ho Chi Minh, in part, because it was supported and supplied by China. Ho's government gained recognition from China and the Soviet Union by January 1950 in response to Western support for the State of Vietnam that the French had proposed as an associate state within the French Union. In the French-controlled areas of Vietnam, in the same year, the government of Bao Dai gained recognition by the United States and the United Kingdom.

Unlikely alliances had to be made between left- and right-wing parties in order to form a government invested by the National Assembly, which resulted in strong parliamentary instability. Hence, France had fourteen prime ministers in succession between the creation of the Fourth Republic in 1947 and the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. The rapid turnover of governments (there were 17 different governments during the war) left France unable to prosecute the war with any consistent policy according to veteran General René de Biré (who was a lieutenant at Dien Bien Phu).* [56] France was increasingly unable to afford the costly conflict in Indochina and, by 1954, the United States was paying 80% of France's war effort, which was $3,000,000 per day in 1952.* [57]* [58] A strong anti-war movement came into existence in France driven mostly by the then-powerful French Communist Party (outpowering the socialists) and its young militant associations, major trade unions such as the General Confederation of Labour, and notable leftist intellectuals.* [59]* [60] The first occurrence was probably at the National Assembly on March 21, 1947, when the communist deputees refused to back the military credits for Indochina. The following year a pacifist event was organized, the "1st Worldwide Congress of Peace Partisans" (1er Congrès Mondial des Partisans de la Paix, the World Peace Council's predecessor), which took place March 25–28, 1948, in Paris, with the French communist Nobel laureate atomic physicist Frédéric Joliot-Curie as president. Later, on April 28, 1950, Joliot-Curie would be dismissed from the military and civilian Atomic Energy Commission for political reasons.* [61] Young communist militants (UJRF) were also accused of sabotage actions like the famous Henri Martin affair and the case of Raymonde Dien, who was jailed one year for having blocked an ammunition train, with the help of other militants, in order to prevent the supply of French forces in Indochina in February 1950.* [56]* [59] Similar actions against trains occurred in Roanne, Charleville, Marseille, and Paris. Even ammunition sabotage by PCF agents has been reported, such as grenades exploding in the hands of legionaries.* [56] These actions became

92 such a cause for concern by 1950 that the French Assembly voted a law against sabotage between March 2– 8. At this session tension was so high between politicians that fighting ensued in the assembly following communist deputees’speeches against the Indochinese policy.* [61] This month saw the French navy mariner and communist militant Henri Martin arrested by military police and jailed for five years for sabotage and propaganda operations in Toulon's arsenal. On May 5 communist Ministers were dismissed from the government, marking the end of Tripartism.* [61] A few months later on November 11, 1950, the French Communist Party leader Maurice Thorez went to Moscow. Some military officers involved in the Revers Report scandal (Rapport Revers) such as Salan were pessimistic about the way the war was being conducted,* [62] with multiple political-military scandals all happening during the war, starting with the Generals' Affair (Affaire des Généraux) from September 1949 to November 1950. As a result, General Georges Revers was dismissed in December 1949 and socialist Defense Ministry Jules Moch (SFIO) was brought on court by the National Assembly on November 28, 1950. Emerging media played their role. The scandal started the commercial success of the first French news magazine, L'Express, created in 1953.* [63] The third scandal was financial-political, concerning military corruption, money and arms trading involving both the French Union army and the Viet Minh, known as the Piastres affair. The war ended in 1954 but its sequel started in French Algeria where the French Communist Party played an even stronger role by supplying the National Liberation Front (FLN) rebels with intelligence documents and financial aid. They were called "the suitcase carriers" (les porteurs de valises). In the French news, the Indochina War was presented as a direct continuation of the Korean War, where France had fought: a UN French battalion, incorporated in a U.S. unit in Korea, was later involved in the Battle of Mang Yang Pass of June and July 1954.* [49] In an interview taped in May 2004, General Marcel Bigeard (6th BPC) argues that “one of the deepest mistakes done by the French during the war was the propaganda telling you are fighting for Freedom, you are fighting against Communism”,* [50] hence the sacrifice of volunteers during the climactic battle of Dien Bien Phu. In the latest days of the siege, 652 non-paratrooper soldiers from all army corps from cavalry to infantry to artillery dropped for the first and last time of their life to support their comrades. The Cold War excuse was later used by General Maurice Challe through his famous “Do you want Mers El Kébir and Algiers to become Soviet bases as soon as tomorrow?", during the Generals' putsch (Algerian War) of 1961, with limited effect though.* [64]

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM nights will remain in History as one of the most heroic of all time.”Later on, he denounced Chinese aid to the Viet Minh, explained that the United States could not act openly because of international pressure, and concluded with the call to “all concerned nations”concerning the necessity of “a collective defense”against “the communist aggression”.* [8]

1.9.6 War crimes and re-education camps • The Boudarel Affair. Georges Boudarel was a French communist militant who used brainwashing and torture against French Union POWs in Viet Minh reeducation camps.* [65] The French national association of POWs brought Boudarel to court for a war crime charge. Most of the French Union prisoners died in the Viet Minh camps and many POWs from the Vietnamese National Army were missing. • Passage to Freedom was a Franco-American operation to evacuate refugees. Loyal Indochinese evacuated to metropolitan France were kept in detention camps.* [66] • In 1957, the French Chief of Staff with Raoul Salan would use the POWs’ experience with the Viet Minh reeducation camps to create two "Instruction Center for Pacification and Counter-Insurgency" (Centre d'Instruction à la Pacification et à la Contre-Guérilla aka CIPCG) and train thousands of officers during the Algerian War. • Throughout the war the Viet Minh regularly used terror against civilians with up to 150,000 civilians assassinated during the war.* [21] • The French Army tortured Viet Minh prisoners* [67]

1.9.7 Other countries' involvement Further information: French Union

By 1946, France headed the French Union. As successive governments had forbidden the sending of metropolitan troops, the French Far East Expeditionary Corps (CEFEO) was created in March 1945. The Union gathered combatants from almost all French territories made of colonies, protectorates and associated states (Madagascar, Senegal, Tunisia, etc.) to fight in French Indochina, which was then occupied by the Japanese. About 325,000 of the 500,000 French troops were Indochinese, almost all of whom were used in conventional * A few hours after the French Union defeat at Dien units. [68] Bien Phu in May 1954, United States Secretary of State The Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF) was a federaJohn Foster Dulles made an official speech depicting the tion of African colonies. Senegalese and other African “tragic event”and “its defense for fifty seven days and troops were sent to fight in Indochina. Some African

1.9. FIRST INDOCHINA WAR alumni were trained in the Infantry Instruction Center no.2 (Centre d'Instruction de l'Infanterie no.2) located in southern Vietnam. Senegalese of the Colonial Artillery fought at the siege of Dien Bien Phu. As a French colony (later a full province), French Algeria sent local troops to Indochina including several RTA (Régiment de Tirailleurs Algériens) light infantry battalions. Morocco was a French protectorate and sent troops to support the French eﬀort in Indochina. Moroccan troops were part of light infantry RTMs (Régiment de Tirailleurs Marocains) for the “Moroccan Sharpshooters Regiment”.

French Foreign Legion patrol question a suspected member of the Viet Minh.

As a French protectorate, Bizerte, Tunisia, was a major French base. Tunisian troops, mostly RTT (Régiment de Tirailleurs Tunisiens), were sent to Indochina. Part of French Indochina, then part of the French Union and later an associated state, Laos fought the communists along with French forces. The role played by Laotian troops in the conflict was depicted by veteran Pierre Schoendoerffer's famous 317th Platoon released in 1964.* [69] The French Indochina state of Cambodia played a significant role during the Indochina War through its infantrymen and paratroopers. While Bảo Đại's State of Vietnam (formerly Annam, Tonkin, Cochinchine) had the Vietnamese National Army supporting the French forces, some minorities were trained and organized as regular battalions (mostly infantry tirailleurs) that fought with French forces against the Viet Minh. The Tai Battalion 2 (BT2, 2e Bataillon Thai) is infamous for its desertion during the siege of Dien Bien Phu. Propaganda leaflets written in Tai and French sent by the Viet Minh were found in the deserted positions and trenches. Such deserters were called the Nam Yum rats by Bigeard during the siege, as they hid close to the Nam Yum river during the day and searched at night for supply drops.* [70] Another allied minority was the Muong people (Mường). The 1st Muong Bat-

93 talion (1er Bataillon Muong) was awarded the Croix de guerre des théâtres d'opérations extérieures after the victorious Battle of Vinh Yen in 1951.* [71] In the 1950s, the French established secret commando groups based on loyal Montagnard ethnic minorities referred to as "partisans" or "maquisards", called the Groupement de Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés (Composite Airborne Commando Group or GCMA), later renamed Groupement Mixte d'Intervention (GMI, or Mixed Intervention Group), directed by the SDECE counterintelligence service. The SDECE's “Service Action” GCMA used both commando and guerrilla techniques and operated in intelligence and secret missions from 1950 to 1955.* [72]* [73] Declassified information about the GCMA includes the name of its commander, famous Colonel Roger Trinquier, and a mission on April 30, 1954, when Jedburgh veteran Captain Sassi led the Meo partisans of the GCMA Malo-Servan in Operation Condor during the siege of Dien Bien Phu.* [74] In 1951, Adjutant-Chief Vandenberghe from the 6th Colonial Infantry Regiment (6e RIC) created the“Commando Vanden”(aka “Black Tigers”, aka “North Vietnam Commando #24”) based in Nam Định. Recruits were volunteers from the Thổ people, Nùng people and Miao people. This commando unit wore Viet Minh black uniforms to confuse the enemy and used techniques of the experienced Bo doi (Bộ đội, regular army) and Du Kich (guerrilla unit). Viet Minh prisoners were recruited in POW camps. The commando was awarded the Croix de guerre des TOE with palm in July 1951; however, Vandenberghe was betrayed by a Viet Minh recruit, commander Nguien Tinh Khoi (308th Division's 56th Regiment), who assassinated him (and his Vietnamese fiancee) with external help on the night of January 5, 1952.* [75]* [76]* [77] Coolies and POWs known as PIM (Prisonniers Internés Militaires, which is basically the same as POW) were civilians used by the army as logistical support personnel. During the battle of Dien Bien Phu, coolies were in charge of burying the corpses —during the first days only, after they were abandoned, hence giving off a terrible smell, according to veterans —and they had the dangerous job of gathering supply packets delivered in drop zones while the Viet Minh artillery was firing hard to destroy the crates. The Viet Minh also used thousands of coolies to carry the Chu-Luc (regional units) supplies and ammunition during assaults. The PIM were civilian males old enough to join Bảo Đại's army. They were captured in enemy-controlled villages, and those who refused to join the State of Vietnam's army were considered prisoners or used as coolies to support a given regiment.* [78] One point that the French had a major problem with was the concept of sanctuary. As long as the revolutionaries who are fighting a guerilla war have a sanctuary, in which they can hide out, recoup after losses, and store supplies, it is almost impossible for any foreign enemy to ever destroy them. In the early 1950s, southern China

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM

China supplied the Viet Minh with hundreds of Soviet-built GAZ51 trucks in the 1950s.

was used as a sanctuary by Viet Minh guerrillas. Several hit and run ambushes were successfully operated against French Union convoys along the neighboring Route Coloniale 4 (RC 4), which was a major supply way in Tonkin (northern Vietnam). One of the most famous attacks of this kind was the battle of Cao Bằng. China supplied the Viet Minh guerrillas with food (thousands of tons of rice), money, medics, arms, ammunition, artillery (24 guns were used at Dien Bien Phu) and other military equipment including a large part of material captured from Chiang Kai-shek's National Revolutionary Army during the Chinese Civil War. Evidences of the Chinese secret aid were found in caves during Operation Hirondelle in July 1953.* [79]* [80] 2,000 Chinese and Soviet Union military advisors trained the Viet Minh guerrilla force to turn it into a full range army.* [56] On top of this China sent two artillery battalions at the siege of Dien Bien Phu on May 6, 1954. One operated 12 x 6 Katyusha rockets* [81] China and the Soviet Union were the first nations to recognize North Vietnam. The Soviet Union was the other ally of the Viet Minh, supplying GAZ trucks, truck engines, fuel, tires, arms (thousands of Skoda light machine guns), all kind of ammunitions, anti-aircraft guns (4 x 37 mm type) and cigarettes. During Operation Hirondelle, the French Union paratroopers captured and destroyed tons of Soviet supplies in the Ky Lua area.* [79]* [82] According to General Giap, the Viet Minh used 400 GAZ-51 soviet-built trucks at the battle of Dien Bien Phu. Because the trucks were using highly effective camouflage, the French Union reconnaissance planes were not able to notice them. On May 6, 1954, during the siege, Katyusha were successfully used against the outpost. Together with China, the Soviet Union sent 2,000 military advisors to train the Viet Minh and turn it into a fully organized army.* [56]

Anti-communist Vietnamese refugees moving from a French LSM landing ship to the USS Montague during Operation Passage to Freedom in 1954.

because the Viet Minh had recently been their allies, and because most of its attention was focused on Europe where Winston Churchill argued an Iron Curtain had fallen. Then the U.S. government gradually began supporting the French in their war eﬀort, primarily through the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, as a means of stabilizing the French Fourth Republic in which the French Communist Party was a signiﬁcant political force. A dramatic shift occurred in American policy after the victory of Mao Zedong's Communist Party of China in the Chinese Civil War. By 1949, however, the United States became concerned about the spread of communism in Asia, particularly following the end of the Chinese Civil War, and began to strongly support the French as the two countries were bound by the Cold War Mutual Defense Programme.* [83]

After the Moch–Marshall meeting of September 23, 1950, in Washington, the United States started to support the French Union effort politically, logistically and financially. Officially, US involvement did not include use of armed force. However, recently it has been discovered that undercover (CAT)—or not—US Air Force pilots flew to support the French during Operation Castor in November 1953. Two US pilots were killed in action during the siege at Dien Bien Phu the following year. These facts were declassified and made public more Mutual Defense Assistance Act (1950–1954) than 50 years after the events, in 2005 during the Légion At the beginning of the war, the U.S. was neutral in the d'honneur award ceremony by the French ambassador in conflict because of opposition to European colonialism, Washington.* [84]

1.9. FIRST INDOCHINA WAR In May 1950, after the capture of Hainan island by Chinese Communist forces, U.S. President Harry S. Truman began covertly authorizing direct ﬁnancial assistance to the French, and on June 27, 1950, after the outbreak of the Korean War, announced publicly that the U.S. was doing so. It was feared in Washington that if Ho were to win the war, with his ties to the Soviet Union, he would establish a puppet state with Moscow with the Soviets ultimately controlling Vietnamese aﬀairs. The prospect of a communist-dominated Southeast Asia was enough to spur the U.S. to support France, so that the spread of Sovietallied communism could be contained.

95 Franco-American evacuation operation called "Passage to Freedom". The same month, the United States delivered additional aircraft, again using the USS Windham Bay.* [86] On April 18, 1954, during the siege of Dien Bien Phu, the USS Saipan delivered 25 Korean War AU-1 Corsair aircraft for use by the French Aeronavale in supporting the besieged garrison. US Air Force assistance (1952–1954)

On June 30, 1950, the first U.S. supplies for Indochina were delivered. In September, Truman sent the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) to Indochina to assist the French. Later, in 1954, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower explained the escalation risk, introducing what he referred to as the “domino principle”, which eventually became the concept of domino theory. During the Korean War, the conflict in Vietnam was also seen as part of a broader proxy war with China and the USSR in Asia. A 1952 F4U-7 Corsair of the 14.F flotilla who fought at Dien Bien Phu.

US Navy assistance (1951–1954)

A total of 94 F4U-7s were built for the Aéronavale in 1952, with the last of the batch, the ﬁnal Corsair built, rolled out in December 1952. The F4U-7s were actually purchased by the U.S. Navy and passed on to the Aéronavale through the U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP). They were supplemented by 25 ex-U.S.MC AU-1s (previously used in the Korean War) and moved from Yokosuka, Japan, to Tourane Air Base (Da Nang), Vietnam, in April 1952. US Air Force assistance followed in November 1953 when the French commander in Indochina, General Henri Navarre, asked General Chester E. McCarty, commander of the Combat Cargo Division, for 12 Fairchild C-119s for Operation Castor at Dien Bien Phu. The USAF also provided C-124 Globemasters to transport French paratroop reinforcements to Indochina.

Under the codename Project Swivel Chair,* [87] on Bois Belleau (aka USS Belleau Wood) transferred to France in March 3, 1954, twelve C-119s of the 483rd Troop Carrier Wing (“Packet Rats”) based at Ashiya, Japan, were 1953. painted with France's insignia and loaned to France with The USS Windham Bay delivered Grumman F8F Bearcat 24 CIA pilots for short-term use. Maintenance was carried out by the US Air Force and airlift operations were ﬁghter aircraft to Saigon on January 26, 1951.* [85] commanded by McCarty.* [84] On March 2 of that year, the United States Navy transferred the USS Agenor (ARL-3) (LST 490) to the French Navy in Indochina in accordance with the MAAG-led Central Intelligence Agency covert operations (1954) MAP. Renamed RFS Vulcain (A-656), she was used in Operation Hirondelle in 1953. The USS Sitkoh Bay car- Twenty four Central Intelligence Agency (Civil Air rier delivered Grumman F8F Bearcat aircraft to Saigon Transport) pilots supplied the French Union garrison duron March 26, 1951. During September 1953, the USS ing the siege of Dien Bien Phu by airlifting paratroopers, Belleau Wood (renamed Bois Belleau) was lent to France ammunition, artillery pieces, tons of barbed wire, medics and sent to French Indochina to replace the Arromanches. and other military materiel. With the reducing Drop zone She was used to support delta defenders in the Hạ Long areas, night operations and anti-aircraft artillery assaults, Bay operation in May 1954. In August, she joined the many of the “packets”fell into Viet Minh hands. The

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM

French-marked USAF C-119 ﬂown by CIA pilots over Dien Bien Phu in 1954.

37 CIA pilots completed 682 airdrops under anti-aircraft ﬁre between March 13 and May 6. Two CAT pilots, Wallace Buﬀord and James B. McGovern, Jr. were killed in action when their Fairchild C-119 Flying Boxcar was shot down on May 6, 1954 .* [84] On February 25, 2005, the French ambassador to the United States, Jean-David Levitte, awarded the seven remaining CIA pilots the Légion d'honneur.* [84]

Operation Passage to Freedom (1954) Main article: Operation Passage to Freedom In August 1954, in support to the French navy and the merchant navy, the U.S. Navy launched Operation Passage to Freedom and sent hundreds of ships, including USS Montague, in order to evacuate non-communist— especially Catholic —Vietnamese refugees from North Vietnam following the July 20, 1954, armistice and partition of Vietnam. Up to 1 million Vietnamese civilians were transported from North to South during this period,* [88] with around one tenth of that number moving in the opposite direction.

1.9.8

Popular culture

French Indochina medal, law of August 1, 1953.

ing World War II (Берлин, 1945) and the “S"-shaped POW column marching after the battle, where he used the same optical technique he experimented with before when he staged the German prisoners after the Siege of Leningrad (Ленинград в борьбе, 1942) and the Battle of Moscow (Разгром немецких войск под Москвой, 1942).* [89]* [90]

Although a kind of taboo in France,“the dirty war”has been featured in various ﬁlms, books and songs. Since its declasiﬁcation in the 2000s, television documentaries have been released using new perspectives about the U.S. covert involvement and open critics about the French propaganda used during wartime.

Hollywood made a ﬁlm about Dien Bien Phu in 1955, Jump into Hell, directed by David Butler and scripted by Irving Wallace, before his fame as a bestselling novelist. Hollywood also made several ﬁlms about the war, Robert Florey's Rogues' Regiment (1948). Samuel Fuller's China Gate (1957). and James Clavell's Five Gates to Hell (1959).

Famous Communist propagandist Roman Karmen was in charge of the media exploitation of the battle of Dien Bien Phu. In his documentary, Vietnam (Вьетнам, 1955), he staged the famous scene with the raising of the Viet Minh ﬂag over de Castries' bunker which is similar to the one he staged over the Berlin Reichstag roof dur-

The ﬁrst French movie about the war, Shock Patrol (Patrouille de Choc) aka Patrol Without Hope (Patrouille Sans Espoir) by Claude Bernard-Aubert, came out in 1956. The French censor cut some violent scenes and made the director change the end of his movie which was seen as "too pessismistic".* [91] Léo Joannon's ﬁlm Fort du Fou

1.9. FIRST INDOCHINA WAR

(Fort of the Mad) /Outpost in Indochina was released in 1963. Another film was The 317th Platoon (La 317ème Section) was released in 1964, it was directed by Indochina War (and siege of Dien Bien Phu) veteran Pierre Schoendoerffer. Schoendoerffer has since become a media specialist about the Indochina War and has focused his production on realistic war movies. He was cameraman for the army (“Cinematographic Service of the Armies” , SCA) during his duty time; moreover, as he had covered the Vietnam War he released The Anderson Platoon, which won the Academy Award for Documentary Feature.

[10] http://www.historycy.org/index.php?showtopic= 36539&st=15 (in Polish)

Graham Greene's novel The Quiet American takes place during this war.

[11] http://geb.uni-giessen.de/geb/volltexte/2013/9311/pdf/ DaoDucThuan_2013_02_05.pdf

[6] Jacques Dalloz, La Guerre d'Indochine 1945–1954, Seuil, Paris, 1987,pp. 129–130, 206 [7] Jacques Dalloz (1987). La Guerre d'Indochine 1945– 1954. Paris: Seuil. pp. 129–130. [8] henrisalvador. “John Foster Dulles on the fall of Dien Bien Phu”. Dailymotion. Retrieved August 19, 2015. [9]“Viện trợ của Trung Quốc đối với cuộc kháng chiến chống Pháp của Việt Nam”. Retrieved August 19, 2015.

A Vietnamese software developer made a videogame [12] http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-5159. called 7554 after the date of Battle of Dien Bien Phu html to commemorate the First Indochina War from the Viet[13] Windrow, Martin (1998). The French Indochina War namese point of view. 1946–1954 (Men-At-Arms, 322). London: Osprey Publishing. p. 11. ISBN 1-85532-789-9.

1.9.9

See also

[14] Windrow 1998, p. 23

• Hélie Denoix de Saint Marc

[15] Ford, Dan. “Japanese soldiers with the Viet Minh”.

• Japanese invasion of French Indochina

[16] Spencer Tucker, Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War (1998)

• Franco-Thai War

[17] Clodfelter, Michael, Vietnam in Military Statistics (1995)

• Japanese coup d'état in French Indochina • Japanese holdout • Indochina Wars • North Vietnamese invasion of Laos • Second Indochina War • Third Indochina War • Cambodian–Vietnamese War • Pathet Lao • United Issarak Front

1.9.10

Notes

[1] Lee Lanning, Michael (2008). Inside the VC and the NVA. : Texas A&M University Press. p. 119. ISBN 978-160344-059-2. [2] Crozier, Brian (2005). Political Victory: The Elusive Prize Of Military Wars. Transaction. p. 47. ISBN 978-0-76580290-3.

[18] Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam 1945– 1995. James S. Olson,Randy W. Roberts. Chapter 2: The ﬁrst Indochina war 1945–54 [19] Smedberg, M (2008), Vietnamkrigen: 1880–1980. Historiska Media, p. 88 [20] Eckhardt, William, in World Military and Social Expenditures 1987–88 (12th ed., 1987) by Ruth Leger Sivard. [21] Dommen, Arthur J. (2001), The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans, Indiana University Press, pg. 252. [22] s:Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part I.djvu/30 [23] Fall, Street Without Joy, p. 17. [24] Edward Rice-Maximin, Accommodation and Resistance: The French Left, Indochina, and the Cold War, 1944– 1954 (Greenwood, 1986). [25] Flitton, Dave. “Battleﬁeld Vietnam – Dien Bien Phu, the legacy”. Public Broadcasting System PBS. Retrieved 29 July 2015.

[3] Fall, Street Without Joy, p. 63.

[26] Interview with Carleton Swift, http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/ vietnam-9dc948-interview-with-carleton-swift

1981,

[4] Logevall, Fredrik (2012). Embers of War: the fall of an empire and the making of America's Vietnam. Random House. pp. 596–9. ISBN 978-0-375-75647-4.

[27] Stuart-Fox, Martin. A History of Laos. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, http://www. taiwandocuments.org/japansurrender.htm

[5] “CNN.com – France honors CIA pilots – Feb 28, 2005” [28] “WGBH Open Vault – Interview with Archimedes L. A. . Retrieved August 19, 2015. Patti, 1981”. Retrieved August 19, 2015.

[29] " ベトナム独立争参加日本人の事跡に基づく日越のあり方に関する研究" (PDF). 井川一久. Tokyo foundation. October 2005. Retrieved June 10, 2010. [30] " 日越関係発展の方途を探る研究ヴェトナム独立争参加日本人―その実態と日越両国にとっての歴史的意味―" (PDF). 井川一久. Tokyo foundation. May 2006. Retrieved June 10, 2010. [31] Barbara Wertheim Tuchman (1985). The march of folly: from Troy to Vietnam. Random House, Inc. p. 235. ISBN 0-345-30823-9. Retrieved November 28, 2010.

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM

[48] Gras, Yves (1979). Histoire de la Guerre d'Indochine. Paris. p. 408. ISBN 2-259-00478-4. [49] “La Guerre En Indochine” (video). newsreel. October 26, 1950. Retrieved May 20, 2007. [50] “Bigeard et Dien Bien Phu”(video). TV news. Channel 2 (France). May 3, 2004. Retrieved May 20, 2007. [51] DienBienPhu.org the oﬃcial web site of the battle [52] June 17, 1954 discourse of Mendès-France on the website of the French National Assembly

[32] Tuchman 1985, p. 237. [53] The Pentagon Papers (1971), Beacon Press, vol. 3, p. 134. [33] Text of Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers General Order no. One, Taiwan Documents Project, http: //www.taiwandocuments.org/surrender05.htm

[54] The Pentagon Papers (1971), Beacon Press, vol. 3, p. 119. [55] The Pentagon Papers (1971), Beacon Press, vol. 3, p. 140.

[34] Larry H. Addington (2000). America's war in Vietnam: a short narrative history. Indiana University Press. p. 30. ISBN 0-253-21360-6. Retrieved November 28, 2010. [35] Peter Neville (2007). Britain in Vietnam: prelude to disaster, 1945-6. Psychology Press. p. 119. ISBN 0-41535848-5. Retrieved November 28, 2010. [36] Van Nguyen Duong (2008). The tragedy of the Vietnam War: a South Vietnamese oﬃcer's analysis. McFarland. p. 21. ISBN 0-7864-3285-3. Retrieved November 28, 2010. [37] Stein Tønnesson (2010). Vietnam 1946: how the war began. University of California Press. p. 41. ISBN 0-52025602-6. Retrieved November 28, 2010. [38] Elizabeth Jane Errington (1990). Elizabeth Jane Errington; B. J. C. McKercher, eds. The Vietnam War as history. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 63. ISBN 0-27593560-4. Retrieved November 28, 2010. [39] “The Vietnam War Seeds of Conﬂict 1945–1960”. The History Place. 1999. Retrieved December 28, 2010. [40] Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, (New York: Penguin Books Ltd., 1997), 146 [41] Allies Reinforce Java and Saigon, British Paramount News rushes, 1945 [42] Philipe Leclerc de Hauteloque (1902–1947), La légende d'un héro, Christine Levisse-Touzé, Tallandier/Paris Musées, 2002

[56] Hercombe, Peter (2004). “Dien Bien Phu, Chronicles of a Forgotten Battle”. documentary. Transparences Productions/Channel 2 (France). [57] “France's war against Communists rages on” (video). newsreel. News Magazine of the Screen/Warner Bros. May 1952. Retrieved May 20, 2007. [58] A Bernard Fall Retrospective, presentation of Bernard B. Fall, Vietnam Witness 1953–56, New York, Praeger, 1966, by the Ludwig von Mises Institute [59] Ruscio, Alain (August 2, 2003). “Guerre d'Indochine: Libérez Henri Martin”(in French). l'Humanité. Archived from the original on September 29, 2007. Retrieved May 20, 2007. [60] Nhu Tang, Truong (March 12, 1986).“A Vietcong Memoir: An Inside Account of the Vietnam War and Its Aftermath”. Vintage. Retrieved June 27, 2007. [61] “France History, IV Republic (1946–1958)" (in French). Quid Encyclopedia. Retrieved May 20, 2007. [62] Patrick Pesnot, Rendez-vous Avec X – Dien Bien Phu, France Inter, December 4, 2004 (Rendez-vous With X broadcast on public station France Inter) [63] “We wanted a newspaper to tell what we wanted”interview by Denis Jeambar & Roland Mihail [64] General Challe's appeal (April 22, 1961)

[43] Windrow 2004, p. 90.

[65] “Accueil”. Retrieved August 19, 2015.

[44] Barnet, Richard J. (1968). Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World. World Publishing. p. 185. ISBN 0-529-02014-9.

[66] “USS Skagit and Operation Passage To Freedom”. selfpublished. Archived from the original on June 17, 2007. Retrieved May 20, 2007.

[45] Sheehan, Neil (1988). A Bright Shining Lie. New York: Random House. p. 155. ISBN 0-394-48447-9.

[67] indochine.uqam.ca/en/historical-dictionary/ 1420-torture-french.html

[46] Cirillo, Roger (2015). The Shape of Battles to Come. Louisville: University Press of Kentucky. p. 187. ISBN 978-0813165752.

[68] Alf Andrew Heggoy and Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria, Bloomington, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 1972, p.175

[47] Trận then chốt Đông Khê. 02 November, 2014.

[69] The 317th Platoons script

1.9. FIRST INDOCHINA WAR

[70] Original audio recordings of General de Castries (Dien Bien Phu) and General Cogny (Hanoi) transmissions on May 7, 1954, during the battle of Dien Bien Phu (from the European Navigator based in Luxembourg) [71] French Defense Ministry archives, ECPAD [72] Raymond Muelle; Éric Deroo (1992). Services spéciaux, armes, techniques, missions: GCMA, Indochine, 1950– 1954 ... Editions Crépin-Leblond. ISBN 978-2-70300100-3. [73] Michel David (2002). Guerre secrète en Indochine: Les maquis autochtones face au Viêt-Minh (1950–1955). ISBN 978-2-7025-0636-3. [74] Dien Bien Phu – Le Rapport Secret, Patrick Jeudy, TF1 Video, 2005 [75] French Defense Ministry archives [76] French Defense Ministry archives [77] French Defense Ministry archives [78] Dr. Jacques Cheneau in In Vietnam, 1954. Eight episode [79] French Defense Ministry archives [80] French Defense Ministry archives [81] Chinese General Hoang Minh Thao and Colonel Hoang Minh Phuong quoted by Pierre Journoud researcher at the Defense History Studies (CHED), Paris University Pantheon-Sorbonne, in Paris Hanoi Beijing published in Communisme magazine and the Pierre Renouvin Institute of Paris, July 20, 2004. [82] French Defense Ministry archives [83] “Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam” (PDF). book. University Press of Kentucky. July 2007. Retrieved June 28, 2007. [84] “U.S. Pilots Honored For Indochina Service” (PDF). Embassy of France in the U.S. February 24, 2005. Retrieved March 30, 2010. [85] French Defense Ministry archives [86] http://www.ina.fr/archivespourtous/index.php?vue= corpus&code=C0524208764# Indochina War: The “good oﬃces”of the Americans (National Audiovisual Institute)

1.9.11 References • Buttinger, Joseph (1972). A Dragon Deﬁant: A Short History of Vietnam. New York: Praeger. OCLC 583077932. • Chaliand, Gérard (1982). Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan. California: University of California Press. ISBN 0-520-04443-6. • Jian, Chen (1993). “China and the First Indo-China War, 1950–54”. The China Quarterly (London: School of Oriental and African Studies) 133 (March): 85–110. doi:10.1017/s0305741000018208. ISSN 03057410. • Cogan, Charles G. (2000). “L'attitude des ÉtatsUnis à l'égard de la guerre d'Indochine”. In Vaïsse, Maurice. Armée française dans la guerre d'Indochine (1946–1954). Bruxelles: Complexe. pp. 51–88. ISBN 2-87027-810-1. • Conboy, Kenneth; Morrison, James (1995). Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos. Boulder, CO: Paladin Press. ISBN 978-1-58160-535-8. • Devillers, Philippe; Lacouture, Jean (1969). End of a War: Indochina, 1954. New York: Praeger. OCLC 575650635. • Dunstan, Simon (2004). Vietnam Tracks: Armor in Battle 1945–75. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 1-84176833-2. • Fall, Bernard B. (1967). Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu. Philadelphia: Lippincott. OCLC 551565485. • Fall, Bernard B (1994). Street Without Joy. Stackpole Books. ISBN 0-8117-1700-3. • Fall, Bernard B. (1963). The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. New York: Praeger. OCLC 582302330.

[87] Conboy, Morrison, p. 6.

• Giap, Vo Nguyen (1971). The Military Art of People's War. New York: Modern Reader. ISBN 085345-193-1.

[88] Lindholm, Richard (1959). Viet-nam, the ﬁrst ﬁve years: an international symposium. Michigan State University Press

• Hammer, Ellen Joy (1954). The Struggle for Indochina. Stanford: Stanford University Press. OCLC 575892787.

[89] Pierre Schoendoerﬀer interview with Jean Guisnel in Some edited pictures

• Humphries, James. F (1999). Through the Valley: Vietnam, 1967–1968. Lynne Rienner Publishers. ISBN 1-55587-821-0.

[90] Roman Karmen, un cinéaste au service de la révolution, Dominique Chapuis & Patrick Barbéris, Kuiv Productions / Arte France, 2001 [91] The Cinematheque of Toulouse

• Perkins, Mandaley (2006). Hanoi, Adieu: A Bittersweet Memoir of French Indochina. Sydney: Harper Perennial. ISBN 978-0-7322-8197-7.

100

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM

• Roy, Jules (1963). The Battle of Dienbienphu. New was a state in Southeast Asia which existed as a state York: Pyramid Books. OCLC 613204239. from 1945 to 1976. Vietnamese revolutionary leader Ho Chi Minh declared independence from France on • Summers, Harry G. (1995). Historical Atlas of the 2 September 1945 and announced the creation of the Vietnam War. New York: Houghton Mifflin. ISBN Democratic Republic of Vietnam. France reasserted its 0-395-72223-3. colonial dominance and a war ensued between France • Thi, Lam Quang (2002). The Twenty-Five Year and the Viet Minh, led by Ho. The Viet Minh (“League Century: A South Vietnamese General Remembers for the Independence of Vietnam”) was a coalition of the Indochina War to the Fall of Saigon. University nationalist groups, mostly led by communists, In February 1951, the communists announced the creation of the of North Texas. ISBN 1-57441-143-8. Lao Động Party (Labor Party), gradually marginalizing • Vaïsse; editor (2000). L'Armée française dans la non-communists in the Viet Minh.* [9] guerre d'Indochine (1946–1954). Paris: Editions Between 1946 and 1954, the Viet Minh captured and conComplexe. ISBN 978-2-87027-810-9. trolled most of rural areas of Vietnam. In 1954, after the • Wiest, Andrew; editor (2006). Rolling Thunder in French were defeated, the negotiation of the Geneva Aca Gentle Land. Oxford: Osphrey. ISBN 978-1- cords ended the war between France and the Viet Minh and granted Vietnam independence. The Geneva Ac84603-020-8. cords divided the country provisionally into northern and • Windrow, Martin (1998). The French Indochina southern zones, and stipulated general elections in July War, 1946–1954. Osprey. ISBN 1-85532-789-9. 1956“to bring about the unification of Viet-Nam.”* [10] The northern zone was commonly called North Vietnam • Windrow, Martin (2004). The Last Valley. Weidenand the southern zone South Vietnam, or, formally, the feld and Nicolson. ISBN 0-306-81386-6. Republic of Vietnam. Supervision of the implementation of the Geneva Accords was the responsibility of an International Commission consisting of India, Canada, and Poland. The United • Pescali, Piergiorgio (2010). Indocina. Bologna: States did not sign the Geneva Accords but instead stated Emil. ISBN 978-88-96026-42-7. that the U.S. “shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly.”* [11] In July 1.9.13 External links 1955, the Prime Minister of the State of Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, announced that the State of Vietnam would • Pentagon Papers, Chapter 2 not participate in elections to unify the country. He said that South Vietnam had not signed the Geneva accords • Vietnam: The Impossible War and was not bound by it.* [12] • Fall, Bernard B. Street Without Joy: The French DeWith the failure to reunify Vietnam by elections, Demobacle In Indochina cratic Republic of Vietnam attempted to unify the coun• ANAPI's official website (National Association of try by force in the Vietnam War (1955–75). North Vietnam and the Viet Cong insurgents supported by Former POWs in Indochina) their communist allies, including the Soviet Union and • Hanoi upon the army's return in victory (bicycles de- China, fought against the military of South Vietnam, the mystified) Viet Nam Portal U.S. and other anti-communist military forces, includ• (French) Photos about the First War of Indochina ing South Korea, Australia, Thailand and smaller players. North Vietnam also supported indigenous commu(French Defense Archives) (ECPAD) nist rebels in Cambodia and Laos against their respective U.S,-backed governments. The war ended when Democratic Republic of Vietnam forces and the Viet Cong de1.10 North Vietnam feated Republic of Vietnam and in 1976 united the two parts of the country into the Socialist Republic of VietFor the region of Northern Vietnam, see Northern nam. Vietnam. “NVN”redirects here. For other uses, see NVN (disambiguation). 1.10.1 Presidency of Hồ Chí Minh (1945–

1.9.12

See also

The State of Vietnam referendum of 1955 determined the future form of government of the State of Vietnam, • First Indochina War the nation that was to become the Republic of Vietnam (widely known as South Vietnam). It was con• French Indochinese piastre tested by Prime Minister Ngô Đình Diệm, who proposed a republic, and former emperor Bảo Đại. Bảo Đại had • Vietnamese National Army abdicated as emperor in 1945 and at the time of the referendum held the title of head of state. Though published • Colonization of Cochinchina counts showed Diệm winning the election with 98.2% of the vote, the referendum was widely marred by electoral 2.1.6 References fraud. In the capital, Saigon, Diệm was credited with more than 600,000 votes, although only 450,000 people [1] http://bqllang.gov.vn/tin-tuc/tin-tong-hop/ were on the electoral roll.* [1]* [2] He accumulated tallies 1378-nh-ng-cu-c-tr-l-i-ph-ng-v-n-bao-chi-c-a-bac-h-ph-n-3. in excess of 90% of the registered voters, even in rural html regions where opposition groups prevented voting. [2] http://bqllang.gov.vn/tin-tuc/tin-tong-hop/ The referendum was the last phase in the power struggle 1378-nh-ng-cu-c-tr-l-i-ph-ng-v-n-bao-chi-c-a-bac-h-ph-n-3. between Bảo Đại and his prime minister. Bảo Đại dishtml liked Diệm and had frequently attempted to undermine

him, having appointed him only because he was a con[3] http://vnexpress.net/tin-tuc/thoi-su/ duit to American aid. At the time, the country was gole-thoai-vi-cua-hoang-de-bao-dai-qua-loi-ke-cua-nha-tho-huy-can-3271851. ing through a period of insecurity, as Vietnam had been html [4] http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/ vietnam-independence-proclaimed

2.2 State of Vietnam referendum, 1955

temporarily partitioned as a result of the 1954 Geneva Accords that ended the First Indochina War. The State of Vietnam controlled the southern half of the country, pending national elections that were intended to reunify the country under a common government. Still, the Vietnamese National Army was not in full control of southern Vietnam; the Cao Đài and Hòa Hảo religious sects ran their own administrations in the countryside supported by private armies, while the Bình Xuyên organised crime syndicate controlled the streets of Saigon. Despite interference from these groups, Bảo Đại, and even French oﬃcials, Diệm managed to subdue the private armies and consolidate government control over the country by mid1955. Emboldened by his success, Diệm began to plot Bảo Đại's downfall. He scheduled a referendum for 23 October 1955 and pushed Bảo Đại out of the political scene, hindering the former emperor's attempts to derail the poll. In the period leading up to the vote, campaigning for Bảo Đại was banned, while Diệm's election campaign focused on personal attacks against Bảo Đại. These included pornographic cartoons of the head of state and unveriﬁed rumours claiming he was illegitimate and linking him to various mistresses. The government-controlled media launched polemical attacks on Bảo Đại, and police went door-to-door, warning people of the consequences of failing to vote. After his brother Ngô Đình Nhu successfully rigged the poll, Diệm proclaimed himself president of the newly created Republic of Vietnam.

2.2.1 Background Ngô Đình Diệm declared himself president of the newly proclaimed Republic of Vietnam after a fraud-ridden referendum vote.

Main articles: Geneva Conference (1954), Operation Passage to Freedom and Battle of Saigon (1955)

2.2. STATE OF VIETNAM REFERENDUM, 1955 The defeat of the French Army at Điện Biên Phủ in 1954, followed by the Geneva Accords, led to a divided Vietnam. The French-backed State of Vietnam led by former Emperor Bảo Đại, provisionally held control south of the 17th parallel. Hồ Chí Minh's Viet Minh held the north under the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which Hồ Chí Minh had proclaimed in 1945. The agreements stated that nationwide elections were to be held in 1956 to unify the country under a common government. In July 1954, during the transition period, Bảo Đại appointed Diệm as Prime Minister of the State of Vietnam.* [3] On 11 October 1954, the border was closed by the International Control Commission, after a period of 300 days during which free passage between both halves of Vietnam had been allowed. Under the Geneva Accords, anti-communist military personnel were obliged to evacuate to the south, while communist forces were to be moved north. Civilians were free to move to whichever zone they preferred. During the 300 days, Diệm and U.S. CIA adviser Colonel Edward Lansdale staged a campaign to convince people to move to South Vietnam. The campaign was particularly focused on Vietnam's Catholics, who were to provide Diệm's power base in his later years, with the use of the slogan “God has gone south”. Between 800,000 and 1,000,000 people migrated to the south, mostly Catholics. At the start of 1955, French Indochina was dissolved, leaving Diệm in temporary control of the south.* [4]* [5] At the time, Diệm had little authority beyond the gates of his own palace. Bảo Đại had little confidence in him and gave him meagre support—the pair had clashed in the past, with Diem resigning as Bảo Đại's Interior Minister two decades earlier, believing the head of state to be weak and ineffective.* [6]* [7] Many historians believe that Bảo Đại may have selected Diệm for the latter's ability to attract U.S. support and funding.* [8]* [9] During the transition period, the French Expeditionary Corps maintained a presence in South Vietnam.* [10] This led to tension between France and the State of Vietnam. Diệm, a passionate nationalist, detested the French, who reciprocated, hoping he would fail, even calling for his removal on occasions.* [11]* [12] Diệm faced challenges to his authority from four more groups. The Hòa Hảo and Cao Đài religious sects had private armies that controlled the Mekong Delta and the areas west of Saigon, respectively. The Bình Xuyên was an armed, organised crime empire that controlled much of Saigon with a 40,000 strong private army, while the Vietminh still controlled much of the rural area. Diệm's Vietnamese National Army (VNA) was led by General Nguyễn Văn Hinh, a French citizen who loathed and frequently disobeyed him. Bảo Đại sold the operating license of the national police to the Bình Xuyên, effectively putting administrative control of the police in the hands of a crime syndicate.* [13]

109 to provide stable rule, Diệm forced the matter to a head in April 1955. He ordered the Bình Xuyên to relinquish control of the National Police and submit to his command by integrating into the VNA or disbanding, threatening to crush them if they refused. He bribed Hòa Hảo and Cao Đài commanders into joining the VNA, gradually resulting in the defection of some commanders and their units, while others continued to lead their forces against Saigon. The Bình Xuyên defied Diệm's ultimatum. On 27 April, the VNA initiated the Battle for Saigon. After a brief but violent battle that left between 500 and 1,000 people dead and about 20,000 homeless, the Bình Xuyên were crushed. Diệm had regained both U.S. confidence and control of the police. Jubilant crowds lauded Diệm and denounced Bảo Đại, who had tried to dismiss him in the middle of the battle to prevent him from quelling the Bình Xuyên.* [14] In addition, General Paul Ely, the head of the French presence in Vietnam, tried to impede Diệm;* [15] his troops put road blocks against the VNA and gave intelligence to the Bình Xuyên.* [16] Buoyed by his successes, and fueled by increased hatred of both the French and Bảo Đại after their attempts to prevent him from dismantling the Bình Xuyên,* [17] Diệm became more confident as he went about consolidating his hold on power. On 15 May, Diệm abolished Bảo Đại's Imperial Guard; its 5,000 men became the 11th and 42nd Infantry Regiments of the VNA. Diệm then stripped Bảo Đại of his extensive crown lands. On 15 June, Diệm had the Council of the Royal Family at Huế declare that Bảo Đại be stripped of his powers, and that he, Diệm, be made president.* [18] Bảo Đại's relatives condemned him for abdicating as head of state, and for his links with France and the Bình Xuyên.* [19] Historians have speculated that the royals agreed to turn on Bảo Đại so Diệm would not seize their assets.* [19]

2.2.2 Organization of the referendum On 7 July 1955, the ﬁrst anniversary of his installation as prime minister, Diệm announced that a national referendum would be held to determine the future of the country.* [18] On 16 July, Diệm publicly announced his intention to not take part in the reuniﬁcation elections: “We will not be tied down by the [Geneva] treaty that was signed against the wishes of the Vietnamese people.” * [20]

Diệm contended that the Communists would never allow free elections in the north, so therefore South Vietnam must strike out on its own and establish a separate, nonCommunist state.* [20] This was echoed by the Saigon press, which ran articles assailing communist elections as shambolic, rigged, and meaningless;* [20] at the time, the northern half of Vietnam had a greater population than the south. A month earlier, North Vietnamese Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng wrote to Saigon asking to beAmid growing French and US skepticism of his ability gin negotiations over the speciﬁc details of the elections. While the Americans were happy to avoid elections be-

110

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM Under the Elysee Accords and the subsequent legislation that created the State of Vietnam in 1949, Bảo Đại's position as head of state was neither permanent nor indefinite. Sovereignty was presumed to rest solely upon the people, with Bảo Đại being a mere conduit. As a result, the referendum itself was within the law.* [26] Diệm had not been elected to his post, so he saw the referendum as an opportunity to rebuff opponents, who claimed that he was undemocratic and autocratic. The event also gave Diệm an opportunity to boost his prestige by defeating Bảo Đại in a head-to-head contest.* [26] It was previously agreed that a National Assembly would be elected first, but Diệm went ahead with the plebiscite, which meant that he would have total power if he deposed Bảo Đại before a legislature was formed.* [27]

Colonel Edward Lansdale, who helped Diệm in his campaign

U.S. diplomats were concerned that the move would be seen as a power grab, as Diệm was organising and driving an electoral process in which he was a candidate. The Americans felt that a legislature should be formed first and that the body should oversee the referendum, but Diệm ignored their advice.* [23]* [28] Ambassador G. Frederick Reinhardt informed Washington that Diệm had no intention of allowing a level playing field for the opposition, and that the foreign press had already made much of Diệm's democratic pronouncements being a facade.* [28] The Department of State agreed and opted to avoid trumpeting the referendum as an exercise in democracy for fear of attracting negative reactions to their foreign policy.* [29] Nevertheless, U.S. officials in Vietnam were pleased with the referendum, as they saw it as an opportunity to strengthen South Vietnam and avoid defeat to the communists, as they saw a republican model as being more robust.* [30]

cause of fears of a communist victory, they hoped that Diệm would enter the dialogue over planning matters and wait for North Vietnam to object to a proposal, and thus use it to blame Ho for violating the Geneva Accords.* [20] The Americans had earlier advised Diệm, who had been acting in defiance of Bảo Đại, that continued aid was contingent on Diệm establishing a legal basis for usurping the Having declared his disdain for the 1956 reunification head of state's power.* [21] elections, Diệm saw the referendum as the first step in On 6 October 1955, Diệm announced the referendum creating a long-term state to rule over South Vietnam. would be held on 23 October.* [22] The election was open He repeatedly said that the creation of a legislature and to men and women aged 18 or over, and the government a constitution for his new state would follow the referenarranged to have a polling station set up for every 1,000 dum.* [28] registered voters.* [22]* [23] The poll was contested by Bảo Đại, who had spent much of his time in France and Diệm reportedly saw the poll as an opportunity to legitadvocated a monarchy, and Diệm, who ran on a repub- imise him as a symbol of Vietnamese democracy, so that lican platform.* [1] According to historian Jessica Chap- he could frame and justify his refusal to participate in naman, it was a choice between “the country's obsolete tional elections as a struggle between freedom and comemperor and its far-from-popular prime minister, Ngo munist authoritarianism. Diệm asserted that South VietDinh Diem”.* [24] In announcing the referendum, Diệm nam would eventually reunify the nation under a demoportrayed his decision as being motivated by a love of cratic administration and liberate their northern compademocracy and popular discontent with the rule of Bảo triots from communist oppression, and championed the Đại. The prime minister cited a plethora of petitions referendum as a first step in nurturing democracy. His from various social, religious, and political groups calling support base was to use this as a means of justifying the on him to stage a plebiscite to remove Bảo Đại, claiming deposal of Bảo Đại, citing past* decisions that according he was motivated by these “legitimate and democratic” to them, were pro-communist. [20] sentiments.* [25] Lansdale cautioned Diệm against elec- One of Diệm's main themes was that the referendum toral fraud, confident that Diệm would win a free election: would usher in a new era of unprecedented democracy: “While I'm away I don't want to suddenly read that you “This shall be but the first step made by our people in the have won by 99.99%. I would know that it's rigged then.” free use of our political rights.”* [25] The day before the U.S. officials thought that a fair election would have seen poll, Diệm said: “This 23 October, for the first time in Diệm poll between 60% and 70% of the vote.* [1]

2.2. STATE OF VIETNAM REFERENDUM, 1955 our country's history, our men and women will exercise one of many basic civil rights of a democracy, the right to vote.”* [31] A government proclamation four days before the poll said:“Dear compatriots, proclaim your will forcefully! Go forward ﬁrmly in the path of Freedom, Independence and Democracy!"* [31]

111 these broadcasts.* [36]

On the other hand, the bachelor Diệm was described as the“hero of the people”and“father of all children”.* [33] The slogans exhorted the populace to vote for the prime minister because“To vote for the revolutionary man Ngo Dinh Diem is to build a society of welfare and justice”. They portrayed Diệm as a patriotic and nationalist anticommunist, proclaiming “To kill communists, depose 2.2.3 Campaign the king, [and] struggle against colonialists is a citizen's * Diệm ran a personal attack campaign against the head of duty in Free Vietnam.” [34] state, for whom campaigning was prohibited.* [32] The Diệm's government-controlled press overwhelmed Bảo army and national police went about enforcing the ban on Đại with endless personal propaganda attacks, with spepro-Bảo Đại and anti-Diệm activities.* [33] Police went cial editions of newspapers being devoted to polemical from door to door, explaining the consequences of fail- biographical accounts of the former emperor.* [18] This ing to vote.* [18] They organized conferences in rural vil- allowed Diệm's campaign to condemn Bảo Đại with much lages and addressed the populace with loudspeakers. In more salacious detail than was possible through mere slogeneral, Diệm's line of attack was to portray Bảo Đại as a gans. This started in August when the daily newspaper drunken womanizer who was preoccupied with immoral Thoi Dai started a three-week series that disseminated pleasures and unconcerned with the problems of the pop- unsubstantiated and scandalous details about Bảo Đại's ulace.* [32]* [33]* [34] Vietnam's monarchic tradition was life. These were written by editorialist Hong Van, who built on Confucianism and the emperor's Mandate of called Bảo Đại a “dung beetle who sold his country for Heaven, and Diệm's campaign claimed Bảo Đại had lost personal glory”.* [34] Van claimed Bảo Đại was the illethis mandate through his debauched lifestyle.* [34] Ac- gitimate son of Emperor Khải Định, alleging Khải Định cording to Joseph Buttinger, who was based in Viet- had been infertile and married a maid, before claiming nam as the second in command at the International Res- the maid's son, by another man, as his own.* [38] The pacue Committee, the methods used to influence the poll per claimed Bảo Đại was “big like a lubber, had many were “outrageous”.* [18] Donald Lancaster, a journal- children, and was very fond of women”while Khải Định ist who covered the poll, said “Whereas Bao Dai was was uncomfortable with females, hinting that the differgiven no opportunity to defend himself, the government- ent personalities were inconsistent with a common biocontrolled press proceeded to overwhelm him with scur- logical lineage.* [37] rilous abuse.”* [35] Diệm later banned Bảo Đại from enCapitalising on anti-French sentiment, the paper went tering the State of Vietnam.* [36] on to discuss Bảo Đại's upbringing in France, claiming Diệm's advertising included the parading of giant that he was already womanising as a teenager because of pageant-style floats of Bảo Đại through the streets of his European upbringing.* [39] Bảo Đại later married an Saigon, depicted with bags of money on his shoulders, a ethnic Vietnamese French citizen, who became Empress deck of cards in his hands, and with naked blonde women Nam Phương, who had been raised Catholic. The editoand bottles of cognac in his arms. This was a reference rials accused her of being a French agent and claimed she to the head of state's reputation for opulence, gambling had treated the queen mother badly,* [39] a serious charand womanising.* [32]* [33] In particular, the blonde hair acter flaw as Confucianism strongly emphasized respect referred to Bảo Đại's purported penchant for European for elders. Hong Van went on to claim that Bảo Đại's mistresses with whom he liaised on the French Riviera. sequence of Gallic lovers was an indication that colonial Bảo Đại's dummy was accompanied by that of a French- officials were successfully using sex to turn the head of man putting gold into his pockets, thereby questioning his state into a puppet of France.* [40] nationalist credentials.* [33] Posters and effigies associatThe culmination of the newspaper campaign was a satiring Bảo Đại with a pig's head were disseminated,* [18] ical pornographic cartoon, entitled “The Story of Bảo while a prominent newspaper composed and encouraged Đại”.* [41] It summarized the scandalous depictions of the people to sing insulting songs about Bảo Đại.* [37] the head of state made by Thoi Dai in the preceding weeks Walls and public transport vehicles were plastered with and was published on 19 October, four days before the slogans, including “Beware of the evil king Bảo Đại's referendum.* [42] The pictures featured full frontal nude preference for gambling, women, wine, milk, and but- depictions of Bảo Đại and his mistresses, with genitalia ter. Those who vote for him betray their country.”* [33] clearly visible, including a frame showing a naked blonde Aside from referring to his opulent lifestyle, other slo- performing an erotic dance for the head of state.* [41] gans such as “Bao Dai, puppet king selling his country” Aside from painting Bảo Đại as a sexually insatiable glut, and “Bao Dai, master keeper of gambling dens and ton, Diệm's campaign also attacked the head of state's * brothels”, [34] referred to his alleged softness towards nationalist credentials. They criticised him as being too the communists. The radio was used to verbally abuse soft in his dealings with French colonial authorities, and Bảo Đại, who was accused of treason and corruption in

112

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM

for serving as the head of state of the Empire of Vietnam, a puppet regime set up by Imperial Japan after they invaded during World War II.* [40]* [43] They also accused him of ceding half the country to the communists.* [40] The communists had already captured more than half the country on the battleﬁeld,* [44] and Diệm claimed he had no choice, but Diệm's campaign portrayed him as incompetent and unwilling to take the blame.* [41]

erendum illegal. He invited “friendly countries and the people of Vietnam to distrust this political maneuver”. Diệm had earlier told a cabinet minister that there was only one political party – Nhu's outﬁt, and went about eradicating opposition by force.* [49] Opponents claimed Diệm's declarations about the value of democracy were hollow.* [48]

Diệm used the Ministry of Information's electoral education campaign as a partisan political tool. Instead of using it purely to explain the democratic process, the campaign was used to extol Diệm and his allies.* [45] After explaining what democracy was, a pamphlet outlined why Deposing a chief-of-state is a vital act.* [31] After elaborating on the powers of the head of state, the pamphlet went on to champion Diệm as an anti-communist who could defend people's freedom, while explaining why Bảo Đại was unﬁt to lead, saying that he did not have respect among the international community.* [31]

2.2.5 Logistics and voting

On 15 October, Bảo Đại issued a statement protesting against the referendum. He urged the governments of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, India and even the Soviet Union not to recognise Diệm, asserting that he was an obstacle to the reuniﬁcation of Vietnam under the Geneva Accords.* [18] He accused Diệm's poll of being “a governmental activity which conforms neither to the profound sentiment of the Vietnamese people nor to the common cause of peace”.* [21] On 18 October, he made the token gesture of formally dismissing Diệm. The following day, he denounced“the police methods”of Diệm's“dictatorship”and warned the Vietnamese populace “against a regime that was bound to lead them to ruin, famine, and war”. Bảo Đại accused Diệm of trying to foment conﬂict between the French and the Americans.* [46] On the eve of the poll, Bảo Đại stated “I can even tell you that I know the percentage of favourable votes that Mr. Diem has decided to obtain.” * [18]

2.2.4

Lansdale advised Diệm to print his ballots in red, while those of Bảo Đại were printed in green. In Vietnam, red is associated with good luck and prosperity, whereas green is often associated with a cuckold and bad luck.* [1]* [33]* [50] Diệm's red ballots pictured him with youthful and modern-looking people, while Bảo Đại's photo was placed in old-fashioned robes, which he never wore.* [18] In addition, Bảo Đại's portrait showed him to appear dazed and bloated, while Diệm and those surrounding him were smiling and appeared to be energetic.* [51] The ballot claimed that a vote for Diệm would be a vote for democracy, stating “I depose Bảo Đại and recognise Ngô Đình Diệm as Head of State, charged with the commission of setting up a democratic regime.” * [18]* [23]* [51] Bảo Đại's ballot read “I do not depose Bảo Đại and do not regard Ngô Đình Diệm as the Head of State charged with the commission of setting up a democratic regime.”* [18]* [51] The voters would place the red or green ballot into the box, according to their preference, while discarding the other, which meant the voting was actually not secret.* [23]

Other opposition

The staging of the election was subsidised by foreign funding. The United States government and a combination of American Roman Catholic charities contributed US$2 million each.* [47] Ba Cụt, a leader of an antigovernment Hòa Hảo religious sect, distributed a pamphlet condemning Diệm as an American puppet, citing the funding as proof and further asserting that Diệm was going to“Catholicize”the country.* [48] The Vietnamese Socialist Party, which was aﬃliated to the Hòa Hảo, claimed Diệm had “bribed the world of laborers and young students to petition in support of Diem's rise to chief-of-state and to petition in favor of deposing Bao Dai”, using the American election funding.* [49] Another Hòa Hảo rebel leader, General Trần Văn Soái, assailed Diệm's undemocratic regime and declared the ref-

Ngô Đình Nhu (right), Diệm's brother, supervised and rigged the referendum; on the left is US Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson. (1961)

The logistics of the referendum were organised and supervised by Diệm's brother and conﬁdant, Nhu, who was the leader of the family's secret Cần Lao party, which supplied the Ngôs' electoral base. Reports of violence and intimidation were widespread. During the referendum, Nhu's staﬀ told voters to throw away the green bal-

2.2. STATE OF VIETNAM REFERENDUM, 1955 lots. Those who disobeyed were often chased down and beaten, with pepper sauce and water sometimes being forced into their nostrils.* [1]* [32] The violations were particularly ﬂagrant in central Vietnam,* [52] a region over which another of Diệm's younger brothers, Ngô Đình Cẩn, ruled.* [53] Cẩn was based in the former imperial capital city of Huế, home of the Nguyễn Dynasty and a source of support for Bảo Đại. He stiﬂed this support by ordering the police to arrest 1,200 people for political reasons in the week leading up to the vote.* [52] In the city of Hội An, several people were killed in election violence on the day of the poll.* [54] Voting started at 07:00 and ended at 17:00.* [55]

2.2.6

Counting and results

Diệm's government formulated procedural regulations ostensibly designed to ensure results and ballots were correctly accounted for and to prevent election fraud. In reality however, the votes were counted without independent supervision, which resulted in Diệm being credited with 98.2% of the vote. The prime minister tallied 605,025 votes in Saigon, although only 450,000 voters were registered in the capital. Diệm's tally exceeded the registration numbers in other districts.* [1]* [32] French newspapers claimed that only half of the registered voters in Saigon had actually voted, and that the rest had boycotted the election,* [56] implying that more than 60% of the votes in the capital were not authentic. Defenders of Diệm claim this was due to recently arrived, mostly Catholic, refugees from North Vietnam who voted without being enrolled, rather than large-scale ballot stuffing.* [54] Diệm's regime had announced that 5,335,668 people were eligible to vote, but when the results were declared, there were 5,784,752 ballots.* [55] Diệm's government claimed his candidacy had been endorsed by the mother of Bảo Đại, although Diệm had ordered the military to confiscate her family's property and evict her from the land.* [57] The near unanimous voter turnout and support for Diệm was replicated in highland and Mekong Delta swamp areas, which were not even under the control of the government and its Vietnamese National Army.* [58] In some districts of the Mekong Delta, overwhelming tallies for Diệm in excess of 90% of the registered voters were recorded,* [59] even though the Hòa Hảo warlord Ba Cụt and his army had prevented voting.* [18] The referendum was widely condemned for being fraudulent.* [52] Historian and writer Jessica Chapman said “Even Diệm apologists like Anthony Trawick Bouscaren and American CIA officer Edward Lansdale concur with the prime minister's harshest critics on the conclusion that the South Vietnamese government was either incapable of or unwilling to hold a truly free, representative plebiscite”.* [35] A CIA report written in 1966 adjudged the poll to be the most heavily manipulated in the first 11 years of South Vietnam's history.* [45] The U.S. government privately concluded that the monopoly Diệm had on

113 the media and the election campaign was a greater factor in the victory than intimidation and the fact that the voting was effectively public. Reinhardt cabled Washington, saying that the “referendum proved [a] resounding success for [the] Diem government”.* [45] He indicated that the poll results were not necessarily a reflection of reality by adding that the result did not show that Diệm had majority support but that he was able to control the country, effectively unchallenged. The U.S. government was heartened by Diệm's apparent ability to negate communist and other opposition.* [45] The scholar Bernard B. Fall stated that “there is not the slightest doubt that this plebiscite was only a shade more fraudulent than most electoral tests under a dictatorship” .* [58] The American journalist Stanley Karnow cited the dubious plebiscite as evidence of Diệm's“mandarin mentality”.* [1] Chapman wrote that "... no amount of unilateral campaigning, anti-Bảo Đại sentiment, or Confucian political restraint could explain Diệm's 98 percent margin of victory in a politically heterogeneous South Vietnam. Corruption and intimidation must have played a significant role.”* [60] Buttinger said that while the monarchy was“another rotten relic of Vietnam's past”and Bảo Đại “its last, unworthy representative”, fraud and intimidation were unnecessary as Diệm would have won easily in any event.* [35] Historian David Anderson said the victory “was not a true representation of Diệm's power or popularity. The emperor's weakness, the disarray of the political opposition, and other such factors explain his triumph”.* [30]

2.2.7 Reaction and aftermath Three days after the vote, Diệm proclaimed the creation of the Republic of Vietnam, naming himself as its president.* [50] He said“The October 23rd plebiscite in which [the people of South Vietnam] took such an enthusiastic part, constitutes an approval of the policies pursued thus far and at the same time augurs a whole new era for the future of our country.”* [46] Diệm reiterated that he would not partake in national reunification elections, saying that they would be futile unless “true liberty” came about in the communist North Vietnam, which impressed American observers, who feared a total communist takeover.* [60] Having claimed the election was entirely without irregularities,* [54] the United States government hailed Diệm as a new hero of the “free world”.* [18] Senator Mike Mansfield (D-MT) claimed the referendum “was a reflection of their [the Vietnamese people's] search for a leader who would respond to their needs ... they sensed that Diệm could provide that kind of leadership.”* [61] Mansfield had been a professor of Asian history before entering politics; as a result his opinions about Vietnam were more influential and held in high regard by his fellow senators.* [62] Archives of policy discussions show that the Americans were concerned more about the negative

114 image created by Diem's autocratic and antidemocratic style among the international community, rather than its possible effects on national cohesion.* [63] The US State Department spokesman said “the people of Viet-Nam have spoken, and we, of course, recognise their decision” .* [61] An official congratulatory statement from the department said“The Department of State is gratified that according to reports the referendum was conducted in such an orderly and efficient manner and that the people of Viet-Nam have made their choice unmistakably clear ... we look forward to a continuation of the friendly relations between the Government of Viet-Nam and the United States.”* [64] Reaction to Diệm's victory among the American press varied with geographic location.* [45] Newspapers in the Midwest hailed Diệm's win as a triumph for democracy and extolled the new president as a champion of democracy. However, The New York Times said that the extreme margin of victory made “Diem's administrative control look more pervasive than is thought to be the case by a number of observers here.”* [60] However, the paper also obligingly claimed the poll a “sound democratic procedure”and a “public tribute to a strong-willed leader”. Reader's Digest called it an“overwhelming endorsement” and dubbed Diệm a “beacon of light, showing the way to free people”.* [61] Diệm's victory was seen as a blow to French stature in Vietnam, as the former colonial power had helped to set up Bảo Đại's State of Vietnam in 1949.* [60] They consistently opposed Diệm and his policies, and unsuccessfully tried to impede him.* [65] The U.S. media regarded Diệm's victory as a signal that the United States would be the only Western power in South Vietnam. Some felt that this would enable Diệm to rule effectively without French hindrance, while others felt that this would leave too much of a burden on the American government.* [60] The French media and diplomatic corps viewed the result as a humiliation. Before the poll, French officials had privately predicted Diệm would dissolve the French High Command and use any victory as justification for scrapping the national reunification elections. The French media viewed the poll as undemocratic and a plot by the Americans to sabotage any prospect of national reunification, but France recognised the Republic of Vietnam soon after.* [56] Diệm severed economic relations with France on 9 December 1955, and withdrew from the French Union shortly afterwards. Neither the Soviet Union nor communist China overtly objected to Diệm's actions in creating a new state in the southern half of Vietnam.* [66] Nevertheless, by the time of Diệm's deposal and assassination in 1963, France bought 46.3% of South Vietnam's exports and accounted for most of the foreign investment in the country.* [67] French cultural influences and the language remained prevalent.* [67] In January 1956, with no legislature and constitution in

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM place, Diệm used his absolute power to dissolve the Revolutionary Council by launching police raids on the members, forcing those from the Cao Đài and Hòa Hảo who had rallied to his side to go on the run. As a result, they turned against him.* [49]

2.2.8 References [1] Karnow, p. 239. [2] Tucker, p.366. [3] Jacobs, pp. 37–42. [4] Maclear, pp. 65–68. [5] Jacobs, pp. 43–53. [6] Jacobs, pp. 20–26. [7] Karnow, p. 231. [8] Jacobs, p. 39. [9] Karnow, p. 234. [10] Jacobs, p. 61. [11] Jacobs, pp. 22–25, 43, 60–61. [12] Karnow, p. 236. [13] Jacobs, pp. 61–62. [14] Jacobs, pp. 71–79. [15] Moyar, pp. 47–51. [16] Karnow, p. 238. [17] Chapman, p. 677. [18] Buttinger, pp. 890–92. [19] Chapman, p. 678. [20] Chapman, p. 694. [21] Chapman, p. 679. [22] Chapman, p. 697. [23] Miller, p. 206. [24] Chapman, p. 671. [25] Chapman, p. 691. [26] Miller, p. 205. [27] Miller, pp. 204–06. [28] Chapman, p. 695. [29] Chapman, pp. 695–96. [30] Chapman, p. 673. [31] Chapman, p. 692. [32] Jacobs, p. 95.

2.3. OPERATION PASSAGE TO FREEDOM

[33] Moyar, p. 54. [34] Chapman, p. 684. [35] Chapman, p. 672. [36] Brownell, p. 153. [37] Chapman, p. 685. [38] Chapman, pp. 684–85. [39] Chapman, p. 687. [40] Chapman, p. 688. [41] Chapman, p. 689. [42] Chapman, pp. 688–89. [43] Jacobs, pp. 21–22. [44] Jacobs, p. 40. [45] Chapman, p. 698. [46] Chapman, p. 680. [47] Chapman, pp. 701–02. [48] Chapman, p. 701. [49] Chapman, p. 702. [50] Langguth, p. 99. [51] Chapman, p. 696. [52] Miller, p. 207. [53] Karnow, p. 246. [54] Miller, p. 208. [55] Brownell, p. 154. [56] Chapman, p. 700. [57] Brownell, p. 157.

115

2.2.9 Sources • Brownell, William (1963). The American Mandarin: a study of the life of Diem and of the origins of the American involvements. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University. • Buttinger, Joseph (1967). Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled. Praeger Publishers. • Chapman, Jessica (September 2006). “Staging Democracy: South Vietnam's 1955 Referendum to Depose Bao Dai”. Diplomatic History 30 (4). doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.2006.00573.x. • Fall, Bernard B. (1963). The Two Viet-Nams. Praeger Publishers. ISBN 0-8133-0092-4. • Jacobs, Seth (2006). Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America's War in Vietnam. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littleﬁeld. ISBN 0-7425-4447-8. • Karnow, Stanley (1997). Vietnam: A history. New York City: Penguin Books. ISBN 0-670-84218-4. • Langguth, A. J. (2000). Our Vietnam. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-684-81202-9. • Maclear, Michael (1981). Vietnam: The ten thousand day war. Methuen. ISBN 0-423-00580-4. • Miller, Edward (2004). Grand Designs, Vision, Power and Nation Building in America's Alliance with Ngo Dinh Diem, 1954–1960. UMI. • Moyar, Mark (2006). Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965. New York City: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-86911-0. • Roberts, Priscilla (ed) (2006). Behind the bamboo curtain: China, Vietnam, and the world beyond Asia. Stanford University Press. ISBN 0-8047-5502-7. • Tucker, Spencer C. (2000). Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 1-57607-040-9.

[58] Fall, p. 257. [59] Moyar, p. 55.

2.3 Operation Passage to Freedom

[60] Chapman, p. 699. [61] Brownell, p. 158. [62] Jacobs, p. 31. [63] Chapman, p. 703. [64] Brownell, p. 159. [65] Jacobs, pp. 22–25, 43, 60, 61, 71–79. [66] Roberts, p. 115. [67] Roberts, p. 159.

Operation Passage to Freedom was a term used by the United States Navy to describe its assistance in transporting in 1954–55 310,000 Vietnamese civilians, soldiers and non-Vietnamese members of the French Army from communist North Vietnam (the Democratic Republic of Vietnam) to South Vietnam (the State of Vietnam, later to become the Republic of Vietnam). The French and other countries may have transported a further 500,000.* [1]* [2]* [3] In the wake of the French defeat at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, the Geneva Accords of 1954 decided the fate of French Indochina after eight years of war between French Union forces and the Viet

116

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM State of Vietnam in the south. The agreements allowed a 300-day period of grace, ending on May 18, 1955, in which people could move freely between the two Vietnams before the border was sealed. The partition was intended to be temporary, pending elections in 1956 to reunify the country under a national government. Between 600,000 and one million northerners moved south, including more than 200,000 French citizens and soldiers in the French army * [4] while between 14,000 - 45,000 civilians and approximately 100,000 Viet Minh ﬁghters moved in the opposite direction.* [1]* [5]* [6]

The mass emigration of northerners was facilitated primarily by the French Air Force and Navy. American naval vessels supplemented the French in evacuating northerners to Saigon, the southern capital. The operation was accompanied by a large humanitarian relief effort, bankrolled in the main by the United States government in an attempt to absorb a large tent city of refugees that had sprung up outside Saigon. For the US, the migration was a public relations coup, generating wide coverage of the ﬂight of Vietnamese from the perceived oppression of communism to the “free world”in the southern dictatorship under American auspices. The period was Up to a million refugees left communist North Vietnam during Operation Passage to Freedom after the country was partitioned. marked by a Central Intelligence Agency-backed propaganda campaign on behalf of South Vietnam's Roman Catholic Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem. The campaign exhorted Catholics to ﬂee impending religious persecution under communism, and around 60% of the north's 1 million Catholics obliged.* [6]* [7]

2.3.1 Background Main articles: First Indochina War and Geneva Conference (1954)

Propaganda poster exhorting Northerners to move South. Title: “Go South to avoid Communism”. Bottom caption: “People of Southern Vietnam are welcoming with open arms Northern Vietnamese people.”

Minh, which sought Vietnamese independence. The accords resulted in the partition of Vietnam of Vietnam at the 17th parallel north, with Ho Chi Minh's communist Viet Minh in control of the north and the French-backed

At the end of World War II, the Viet Minh had proclaimed independence under the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in September 1945. This occurred after the withdrawal of Imperial Japan, which had seized control of the French colony during World War II. The military struggle started in November 1946 when France attempted to reassert control over Indochina with an attack on the northern port city of Haiphong.* [8] The DRV was recognised by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC). On the other hand, the western powers recognised the French-backed State of Vietnam, nominally led by Emperor Bảo Đại, but with a Frenchtrained Vietnamese National Army (VNA) which was loyal to the French Union forces. In May 1954, after eight years of ﬁghting, the French were surrounded and defeated in a mountainous northern fortress at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu.* [9] France's withdrawal from Indochina was ﬁnalised in the Geneva Accords of July 1954, after two months of negotiations between Ho's DRV, France, the PRC and the Soviet Union. Under the terms of the agreement, Vietnam was temporarily divided at the 17th parallel north pending elections in 1956 to choose

2.3. OPERATION PASSAGE TO FREEDOM

117

a national government that would administer a reunified country. The communist Viet Minh were left in control of North Vietnam, while the State of Vietnam controlled the south. French Union forces would gradually withdraw from Vietnam as the situation stabilised.* [10] Both Vietnamese sides were unsatisfied with the outcome at Geneva; Ngo Dinh Diem, Prime Minister of the State of Vietnam, denounced France's agreement and ordered his delegation not to sign. He stated “We cannot recognise the seizure by Soviet China . . . of over half of our national territory”and that “We can neither concur in the brutal enslavement of millions of compatriots”.* [11] North Vietnamese Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng expressed bitterness after his Soviet and Chinese backers threatened to cut support if he did not agree to the peace terms; Dong had wanted to press home the Viet Minh's military advantage so they could lay claim to more territory at the negotiating table.* [11] Under the accords, there was to be a 300-day period in which free civilian movement was allowed between the two zones, whereas military forces were compelled to relocate to their respective sides. All French Far East Expeditionary Corps and VNA forces in the north were to Vietnamese refugees move from a French landing ship to the USS be evacuated south of the 17th parallel, while all Viet Montague during Operation Passage to Freedom in August 1954. Minh fighters had to relocate to the north. The accords stipulated that civilians were to be given the opportunity to move to their preferred half of Vietnam.* [12] Article 2.3.2 Evacuation 14(d) of the accords stated that: The predictions made by Diem and Ely were extremely inaccurate.* [12] There had been heavy fighting in northern Vietnam, where the Vietminh were at their strongest, and many people had been forced to abandon their homes.* [15] Although French charities had been operatAny civilians residing in a district coning in the north, the refugee camps were disorganised and trolled by one party who wish to go and live were unable to provide little more than shelter. As a rein the zone assigned to the other party shall be * sult, there was a great number of northerners who wanted permitted and helped to do so. [12] to leave and start a new life in the south.* [16]

Article 14(d) allowed for a 300-day period of free movement between the two Vietnams,* [13] ending on May 18, 1955. The parties had given little thought to the logistics of the population resettlement during the negotiations at Geneva, and assumed the matter would be minor. Despite claiming that his northern compatriots had been “enslaved”,* [12] Diem expected no more than 10,000 refugees. General Paul Ely, the French CommissionerGeneral of Indochina, expected that around 30,000 landlords and business executives would move south and proclaimed that he would take responsibility for transporting any Vietnamese who wanted to move to territory controlled by the French Union, such as South Vietnam. French Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France and his government had planned to provide aid for around 50,000 displaced persons.* [12] Mendes-France was sure that the FFEEC would be able to handle the work all by itself.* [14] The Americans saw the period as an opportunity to weaken the communist north.* [12]

The French started their evacuation with their preconceived notion that few would want to head south. As knowledge of the migration program spread through the communist-controlled north, thousands of predominantly northern Catholic asylum-seekers descended on the capital Hanoi and the port of Haiphong, both of which were still in French control. This led to anarchy and confusion as the emigrants fought over limited shelter, food, medicine and places on the ships and planes that were bound for the south. By early August, there were over 200,000 evacuees waiting in Hanoi and Haiphong.* [12] Initially the ad hoc camps had insuﬃcient sanitation and water quality control, leading to the possibility of outbreaks of disease. Some American representatives said that they were the worst conditions they had seen.* [17] The conditions continued to be poor and chaotic after the evacuation got into full swing, and did not improve significantly for a month.* [18] There was no organization infrastructure as far as registration or medical records and immunisation of the waiting evacuees.* [17] The communists thus sent their propaganda activists through the

118 camps and said that the lack of organisation proved that life for prospective refugees would be even worse in the south, where they would be completely under the control of South Vietnam.* [19] The French Navy and Air Force had been depleted during World War II. They were unable to deal with the unexpectedly large number of refugees.* [12] This was exacerbated by their unwillingness to allow civilian evacuees to travel on trains from outlying districts to Hanoi and Haiphong, as their priority was evacuating their military personnel and equipment. France asked Washington for assistance, so the US Department of Defense ordered the US Navy to mobilise an evacuation task force.* [12] The American government saw the evacuation as an opportunity to weaken the communists by providing for and thereby winning the loyalty of the refugees to the anti-communist cause.* [15] The United States Operation Mission proposed that aside from helping to evacuate refugees to the south and thereby draining the communist population base, the Americans should provide healthcare, shelter, food and clothing in order to help the anticommunists win the fidelity of their compatriots.* [20] Another benefit of participating in the evacuation was that American personnel would be on the ground in North Vietnam, allowing them to gather intelligence on communist activities.* [21] Accordingly, Task Force 90 (CTF-90) was inaugurated under the command of Rear Admiral Lorenzo Sabin. US servicemen renovated and transformed cargo vessels and tank carriers to house the thousands of Vietnamese who would be evacuated in them. The repairs were frequently done en route to Haiphong from their bases at Subic Bay in the Philippines.* [12] Sabin had no prior involvement in humanitarian matters, and he and his staff prepared Operation Order 2–54—the 114-page policy framework for the operation—in the space of a week during their sea voyage from Japan to Vietnam.* [21] The first US vessel to participate in the mass evacuation was the Menard, which left Haiphong on August 17. It carried 1,924 refugees for a 1,600 kilometre, three-day journey to the southern capital.* [22] By this time, there were already 132,000 people registered at the waiting areas, although very few had any identification.* [19] As a result, there would be more work to be done in identifying their needs once they arrived in the south.* [19] The Montrose followed on the next day, with 2,100 passengers. Both were originally built as attack transport vessels. In August, the US policy was liberalised so that Vietnamese and French military personnel could also be evacuated at the discretion of CTF-90 and the Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group (CHMAAG).* [22] To cope with the rising volume of southbound sea transport, CHMAAG established a refugee debarkation site at Vũng Tàu, a coastal port at the entrance of the Saigon River. This site relieved congestion in the Saigon refugee camps and decreased the traffic bottlenecks along the river. A

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM setback occurred when a typhoon struck the Haiphong area, destroying almost half of the refugee staging area. Despite the problems, by September 3, the US Navy had evacuated 47,000 northerners after only two weeks of operations.* [23] The high rate of evacuation caused the South Vietnamese government to order that only one shipment of at most 2,500 passengers was to arrive in Saigon or Vũng Tàu per day, until September 25. The population pressure in the south was eased as incoming numbers fell due to Viet Minh propaganda campaigns and forcible detention, combined with the rice harvesting season, which had prompted some to delay their departure.* [24] Some were even waiting to finish all their business deals before moving in the Lunar New Year. On October 10, the Viet Minh were given full control of Hanoi, closing off one point of evacuation for those who wanted out.* [25] Some also decided to stay behind and see how the Viet Minh would treat the inhabitants of Hanoi before making a decision on whether to leave their ancestral lands.* [25] On October 20, the French authorities that were still in control of the ports decided to waive docking fees on US vessels engaged in the evacuation.* [24] Because of the high demand, the naval vessels had to travel quickly; one ship completed one round trip in a record of only six days.* [26] The record for the most passengers taken in one journey was set by the USS General Black, which sailed on October 29 with 5,224 Vietnamese aboard.* [27] In November, the evacuation was further hampered by another typhoon, while the entire crew of one American vessel were struck down by a scabies outbreak.* [28] In December, because of Viet Minh obstruction, which prevented people from rural and regional areas from travelling to Hanoi and Haiphong to emigrate, the French Navy sent ships to hover just off the coast near the regional town of Vinh to evacuate refugees.* [29]

USS Menard, the ﬁrst American ship to participate in the naval evacuation

According to COMIGAL,* [30] the South Vietnamese government agency responsible for the migration, French aircraft made 4,280 trips, carrying a total of 213,635 refugees. A total of 555,037 passengers were recorded on 505 sea trips. The French Navy accounted for the vast majority of the naval evacuees, with 388 voyages, while the US Navy made 109. British, Taiwanese and

2.3. OPERATION PASSAGE TO FREEDOM Polish ships made two, two and four journeys respectively. The official figures reported that a total of 768,672 people had migrated under military supervision. Of this number around 190,000 were French and Saigon soldiers and returned prisoners; some 43,000 were military dependents, “15,000–25,000 Nung tribesmen who were military auxiliaries, between 25,000 and 40,000 French citizens, and about 45,000 Chinese residents.” * [2] It also included several thousand people who had worked for the French and Vietnamese administrations in the North. The official figures recorded that more than 109,000 people journeyed into the south by their own means, some arriving outside the 300-day period. These people typically crossed the river that divided the zones on makeshift rafts, sailed on improvised watercraft into a southern port, or trekked through Laos. As of 1957, the South Vietnamese government claimed a total of 928,152 refugees, of whom 98.3% were ethnic Vietnamese. The 1957 report said that 85% were engaged in farming or fishing for their livelihood and 85% were Catholics, while the remainder were Buddhists or Protestants.* [31] However, an October 1955 government report claimed that 76.3% were Catholics, 23.5% were Buddhists and 0.2% Protestants.* [32] In 1959, however, the head of COMIGAL, Bui Van Luong, admitted that the actual number of refugees could have been as low as 600,000. The official data excluded approximately 120,000 anti-communist military personnel and claimed that only 4,358 people moved north, though no historians consider this number credible. The northward migration was attributed to itinerant workers from rubber plantations who returned north for family reasons.* [31] An independent study by the French historian Bernard B. Fall determined that the US Navy transported around 310,000 refugees. The French were credited with around 214,000 airlifted refugees, 270,000 seaborne refugees and 120,000 and 80,000 Vietnamese and French military evacuees respectively.* [3] During the US Navy voyages, 54 people died on board, and 111 babies were born.* [26] Fall believed that of the 109,000 refugees who went south by their own means, a large number hitchhiked on southbound French transport vessels that were not related to the migration operation. Fall felt that the figures were likely to have been overestimated, due to immigration fraud. Some refugees would travel south and register themselves, before smuggling themselves onto vessels returning north for another shipment of humans. They would then return south and re-register to claim another aid package. Likewise, with instances of entire villages moving south, the authorities frequently did not explicitly count the number of villagers, but simply took the word of the village leaders. The chiefs would often inflate the population figures to claim more aid rations. The mass exodus did not disrupt the north largely because whole villages often emigrated, instead of half a village moving and leaving the remainder of the community in disarray. Fall estimated that around 120,000 Viet Minh troops and their dependents went north. Most of these

119 evacuations were attributed to Viet Minh military strategy, with some being ordered to stay behind in readiness for future guerrilla activities. The northward movement was facilitated by vessels leaving from assembly areas at Qui Nhơn and Cà Mau at the southernmost extremity of Vietnam. The voyages to North Vietnam were provided by empty French ships heading back north to fetch more southbound anti-communists, as well vessels from communist nations such as Poland. The Viet Minh also actively cultivated the Montagnard indigenous people of Vietnam, whose land in the Central Highlands was encroached upon by incoming northern settlers. The communists spread propaganda through broadcasts in tribal languages and inﬁltrated the highland areas. According to a study by the Michigan State University Group, some 6,000 tribespeople went north with the communists, accompanied by some Viet Minh who had adopted the indigenous culture.* [3]

Refugees transfer from a French LCT landing craft to British carrier HMS Warrior at the port of Haiphong during the operation 4 September 1954

The largest numbers of Catholic refugees came from the two northern dioceses with the highest percentage of Catholics in Vietnam.* [33] These were Phát Diêm and Bùi Chu, mainly located in modern-day Ninh Bình and Nam Định Provinces respectively. The bishops of the dioceses, had been strident opponents of the communists, and both had organised Catholic paramilitary groups that fought against the Viet Minh, which had long identified Catholics with colonial collaborationism.* [33] When the communists had gained the upper hand in the north, many Catholics had already begun making preparations to move to the south, where the communists were less influential, and large movements began immediately when news of the partition came through.* [33] After the defeat of French Union forces at Dien Bien Phu, French officers had evacuated their troops from Bui Chu and Phat Diem to reinforce the area between Hanoi and Haiphong which they still controlled, making it very easy for the communists to progress through the Catholic strongholds.* [33] The French withdrawal was not announced and was supposed to be secret, but the local church leadership found

120 out quickly and the local Catholic community had already begun to move to the ports before end of talks in Geneva. By the time the accords were signed, 45,000 Catholic refugees were already waiting in Hanoi, Haiphong or Hải Dương.* [33] According to the records of the Catholic Church, over 70% of Catholics in Bui Chu and Phat Diem left, compared to around 50% in most other areas. The Catholic records claim that only a third of Hanoi Catholics left, and that around 80% of all clergy left.* [32] In all areas, a higher proportion of priests left than laypeople, which has been attributed to the communists inflicting heavier punishments on more prominent opposition figures, such as clerics.* [34] The departure rate was also lower in areas further removed from the coastal areas and departure ports;* [35] in Hưng Hóa, only 11.8% of Catholics were recorded by their diocese as have migrated.* [32] It has been speculated that the low rate of Hanoi residents choosing to depart may have been because the city was relatively untouched by the decade of fighting,* [35] and that the varying and high rate of departures among rural Catholics was due to the influence of the local clergy;* [36] priests in northern Vietnam were noted to be more theocratic and involved in civic decision-making.* [37] They used a variety of ways to persuade their disciples to migrate; some explained their belief that circumstances would be difficult for people who did not immigrate, some simply gave dogmatic reasons such as“God is not here any more”,* [37] while others gave no reason at all and made declarations such as “We are leaving tomorrow”in the expectation that their followers would obey without question.* [37] Surveys on the immigrants suggested they were largely content to follow the recommendation of the local priest.* [37] In some areas, the bishop in charge of the diocese told Catholics to stay, but laypeople were more likely to leave or stay depending on the stance of the local priest with whom they had regular contact; in many cases, such as in Hanoi, a majority of priests ignored their bishop and left anyway.* [38]

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM tors under the Colombo Plan.* [26] With most of the refugees being Catholic, the voluntary agencies most prominent in helping the US and French governments with humanitarian relief eﬀorts were Catholic. The National Catholic Welfare Conference and Catholic Relief Services contributed over US$35 million ($308 million as of 2016) and sent hundreds of aid workers to South Vietnam. US clerics such as Joseph Harnett spent more than a year supervising the establishment of humanitarian and religious projects in Saigon. These included the establishment and maintenance of orphanages, hospitals, schools and churches. Harnett's volunteers fed rice and warm milk to 100,000 refugees on a daily basis. Tens of thousands of blankets donated by the American Catholic organisations served as beds, makeshift roofs against monsoonal downpours and as temporary walls in mass housing facilities.* [42] The United Nations Children's Fund contributed technical assistance and helped to distribute merchandise, foodstuﬀs and various other gifts.* [41]

2.3.3 Propaganda campaign

In many cases, families left some members behind in the hope that they would retain land for the family,* [39] while there were reports that a minority of Catholics with links to the communists decided to stay willingly.* [40] The US provided emergency food, medical care, clothing and shelter at reception centres in Saigon and elsewhere in the south. American sources donating through the United States Operations Mission (USOM) were responsible for 97% of the aid.* [41] The USOM sent public health professionals to help with sanitation in an attempt to prevent the spread of disease. Doctors and nurses were sent to help train local workers in healthcare procedures, so that they would eventually be able to take care of the medical needs refugees.* [15] In order of contributions to the aid eﬀorts, the US were followed by France, United Kingdom, Australia, West Germany, New Zealand and the Netherlands.* [41] Australian sent farming equipment and accompanying technical instruc-

Colonel Edward Lansdale

The US ran a propaganda campaign through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to enhance the size of the southward exodus. The program was directed by Colonel Edward Lansdale, who masqueraded as the assistant US air attaché in Saigon while leading a covert group that specialised in psychological warfare. Lansdale had advised Diem that it was imperative to maximise the population in the south in preparation for the national reuniﬁcation

2.3. OPERATION PASSAGE TO FREEDOM elections. When Diem noted the limited ability of the south to absorb refugees, Lansdale assured him that the US would bear the burden. Diem thus authorised Lansdale to launch the propaganda campaign. According to the historian Seth Jacobs, the campaign “ranked with the most audacious enterprises in the history of covert action”.* [43] Lansdale recollected that “U.S. officials wanted to make sure that as many persons as possible, particularly the strongly anti-communist Catholics, relocated in the South”.* [44] While many Diem supporters claimed that the mass exodus was proof of the popularity of Diem and the people's hatred of communism, the CIA operative Chester Cooper said “the vast movement of Catholics to South Vietnam was not spontaneous”.* [45] However, while Lansdale is often credited by historians —usually those critical of his influence—with the large exodus of refugees due to superstition, he rejected the notion that his campaign had much effect on popular sentiment, saying in later years: “People don’t just pull up their roots and transplant themselves because of slogans. They honestly feared what might happen to them, and their emotion was strong enough to overcome their attachment to their land, their homes, and their ancestral graves. So the initiative was very much theirs—and we mainly made the transportation possible.”* [46] Some northerners who stayed behind and were interviewed half a century later said that they had not come across any promigration propaganda and said that their decisions were based on discussions with fellow locals.* [39] They said that concerns over the possible effects of communist rule were discussed among themselves independent of outside information.* [39]

121 Lansdale's campaign focused on northern Catholics, who were known for their strongly anti-communist tendencies. His staff printed tens of thousands of pamphlets with slogans such as “Christ has gone south”and “the Virgin Mary has departed from the North”,* [47] alleging antiCatholic persecution under Ho Chi Minh. Posters depicting communists closing a cathedral and forcing the congregation to pray in front of Ho, adorned with a caption “make your choice”, were pasted around Hanoi and Haiphong.* [47] Diem himself went to Hanoi several times in 1954 while the French were still garrisoned there to encourage Catholics to move, portraying himself as a savior of Catholics.* [48] The campaign resonated with northern Catholic priests, who told their disciples that Ho would end freedom of worship, that sacraments would no longer be given and that anyone who stayed behind would endanger their souls.* [47] A survey of refugees some five decades later confirmed that they felt their interests would be best served under a Catholic leader and that Diem had substantial personal appeal due to his religion.* [48] Some have argued that the Catholics would have left regardless of Lansdale's activities, as they had first-hand experiences of their priests and co-religionists being captured and executed for resisting the communist revolution.* [49] Regardless of the impact of the propaganda campaigns, the Catholic immigrants helped to strengthen Diem's support base. Before the partition, most of Vietnam's Catholic population lived in the north. After the borders were sealed, the majority were now under Diem's rule. The Catholics implicitly trusted Diem due to their common faith and were a source of loyal political support. One of Diem's main objections to the Geneva Accords —which the State of Vietnam refused to sign —was that it deprived him of the Catholic regions of North Vietnam,* [42] and he had unsuccessfully called for Bui Chu and Phat Diem to be omitted from the communist zone.* [50] With entire Catholic provinces moving south en masse, in 1956 the Diocese of Saigon had more Catholics than Paris and Rome. Of Vietnam's 1.45 million Catholics, over a million lived in the south, 55% of whom were northern refugees.* [42] Prior to this, only 520,000 Catholics lived in the Dioceses of Saigon and Huế combined.* [51]

Lansdale employed a variety of stunts to encourage more northerners to move south. South Vietnamese soldiers in civilian clothing infiltrated the north, spreading rumours of impending doom. One story was that the communists had a deal with Vietnam's traditional enemy China, allowing two communist Chinese divisions to invade the north. The story reported that the Chinese were raping and pillaging with the tacit approval of the communists. Lansdale hired counterfeiters to produce bogus Viet Minh leaflets on how to behave under communist rule, advising them to create a list of their material possessions so that the communists would be able to confiscate them more Apart from anti-communist campaigning, economics was easily, thereby fomenting peasant discontent.* [43] another factor in moving south. The US gave handLansdale's men forged documents allegedly issued by the outs of US$89 ($784 as of 2016) for each refugee who Vietminh that promised to seize all private property. He moved; the per capita income in Vietnam at the time claimed that “The day following distribution of these was only $85 per year ($749 per year as of 2016).* [44] leatlets, refugee registration tripled”.* [44] The Cen- Others have pointed to natural geographic factors unretral Evacuation Committee in Haiphong, an American- lated to and uncontrollable by political regimes. They funded group, issued pamphlets claiming that in South point to the fact that the land in the south was seen as Vietnam, “the cost of living is three times less”,* [44] being more productive, and memories of the Great Vietand that there would be welfare payments and free rice- namese Famine of 1945, which killed millions in the lands, the latter two of which were false.* [44] It said that north, as reasons independent of politics that motivated “By remaining in the North you will experience famine migrants.* [39] In the mid-1950s, northern Vietnam again and will damn your souls. Set out now, brothers and sis- suffered food shortages, and some migrants have cited ters!"* [44] food security as motive for relocation.* [48] Adding to this

122 was a general perception that Saigon was a more modern city with more economic vibrancy.* [48] Earlier in the 20th century, there had also been instances of campaigns by Catholics to encourage southerly migration to exploit underdeveloped land in the south, so it was not a new concept for them.* [39] The Viet Minh engaged in counter-propaganda campaigns in an attempt to deter the exodus from the north.* [52] They moved through the neighbourhoods of Hanoi and Haiphong on a daily basis, passing out their pamphlets.* [53] Evacuees reported being ridiculed by the Viet Minh, who claimed that they would be sadistically tortured before being killed by the French and American authorities in Haiphong. The communists depicted the personnel of Task Force 90 as cannibals who would eat their babies, predicting disaster in the jungles, beaches and mountains of South Vietnam.* [52] They further said that the Americans would throw them overboard to drown in the ocean.* [53] The Viet Minh boasted to the emigrants that it was a high and futile risk, asserting that the 1956 reuniﬁcation elections would result in a decisive communist victory.* [52] The communist efforts were helped by the fact that many French or State of Vietnam oﬃces in the north evacuated their personnel and sold or otherwise left behind their printing facilities, many of which fell into Viet Minh hands.* [53]

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM French ship. This prompted villagers to clash with soldiers, killing one and capturing three, before barricading themselves inside a church. Troops forced their way into the church and dispersed the Vietnamese peasants, arresting several hundred. The village leader and a priest were tried by a kangaroo“People’s Court”and sentenced to prison.* [2] As a result, many refugees headed directly for the nearest coastal point to wait for passing vessels.* [55] In one sweep of the coast near the Catholic stronghold of Phát Diêm, the French Navy picked up 42,000 stranded refugees in two days.* [28] The VNA also swept the area in late 1954 for two days, picking up several thousand refugees, but increasing communist attacks forced them to stop.* [56] In some rural coastal areas where it was common for refugees to converge before boarding vessels to connect to the long-distance naval vessels taking them south, the Viet Minh installed mortars on the beaches to deter prospective immigrants.* [57]

They prohibited mass gatherings in an attempt to stop entire villages or other large groups of people from emigrating together, and also isolated people who sold their water buffalo and other belongings, as this was a clear sign that they intended to end their farming.* [57] Both the Americans and the South Vietnamese lodged complaints to the International Control Commission about the violations of the Geneva Accords, but little action was taken.* [58] According to B. S. M. Murti, the Indian representative on the ICC, the communists did not try to stop the refugees 2.3.4 Communist prevention of emigra- at first, but increased their efforts over time as it became clearer that large proportions of the population wanted to tion emigrate.* [35] Along with counter-propaganda, the Viet Minh also sought to detain or otherwise prevent would-be refugees from leaving. As the American and French military per- 2.3.5 Media and public relations sonnel were only present in the major cities and at air The United States reaped substantial public relations benbases and on the waterfront, the communists tried to which was used to depict the stop people from trying to leave through a military pres- efits from the mass exodus, * allure of the “free world” . [42] This was enhanced by the ence in the ruralside to interdict the flow of would-be comparatively negligible number of people who volun* refugees. [27] The communists were most effective in tarily moved into the communist north. The event generNghệ An and Thanh Hóa Provinces, which they had long * ated unprecedented press coverage of Vietnam. [42] Ini* controlled; [35] only 20% of Catholics in Thanh Hóa tially however, the press coverage was scant, and Admi* migrated. [32] In parts of the Red River Delta, ferry ral Sabin bemoaned the lack of promotional work done services and other water traffic were shut down so that by the US Navy to publicise the evacuation among the * refugees would not be able to travel to Haiphong. [54] * [59] At one point, a journalist from the American media. In some cases there were reports of thousands-strong groups of refugees being forced back by similar num- Associated Press travelled from Manila to Haiphong, but that Amerbers of armed communist cadres.* [54] The most noto- was ordered back by superiors on the grounds * [60] icans were not interested in the subject. rious took place at Tra Ly and Ba Lang. At Tra Ly, Viet Minh troops forcibly dispersed most of a group of However, over time, the media interest grew. Many about 10,000 refugees. Some villagers who fled to sand- prominent news agencies sent highly decorated reporters bars offshore hoping for sanctuary were trapped by ris- to cover the event. The New York Times dispatched ing tides. The French asked the International Control Tillman and Peggy Durdin, while the New York HerCommission to dispatch mobile teams to Tra Ly, but ald Tribune sent the Pulitzer Prize-winning war reporters the Viet Minh hindered ICC movement and had finished Marguerite Higgins and Homer Bigart. Future US emtheir job before the team arrived. French naval offi- bassy official John Mecklin covered the event for Time cers on the scene reported that the Viet Minh fired upon Life. The press reports presented highly laudatory and villagers in the dunes. At Ba Lang in December, the emotional accounts of the mass exodus of Vietnamese Viet Minh arrested refugee leaders who had contacted a away from the communist north. Time Life called the

2.3. OPERATION PASSAGE TO FREEDOM

123

2.3.6 Social integration The mass influx of refugees presented various social issues for South Vietnam. The new arrivals needed to be integrated into society with jobs and housing, as long periods in tents and temporary housing would sap morale and possibly foster pro-communist sympathies. Diem had to devise programs to ease his new citizens into the economic system.* [67] Diem appointed Bui Van Luong —a family friend and devout Catholic—as the head of COMIGAL, the government resettlement agency. COMIGAL worked in cooperation with the United States Operations Mission, the non-military wing of the American presence and the Military Assistance Advisory Group.* [67] Although COMIGAL was purely dedicated to refugee issues, there was a constant turnover of public servants through their staff, and the benefits of continuity did not materialize.* [26] After only a few months in the job, Luong was replaced by Pham Van Huyen on December 7, 1954.* [26] COMIGAL were supplemented by American Catholic aid agencies and an advisory group from Michigan State University, where Diem had stayed while in self-imposed exile in the early 1950s.* [67] There A Vietnamese Catholic evacuee. Catholics represented approxiwere three phases in the resettlement program.* [68] With mately 85% of the refugees in South Vietnam. more than 4,000 new arrivals per day, the northerners were housed in Saigon and Vũng Tàu in 42 makeshift reception centers.* [68] These consisted of existing schools, vacated French barracks, churches and tent cities on the mass migration “a tragedy of almost nightmarish pro- grounds* of Tan Son Nhut Air Base and Phú Thọ Raceportions ... Many [refugees] went without food or water course. [68] These could not be used indefinitely as the or medicine for days, sustained only by the faith in their grounds needed to be used for their preexisting purpose, and furthermore, such ad hoc areas were vulnerable to heart.”* [42] outbreaks of fire and disease.* [68] In the American Catholic press, the migration was given The refugees needed buildings such as schools, hospitals, front page coverage in diocesan newspapers. The accounts were often sensationalist, demonizing the com- warehouses, places of worship were built for them. As munist Viet Minh as religious persecutors who commit- part of the second phase, temporary villages were built ted barbaric atrocities against Catholics.* [61] Our Sunday and by mid-1955, most of the one million refugees were Visitor called the“persecution”in Vietnam“the worst in living in rows of temporary housing settlements, mostly history”,* [61]* [62] alleging that the Viet Minh engaged near highways leading out of Saigon, in provinces adjain“child murder and cannibalism”.* [61]* [62] San Fran- cent to the capital. The largest concentration of housing second stage was located to the north of the capcisco's Monitor told of a priest whom the Viet Minh“beat in this * * ital. [67] [68] Only a minority could be sent to the ferwith guns until insensible and then buried alive in a ditch” tile Mekong Delta, as the area was already overcrowded. * * . [61] [63] Newark, Ohio's The Advocate posted an ediIt was also restive due to the presence of militant reli* * torial cartoon titled“Let Our People Go!", [61] [64] degious sects, so the most of the military evacuees were sent picting mobs of Vietnamese refugees attempting to break * [69] there. through a blood-laced fence of barbed wire. Milwaukee's Catholic Herald Citizen described two priests who had Overcrowding was a serious problem in many of the ad been chained together and “suffered atrocious and end- hoc secondary camps set up in the Saigon region, and led less agony”.* [61]* [65] Other papers depicted the Viet to public health issues.* [69] The Biên Hòa region on the Minh blowing up churches, torturing children and gun- northeastern outskirts of Saigon was scheduled to have a ning down elderly Catholics. One paper proclaimed that capacity of 100,000 refugees,* [69] but this was soon ex“the people of Vietnam became a crucified people and ceeded.* [70] In the Ho Nai camp near Bien Hoa, which their homeland a national Golgotha”.* [61] The Catholic was supposed to hold only 10,000 refugees, more than media also ran stories about Buddhist refugees who con- 41,000 were present by the end of 1954.* [71] The area verted, hailing it as proof of their religion's superior- surrounding Thủ Dầu Một north of the southern capital had initially been allocated a quota of 20,000 even ity.* [66]

124 though there was no rice paddies in the area.* [69] The area near Tây Ninh was to accommodate 30,000 people, although the locals thought that 100,000 could fit in.* [69] Some large Catholic settlements such as Thủ Đức, Bình Thạnh and Gò Vấp on the outskirts of Saigon have now been subsumed by urban sprawl and are now districts of the city.* [72] Because of the excessive number of inhabitants, the infrastructure at many camps could not cope and the promises made to the refugees were not kept.* [71] American military doctors travelled around the south in groups of three, and because of the paucity of health professionals, saw around 150–450 patients per day. They were also hampered by customs law, which only allowed charities to bring medicine into the country without taxation. This forced them to turn to charitable organisations as a conduit, creating another layer of bureaucracy.* [73] This was exacerbated by the fact that some corrupt Vietnamese officials pocketed the medical aid.* [74] The organisational ability of the government agencies charged with overseeing the integration of the refugees into society was frequently criticised by American officials.* [75] In many cases, the individual officials simply made their own decisions and the goal of resettling the northerners without disruption to the existing local economy or social structure was not achieved. In other cases, the northern Catholics formed their own committees and settled and built on areas as they saw fit.* [76] By the end of September, the shortage of funds and equipment had eased, but their distribution was not organised or coordinated effectively.* [75] At the same time, some Viet Minh cadres who stayed in the south after the partition pretended to be refugees and stirred up trouble inside the camps.* [74] Aside from disruption by communists, other non-communist movements such as the Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng were strong in areas of central Vietnam, were opponents of Diem and some of them were military personnel.* [77] This sometimes caused hindrance in civilian-military cooperation in the resettlement program, as some of Diem's public servants were suspicious of the military's reliability as a working partner.* [77] At the time, much of the rural ricelands had been abandoned due to war and lay fallow. The Americans pressured Diem to assume control of such lands and distribute it to the new settlers and to allow them to start their new lives and ease the overcrowding in the camps, but no action was taken in 1954.* [26] At the time, there was a severe wastage of personnel due to the placement of refugees in land that was inappropriate to them. Vietnamese officials had resolved to place the settlers in land similar to their northern origins so that they could be productive, but bureaucratic difficulties hampered COMIGAL and no plan was produced. Throughout 1954, 60% of the new arrivals identified themselves as having an agrarian background, but only 20% of the total refugees were placed in arable farming areas, meaning that at least 40% of the northerners were in areas not appropriate for

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM their skill set.* [71] There were also severe problems in finding and then distributing farming equipment to the northerners so that they could get to work and resuscitate the agricultural sector that was hindered by the war.* [71] The next objective was to integrate the refugees into South Vietnamese society. At the time, there was a lack of arable land in secure areas. In early 1955, the Viet Minh still controlled much of the Mekong Delta, while other parts were controlled by the private armies of the Cao Đài and Hòa Hảo religious sects. The Bình Xuyên organised crime gang controlled the streets of Saigon, having purchased the operating license for the national police from Emperor Bảo Đại. The new arrivals could not be safely sent to the countryside until the Viet Minh had moved north and Diem had dispersed the sects and gangs. The urban areas were secured when the VNA defeated the Bình Xuyên in the Battle for Saigon in late April and early May. Lansdale managed to bribe many of the Hòa Hảo and Cao Đài military commanders to integrate into Diem's VNA, but some commanders fought on. It was not until early 1956 that the last Hoa Hao commander, Ba Cụt, was captured in an Army of the Republic of Vietnam campaign by General Dương Văn Minh. This allowed COMIGAL to send expeditions to survey the rural land for settlement.* [67] The third phase of the resettlement involved the dispersal of the new arrivals from the temporary villages in regions surrounding the capital and other large cities. The areas where the refugees had initially were over settled, notably Biên Hòa, where the population had doubled during the migration period. In contrast, two thirds of South Vietnamese provinces had taken less than 10,000 refugees, and some of these less than 1,000.* [78] In the crowded provinces there were fears of social unrest due to a shortage of work.* [78] COMIGAL dispatched inspection teams throughout South Vietnam to identify areas that were suitable for accommodating the new arrivals according to their professional skills. This required a search for arable land for farmers, favourable coastal areas for fishing and areas near large population centres for industrially oriented arrivals. Having identified the relevant areas, COMIGAL would set up plans for settlement subprojects, sending proposals to the USOM or the French Technical and Economic Cooperation Bureau to gain approval and funding. The bureaucracy was relatively low, with most applications taking less than a fortnight for finalising paperwork and receiving approval. Each subproject was given a ninemonth deadline for completion.* [79] When suitable areas were found, groups of refugees usually numbering between one and three thousand were trucked to the site and began creating the new settlement. This involved digging wells, building roads and bridges, clearing forests, bushes and swamps and constructing fishing vessels. Village elections were held to select members for committees that would liaise with COMIGAL on be-

2.3. OPERATION PASSAGE TO FREEDOM

125

half of the new settlement.* [79] COMIGAL provided the settlers with agrarian implements, fertilisers and farm animals. By mid-1957, 319 villages had been built. Of these, 288 were for farmers and 26 for ﬁshermen. The refugees settled predominantly in the Mekong Delta, where 207 villages were built.* [80] The most notable scheme in the area was the Cai San Agricultural Resettlement Project, based along a system of canals near Long Xuyên.* [78] Another 50 villages were created further north near the border with North Vietnam, while 62 were built in the central highlands.* [80] A 1955 government report claimed that only 2% of the land in the central highlands, mostly inhabited by indigenous tribes were being used for economic purposes, and it was seen as a key area for exploitation and building settlements to block the advance of communism.* [81] The area was seen as an important means of alleviating overcrowding, fuelling rapid economic development, and the government hoped that the presence of ethnic Vietnamese development would prompt the indigenous tribespeople to abandon their hunter-gatherer lifestyle, thus “guiding them on the path to civilization and progress, so that they might join the ranks of the State's founders and liberators”.* [81] In the Central Highlands town of Buôn Ma Thuột, the local sawmill was inundated with lumber to build houses and much of the surrounding forest was cleared for settlements.* [26] In total, 92,443 housing units were constructed, serviced by 317 and 18 elementary and secondary schools respectively. 38,192 hectares of land were cleared and some 2.4 million tons of potassium sulfate fertiliser were distributed.* [80] At the end of 1957, Diem dissolved COMIGAL, declaring that its mission had been accomplished.* [82]

2.3.7

Diﬃculties and criticism

See also: Huế Phật Đản shootings, Xá Lợi Pagoda raids and Arrest and assassination of Ngô Đình Diệm The program had some loose ends that manifested themselves later. Many refugees were not economically integrated and lived from government handouts. Critics noted that the refugees had become a special interest group that fostered resentment. The COMIGAL officials often decided not to split up refugees belonging to the same village, hoping to maintain social continuity.* [83] In some cases, Catholic priests refused to obey government directives to settle in certain areas.* [84] Many of the refugees also refused to relocate from the camps on the outskirts of the capital, wanting to live an urban lifestyle,* [85] and objecting to Diem's desire that they help developed inhospitable frontier territory where disease was more common and the economy less developed.* [86] On occasions, the reluctance to disperse away from Saigon resulted in protests outside Diem's residence.* [87] Many Catholic villages were effectively transplanted into southern territory. This was efficient

President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam saw the predominantly Catholic refugees as his most reliable constituency.

in the short run but meant that they would never assimilate into southern society. They had little contact with the Buddhist majority and often held them in contempt, sometimes flying the Vatican flag instead of the national flag.* [88] Peter Hansen, an Australian Catholic priest and academic scholar of religion, has added that tensions between northern and southern Catholics were also present, due to issues of regionalism and local traditions. Hansen also said that northern Catholics took a more defensive attitude towards other religions than their southern coreligionists, and were more likely to see non-Catholics as a threat. He further noted that northern Catholics had a more theocratic outlook in that they were more willing to listen to the advice of priests on a wide range of issues, not only spiritual and ecclesiastical matters.* [89] These differences and the sense of segregation persist to the current day.* [90] Diem, who had a reputation for heavily favouring Catholics, granted his new constituents a disproportionately high number of government and military posts on religious grounds rather than merit.* [88] The disproportionate number of northerners who occupied leadership posts also raised tensions among some regional-minded southerners who regarded them as intruders.* [91] He continued the French practice of defining Catholicism as a“religion”and Buddhism as an“association”, which restricted their activities. This fostered a social divide between the new arrivals and their compatriots. While on a visit to Saigon in 1955, the British journalist and

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novelist Graham Greene reported that Diem's religious favouritism“may well leave his tolerant country a legacy of anti-Catholicism”.* [83] In 1963, simmering discontent over Diem's religious bias exploded into mass civil unrest during the Buddhist crisis. After the Buddhist ﬂag was prohibited from public display for the Vesak celebrations commemorating the birth of Gautama Buddha, Diem's forces opened ﬁre and killed nine protesters.* [92] As demonstrations continued through the summer, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam Special Forces ransacked pagodas across the country, killing hundreds and jailing thousands of Buddhists.* [88] The tension culminated in Diem being overthrown and assassinated in a November coup.* [93]

[18] Frankum, p. 114. [19] Frankum, p. 110. [20] Frankum, pp. 38–39. [21] Frankum, p. 40. [22] Lindholm, p. 63. [23] Lindholm, p. 64. [24] Lindholm, pp. 65–67. [25] Frankum, p. 158. [26] Frankum, p. 193.

The indigenous population in the central highlands com- [27] Frankum, p. 159. plained bitterly about the intrusion of ethnic Catholic [28] Frankum, p. 172. Vietnamese onto their land. As a result of their discontent with the southern government, communist propagandists [29] Frankum, pp. 188–189. in the highlands found it easier to win them over.* [94]

[30] Formally known as the Commissariat of Refugees, COMIGAL was the acronym in French.

2.3.8

Notes

[31] Lindholm, pp. 48–50.

[1] Frankum, Ronald (2007). Operation Passage to Freedom: The United States Navy in Vietnam, 1954–55. Lubbock, Texas: Texas Tech University Press. ISBN 978-0-89672608-6.

[32] Hansen, p. 180.

[2] Prados, John (January 2005).“The Numbers Game: How Many Vietnamese Fled South In 1954?". The Veteran. Archived from the original on 2006-05-27.

[35] Hansen, p. 181.

[3] Lindholm, pp. 55–57.

[37] Hansen, p. 187.

[4] Lindholm, p. 49; Prados

[38] Hansen, pp. 188–189.

[5] Ruane, Kevin (1998). War and Revolution in Vietnam. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-1-85728-323-5.

[39] Hansen, p. 185.

[6] Tran, Thi Lien (November 2005). “The Catholic Question in North Vietnam”. Cold War History (London: Routledge) 5 (4): 427–49. doi:10.1080/14682740500284747.

[41] Lindholm, p. 50.

[7] Jacobs (2006), p. 45 [8] Jacobs (2006), p. 23. [9] Karnow, pp. 210–214. [10] Karnow, p. 218.

[33] Hansen, p. 179. [34] Hansen, p. 189.

[36] Hansen, p. 182.

[40] Hansen, p. 188.

[42] Jacobs (2006), p. 45. [43] Jacobs (2006), p. 52. [44] Jacobs (2004), p. 133. [45] Jacobs (2004), p. 132. [46] Hansen, pp. 182–183. [47] Jacobs (2006), p. 53.

[11] Jacobs (2006), pp. 41–42.

[48] Hansen, p. 186.

[12] Jacobs (2006), pp. 43–44.

[49] Hansen, p. 184.

[13] Hansen, p. 178.

[50] Hansen, p. 203.

[14] Jacobs (2004), p. 130.

[51] Hansen, p. 177.

[15] Frankum, p. 38.

[52] Lindholm, p. 78.

[16] Frankum, p. 39.

[53] Frankum, p. 112.

[17] Frankum, p. 109.

[54] Frankum, p. 160.

2.4. VIETNAM WAR

127

[55] Frankum, p. 162.

[91] Hansen, p. 175.

[56] Hansen, pp. 204–205.

[92] Jacobs (2006), p. 143.

[57] Frankum, p. 190.

[93] Jones, p. 429.

[58] Frankum, p. 167.

[94] Lindholm, p. 94.

[59] Frankum, pp. 167–168. [60] Frankum, p. 168. [61] Jacobs (2006), p. 46. [62]“Today's Persecution Worst in History”. Our Sunday Visitor. 1955-03-20. [63]“Bishops Bare Red Record of Viet Violence”. Monitor. 1954-12-24. [64]“Let Our People Go!". The Advocate. 1954-12-03. [65]“Viet Minh Violence Angers U.S. Bishops”. Catholic Herald Citizen. 1954-11-27. [66] Jacobs (2004), pp. 191–192. [67] Jacobs (2006), p. 54. [68] Hansen, p. 193. [69] Frankum, p. 149. [70] Frankum, pp. 180–195. [71] Frankum, p. 192. [72] Hansen, p. 202. [73] Frankum, pp. 171–172. [74] Frankum, p. 183. [75] Frankum, p. 150. [76] Hansen, p. 194. [77] Frankum, p. 185. [78] Hansen, p. 195. [79] Lindholm, p. 51. [80] Lindholm, pp. 52–53. [81] Hansen, p. 196. [82] Jacobs (2006), p. 55. [83] Jacobs (2006), p. 56. [84] Frankum, p. 191. [85] Frankum, p. 151.

2.3.9 References • Frankum, Ronald (2007). Operation Passage to Freedom: The United States Navy in Vietnam, 1954– 55. Lubbock, Texas: Texas Tech University Press. ISBN 978-0-89672-608-6. • Hansen, Peter (2009). “Bắc Di Cư: Catholic Refugees from the North of Vietnam, and Their Role in the Southern Republic, 1954–1959”. Journal of Vietnamese Studies (Berkeley, California: University of California Press) 4 (3): 173–211. doi:10.1525/vs.2009.4.3.173. • Jacobs, Seth (2004). America's Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia, 1950–1957. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. ISBN 08223-3440-2. • Jacobs, Seth (2006). Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America's War in Vietnam, 1950–1963. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littleﬁeld. ISBN 0-7425-4447-8. • Jones, Howard (2003). Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-505286-2. • Karnow, Stanley (1997). Vietnam: A History. New York: Penguin Books. ISBN 0-670-84218-4. • Lindholm, Richard (1959). Viet-nam, The First Five Years: An International Symposium. Michigan State University Press. • Ruane, Kevin (1998). War and Revolution in Vietnam. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-1-85728-3235. • Tran, Thi Lien (November 2005). “The Catholic Question in North Vietnam: From Polish Sources, 1954–56”. Cold War History (London: Routledge) 5 (4): 427–449. doi:10.1080/14682740500284747.

[86] Hansen, p. 197. [87] Hansen, p. 199.

2.4 Vietnam War

[88] Jacobs (2006), p. 153. [89] Hansen, pp. 177–178. [90] Hansen, p. 201.

“War in Vietnam”redirects here. For other wars in Vietnam, see Military history of Vietnam. “Indochina conﬂict”redirects here. For the conﬂict in

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French Indochina, see Indochina War.

of progress toward winning the war were illusory despite many years of massive U.S. military aid to South VietThe Vietnam War (Vietnamese: Chiến tranh Việt Nam), nam. also known as the Second Indochina War,* [39] and also Gradual withdrawal of U.S. ground forces began as part known in Vietnam as Resistance War Against Amer- of "Vietnamization", which aimed to end American inica (Vietnamese: Kháng chiến chống Mỹ) or simply the volvement in the war while transferring the task of fightAmerican War, was a Cold War-era proxy war* [40] ing the Communists to the South Vietnamese themselves. that occurred in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia from 1 Despite the Paris Peace Accord, which was signed by all November 1955* [A 1] to the fall of Saigon on 30 April parties in January 1973, the fighting continued. In the 1975. This war followed the First Indochina War (1946– U.S. and the Western world, a large anti-Vietnam War 54) and was fought between North Vietnam—supported movement developed as part of a larger counterculture. by the Soviet Union, China and other communist allies The war changed the dynamics between the Eastern and —and the government of South Vietnam—supported by Western Blocs, and altered North-South relations.* [49] the United States, Philippines and other anti-communist Direct U.S. military involvement ended on 15 August allies.* [45] The Viet Cong (also known as the National 1973.* [50] The capture of Saigon by the North VietLiberation Front, or NLF), a South Vietnamese commu- namese Army in April 1975 marked the end of the war, nist common front aided by the North, fought a guerrilla and North and South Vietnam were reunified the followwar against anti-communist forces in the region. The ing year. The war exacted a huge human cost in terms of People's Army of Vietnam, also known as the North Viet- fatalities (see Vietnam War casualties). Estimates of the namese Army (NVA), engaged in a more conventional number of Vietnamese soldiers and civilians killed vary war, at times committing large units to battle. from 800,000* [18] to 3.1 million.* [30]* [51]* [52] Some As the war continued, the part of the Viet Cong in the fighting decreased as the role of the NVA grew. U.S. and South Vietnamese forces relied on air superiority and overwhelming firepower to conduct search and destroy operations, involving ground forces, artillery, and airstrikes. In the course of the war, the U.S. conducted a large-scale strategic bombing campaign against North Vietnam. The U.S. government viewed its involvement in the war as a way to prevent a Communist takeover of South Vietnam. This was part of a wider containment policy, with the stated aim of stopping the spread of communism. The North Vietnamese government and the Viet Cong were fighting to reunify Vietnam under communist rule. They viewed the conflict as a colonial war, fought initially against forces from France and then America, and later against South Vietnam.* [46]

200,000–300,000 Cambodians,* [36]* [37]* [38] 20,000– 200,000 Laotians,* [53]* [54]* [55]* [56]* [57]* [58] and 58,220 U.S. service members also died in the conﬂict, with a further 1,626 missing in action.* [A 2]

2.4.1 Names for the war Further information: Terminology of the Vietnam War Various names have been applied to the conﬂict. Vietnam War is the most commonly used name in English. It has also been called the Second Indochina War and the Vietnam Conﬂict.

As there have been several conflicts in Indochina, this particular conflict is known by the names of its primary protagonists to distinguish it from others.* [63] In Beginning in 1950, American military advisors arrived Vietnamese, the war is generally known as Kháng chiến in what was then French Indochina.* [47]* [A 3] U.S. in- chống Mỹ (Resistance War Against America). It is also * volvement escalated in the early 1960s, with troop levels called Chiến tranh Việt Nam (The Vietnam War). [64] tripling in 1961 and again in 1962.* [48] U.S. involvement The primary military organizations involved in the war escalated further following the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin inci- were, on one side, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam dent, in which a U.S. destroyer clashed with North Viet- (ARVN) and the U.S. military, and, on the other side, namese fast attack craft, which was followed by the Gulf the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) (more commonly of Tonkin Resolution, which gave the U.S. president au- called the North Vietnamese Army, or NVA, in English thorization to increase U.S. military presence. Regular language sources), and the National Front for the LiberU.S. combat units were deployed beginning in 1965. Op- ation of South Vietnam (NLF, more commonly known erations crossed international borders: bordering areas of as the Viet Cong in English language sources), a South Laos and Cambodia were heavily bombed by U.S. forces Vietnamese communist guerrilla force.* [65] as American involvement in the war peaked in 1968, the same year that the communist side launched the Tet Offensive. The Tet Offensive failed in its goal of overthrow- 2.4.2 Background to 1949 ing the South Vietnamese government, but became the turning point in the war, as it persuaded a large segment of See also: History of Vietnam, 1940-1946 in the Vietnam the United States population that its government's claims War, Cochinchina Campaign, Cần Vương, Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng, Yên Bái mutiny, Vietnam during World

2.4. VIETNAM WAR War II and War in Vietnam (1945–46) France began its conquest of Indochina in the late 1850s, and completed paciﬁcation by 1893.* [66]* [67]* [68] The 1884 Treaty of Huế formed the basis for French colonial rule in Vietnam for the next seven decades. In spite of military resistance, most notably by the Cần Vương of Phan Đình Phùng, by 1888 the area of the currentday nations of Cambodia and Vietnam was made into the colony of French Indochina (Laos was later added to the colony).* [69] Various Vietnamese opposition movements to French rule existed during this period, such as the Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng who staged the failed Yên Bái mutiny in 1930, but none were ultimately as successful as the Viet Minh common front, which was founded in 1941, controlled by the Indochinese Communist Party, and funded by the U.S. and the Chinese Nationalist Party in its ﬁght against Japanese occupation.* [70]* [A 4]

129 the famine and the authorities that were partially responsible for it bolstered the Viet Minh's popularity and they recruited many members during this period.* [77] On 22 August 1945, following the Japanese surrender, OSS agents Archimedes Patti and Carleton B. Swift Jr. arrived in Hanoi on a mercy mission to liberate allied POWs and were accompanied by Jean Sainteny, a French government official.* [80] The Japanese forces informally surrendered (the official surrender took place on 2 September 1945 in Tokyo Bay) but being the only force capable of maintaining law and order the Japanese Imperial Army remained in power while keeping French colonial troops and Sainteny detained.* [81] During August the Japanese forces remained inactive as the Viet Minh and other nationalist groups took over public buildings and weapons, which began the August Revolution. OSS officers met repeatedly with Ho Chi Minh and other Viet Minh officers during this period* [82] and on 2 September 1945 Ho Chi Minh declared the independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam before a crowd of 500,000 in Hanoi.* [79] In an overture to the Americans, he began his speech by paraphrasing the United States Declaration of Independence: “All men are created equal. The Creator has given us certain inviolable Rights: the right to Life, the right to be Free, and the right to achieve Happiness.”* [79]

In 1940, during World War II, the French were defeated by the Germans. The French State (commonly known as Vichy France) was established as a client state of Nazi Germany. The French colonial authorities, in French Indochina, sided with the Vichy regime. In September 1940, Japan invaded Indochina. Following the cessation of fighting and the beginning of the Japanese occupation, the French colonial authorities collaborated with the Japanese. The French continued to run affairs in In- The Viet Minh took power in Vietnam in the August Revdochina, but ultimate power resided in the hands of the olution.* [79] According to Gabriel Kolko, the Viet Minh Japanese.* [70] enjoyed large popular support,* [83] although Arthur J. The Viet Minh was founded as a league for indepen- Dommen cautions against a“romanticized view”of their dence from France, but also opposed Japanese occupa- success: “The Viet Minh use of terror was systematic… tion in 1945 for the same reason. The U.S. and Chinese .the party had drawn up a list of those to be liquidated Nationalist Party supported them in the fight against the without delay.”* [84] Japanese.* [72] However, they did not have enough power to fight actual battles at first. Viet Minh leader Ho Chi Minh was suspected of being a communist and jailed for a year by the Chinese Nationalist Party.* [73] Double occupation by France and Japan continued until the German forces were expelled from France and the French Indochina colonial authorities started holding secret talks with the Free French. Fearing that they could no longer trust the French authorities, the Japanese army interned the French authorities and troops on 9 March 1945* [74] and created the puppet Empire of Vietnam state, under Bảo Đại instead. During 1944–1945, a deep famine struck northern Vietnam due to a combination of bad weather and French/Japanese exploitation (French Indochina had to supply grains to Japan).* [75] Between 400,000 and 2 million* [18] people died of starvation (out of a population of 10 million in the affected area).* [76] Exploiting the administrative gap* [77] that the internment of the French A Japanese naval officer surrenders his sword to a British lieuhad created, the Viet Minh in March 1945 urged the pop- tenant in Saigon on 13 September 1945. ulation to ransack rice warehouses and refuse to pay their taxes.* [78] Between 75 and 100 warehouses were conseHowever, the major allied victors of World War II, the quently raided.* [79] This rebellion against the effects of United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union,

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all agreed the area belonged to the French.* [79] As the French did not have the means to immediately retake Vietnam, the major powers came to an agreement that British troops would occupy the south while Nationalist Chinese forces would move in from the north.* [79] Nationalist Chinese troops entered the country to disarm Japanese troops north of the 16th parallel on 14 September 1945.* [85] When the British landed in the south, they rearmed the interned French forces as well as parts of the surrendered Japanese forces to aid them in retaking southern Vietnam, as they did not have enough troops to do this themselves.* [79] On the urging of the Soviet Union, Ho Chi Minh initially attempted to negotiate with the French, who were slowly re-establishing their control across the area.* [86] In January 1946, the Viet Minh won elections across central and northern Vietnam.* [87] On 6 March 1946, Ho signed an agreement allowing French forces to replace Nationalist Chinese forces, in exchange for French recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as a “free”republic within the French Union, with the speciﬁcs of such recognition to be determined by future negotiation.* [88]* [89]* [90] The French landed in Hanoi by March 1946 and in November of that year they ousted the Viet Minh from the city.* [86] British forces departed on 26 March 1946, leaving Vietnam in the hands of the French.* [91] Soon thereafter, the Viet Minh began a guerrilla war against the French Union forces, beginning the First Indochina War. The war spread to Laos and Cambodia, where communists organized the Pathet Lao and the Khmer Serei, both of which were modeled on the Viet Minh.* [92] Globally, the Cold War began in earnest, which meant that the rapprochement that existed between the Western powers and the Soviet Union during World War II disintegrated. The Viet Minh ﬁght was hampered by a lack of weapons; this situation changed by 1949 when the Chinese Communists had largely won the Chinese Civil War and were free to provide arms to their Vietnamese allies.* [92]

2.4.3

Exit of the French, 1950–54

French soldiers ﬁght oﬀ a Viet Minh ambush in 1952.

Military advisors from the People's Republic of China (PRC) began assisting the Viet Minh in July 1950.* [96] PRC weapons, expertise, and laborers transformed the Viet Minh from a guerrilla force into a regular army.* [97] In September 1950, the United States created a Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) to screen French requests for aid, advise on strategy, and train Vietnamese soldiers.* [98] By 1954, the United States had supplied 300,000 small arms and spent US$1 billion in support of the French military effort, shouldering 80 percent of the cost of the war.* [99] There were also talks between the French and Americans in which the possible use of three tactical nuclear weapons was considered, though reports of how seriously this was considered and by whom are even now vague and contradictory.* [100]* [101] One version of the plan for the proposed Operation Vulture envisioned sending 60 B29s from U.S. bases in the region, supported by as many as 150 fighters launched from U.S. Seventh Fleet carriers, to bomb Viet Minh commander Võ Nguyên Giáp's positions. The plan included an option to use up to three atomic weapons on the Viet Minh positions. Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, gave this nuclear option his backing. U.S. B-29s, B-36s, and B-47s could have executed a nuclear strike, as could carrier aircraft from the Seventh Fleet.* [102]

Main articles: First Indochina War, Operation Vulture U.S. carriers sailed to the Gulf of Tonkin, and reconnaisand Operation Passage to Freedom sance flights over Dien Bien Phu were conducted during the negotiations. According to U.S. Vice-President In January 1950, the People's Republic of China and the Richard Nixon, the plan involved the Joint Chiefs of Soviet Union recognized the Viet Minh's Democratic Re- Staff drawing up plans to use three small tactical nupublic of Vietnam, based in Hanoi, as the legitimate gov- clear weapons in support of the French.* [100] Nixon, a ernment of Vietnam. The following month the United so-called "hawk" on Vietnam, suggested that the United States and Great Britain recognized the French-backed States might have to“put American boys in”.* [103] U.S. State of Vietnam in Saigon, led by former Emperor Bảo President Dwight D. Eisenhower made American particĐại, as the legitimate Vietnamese government.* [93]* [94] ipation contingent on British support, but they were opThe outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 convinced posed to such a venture.* [103] In the end, convinced that many Washington policymakers that the war in Indochina the political risks outweighed the possible benefits, Eisenwas an example of communist expansionism directed by hower decided against the intervention. Eisenhower was the Soviet Union.* [95] a five-star general. He was wary of getting the United

2.4. VIETNAM WAR States involved in a land war in Asia.* [104] The Viet Minh received crucial support from the Soviet Union and PRC. PRC support in the Border Campaign of 1950 allowed supplies to come from the PRC into Vietnam. Throughout the conﬂict, U.S. intelligence estimates remained skeptical of French chances of success.* [105]

131 In addition to the Catholics ﬂowing south, up to 130,000 “Revolutionary Regroupees”went to the north for “regroupment”, expecting to return to the south within two years.* [112] The Viet Minh left roughly 5,000 to 10,000 cadres in the south as a “politico-military substructure within the object of its irredentism.”* [113] The last French soldiers were to leave Vietnam in April 1956.* [97] The PRC completed its withdrawal from North Vietnam at around the same time.* [96] Around 52,000 Vietnamese civilians moved from south to north.* [114]

The Battle of Dien Bien Phu marked the end of French involvement in Indochina. Giap's Viet Minh forces handed the French a stunning military defeat, and on 7 May 1954, the French Union garrison surrendered. At the Geneva Conference, the French negotiated a ceasefire agreement with the Viet Minh, and independence was granted to Between 1953 and 1956, the North Vietnamese government instituted various agrarian reforms, including Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. “rent reduction”and “land reform”, which resulted in significant political oppression. Declassified Politburo documents confirm that 1 in 1,000 North Viet2.4.4 Transition period namese (i.e., about 14,000 people) were the quota targeted for execution during the “rent reduction”camMain articles: Geneva Conference (1954), Operation paign.* [115] During the land reform, testimony from Passage to Freedom, Battle of Saigon (1955), Ba Cụt, North Vietnamese witnesses suggested a ratio of one exState of Vietnam referendum, 1955 and Land reform in ecution for every 160 village residents, which extrapoNorth Vietnam lated nationwide would indicate nearly 100,000 execuVietnam was temporarily partitioned at the 17th paraltions. Because the campaign was concentrated mainly in the Red River Delta area, a lower estimate of 50,000 executions became widely accepted by scholars at the time.* [116]* [117]* [118] In 1956, leaders in Hanoi admitted to “excesses”in implementing this program and restored a large amount of the land to the original owners.* [119]

The Geneva Conference, 1954

lel, and under the terms of the Geneva Accords, civilians were to be given the opportunity to move freely between the two provisional states for a 300-day period. Elections throughout the country were to be held in 1956 to establish a unified government.* [106] Around one million northerners, mainly minority Catholics, fled south, fearing persecution by the communists* [107] following an American propaganda campaign using slogans such as “The Virgin Mary is heading south”,* [108] and aided by a U.S.-funded $93 million relocation program, which included the use of the Seventh Fleet to ferry refugees.* [109] As many as two million more would have left had they not been stopped by the Viet Minh.* [110] The northern, mainly Catholic refugees were meant to give the later Ngô Đình Diệm regime a strong anticommunist constituency.* [111] Diệm later went on to staff his administration's key posts mostly with northern and central Catholics.

The south, meanwhile, constituted the State of Vietnam, with Bảo Đại as Emperor and Ngô Đình Diệm (appointed in July 1954) as his prime minister. Neither the United States government nor Ngô Đình Diệm's State of Vietnam signed anything at the 1954 Geneva Conference. With respect to the question of reunification, the noncommunist Vietnamese delegation objected strenuously to any division of Vietnam, but lost out when the French accepted the proposal of Viet Minh delegate Phạm Văn Đồng,* [120] who proposed that Vietnam eventually be united by elections under the supervision of “local commissions”.* [121] The United States countered with what became known as the “American Plan”, with the support of South Vietnam and the United Kingdom.* [122] It provided for unification elections under the supervision of the United Nations, but was rejected by the Soviet delegation.* [122] The United States said, “With respect to the statement made by the representative of the State of Vietnam, the United States reiterates its traditional position that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will not join in any arrangement which would hinder this”.* [123] U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote in 1954, “I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting, possibly eighty percent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief

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of State Bảo Đại. Indeed, the lack of leadership and drive on the part of Bảo Đại was a factor in the feeling prevalent among Vietnamese that they had nothing to ﬁght for.” * [124] According to the Pentagon Papers, however, from 1954 to 1956 “Ngô Đình Diệm really did accomplish miracles”in South Vietnam:* [125] “It is almost certain that by 1956 the proportion which might have voted for Ho —in a free election against Diệm —would have been much smaller than eighty percent.”* [126] In 1957, independent observers from India, Poland, and Canada representing the International Control Commission (ICC) stated that fair, unbiased elections were not possible, with the ICC reporting that neither South nor North Vietnam had honored the armistice agreement* [127] From April to June 1955, Diệm eliminated any political opposition in the south by launching military operations against two religious groups: the Cao Đài and Hòa Hảo of Ba Cụt. The campaign also focused on the Bình Xuyên organized crime group which was allied with members of the communist party secret police and had some military elements. As broad-based opposition to his harsh tactics mounted, Diệm increasingly sought to blame the communists.* [23] In a referendum on the future of the State of Vietnam on 23 October 1955, Diệm rigged the poll supervised by his brother Ngô Đình Nhu and was credited with 98.2 percent of the vote, including 133% in Saigon. His American advisors had recommended a more modest winning margin of “60 to 70 percent.”Diệm, however, viewed the election as a test of authority.* [128] Three days later, he declared South Vietnam to be an independent state under the name Republic of Vietnam (ROV), with himself as president.* [129] Likewise, Ho Chi Minh and other communist oﬃcials always won at least 99% of the vote in North Vietnamese “elections”.* [130]

U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles greet President Ngô Đình Diệm of South Vietnam in Washington, 8 May 1957.

A devout Roman Catholic, Diệm was fervently anticommunist, nationalist, and socially conservative. Historian Luu Doan Huynh notes that “Diệm represented narrow and extremist nationalism coupled with autocracy and nepotism.”* [133] The majority of Vietnamese people were Buddhist, and were alarmed by actions such as Diệm's dedication of the country to the Virgin Mary. Beginning in the summer of 1955, Diệm launched the “Denounce the Communists”campaign, during which communists and other anti-government elements were arrested, imprisoned, tortured, or executed. He instituted the death penalty against any activity deemed communist in August 1956.* [134] According to Gabriel Kolko about 12,000 suspected opponents of Diệm were killed between 1955 and 1957 and by the end of 1958 an estimated 40,000 political prisoners had been jailed.* [135] However, Guenter Lewy argues that such ﬁgures were exaggerated and that there were never more than 35,000 prisoners of all kinds in the whole country.* [136]

The domino theory, which argued that if one country fell to communism, then all of the surrounding countries would follow, was ﬁrst proposed as policy by the Eisenhower administration.* [131] John F. Kennedy, then a U.S. Senator, said in a speech to the American Friends of Vietnam:“Burma, Thailand, India, Japan, the Philippines and obviously Laos and Cambodia are among those In May 1957, Diệm undertook a ten-day state visit to the whose security would be threatened if the Red Tide of United States. President Eisenhower pledged his continued support, and a parade was held in Diệm's honor in Communism overﬂowed into Vietnam.”* [132] New York City. Although Diệm was publicly praised, in private Secretary of State John Foster Dulles conceded that Diệm had been selected because there were no bet2.4.5 Diệm era, 1955–63 ter alternatives.* [137] Main articles: Ngô Đình Diệm and War in Vietnam Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara wrote (1954–59) in Argument Without End (1999) that the new American patrons of the Republic of Vietnam (ROV) were almost completely ignorant of Vietnamese culture. They knew little of the language or long history of the country.* [93] Rule There was a tendency to assign American motives to Vietnamese actions, though Diệm warned that it was an ilSee also: Ngô Đình Diệm presidential visit to Australia lusion to believe that blindly copying Western methods would solve Vietnamese problems.* [93]

2.4. VIETNAM WAR Insurgency in the South, 1954–60

133 eralization of the GVN, on coalition government and the neutralization of Vietnam.”Often the leaders of the organization were kept secret.* [44]

Main articles: Viet Cong and War in Vietnam (1959–63) Between 1954 and 1957 there was large-scale but dis- The reason for the continued survival of the NLF was the class relations in the countryside. The vast majority of the population lived in villages in the countryside where the key issue was land reform. The Viet Minh had reduced rents and debts; and had leased communal lands, mostly to the poorer peasants. Diem brought the landlords back to the villages. People who were farming land they held for years now had to return it to landlords and pay years of back rent. This rent collection was enforced by the South Vietnamese army. The divisions within villages reproduced those that had existed against the French: “75 percent support for the NLF, 20 percent trying to remain neutral and 5 percent firmly pro-government,”* [139] North Vietnamese involvement Sources disagree on whether North Vietnam played a direct role in aiding and organizing South Vietnamese rebels prior to 1960. Kahin and Lewis assert: Contrary to United States policy assumptions, all available evidence shows that the revival of the civil war in the South in 1958 was undertaken by Southerners at their own —not Hanoi's —initiative …Insurgency activity against the Saigon government began in the South under Southern leadership not as a consequence of any dictate from Hanoi, but contrary to Hanoi's injunctions.* [44] Similarly, historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. states that “it was not until September, 1960 that the Communist Party The Ho Chi Minh trail was used to supply the Viet Cong. of North Vietnam bestowed its formal blessing and called for the liberation of the south from American imperialorganized dissidence in the countryside which the Diệm * government succeeded in quelling. In early 1957 South ism”. [44] Vietnam had its first peace in over a decade. However, by By contrast, the author of War Comes to Long An Jeffrey mid-1957 through 1959 incidents of violence increased Race interviewed communist defectors in 1967 and 1968 but the government “did not construe it as a campaign, who found such denials “very amusing”, and who considering the disorders too diffuse to warrant commit- “commented humorously that the Party had apparently ting major GVN [Government of Vietnam] resources.” been more successful than was expected in concealing its By early 1959 however, Diệm considered it an organized role.”* [140] James Olson and Randy Roberts assert that campaign and implemented Law 10/59, which made po- North Vietnam authorized a low-level insurgency in Delitical violence punishable by death and property confis- cember 1956.* [43] To counter the accusation that North cation.* [138] There had been some division among for- Vietnam was violating the Geneva Accord, the indepenmer Viet Minh whose main goal was to hold the elections dence of the Viet Cong was stressed in communist propromised in the Geneva Accords, leading to "wildcat" paganda.* [141] activities separate from the other communists and anti- In March 1956, southern communist leader Lê Duẩn preGVN activists.* [44] sented a plan to revive the insurgency entitled “The In December 1960, the National Liberation Front (NLF, a.k.a. the Viet Cong) was formally created with the intent of uniting all anti-GVN activists, including noncommunists. According to the Pentagon Papers, the Viet Cong “placed heavy emphasis on the withdrawal of American advisors and influence, on land reform and lib-

Road to the South”to the other members of the Politburo in Hanoi, but as both China and the Soviets opposed confrontation at this time, Lê Duẩn's plan was rejected.* [141] However the North Vietnamese leadership approved tentative measures to revive the southern insurgency in December 1956.* [142] Communist

134 forces were under a single command structure set up in 1958.* [143] The North Vietnamese Communist Party approved a“people's war”on the South at a session in January 1959* [144] and in May, Group 559 was established to maintain and upgrade the Ho Chi Minh trail, at this time a six-month mountain trek through Laos. About 500 of the“regroupees”of 1954 were sent south on the trail during its ﬁrst year of operation.* [145] The ﬁrst arms delivery via the trail was completed in August 1959.* [146]

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM *

[152]* [153]

In May 1961, U.S. Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson visited Saigon and enthusiastically declared Diệm the "Winston Churchill of Asia.”* [154] Asked why he had made the comment, Johnson replied, “Diệm's the only boy we got out there.”* [137] Johnson assured Diệm of more aid in molding a ﬁghting force that could resist the communists.

Kennedy's policy toward South Vietnam rested on the assumption that Diệm and his forces had to ultimately defeat the guerrillas on their own. He was against the deployment of American combat troops and observed that “to introduce U.S. forces in large numbers there today, while it might have an initially favorable military impact, would almost certainly lead to adverse political and, in the long run, adverse military consequences.”* [155] The quality of the South Vietnamese military, however, remained poor. Poor leadership, corruption, and politi2.4.6 Kennedy's escalation, 1961–63 cal promotions all played a part in weakening the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN). The frequency of guerrilla Main articles: Strategic Hamlet Program and Phạm attacks rose as the insurgency gathered steam. While Ngọc Thảo Hanoi's support for the Viet Cong played a role, South Vietnamese governmental incompetence was at the core * In the 1960 U.S. presidential election, Senator John of the crisis. [156] F. Kennedy defeated incumbent Vice President Richard Nixon. Although Eisenhower warned Kennedy about Laos and Vietnam, Europe and Latin America “loomed larger than Asia on his sights.”* [149] In his inaugural address, Kennedy made the ambitious pledge to “pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and success of liberty.”* [150] In June 1961, he bitterly disagreed with Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev when they met in Vienna to discuss key U.S.–Soviet issues. Only 16 months later, the U.S.–Soviet issues included the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 16–28, 1962) played out on television worldwide and was the closest the Cold War came to escalating into a full-scale nuclear war, and the U.S. raised the readiness level of Strategic Air Command (SAC) forces to DEFCON 2. North Vietnam invaded Laos in 1959, and used 30,000 men to build invasion routes through Laos and Cambodia by 1961.* [147] About 40,000 communist soldiers inﬁltrated into the south from 1961–63.* [141] North Vietnam sent 10,000 troops of the North Vietnamese Army to attack the south in 1964, and this ﬁgure increased to 100,000 in 1965.* [148]

The Kennedy administration remained essentially committed to the Cold War foreign policy inherited from the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. In 1961, the U.S. had 50,000 troops based in Korea, and Kennedy faced a three-part crisis – the failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion, the construction of the Berlin Wall, and a negotiated settlement between the pro-Western government of Laos and the Pathet Lao communist movement.* [151] These crises made Kennedy believe that another failure on the part of the United States to gain control and stop communist expansion would fatally damage U.S. credibility with its allies and his own reputation. Kennedy was thus determined to“draw a line in the sand”and prevent a communist victory in Vietnam. He told James Reston of The New York Times immediately after his Vienna meeting with Khrushchev, “Now we have a problem making our power credible and Vietnam looks like the place.”

South Vietnam, Military Regions, 1967

One major issue Kennedy raised was whether the Soviet space and missile programs had surpassed those of the United States. Although Kennedy stressed long-range missile parity with the Soviets, he was also interested in using special forces for counterinsurgency warfare in Third World countries threatened by communist insur-

2.4. VIETNAM WAR

135

gencies. Although they were originally intended for use behind front lines after a conventional Soviet invasion of Europe, Kennedy believed that the guerrilla tactics employed by special forces such as the Green Berets would be effective in a “brush fire”war in Vietnam. Kennedy advisors Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow recommended that U.S. troops be sent to South Vietnam disguised as flood relief workers. Kennedy rejected the idea but increased military assistance yet again. In April 1962, John Kenneth Galbraith warned Kennedy of the“danger we shall replace the French as a colonial force in the area and bleed as the French did.”* [157] By November 1963, there were 16,000 American military personnel in South Vietnam, up from Eisenhower's 900 advisors.* [158] The Strategic Hamlet Program was initiated in late 1961. This joint U.S.-South Vietnamese program attempted to resettle the rural population into fortified camps. It was implemented in early 1962 and involved some forced relocation, village internment, and segregation of rural South Vietnamese into new communities where the peasantry would be isolated from Communist insurgents. It was hoped these new communities would provide security for the peasants and strengthen the tie between them and the central government. However, by November 1963 the program had waned, and it officially ended in 1964.* [159]

A US tank convoy during the Vietnam War.

stave off coups; he had earlier vomited during a communist attack. Some policymakers in Washington began to conclude that Diệm was incapable of defeating the communists and might even make a deal with Ho Chi Minh. He seemed concerned only with fending off coups, and had become more paranoid after attempts in 1960 and 1962, which he partly attributed to U.S. encouragement. As Robert F. Kennedy noted,“Diệm wouldn't make even the slightest concessions. He was difficult to reason with …"* [162]

On 23 July 1962, fourteen nations, including China, South Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam and the As historian James Gibson summed up the situation: United States, signed an agreement promising to respect Strategic hamlets had failed…. The South the neutrality of Laos.* [160] Vietnamese regime was incapable of winning the peasantry because of its class base among landlords. Indeed, there was no longer a Ousting and assassination of Ngô Đình Diệm 'regime' in the sense of a relatively stable political alliance and functioning bureaucracy. InSee also: Role of the United States in the Vietnam War § stead, civil government and military operations John F. Kennedy (1961–1963), 1960 South Vietnamese had virtually ceased. The National Liberation coup attempt, 1962 South Vietnamese Independence Front had made great progress and was close Palace bombing, Huế Phật Đản shootings and Xá Lợi to declaring provisional revolutionary governPagoda raids ments in large areas.* [163] Main articles: Cable 243, Arrest and assassination of Ngô Đình Diệm, Buddhist crisis, Krulak Mendenhall mission, McNamara Taylor mission, 1963 South Viet- Discontent with Diệm's policies exploded following the namese coup and Reaction to the 1963 South Vietnamese Huế Phật Đản shootings of nine majority Buddhists who were protesting against the ban on the Buddhist flag on coup Vesak, the Buddha's birthday. This resulted in mass protests against discriminatory policies that gave priviThe inept performance of the South Vietnamese army leges to the Catholic Church and its adherents. Diệm's was exemplified by failed actions such as the Battle of elder brother Ngô Đình Thục was the Archbishop of Huế Ap Bac on 2 January 1963, in which a small band of and aggressively blurred the separation between church Viet Cong won a battle against a much larger and better- and state. Thuc's anniversary celebrations shortly before equipped South Vietnamese force, many of whose offi- Vesak had been bankrolled by the government, and Vatcers seemed reluctant even to engage in combat.* [161] ican flags were displayed prominently. There had also The Army of the Republic of Vietnam forces were led been reports of Buddhist pagodas being demolished by in that battle by Diệm's most trusted general, Huỳnh Văn Catholic paramilitaries throughout Diệm's rule. Diệm reCao, commander of the IV Corps. Cao was a Catholic fused to make concessions to the Buddhist majority or who had been promoted due to religion and fidelity rather take responsibility for the deaths. On 21 August 1963, the than skill, and his main job was to preserve his forces to ARVN Special Forces of Colonel Lê Quang Tung, loyal

136 to Diệm's younger brother Ngô Đình Nhu, raided pagodas across Vietnam, causing widespread damage and destruction and leaving a death toll estimated to range into the hundreds.

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM November 1963. When he was informed, Maxwell Taylor remembered that Kennedy “rushed from the room with a look of shock and dismay on his face.”* [164] He had not anticipated Diệm's murder. The U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge, invited the coup leaders to the embassy and congratulated them. Ambassador Lodge informed Kennedy that“the prospects now are for a shorter war”.* [165] Kennedy wrote Lodge a letter congratulating him for “a ﬁne job.”* [166] Following the coup, chaos ensued. Hanoi took advantage of the situation and increased its support for the guerrillas. South Vietnam entered a period of extreme political instability, as one military government toppled another in quick succession. Increasingly, each new regime was viewed by the communists as a puppet of the Americans; whatever the failings of Diệm, his credentials as a nationalist (as Robert McNamara later reﬂected) had been impeccable.* [167]

Kennedy and McNamara

U.S military advisors were embedded at every level of the South Vietnamese armed forces. They were however criticized for ignoring the political nature of the insurgency.* [168] The Kennedy administration sought to refocus U.S. efforts on pacification and “winning over the hearts and minds” of the population. The military leadership in Washington, however, was hostile to any role for U.S. advisors other than conventional troop training.* [169] General Paul Harkins, the commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, confidently predicted victory by Christmas 1963.* [170] The CIA was less optimistic, however, warning that “the Viet Cong by and large retain de facto control of much of the countryside and have steadily increased the overall intensity of the effort”.* [171]

Paramilitary officers from the CIA's Special Activities Division trained and led Hmong tribesmen in Laos and into Vietnam. The indigenous forces numbered in the tens of thousands and they conducted direct action missions, led by paramilitary officers, against the Communist Pathet Lao forces and their North Vietnamese supporters.* [172] The CIA also ran the Phoenix Program and Ngô Đình Diệm after being shot and killed in the 1963 coup. participated in Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group (MAC-V SOG), which U.S. officials began discussing the possibility of a regime was originally named the Special Operations Group, but change during the middle of 1963. The United States was changed for cover purposes.* [173] Department of State was generally in favor of encouraging a coup, while the Defense Department favored Diệm. Chief among the proposed changes was the removal of 2.4.7 Johnson's escalation, 1963–69 Diệm's younger brother Nhu, who controlled the secret police and special forces and was seen as the man behind Main article: Joint warfare in South Vietnam, 1963–69 the Buddhist repression and more generally the architect Further information: Role of United States in the Vietof the Ngô family's rule. This proposal was conveyed to nam War: Americanization the U.S. embassy in Saigon in Cable 243. See also: Opposition to the U.S. involvement in the VietThe Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was in contact with generals planning to remove Diệm. They were told that the United States would not oppose such a move nor punish the generals by cutting off aid. President Diệm was overthrown and executed, along with his brother, on 2

nam War, Gulf of Tonkin incident, 1964 South Vietnamese coup, September 1964 South Vietnamese coup attempt, December 1964 South Vietnamese coup and 1965 South Vietnamese coup At the time Lyndon B. Johnson took over the presi-

2.4. VIETNAM WAR

A U.S. B-66 Destroyer and four F-105 Thunderchiefs dropping bombs on North Vietnam during Operation Rolling Thunder

dency after the death of Kennedy, he had not been heavily involved with policy toward Vietnam, Presidential aide Jack Valenti recalls,“Vietnam at the time was no bigger than a man's ﬁst on the horizon. We hardly discussed it because it was not worth discussing.”* [174]* [175] Upon becoming president, however, Johnson immediately had to focus on Vietnam: on 24 November 1963, he said,“the battle against communism [...] must be joined [...] with strength and determination.”* [176] The pledge came at a time when the situation in South Vietnam was deteriorating, especially in places like the Mekong Delta, because of the recent coup against Diệm.* [177] The military revolutionary council, meeting in lieu of a strong South Vietnamese leader, was made up of 12 members headed by General Dương Văn Minh—whom Stanley Karnow, a journalist on the ground, later recalled as “a model of lethargy.”* [178] Lodge, frustrated by the end of the year, cabled home about Minh: “Will he be strong enough to get on top of things?" His regime was overthrown in January 1964 by General Nguyễn Khánh.* [179] However, there was persistent instability in the military as several coups—not all successful—occurred in a short period of time.

137

An alleged Viet Cong activist, captured during an attack on an American outpost near the Cambodian border, is interrogated.

have been shooting at flying fish.”* [181] The second attack led to retaliatory air strikes, prompted Congress to approve the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on 7 August 1964,* [182] signed by Johnson, and gave the president power to conduct military operations in Southeast Asia without declaring war.* [183] Although Congressmen at the time denied that this was a full-scale war declaration, the Tonkin Resolution allowed the president unilateral power to launch a full-scale war if the president deemed it necessary.* [183] In the same month, Johnson pledged that he was not "…committing American boys to fighting a war that I think ought to be fought by the boys of Asia to help protect their own land.”* [184]

An undated NSA publication declassified in 2005, however, revealed that there was no attack on 4 August.* [185] It had already been called into question long before this. "Gulf of Tonkin incident", writes Louise Gerdes, “is an oft-cited example of the way in which Johnson misled the American people to gain support for his foreign policy in Vietnam.”* [186] George C. Herring argues, however, that McNamara and the Pentagon “did not knowingly lie about the alleged attacks, but they were obviously in a mood to retaliate and they seem to have selected from parts that confirmed On 2 August 1964, the USS Maddox, on an intelligence the evidence available to them those * [187] what they wanted to believe.” mission along North Vietnam's coast, allegedly fired upon and damaged several torpedo boats that had been stalking “From a strength of approximately 5,000 at the start of it in the Gulf of Tonkin.* [180] A second attack was re- 1959 the Viet Cong's ranks grew to about 100,000 at ported two days later on the USS Turner Joy and Maddox the end of 1964…Between 1961 and 1964 the Army's in the same area. The circumstances of the attack were strength rose from about 850,000 to nearly a million murky. Lyndon Johnson commented to Undersecretary men.”* [168] The numbers for U.S. troops deployed to of State George Ball that “those sailors out there may Vietnam during the same period were quite different;

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2,000 in 1961, rising rapidly to 16,500 in 1964.* [188] By early 1965, 7,559 South Vietnamese hamlets had been destroyed by the Viet Cong.* [189]

Universal Newsreel ﬁlm about an attack on U.S. air bases and the U.S. response. 1965

A marine from 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, moves an alleged Viet Cong activist to the rear during a search and clear operation held by the battalion 15 miles (24 km) west of Da Nang Air Base.

The National Security Council recommended a threestage escalation of the bombing of North Vietnam. On 2 March 1965, following an attack on a U.S. Marine barracks at Pleiku,* [190] Operation Flaming Dart (initiated when Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin was on a state visit to North Vietnam), Operation Rolling Thunder and Operation Arc Light commenced.* [191] The bombing campaign, which ultimately lasted three years, was intended to force North Vietnam to cease its support for the Viet Cong by threatening to destroy North Vietnam's air defenses and industrial infrastructure. As well, it was aimed at bolstering the morale of the South Vietnamese.* [192] Between March 1965 and November 1968,“Rolling Thunder”deluged the north with a million tons of missiles, rockets and bombs.* [193] Bombing was not restricted to North Vietnam. Other aerial campaigns, such as Operation Commando Hunt, targeted different parts of the Viet Cong and NVA infrastructure. These included the Ho Chi Minh trail supply route, which ran through Laos and Cambodia. The objective of stopping North Vietnam and the Viet Cong was never reached. As one officer noted, “This is a political war and it calls for discriminate killing. The best weapon …would be a knife…The worst is an airplane.”* [194] The Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force Curtis LeMay, however, had long advocated saturation bombing in Vietnam and wrote of the communists that“we're going to bomb them back into the Stone Age”.* [195]

Peasants suspected of being Viet Cong under detention of U.S. army, 1966

patched to South Vietnam. This marked the beginning of the American ground war. U.S. public opinion overwhelmingly supported the deployment.* [196]

In a statement similar to that made to the French almost two decades earlier, Ho Chi Minh warned that if the Americans “want to make war for twenty years then we shall make war for twenty years. If they want to make Escalation and ground war peace, we shall make peace and invite them to afterAfter several attacks upon them, it was decided that U.S. noon tea.”* [197] As former First Deputy Foreign MinAir Force bases needed more protection as the South ister Tran Quang Co has noted, the primary goal of the Vietnamese military seemed incapable of providing se- war was to reunify Vietnam and secure its independence. curity. On 8 March 1965, 3,500 U.S. Marines were dis- Some have argued that the policy of North Vietnam was

2.4. VIETNAM WAR

139 less of political policies, U.S. commanders were institutionally and psychologically unsuited to a defensive mission.* [200] In December 1964, ARVN forces had suffered heavy losses at the Battle of Bình Giã,* [201] in a battle that both sides viewed as a watershed. Previously, communist forces had utilized hit-and-run guerrilla tactics. However, at Binh Gia, they had defeated a strong ARVN force in a conventional battle.* [202] Tellingly, South Vietnamese forces were again defeated in June 1965 at the Battle of Đồng Xoài.* [203]

Start of Tet Oﬀensive as seen looking north from LZ Betty's water tower, just south of Quang Tri City

U.S. soldiers searching a village for Viet Cong

Desertion rates were increasing, and morale plummeted. General William Westmoreland informed Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp Jr., commander of U.S. Pacific forces, that the situation was critical.* [200] He said,“I am convinced that U.S. troops with their energy, mobility, and firepower can successfully take the fight to the NLF [National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam a.k.a. the Viet Cong].”* [204] With this recommendation, Westmoreland was advocating an aggressive departure from America's defensive posture and the sidelining of the South Vietnamese. By ignoring ARVN units, the U.S. commitment became open-ended.* [205] Westmoreland outlined a three-point plan to win the war: • Phase 1. Commitment of U.S. (and other free world) forces necessary to halt the losing trend by the end of 1965.

Heavily bandaged woman with a tag attached to her arm which reads 'VNC Female' meaning Vietnamese civilian

• Phase 2. U.S. and allied forces mount major oﬀensive actions to seize the initiative to destroy guerrilla and organized enemy forces. This phase would end when the enemy had been worn down, thrown on the defensive, and driven back from major populated areas.

not to topple other non-communist governments in South • Phase 3. If the enemy persisted, a period of twelve East Asia.* [198] However, the Pentagon Papers warned to eighteen months following Phase 2 would be reof “a dangerous period of Vietnamese expansionism… quired for the final destruction of enemy forces re.Laos and Cambodia would have been easy pickings for maining in remote base areas.* [206] such a Vietnam….Thailand, Malaya, Singapore, and even Indonesia, could have been next.”* [199] The plan was approved by Johnson and marked a proThe Marines' initial assignment was defensive. The first found departure from the previous administration's indeployment of 3,500 in March 1965 was increased to sistence that the government of South Vietnam was renearly 200,000 by December.* [200] The U.S. military sponsible for defeating the guerrillas. Westmoreland prehad long been schooled in offensive warfare. Regard- dicted victory by the end of 1967.* [207] Johnson did

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not, however, communicate this change in strategy to the media. Instead he emphasized continuity.* [208] The change in U.S. policy depended on matching the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong in a contest of attrition and morale. The opponents were locked in a cycle of escalation.* [209] The idea that the government of South Vietnam could manage its own aﬀairs was shelved.* [209]

Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin with U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson at the Glassboro Summit Conference where the two representatives discussed the possibilities of a peace settlement.

The one-year tour of duty of American soldiers deprived units of experienced leadership. As one observer noted “we were not in Vietnam for 10 years, but for one year 10 times.”* [194] As a result, training programs were shortened. South Vietnam was inundated with manufactured goods. As Stanley Karnow writes, “the main PX [Post Exchange], located in the Saigon suburb of Cholon, was only slightly smaller than the New York Bloomingdale's… "* [210] The American buildup transformed the economy and had a profound effect on South Vietnamese society. A huge surge in corruption was witnessed. Washington encouraged its SEATO allies to contribute troops. Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines* [211] all agreed to send troops. Major allies, however, notably NATO nations Canada and the United Kingdom, declined Washington's troop requests.* [212] The U.S. and its allies mounted complex operations, such as operations Masher, Attleboro, Cedar Falls, and Junction City. However, the communist insurgents remained elusive and demonstrated great tactical flexibility. Meanwhile, the political situation in South Vietnam began to stabilize with the coming to power of prime minister Air Marshal Nguyễn Cao Kỳ and figurehead Chief of State, General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, in mid-1965 at the head of a military junta. This ended a series of coups that had happened more than once a year. In 1967, Thieu became president with Ky as his deputy, after rigged elections. Although they were nominally a civilian government, Ky was supposed to maintain real power through a behind-the-scenes military body. However, Thieu outmaneuvered and sidelined Ky by filling the ranks with

The Ho Chi Minh Trail running through Laos, 1967

generals from his faction. Thieu was also accused of murdering Ky loyalists through contrived military accidents. Thieu, mistrustful and indecisive, remained president until 1975, having won a one-candidate election in 1971.* [213] * [214] The Johnson administration employed a“policy of minimum candor”* [215] in its dealings with the media. Military information officers sought to manage media coverage by emphasizing stories that portrayed progress in the war. Over time, this policy damaged the public trust in official pronouncements. As the media's coverage of the war and that of the Pentagon diverged, a so-called credibility gap developed.* [215] Tet Offensive Main article: Tet Offensive In late 1967 the Communists lured American forces into the hinterlands at Đắk Tô and at the Marine Khe Sanh combat base in Quảng Trị Province where the United States was more than willing to fight because it could unleash its massive firepower unimpeded by civilians. However, on 31 January 1968, the NVA and the Viet Cong broke the truce that traditionally accompanied the Tết (Lunar New Year) holiday by launching the largest bat-

2.4. VIETNAM WAR

141 face of the war. He had been named Time magazine's 1965's Man of the Year and eventually was featured on the magazine's cover three times.* [222] Time described him as“the sinewy personification of the American fighting man…(who) directed the historic buildup, drew up the battle plans, and infused the…men under him with his own idealistic view of U.S. aims and responsibilities.” * [222] Six weeks after the Tet Offensive began, “public approval of his overall performance dropped from 48 percent to 36 percent–and, more dramatically, endorsement for his handling of the war fell from 40 percent to 26 percent.”* [223]

A US "tunnel rat" soldier prepares to enter a Viet Cong tunnel.

tle of the war, the Tet Offensive, in the hope of sparking a national uprising. Over 100 cities were attacked by over 85,000 enemy troops including assaults on General Westmoreland's headquarters and the U.S. Embassy in Saigon.* [216] Although the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces were initially shocked by the scale of the urban offensive, they responded quickly and effectively, decimating the ranks of the Viet Cong. In the former capital city of Huế, the combined NVA and Viet Cong troops captured the Imperial Citadel and much of the city and massacred over 3,000 unarmed Huế civilians.* [217] In the following Battle of Huế American forces employed massive firepower that left 80 percent of the city in ruins.* [218] Further north, at Quảng Trị City, members of the 1st Cavalry Division and 1st ARVN Infantry Division killed more than 900 NVA and Vietcong troops in and around the city.* [219]* [220] In Saigon, 1,000 NLF (Viet Cong) fighters fought off 11,000 U.S. and ARVN troops for three weeks.

U.S. Marines in Operation Allen Brook in 1968

Across South Vietnam, 1,100 Americans and other allied troops, 2,100 ARVN, 14,000 civilians, and 32,000 NVA and Viet Cong lay dead.* [220]* [221] But the Tet Oﬀensive had another, unintended consequence. General Westmoreland had become the public

U.S. Marines ﬁghting in Huế

A few months earlier, in November 1967, Westmoreland had spearheaded a public relations drive for the Johnson administration to bolster flagging public support.* [224] In a speech before the National Press Club he had said a point in the war had been reached“where the end comes into view.”* [225] Thus, the public was shocked and confused when Westmoreland's predictions were trumped by Tet.* [224] The American media, which had until then been largely supportive of U.S. efforts, turned on the Johnson administration for what had become an increasing credibility gap. Although the Tet Offensive was a significant victory for allied forces, in terms of casualties and control of territory, it was a sound defeat when evaluated from the point of view of strategic consequences: it became a turning point in America's involvement in the Vietnam War because it had a profound impact on domestic support for the conflict. Despite the military failure for the Communist forces, the Tet Offensive became a political victory for them and ended the career of president Lyndon B. Johnson, who declined to run for re-election as his approval rating slumped from 48 to 36 percent.* [224] As James Witz noted, Tet “contradicted the claims of progress…made by the Johnson administration and the military.”* [224] The offensive constituted an intelligence failure on the scale of Pearl Harbor.* [211]* [226] Journalist Peter Arnett, in a disputed article, quoted an officer he refused to identify,* [227] saying of Bến Tre (laid to rubble by U.S. attacks)* [228] that “it became necessary to destroy the village in order to save it”.* [229]

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2.4.8 Vietnamization, 1969–72 Nixon Doctrine / Vietnamization

Viet Cong/NVA killed by U.S. Air Force personnel during a perimeter attack of Tan Son Nhut Air Base during the Tet Offensive

Walter Cronkite said in an editorial, “To say that we are closer to victory today is to believe, in the face of the evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past. To suggest we are on the edge of defeat is to yield to unreasonable pessimism. To say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion.” * [230]* [231] Following Cronkite's editorial report, President Lyndon Johnson is reported to have said, “If I've lost Cronkite, I've lost Middle America.”* [232]* [233] Westmoreland became Chief of Staff of the Army in March 1968, just as all resistance was finally subdued. The move was technically a promotion. However, his position had become untenable because of the offensive and because his request for 200,000 additional troops had been leaked to the media. Westmoreland was succeeded Propaganda leaflet urging the defection of Viet Cong and North by his deputy Creighton Abrams, a commander less in- Vietnamese to the side of the Republic of Vietnam clined to public media pronouncements.* [234] On 10 May 1968, despite low expectations, peace talks U.S. President Richard Nixon began troop withdrawals began between the United States and North Vietnam in in 1969. His plan, called the Nixon Doctrine, was to Paris. Negotiations stagnated for five months, until John- build up the ARVN, so that they could take over the defense of South Vietnam. The policy became known as son gave orders to halt the bombing of North Vietnam. "Vietnamization". As historian Robert Dallek writes, “Lyndon Johnson's escalation of the war in Vietnam divided Americans into Nixon said in 1970 in an announcement, “I am tonight warring camps…cost 30,000 American lives by the time announcing plans for the withdrawal of an additional he left office, (and) destroyed Johnson's presidency … 150,000 American troops to be completed during the "* [235] His refusal to send more U.S. troops to Viet- spring of next year. This will bring a total reduction of nam was seen as Johnson's admission that the war was 265,500 men in our armed forces in Vietnam below the that existed when we took office 15 months ago.” lost.* [236] It can be seen that the refusal was a tacit level * [238] admission that the war could not be won by escalation, at least not at a cost acceptable to the American peo- On 10 October 1969, Nixon ordered a squadron of 18 Bple.* [236] As Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara 52s loaded with nuclear weapons to race to the border of noted, “the dangerous illusion of victory by the United Soviet airspace to convince the Soviet Union, in accord States was therefore dead.”* [237] with the madman theory, that he was capable of anything Vietnam was a major political issue during the United to end the Vietnam War. States presidential election in 1968. The election was won Nixon also pursued negotiations. Theater commander by Republican party candidate Richard Nixon. Creighton Abrams shifted to smaller operations, aimed

2.4. VIETNAM WAR at communist logistics, with better use of ﬁrepower and more cooperation with the ARVN. Nixon also began to pursue détente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with China. This policy helped to decrease global tensions. Détente led to nuclear arms reduction on the part of both superpowers. But Nixon was disappointed that China and the Soviet Union continued to supply the North Vietnamese with aid. In September 1969, Ho Chi Minh died at age seventy-nine.* [239]

143 callous and indiﬀerent, providing additional impetus for the anti-war movement.* [245] The U.S. Air Force continued to heavily bomb Cambodia in support of the Cambodian government as part of Operation Freedom Deal.

In 1971 the Pentagon Papers were leaked to The New York Times. The top-secret history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, commissioned by the Department of Defense, detailed a long series of public deceptions on the part of the U.S. government. The Supreme Court ruled that its The anti-war movement was gaining strength in the publication was legal.* [246] United States. Nixon appealed to the "silent majority" of Americans who he said supported the war without showing it in public. But revelations of the My Lai Massacre, in which a U.S. Army platoon raped and killed civilians, and the 1969 "Green Beret Affair" where eight Special Forces soldiers, including the 5th Special Forces Group Commander, were arrested for the murder* [240] of a suspected double agent* [241] provoked national and international outrage. Beginning in 1970, American troops were withdrawn from border areas where most of the fighting took place, and instead redeployed along the coast and interior, which is one reason why casualties in 1970 were less than half M41 Walker Bulldog, the main battle tank of the ARVN of 1969's totals.* [238] The ARVN launched Operation Lam Son 719 in February 1971, aimed at cutting the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos.* [160] The ostensibly neutral Laos had long been Cambodia and Laos the scene of a civil war, pitting the Laotian government backed by the US against the Pathet Lao and its North Main articles: Operation Menu, Operation Freedom Vietnamese allies. After meeting resistance, ARVN Deal, Operation Commando Hunt, Laotian Civil War, forces retreated in a confused rout. They fled along roads Cambodian Civil War and Operation Lam Son 719 littered with their own dead. When they exhausted fuel supplies, soldiers abandoned their vehicles and attempted Prince Norodom Sihanouk had proclaimed Cambodia to barge their way on to American helicopters sent to neutral since 1955,* [242] but the communists used Cam- evacuate the wounded. Many ARVN soldiers clung to hebodian soil as a base and Sihanouk tolerated their pres- licopter skids in a desperate attempt to save themselves. ence, because he wished to avoid being drawn into a wider U.S. aircraft had to destroy abandoned equipment, inregional conflict. Under pressure from Washington, how- cluding tanks, to prevent them from falling into enemy ever, he changed this policy in 1969. The Vietnamese hands. Half of the ARVN troops involved in the operacommunists were no longer welcome. President Nixon tion were either captured or killed. The operation was a took the opportunity to launch a massive bombing cam- fiasco and represented a clear failure of Vietnamization. paign, called Operation Menu, against communist sanc- As Karnow noted“the blunders were monumental…The tuaries along the Cambodia/Vietnam border. Only five (South Vietnamese) government's top officers had been high-ranking Congressional officials were informed of tutored by the Americans for ten or fifteen years, many at Operation Menu.* [243] training schools in the United States, yet they had learned * In 1970, Prince Sihanouk was deposed by his pro- little.” [247] American prime minister Lon Nol. North Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1970 at the request of Khmer Rouge deputy leader Nuon Chea.* [244] U.S. and ARVN forces launched an invasion into Cambodia to attack NVA and Viet Cong bases.

In 1971 Australia and New Zealand withdrew their soldiers. The U.S. troop count was further reduced to 196,700, with a deadline to remove another 45,000 troops by February 1972. As peace protests spread across the United States, disillusionment and ill-discipline * This invasion sparked nationwide U.S. protests as Nixon grew in the ranks [248] including increased drug use, the commander of a had promised to deescalate the American involvement. "fragging" (the act of murdering * [249] ﬁghting unit) and desertions. Four students were killed by National Guardsmen at Kent State University during a protest in Ohio, which provoked Vietnamization was again tested by the Easter Oﬀensive further public outrage in the United States. The reaction of 1972, a massive conventional NVA invasion of South to the incident by the Nixon administration was seen as Vietnam. The NVA and Viet Cong quickly overran the

144 northern provinces and in coordination with other forces attacked from Cambodia, threatening to cut the country in half. U.S. troop withdrawals continued. But American airpower came to the rescue with Operation Linebacker, and the oﬀensive was halted. However, it became clear that without American airpower South Vietnam could not survive. The last remaining American ground troops were withdrawn by the end of March 1973; U.S. naval and air forces remained in the Gulf of Tonkin, as well as Thailand and Guam.* [250] 1972 election and Paris Peace Accords

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM Geneva Conference of 1954, called for national elections in the North and South. The Paris Peace Accords stipulated a sixty-day period for the total withdrawal of U.S. forces. “This article”, noted Peter Church, “proved …to be the only one of the Paris Agreements which was fully carried out.”* [251]

2.4.9 Opposition to U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War: 1962–1973 Main article: Opposition to the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War During the course of the Vietnam War a large segment

The war was the central issue of the 1972 U.S. presidential election. Nixon's opponent, George McGovern, campaigned on a platform of withdrawal from Vietnam. Nixon's National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, continued secret negotiations with North Vietnam's Lê Đức Thọ. In October 1972, they reached an agreement.

Protests against the war in Washington, D.C. on 24 April 1971

Operation Linebacker II, December 1972

However, South Vietnamese president Thieu demanded massive changes to the peace accord. When North Vietnam went public with the agreement's details, the Nixon administration claimed that the North was attempting to embarrass the president. The negotiations became deadlocked. Hanoi demanded new changes. To show his support for South Vietnam and force Hanoi back to the negotiating table, Nixon ordered Operation Linebacker II, a massive bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong 18–29 December 1972. The offensive destroyed much of the remaining economic and industrial capacity of North Vietnam. Simultaneously Nixon pressured Thieu to accept the terms of the agreement, threatening to conclude a bilateral peace deal and cut off American aid. On 15 January 1973, Nixon announced the suspension of offensive action against North Vietnam. The Paris Peace Accords on“Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam”were signed on 27 January 1973, officially ending direct U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. A cease-fire was declared across North and South Vietnam. U.S. prisoners of war were released. The agreement guaranteed the territorial integrity of Vietnam and, like the

Anti-Vietnam War demonstration, 1967.

of the American population came to be opposed to U.S. involvement in South Vietnam. Public opinion steadily turned against the war following 1967 and by 1970 only a third of Americans believed that the U.S. had not made a mistake by sending troops to ﬁght in Vietnam.* [252] Nearly a third of the American population were strongly against the war. It is possible to specify certain groups who led the anti-war movement and the reasons why. Many young people protested because they were the ones being drafted while others were against the war because the anti-war movement grew increasingly popular among the counterculture and drug culture in American society and its music.

2.4. VIETNAM WAR

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Some advocates within the peace movement advocated a unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam. One reason given for the withdrawal is that it would contribute to a lessening of tensions in the region and thus less human bloodshed. Early opposition to U.S. involvement in Vietnam drew its inspiration from the Geneva Conference of 1954. American support of Diệm in refusing elections was seen as thwarting the very democracy that America claimed to be supporting. John F. Kennedy, while Senator, opposed involvement in Vietnam.* [188] Opposition to the Vietnam War tended to unite groups opposed to U.S. anti-communism and imperialism* [253] and, for those involved with the New Left such as the Catholic Worker Movement. Others, such as Stephen Spiro opposed the war based on the theory of Just War. Some wanted to show solidarity with the people of Vietnam, such as Norman Morrison emulating the actions of Thích Quảng Đức. In a key televised debate from 15 May 1965, Eric Severeid reporting for CBS conducted a debate between McGeorge Bundy and Hans Morgenthau dealing with an acute summary of the main war concerns of the U.S. as seen at that time stating them as: "(1) What are the justifications for the American presence in Vietnam – why are we there? (2) What is the fundamental nature of this war? Is it aggression from North Vietnam or is it basically, a civil war between the peoples of South Vietnam? (3) What are the implications of this Vietnam struggle in terms of Communist China's power and aims and future actions? And (4) What are the alternatives to our present policy in Vietnam?"* [254]* [255] High-profile opposition to the Vietnam War turned to street protests in an effort to turn U.S. political opinion. On 15 October 1969, the Vietnam Moratorium attracted millions of Americans.* [256] Riots broke out at the 1968 Democratic National Convention during protests against the war.* [257] After news reports of American military abuses such as the 1968 My Lai Massacre, brought new attention and support to the anti-war movement, some veterans joined Vietnam Veterans Against the War. The fatal shooting of four students at Kent State University in 1970 led to nationwide university protests.* [258] Antiwar protests ended with the final withdrawal of troops after the Paris Peace Accords were signed in 1973. South Vietnam was left to defend itself alone when the fighting resumed. Many South Vietnamese subsequently fled to the United States.* [259]

Anti-war protests

Under the Paris Peace Accords, between North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Lê Đức Thọ and U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and reluctantly signed by South Vietnamese president Thiệu, U.S. military forces withdrew from South Vietnam and prisoners were exchanged. North Vietnam was allowed to continue supplying communist troops in the South, but only to the extent of replacing expended materiel. Later that year the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Kissinger and Thọ, but the Vietnamese negotiator declined it saying that a true peace did not yet exist. The communist leaders had expected that the ceasefire terms would favor their side. But Saigon, bolstered by a surge of U.S. aid received just before the ceasefire went into effect, began to roll back the Viet Cong. The communists responded with a new strategy hammered out in a series of meetings in Hanoi in March 1973, according to the memoirs of Trần Văn Trà.* [263]

As the Viet Cong's top commander, Tra participated in several of these meetings. With U.S. bombings suspended, work on the Ho Chi Minh trail and other logistical structures could proceed unimpeded. Logistics would be upgraded until the North was in a position to launch a 2.4.10 Exit of the Americans: 1973–75 massive invasion of the South, projected for the 1975–76 The United States began drastically reducing their troop dry season. Tra calculated that this date would be Hanoi's to strike before Saigon's army could be support in South Vietnam during the ﬁnal years of last opportunity * [263] fully trained. Vietnamization. Many U.S. troops were removed from the region, and on 5 March 1971, the United States re- In the November 1972 Election, Democratic nominee turned the 5th Special Forces Group, which was the ﬁrst George McGovern lost 49 of 50 states to the incumbent American unit deployed to South Vietnam, to its former President Richard Nixon. On 15 March 1973, Presibase in Fort Bragg, North Carolina.* [260] * [A 5] dent Nixon implied that the United States would inter-

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CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM approve Trà's plan. A larger offensive might provoke a U.S. reaction and interfere with the big push planned for 1976. Trà appealed over Giáp's head to first secretary Lê Duẩn, who approved of the operation. Trà's plan called for a limited offensive from Cambodia into Phước Long Province. The strike was designed to solve local logistical problems, gauge the reaction of South Vietnamese forces, and determine whether U.S. would return to the fray.

Calling for immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam, George McGovern's 1972 Presidential Campaign lost 49 of 50 states to Richard Nixon.

vene militarily if the communist side violated the ceasefire. Public and congressional reaction to Nixon's trial balloon was unfavorable and in April Nixon appointed Graham Martin as U.S. ambassador to Vietnam. Martin was a second stringer compared to previous U.S. ambassadors and his appointment was an early signal that Washington had given up on Vietnam. During his confirmation hearings in June 1973, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger stated that he would recommend resumption of U.S. bombing in North Vietnam if North Vietnam launched a major offensive against South Vietnam. On 4 June 1973, the U.S. Senate passed the Case–Church Amendment to prohibit such intervention.* [264] The oil price shock of October 1973 following the Yom Kippur War in Egypt caused significant damage to the South Vietnamese economy. The Viet Cong resumed offensive operations when the dry season began and by January 1974 it had recaptured the territory it lost during the previous dry season. After two clashes that left 55 South Vietnamese soldiers dead, President Thieu announced on 4 January that the war had restarted and that the Paris Peace Accord was no longer in effect. There had been over 25,000 South Vietnamese casualties during the ceasefire period.* [265]

Recently released American POWs from North Vietnamese prison camps, 1973

On 13 December 1974, North Vietnamese forces attacked Route 14 in Phước Long Province. Phuoc Binh, the provincial capital, fell on 6 January 1975. Ford desperately asked Congress for funds to assist and re-supply the South before it was overrun. Congress refused. The fall of Phuoc Binh and the lack of an American response left the South Vietnamese elite demoralized.

The speed of this success led the Politburo to reassess its strategy. It was decided that operations in the Central Highlands would be turned over to General Văn Tiến Dũng and that Pleiku should be seized, if possible. Before he left for the South, Dũng was addressed by Lê Duẩn: “Never have we had military and political conditions so Gerald Ford took over as U.S. president on 9 August 1974 perfect or a strategic advantage as great as we have now.” after president Nixon resigned due to the Watergate scan- * [267] dal. At this time, Congress cut financial aid to South Viet- At the start of 1975, the South Vietnamese had three nam from $1 billion a year to $700 million. The U.S. times as much artillery and twice the number of tanks and midterm elections in 1974 brought in a new Congress armored cars as the opposition. They also had 1,400 airdominated by Democrats who were even more deter- craft and a two-to-one numerical superiority in combat mined to confront the president on the war. Congress troops over their Communist enemies.* [268] However, immediately voted in restrictions on funding and military the rising oil prices meant that much of this could not activities to be phased in through 1975 and to culminate be used. They faced a well-organized, highly determined in a total cutoff of funding in 1976. and well-funded North Vietnam. Much of the North's The success of the 1973–74 dry season offensive inspired Trà to return to Hanoi in October 1974 and plead for a larger offensive in the next dry season. This time, Trà could travel on a drivable highway with regular fueling stops, a vast change from the days when the Ho Chi Minh trail was a dangerous mountain trek.* [266] Giáp, the North Vietnamese defense minister, was reluctant to

material and financial support came from the communist bloc. Within South Vietnam, there was increasing chaos. Their abandonment by the American military had compromised an economy dependent on U.S. financial support and the presence of a large number of U.S. troops. South Vietnam suffered from the global recession that followed the Arab oil embargo.

2.4. VIETNAM WAR

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Campaign 275

the North Vietnamese launched their attack, panic set in, and ARVN resistance withered. On 22 March, the NVA See also: 1975 Spring Offensive, Battle of Ban Me Thuot opened the siege of Huế. Civilians flooded the airport and Hue–Da Nang Campaign and the docks hoping for any mode of escape. Some even On 10 March 1975, General Dung launched Campaign swam out to sea to reach boats and barges anchored offshore. In the confusion, routed ARVN soldiers fired on civilians to make way for their retreat.* [23] On 25 March, after a three-day battle, Huế fell. As resistance in Huế collapsed, North Vietnamese rockets rained down on Da Nang and its airport. By 28 March 35,000 VPA troops were poised to attack the suburbs. By 30 March 100,000 leaderless ARVN troops surrendered as the NVA marched victoriously through Da Nang. With the fall of the city, the defense of the Central Highlands and Northern provinces came to an end.* [23] Final North Vietnamese offensive Captured U.S. armored vehicles

275, a limited offensive into the Central Highlands, supported by tanks and heavy artillery. The target was Buôn Ma Thuột, in Đắk Lắk Province. If the town could be taken, the provincial capital of Pleiku and the road to the coast would be exposed for a planned campaign in 1976. The ARVN proved incapable of resisting the onslaught, and its forces collapsed on 11 March. Once again, Hanoi was surprised by the speed of their success. Dung now urged the Politburo to allow him to seize Pleiku immediately and then turn his attention to Kon Tum. He argued that with two months of good weather remaining until the onset of the monsoon, it would be irresponsible to not take advantage of the situation.* [23] President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, a former general, was fearful that his forces would be cut off in the north by the attacking communists; Thieu ordered a retreat. The president declared this to be a “lighten the top and keep the bottom”strategy. But in what appeared to be a repeat of Operation Lam Son 719, the withdrawal soon turned into a bloody rout. While the bulk of ARVN forces attempted to flee, isolated units fought desperately. ARVN General Phu abandoned Pleiku and Kon Tum and retreated toward the coast, in what became known as the “column of tears”.* [23]

Captured USAF warplanes in North Vietnam Museum

For more details on the ﬁnal North Vietnamese oﬀensive, see Ho Chi Minh Campaign.

With the northern half of the country under their control, the Politburo ordered General Dung to launch the final offensive against Saigon. The operational plan for the Ho Chi Minh Campaign called for the capture of Saigon before 1 May. Hanoi wished to avoid the coming monsoon and prevent any redeployment of ARVN forces defendAs the ARVN tried to disengage from the enemy, ing the capital. Northern forces, their morale boosted by refugees mixed in with the line of retreat. The poor con- their recent victories, rolled on, taking Nha Trang, Cam dition of roads and bridges, damaged by years of con- Ranh, and Da Lat. flict and neglect, slowed Phu's column. As the North On 7 April, three North Vietnamese divisions attacked Vietnamese forces approached, panic set in. Often aban- Xuân Lộc, 40 miles (64 km) east of Saigon. The North doned by the officers, the soldiers and civilians were Vietnamese met fierce resistance at Xuân Lộc from the shelled incessantly. The retreat degenerated into a des- ARVN 18th Division, who were outnumbered six to one. perate scramble for the coast. By 1 April the “column For two bloody weeks, severe fighting raged as the ARVN defenders made a last stand to try to block the North Vietof tears”was all but annihilated.* [23] On 20 March, Thieu reversed himself and ordered Huế, namese advance. By 21 April, however, the exhausted Vietnam's third-largest city, be held at all costs, and then garrison were ordered to withdraw towards Saigon. changed his policy several times. Thieu's contradictory An embittered and tearful president Thieu resigned on the orders confused and demoralized his officer corps. As same day, declaring that the United States had betrayed

148 South Vietnam. In a scathing attack, he suggested U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had tricked him into signing the Paris peace agreement two years ago, promising military aid that failed to materialize. Having transferred power to Trần Văn Hương, he left for Taiwan on 25 April. At the same time, North Vietnamese tanks had reached Biên Hòa and turned toward Saigon, brushing aside isolated ARVN units along the way. By the end of April, the ARVN had collapsed on all fronts except in the Mekong Delta. Thousands of refugees streamed southward, ahead of the main communist onslaught. On 27 April 100,000 North Vietnamese troops encircled Saigon. The city was defended by about 30,000 ARVN troops. To hasten a collapse and foment panic, the NVA shelled the airport and forced its closure. With the air exit closed, large numbers of civilians found that they had no way out. Fall of Saigon

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM Ambassador Graham Martin's belief that Saigon could be held and that a political settlement could be reached. Schlesinger announced early in the morning of 29 April 1975 the evacuation from Saigon by helicopter of the last U.S. diplomatic, military, and civilian personnel. Frequent Wind was arguably the largest helicopter evacuation in history. It began on 29 April, in an atmosphere of desperation, as hysterical crowds of Vietnamese vied for limited space. Martin pleaded with Washington to dispatch $700 million in emergency aid to bolster the regime and help it mobilize fresh military reserves. But American public opinion had soured on this conﬂict. In the United States, South Vietnam was perceived as doomed. President Gerald Ford had given a televised speech on 23 April, declaring an end to the Vietnam War and all U.S. aid. Frequent Wind continued around the clock, as North Vietnamese tanks breached defenses on the outskirts of Saigon. In the early morning hours of 30 April, the last U.S. Marines evacuated the embassy by helicopter, as civilians swamped the perimeter and poured into the grounds. Many of them had been employed by the Americans and were left to their fate. On 30 April 1975, NVA troops entered the city of Saigon and quickly overcame all resistance, capturing key buildings and installations. A tank from the 324th Division crashed through the gates of the Independence Palace at 11:30 am local time and the Viet Cong ﬂag was raised above it. President Dương Văn Minh, who had succeeded Huong two days earlier, surrendered.* [269]

2.4.11 Other countries' involvement Pro-Hanoi 2,000 years of Chinese-Vietnamese enmity and hundreds of years of Chinese and Russian mutual suspicions were suspended when they united against us in Vietnam. —Richard Holbrooke, 1985* [270]

People's Republic of China In 1950, the People's Republic of China extended diplomatic recognition to the Viet Minh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam and sent weapons, as well as military advisers led by Luo Guibo Victorious NVA troops at the Presidential Palace, Saigon. to assist the Viet Minh in its war with the French. The Main articles: Fall of Saigon and Operation Frequent first draft of the 1954 Geneva Accords was negotiated by Wind French prime minister Pierre Mendès France and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai who, fearing U.S. intervention, Chaos, unrest, and panic broke out as hysterical South urged* the Viet Minh to accept a partition at the 17th parVietnamese officials and civilians scrambled to leave allel. [271] Saigon. Martial law was declared. American helicopters China's support for North Vietnam included both finanbegan evacuating South Vietnamese, U.S., and foreign cial aid and the deployment of hundreds of thousands nationals from various parts of the city and from the U.S. of military personnel in support roles. In the sumembassy compound. Operation Frequent Wind had been mer of 1962, Mao Zedong agreed to supply Hanoi with delayed until the last possible moment, because of U.S. 90,000 rifles and guns free of charge. Starting in 1965,

2.4. VIETNAM WAR

149

China sent anti-aircraft units and engineering battalions to North Vietnam to repair the damage caused by American bombing, man anti-aircraft batteries, rebuild roads and railroads, transport supplies, and perform other engineering works. This freed North Vietnamese army units for combat in the South. China sent 320,000 troops and annual arms shipments worth $180 million.* [272] The Chinese military claims to have caused 38% of American air losses in the war.* [17] China claimed that its military and economic aid to North Vietnam and the Viet Cong totaled $20 billion (approx. $143 billion adjusted for inflation in 2015) during the Vietnam War.* [17] Included in that aid were donations of 5 million tons of food to North Vietnam (equivalent to NV food production in a single year), accounting for 10-15% of the North Vietnamese food supply by the 1970s.* [17] Sino-Soviet relations soured after the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968. In October, the Chinese demanded North Vietnam cut relations with Moscow, but Hanoi refused.* [274] The Chinese began to withdraw in November 1968 in preparation for a clash with the Soviets, which occurred at Zhenbao Island in March 1969. The Chinese also began financing the Khmer Rouge as a counterweight to the Vietnamese communists at this time. China “armed and trained”the Khmer Rouge during the civil war and continued to aid them for years afterward.* [275] The Khmer Rouge launched ferocious raids Leonid Brezhnev was the leader of the Soviet Union during the into Vietnam in 1975–1978. When Vietnam responded second half of the Vietnam War with an invasion that toppled the Khmer Rouge, China launched a brief, punitive invasion of Vietnam in 1979. tween 1953 and 1991, the hardware donated by the Soviet Union included 2,000 tanks, 1,700 APCs, 7,000 artillery guns, over 5,000 anti-aircraft guns, 158 surface-toair missile launchers, 120 helicopters. During the war, the Soviets sent North Vietnam annual arms shipments worth $450 million.* [278]* [279] From July 1965 to the end of 1974, fighting in Vietnam was observed by some 6,500 officers and generals, as well as more than 4,500 soldiers and sergeants of the Soviet Armed Forces. In addition, Soviet military schools and academies began training Vietnamese soldiers – in all more than 10,000 military personnel.* [280]

Soviet Union Soviet ships in the South China Sea gave vital early warnings to Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam. The Soviet intelligence ships would pick up American B-52 bombers flying from Okinawa and Guam. Their airspeed and direction would be noted and then relayed to COSVN, North Vietnam's southern headquarters. Using airspeed and direction, COSVN analysts would calculate the bombing target and tell any assets to move “perpendicularly to the attack trajectory.”These advance warning gave them time to move out of the way of the bombers, and, while the bombing runs caused extensive damage, because of the early warnings from 1968 to 1970 they did not kill a single military or civilian leader in the headquarters complexes.* [276] North Korea As a result of a decision of the Korean The Soviet Union supplied North Vietnam with medical Workers' Party in October 1966, in early 1967 North Kosupplies, arms, tanks, planes, helicopters, artillery, anti- rea sent a fighter squadron to North Vietnam to back up aircraft missiles and other military equipment. Soviet the North Vietnamese 921st and 923rd fighter squadrons crews fired Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles at U.S. defending Hanoi. They stayed through 1968, and 200 piF-4 Phantoms, which were shot down over Thanh Hóa lots were reported to have served.* [281] in 1965. Over a dozen Soviet citizens lost their lives in In addition, at least two anti-aircraft artillery regiments this conflict. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union were sent as well. North Korea also sent weapons, ammuin 1991, Russian officials acknowledged that the Soviet nition and two million sets of uniforms to their comrades Union had stationed up to 3,000 troops in Vietnam dur- in North Vietnam.* [282] Kim Il-sung is reported to have ing the war.* [277] told his pilots to “fight in the war as if the Vietnamese Some Russian sources give more specific numbers: Be- sky were their own”.* [283]

150 Cuba The contribution to North Vietnam by the Republic of Cuba, under Fidel Castro have been recognized several times by representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.* [284] Fidel Castro has mentioned in his discourses the Batallón Girón (Giron Battalion) as comprising the Cuban contingent that served as military advisors during the war.* [285] In this battalion, alongside the Cubans, fought Nguyễn Thị Định, founding member of the Viet Cong, who later became the ﬁrst female Major General in the North Vietnamese Army.* [286] There are numerous allegations by former U.S. prisoners of war that Cuban military personnel were present at North Vietnamese prison facilities during the war and that they participated in torture activities, in what is known as the “Cuba Program”.* [287]* [288]* [289]* [290]* [291] Witnesses to this include Senator John McCain, 2008 U.S. Presidential candidate and former Vietnam prisoner of war, according to his 1999 book Faith of My Fathers.* [292] Benjamin Gilman, a Vietnam War POW/MIA issue advocate, claim evidence that Cuba's military and non-military involvement may have run into the“thousands”of personnel.* [293] Fidel Castro visited in person Quảng Trị province, held by North Vietnam after the Easter Oﬀensive to show his support for the Viet Cong.* [294]

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM

Vietnamese civilians of Phong Nhi village massacred by South Korean Blue Dragon Brigade in 1968

sion. In August 1966 after the arrival of the 9th Division the Koreans established a corps command, the Republic of Korea Forces Vietnam Field Command, near I Field Force, Vietnam at Nha Trang.* [296] The South Koreans soon developed a reputation for eﬀectiveness, reportedly conducting counterinsurgency operations so well that American commanders felt that the South Korean area of responsibility was the safest.* [297]

Approximately 320,000 South Korean soldiers were sent to Vietnam,* [298] each serving a one-year tour of duty. Maximum troop levels peaked at 50,000 in 1968, howPro-Saigon ever all were withdrawn by 1973.* [299] About 5,099 South Koreans were killed and 10,962 wounded during South Korea Main article: Military history of South the war. South Korea claimed to have killed 41,000 Viet Korea during the Vietnam War Cong fighters.* [298] The United States paid South KoOn the anti-communist side, South Korea (a.k.a. the rean soldiers 236 million dollars for their efforts in Vietnam,* [298] and South Korean GNP increased five-fold during the war.* [298]

Australia and New Zealand Main articles: Military history of Australia during the Vietnam War and New Zealand in the Vietnam War

Soldiers of the South Korean White Horse Division in Vietnam

Republic of Korea, ROK) had the second-largest contingent of foreign troops in South Vietnam after the United States. In November 1961, Park Chung-hee proposed South Korean participation in the war to John F. Kennedy, but Kennedy disagreed.* [295] On 1 May 1964 Lyndon Johnson requested South Korean participation.* [295] The ﬁrst South Korean troops began arriving in 1964 and large combat formations began arriving a year later. The Republic of Korea Marine Corps dispatched their 2nd Marine Brigade while the ROK Army sent the Capital Division and later the 9th Infantry Divi-

Australia and New Zealand, close allies of the United States and members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the ANZUS military co-operation treaty, sent ground troops to Vietnam. Both nations had gained experience in counterinsurgency and jungle warfare during the Malayan Emergency and World War II. Their governments subscribed to the Domino theory. Australia began by sending advisors to Vietnam in 1962, and combat troops were committed in 1965.* [300] New Zealand began by sending a detachment of engineers and an artillery battery, and then started sending special forces and regular infantry which were attached to Australian formations.* [301] Australia's peak commitment was 7,672 combat troops and New Zealand's 552. More than 60,000 Australian personnel were involved during the course of the war, of which 521 were killed and more than 3,000 wounded.* [302] Approximately 3,500 New Zealanders served in Vietnam, losing 37 killed and 187

2.4. VIETNAM WAR

151

The Thai Queen's Cobra battalion in Phuoc Tho

Since November 1967, the Taiwanese government secretly operated a cargo transport detachment to assist the United States and South Vietnam. Taiwan also provided military training units for the South Vietnamese diving units, later known as the Lien Doi Nguoi Nhai (LDMN) or “Frogman unit”in English.* [307] In addition to the An Australian soldier in Vietnam diving trainers there were several hundred military personnel.* [307] Military commandos from Taiwan were wounded.* [303] Most Australians and New Zealanders captured by communist forces three times trying to inserved in the 1st Australian Task Force in Phước Tuy ﬁltrate North Vietnam.* [307] Province.* [300] Canada and the ICC Philippines Some 10,450 Filipino troops were dispatched to South Vietnam. They were primarily engaged in medical and other civilian paciﬁcation projects. These forces operated under the designation PHLCAG-V or Philippine Civic Action Group-Vietnam. More noteworthy was the fact that the naval base in Subic Bay was used for the U.S. Seventh Fleet from 1964 till the end of the war in 1975.* [304]* [305] The Navy base in Subic bay and the Air force base at Clark achieved maximum functionality during the war and supported an estimated 80,000 locals in allied tertiary businesses from shoe making to prostitution.* [306]

Main article: Canada and the Vietnam War Canada, India and Poland constituted the International Control Commission, which was supposed to monitor the 1954 ceaseﬁre agreement.* [308] Oﬃcially, Canada did not have partisan involvement in the Vietnam War and diplomatically it was "non-belligerent". Victor Levant suggested otherwise in his book Quiet Complicity: Canadian Involvement in the Vietnam War (1986).* [309]* [310] The Vietnam War entry in The Canadian Encyclopedia asserts plainly that Canada's record on the truce commissions was a pro-Saigon partisan one.* [311]

Thailand Thai Army formations, including the “Queen's Cobra”battalion, saw action in South Vietnam between 1965 and 1971. Thai forces saw much more 2.4.12 United Front for the Liberation of action in the covert war in Laos between 1964 and Oppressed Races (FULRO) 1972, though Thai regular formations there were heavily outnumbered by the irregular “volunteers”of the Main article: United Front for the Liberation of OpCIA-sponsored Police Aerial Reconnaissance Units or pressed Races PARU, who carried out reconnaissance activities on the * western side of the Ho Chi Minh trail. [23] The ethnic minority peoples of south Vietnam like the Christian Montagnards (Degar), Hindu and MusRepublic of China (Taiwan) Main article: Republic lim Cham and the Buddhist Khmer Krom banded toof China in the Vietnam War gether in the United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races (French: Front Uni de Lutte des Races

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Opprimées, acronym: FULRO) to ﬁght against the Vietnamese for autonomy or independence. FULRO fought against both the anti-Communist South Vietnamese and the Communist Viet Cong, and then FURLO proceeded to ﬁght against the united Communist Socialist Republic of Vietnam after the fall of South Vietnam. FULRO was supported by China, the United States, Cambodia, and some French citizens.* [23]

ing the conﬂict and included rape, massacres of civilians, bombings of civilian targets, terrorism, the widespread use of torture and the murder of prisoners of war. Additional common crimes included theft, arson, and the destruction of property not warranted by military necessity.* [312]

During the war, the South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem began a program to settle ethnic Vietnamese Kinh on Montagnard lands in the Central Highlands region. This provoked a backlash from the Montagnards. The Cambodians under both the pro-China King Sihanouk and the pro-American Lon Nol supported their fellow co-ethnic Khmer Krom in south Vietnam, following an anti- ethnic Vietnamese policy.

Allied war crimes

FULRO was formed from the amalgation of the Cham organization“Champa Liberation Front”(Front de Liberation du Champa FLC) led by the Cham Muslim officer Les Kosem who served in the Royal Cambodian Army, the Khmer Krom organization “Liberation Front of Kampuchea Krom”(Front de Liberation du Kampuchea Krom FLKK) led by Chau Dara, a former monk, and the Montagnard organizations “Central Highlands Liberation Front”(Front de Liberation des Hauts Plateaux FLHP) led by Y Bham Enuol and BAJARAKA. The leaders of FULRO were executed by the Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot when he took power in Cambodia but FULRO insurgents proceeded to fight against the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and it was not until 1992 that they finally surrendered to the United Nations in Cambodia.* [23]

2.4.13

War crimes

Main articles: Tiger Force and Vietnam War Crimes Working Group

War crimes committed by US forces In 1968, the Vietnam War Crimes Working Group (VWCWG) was established by the Pentagon task force set up in the wake of the My Lai Massacre, to attempt to ascertain the veracity of emerging claims of war crimes by U.S. armed forces in Vietnam, during the Vietnam War period. “Vietnam was an atrocity from the get-go…There were hundreds of My Lais. You got your card punched by the numbers of bodies you counted.” David H. Hackworth* [313] The investigation compiled over 9,000 pages of investigative files, sworn statements by witnesses and status reports for top military officers, indicating that 320 incidents had factual basis.* [314] The substantiated cases included 7 massacres between 1967 and 1971 in which at least 137 civilians were killed; seventy eight further attacks targeting non-combatants resulting in at least 57 deaths, 56 wounded and 15 sexually assaulted; one hundred and forty-one cases of US soldiers torturing civilian detainees or prisoners of war with fists, sticks, bats, water or electric shock.* [314] Over 800 alleged atrocities were investigated but only 23 soldiers were ever convicted on charges and most served sentences of less than a year.* [315] A Los Angeles Times report on the archived files concluded that the war crimes were not confined to a few rogue units, having been uncovered in every army division that was active in Vietnam.* [314]

In 2003 a series of investigative reports by the Toledo Blade uncovered a large number of unreported American war crimes particularly from the Tiger Force unit.* [316] Some of the most violent war criminals included men such as Sam Ybarra* [317] and Sergeant Roy Victims of the My Lai massacre E.“the Bummer”Bumgarner, a soldier who served with the 1st Cavalry Division and later the 173d Airborne Main articles: List of war crimes § 1954–1975: Vietnam Brigade.* [318] War and Vietnam War casualties In 1971 the later U.S. presidential candidate, John Kerry, See also: List of massacres in Vietnam testiﬁed before the U.S. Senate and stated that over 150 U.S. veterans testiﬁed during the Winter Soldier InvestiA large number of war crimes took place during the Viet- gation and described war crimes committed in Southeast nam War. War crimes were committed by both sides dur- Asia.* [23]

2.4. VIETNAM WAR

153 I counted sixty-two bodies. In my report I described them as so many women between fifteen and twenty-five and so many children— usually in their mothers' arms or very close to them—and so many old people.”When he later read the official tally of dead, he found that it listed them as 130 VC killed.* [323]

A Viet Cong prisoner captured in 1967 by the U.S. Army awaits interrogation. He has been placed in a stress position by tying a board between his arms.

They told the stories of times that they had personally raped, cut off the ears, cut off heads, taped wires from portable telephones to human genitals and turned up the power, cut off limbs, blown up bodies, randomly shot at civilians, razed villages in a fashion reminiscent of Genghis Khan, shot cattle and dogs for fun, poisoned food stocks and generally ravaged the countryside of South Vietnam in addition to the normal ravage of war and the normal and very particular ravaging which is done by the applied bombing power of this country. —John Kerry testifying before the U.S. Senate in 1971* [319]

War Crimes committed by South Vietnamese forces In terms of atrocities by the South Vietnamese, during the Diem era (1954-1963) R.J. Rummell estimated that 16,000 to 167,000 South Vietnamese civilians were killed; for 1964 to 1975, Rummel estimated a total of 42,000 to 128,000 killed. Thus, the total for 1954 to 1975 is from 57,000 to 284,000 deaths caused by South Vietnam, excluding NLF/North Vietnamese forces killed by the South Vietnamese armed forces.* [324] War crimes committed by South Korean forces South Korean forces were also culpable of war crimes as well. One of the massacres was the Tây Vinh Massacre where ROK Capital Division of the South Korean Army killed 1,200 unarmed citizens between 12 February 1966 and 17 March 1966 in Bình An village, today Tây Vinh village, Tây Sơn District of Bình Định Province in South Vietnam.* [325] Another example was the Gò Dài massacre where ROK Capital Division of the South Korean Army killed 380 civilians on 26 February 1966 in Gò Dài hamlet, in Bình An commune, Tây Sơn District (today Tây Vinh District) of Bình Định Province in South Vietnam.* [325]

North Vietnamese, Viet Cong, and Khmer Rouge war According to political scientist R.J. Rummel, U.S. troops crimes murdered about 6,000 Vietnamese civilians during the * war. [320] Nick Turse, in his 2013 book, Kill Anything Main article: Viet Cong and PAVN strategy, organization that Moves, argues for a much higher total. He says that a and structure § VC/NVA use of terror relentless drive toward higher body counts, a widespread According to Guenter Lewy, Viet Cong insurgents asuse of free-fire zones, rules of engagement where civilians who ran from soldiers or helicopters could be viewed as Viet Cong, and a widespread disdain for Vietnamese civilians led to massive civilian casualties and endemic war crimes inflicted by U.S. troops.* [321] One example cited by Turse is Operation Speedy Express, an operation by the 9th Infantry Division, which was described by John Paul Vann as, in effect, “many My Lais”.* [321] A report by Newsweek magazine suggested that 5,000 innocent civilians may have been killed by U.S. soldiers in this single operation.* [322] In more detail: Air force captain, Brian Wilson, who carried out bomb-damage assessments in free-fire zones throughout the delta, saw the results firsthand.“It was the epitome of immorality…One of the times I counted bodies after an air strike —which always ended with two napalm bombs which would just fry everything that was left—

Victims of the Huế Massacre

sassinated at least 37,000 civilians in South Vietnam and

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routinely employed terror.* [326] Ami Pedahzur has writ- 2.4.14 Women in the Vietnam War ten that “the overall volume and lethality of Viet Cong terrorism rivals or exceeds all but a handful of terrorist American nurses campaigns waged over the last third of the twentieth century”.* [327] Notable Viet Cong atrocities include the massacre of over 3,000 unarmed civilians at Huế during the Tet Offensive and the incineration of hundreds of civilians at the Đắk Sơn massacre with flamethrowers.* [328] Up to 155,000 refugees fleeing the final North Vietnamese Spring Offensive were killed or abducted on the road to Tuy Hòa in 1975.* [329] According to Rummel, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops murdered between 106,000 and 227,000 civilians in South Vietnam.* [320] North Vietnam was also known for its inhumane and abusive treatment of American POWs, most notably in Hỏa Lò Prison (aka the Hanoi Hilton), where severe torture was employed to extract “confessions” .* [330] Da Nang, South Vietnam, 1968 Viet Cong insurgents reportedly sliced off the genitals of village chiefs and sewed them inside their bloody mouths, During the Vietnam War, American women served on cut off the tongues of helpless victims, rammed bamboo active duty doing a variety of jobs. Early in 1963, the lances through one ear and out the other, slashed open Army Nurse Corps (ANC) launched Operation Nightinthe wombs of pregnant women, machine gunned chil- gale, an intensive effort to recruit nurses to serve in Vietdren, hacked men and women to pieces with machetes, nam. Most nurses who volunteered to serve in Vietand cut off the fingers of small children who dared to nam came from predominantly working or middle-class get an education.* [189]* [331] According to a U.S. Senate families with histories of military service. The majorreport, squads were assigned monthly assassination quo- ity of these women were white Catholics and Protestas.* [332] Peer De Silva, former head of the Saigon de- tants.* [342] Because the need for medical aid was great, partment of the CIA, wrote that from as early as 1963, many nurses underwent a concentrated four-month trainViet Cong units were using disembowelment and other ing program before being deployed to Vietnam in the methods of mutilation for psychological warfare.* [333] ANC.* [343] Due to the shortage of staff, nurses usually In the Cambodian Civil War, Khmer Rouge insurgents worked twelve-hour shifts, six days per week and often reportedly committed atrocities during the war. These in- suffered from exhaustion. First Lieutenant Sharon Lane clude the murder of civilians and POWs by slowly sawing was the only female military nurse to be killed by enemy * off their heads a little more each day,* [334] the destruc- gunfire during the war, on 8 June 1969. [344] tion of Buddhist wats and the killing of monks,* [335] attacks on refugee camps involving the deliberate murder of babies and bomb threats against foreign aid workers,* [336] the abduction and assassination of journalists,* [337] and the shelling of Phnom Penh for more than a year.* [338] Journalist accounts stated that the Khmer Rouge shelling“tortured the capital almost continuously” , inflicting “random death and mutilation”on 2 million trapped civilians.* [339] The Khmer Rouge forcibly evacuated the entire city after taking it, in what has been described as a death march: François Ponchaud wrote: “I shall never forget one cripple who had neither hands nor feet, writhing along the ground like a severed worm, or a weeping father carrying his ten-year old daughter wrapped in a sheet tied around his neck like a sling, or the man with his foot dangling at the end of a leg to which it was attached by nothing but skin";* [340] John Swain recalled that the Khmer Rouge were“tipping out patients from the hospitals like garbage into the streets….In five years of war, this is the greatest caravan of human misery I have seen.”* [341]

A nurse treats a Vietnamese child, 1967

At the start of the Vietnam War, it was commonly thought that American women had no place in the military. Their traditional place had been in the domestic sphere, but with the war came opportunity for the expansion of gender roles. In Vietnam, women held a variety of jobs

2.4. VIETNAM WAR which included operating complex data processing equipment and serving as stenographers.* [345] Although a small number of women were assigned to combat zones, they were never allowed directly in the field of battle. The women who served in the military were solely volunteers. They faced a plethora of challenges, one of which was the relatively small number of female soldiers. Living in a male-dominated environment created tensions between the sexes. While this high male to female ratio was often uncomfortable for women, many men reported that having women in the field with them boosted their morale.* [346] Although this was not the women's purpose, it was one positive result of the their service. By 1973, approximately 7,500 women had served in Vietnam in the Southeast Asian theater.* [347] In that same year, the military lifted the prohibition on women entering the armed forces. American women serving in Vietnam were subject to societal stereotypes. Many Americans either considered females serving in Vietnam masculine for living under the army discipline, or judged them to be women of questionable moral character who enlisted for the sole purpose of seducing men.* [348] To address this problem, the ANC released advertisements portraying women in the ANC as “proper, professional and well protected.”(26) This effort to highlight the positive aspects of a nursing career reflected the ideas of second-wave feminism that occurred during the 1960s–1970s in the United States. Although female military nurses lived in a heavily male environment, very few cases of sexual harassment were ever reported.* [349]

155 ilies and the war effort. Women were enlisted in both the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the Viet Cong guerrilla insurgent force in South Vietnam. Some women also served for the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong intelligence services. In South Vietnam, many women voluntarily served in the ARVN's Women's Armed Force Corps (WAFC) and various other Women's corps in the military. Some, like in the WAFC, fought in combat with other soldiers. Others served as nurses and doctors in the battlefield and in military hospitals, or served in South Vietnam or America's intelligence agencies. During Diệm's presidency, Madame Nhu was the commander of the WAFC.* [350] The war saw more than one million rural people migrate or flee the fighting in the South Vietnamese countryside to the cities, especially Saigon. Among the internal refugees were many young women who became the ubiquitous “bargirls”of wartime South Vietnam“hawking her wares – be that cigarettes, liquor, or herself”to American and allied soldiers.* [351] American bases were ringed by bars and brothels.* [352] 8,040 Vietnamese women came to the United States as war brides between 1964 and 1975.* [353] Many mixedblood Amerasian children were left behind when their American fathers returned to the United States after their tour of duty in South Vietnam. 26,000 of them were permitted to immigrate to the United States in the 1980s and 1990s.* [354]

2.4.15 Black servicemen in Vietnam

Vietnamese women

Master-Sergeant and pharmacist Do Thi Trinh, part of the WAFC, supplying medication to ARVN dependents

Unlike the American women who went to Vietnam, North Vietnamese women were enlisted and fought in the combat zone as well as providing manual labor to keep the Ho Chi Minh trail open and cook for the soldiers. They also worked in the rice ﬁelds in North Vietnam and Viet Cong-held farming areas in South Vietnam's Mekong Delta region to provide food for their fam- A wounded African American soldier being carried away, 1968

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The experience of African American military personnel during the Vietnam War has received signiﬁcant attention. For example, the website “African-American Involvement in the Vietnam War”compiles examples of such coverage,* [355] as does the print and broadcast work of journalist Wallace Terry.

due to its ability to continue to function even in adverse, muddy conditions. Other weapons used by the Viet Cong included the World War II-era PPSh-41 submachine gun (both Soviet and Chinese versions), the SKS carbine, the DShK heavy machine gun and the RPG-2/B-40 grenade launcher.

The epigraph of Terry's book Bloods: An Oral History of the Vietnam War by Black Veterans (1984), includes the following quote: “I have an intuitive feeling that the Negro serviceman have a better understanding than whites of what the war is about.”– General William C. Westmoreland, U.S. Army, Saigon, 1967. That book's introduction includes observations about the impact of the war on the black community in general and on black servicemen specifically. Points he makes on the latter topic include: the higher proportion of combat casualties in Vietnam among African American servicemen than among American soldiers of other races, the shift toward and different attitudes of black military careerists versus black draftees, the discrimination encountered by black servicemen“on the battlefield in decorations, promotion and duty assignments”as well as their having to endure “the racial insults, cross-burnings and Confederate flags of their white comrades”– and the experiences faced by black soldiers stateside, during the war and after America's withdrawal.* [356] Upon the war's completion, black casualties made up 12.5% of US combat deaths, approximately equal to percentage of draft-eligible black men, though still slightly higher than the 10% who served in the military.* [357]

While the Viet Cong had both amphibious tanks (such as the PT-76) and light tanks (such as the Type 62), they also used bicycles to transport munitions. The US' heavily armored, 90 mm M48A3 Patton tank saw extensive action during the Vietnam War and over 600 were deployed with US Forces. They played an important role in infantry support. The US service rifle was initially the M14 (though some units were still using the WWII-era M1 Garand for a lack of M14s). Found to be unsuitable for jungle warfare, the M14 was replaced by M16 which was more accurate and lighter than the AK-47. For a period, the gun suffered from a jamming flaw known as “failure to extract”, which means that a spent cartridge case remained lodged in the action after a round is fired.* [361] According to a congressional report, the jamming was caused primarily by a change in gunpowder which was done without adequate testing and reflected a decision for which the safety of soldiers was a secondary consideration.* [362] That issue was solved in early 1968 with the issuance of the M16A1 that featured a chrome plated chamber among several other features.* [363] End-user satisfaction with the M16 was high except during this episode, but the M16 still has a reputation as a gun that jams easily.

The M60 machine gun GPMG (General Purpose Machine Gun) was the main machine gun of the US army at the time and many of them were put on helicopters, to Main article: Weapons of the Vietnam War provide suppressive ﬁre when landing in hostile regions. The communist forces were principally armed with The MAC-10 machine pistol was supplied to many special forces troops in the midpoint of the war. It also armed many CIA agents in the ﬁeld.

2.4.16

Weapons

Two aircraft which were prominent in the war were the AC-130 “Spectre” Gunship and the UH-1 “Huey” gunship. The AC-130 was a heavily armed ground-attack aircraft variant of the C-130 Hercules transport plane; it was used to provide close air support, air interdiction and force protection. The AC-130H “Spectre”was armed with two 20 mm M61 Vulcan cannons, one Bofors 40mm autocannon, and one 105 mm M102 howitzer. The Huey is a military helicopter powered by a single, turboshaft engine, with a two-bladed main rotor and tail rotor. Approximately 7,000 UH-1 aircraft saw service in Vietnam. Marines complete construction of M101 howitzer positions at a mountain-top ﬁre support base, 1968

The Claymore M18A1, an anti-personnel mine, was widely used during the war. Unlike a conventional land mine, the Claymore is command-detonated and direc* * Chinese [358] and Soviet weaponry [359] though some tional, meaning it is fired by remote-control and shoots guerrilla units were equipped with Western infantry a pattern of 700 one-eighth-inch steel balls into the kill weapons either captured from French stocks during the zone like a shotgun. First Indochina war or from ARVN units or bought on * the black market. [360] The ubiquitous Soviet AK-47 The aircraft ordnance used during the war included assault rifle was often regarded as the best rifle of the war, precision-guided munition, cluster bombs, and napalm, a

2.4. VIETNAM WAR

157

thickening/gelling agent generally mixed with petroleum or a similar fuel for use in an incendiary device, initially against buildings and later primarily as an anti-personnel weapon that sticks to skin and can burn down to the bone.* [23]

Radio communications The Vietnam War was the first conflict where U.S. forces had secure voice communication equipment available at the tactical level. The National Security Agency ran a crash program to provide U.S. forces with a family of security equipment code named NESTOR, fielding 17,000 units initially. Eventually 30,000 units were produced. However limitations of the units, including poor voice quality, reduced range, annoying time delays and logistical support issues led to only one unit in ten being used.* [364]* :Vol II, p.43 While many in the U.S. military believed that the Viet Cong and NVA would not be able to exploit insecure communications, interrogation of captured communication intelligence units showed they were able to understand the jargon and codes used in realtime and were often able to warn their side of impending U.S. actions.* [364]* :Vol II, pp. 4, 10

2.4.17

Aftermath

Events in Southeast Asia Further information: Mayaguez incident and Indochina refugee crisis On 2 July 1976, North and South Vietnam were merged to form the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.* [365] Over the decade following the end of the war, 1– 2.5 million South Vietnamese were sent to reeducation camps, with an estimated 165,000 prisoners dying.* [366]* [367]* [368] Jacqueline Desbarats, David T. Johnson, and Franklin E. Zimring estimate that between 65,000* [366] and 250,000* [369] South Vietnamese were executed, although data on post-war executions is sparse and the methodology employed by Desbarats and Karl D. Jackson in their survey of Vietnamese refugees was strongly criticized by Gareth Porter and James Roberts.* [370] R. J. Rummel, an analyst of political killings, estimated that about 50,000 South Vietnamese deported to “New Economic Zones”died performing hard labor,* [320] out of the 1 million that were sent.* [366] 200,000 to 400,000 Vietnamese boat people died at sea, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.* [371]

Vietnamese refugees ﬂeeing Vietnam, 1984

in mass graves, while demographic analysis suggests that the policies of the regime caused between 1.7 and 2.5 million excess deaths altogether (including disease and starvation).* [373] After repeated border clashes in 1978, Vietnam invaded Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia) and ousted the Khmer Rouge, supported by China, in the Cambodian–Vietnamese War. In response, China invaded Vietnam in 1979. The two countries fought a brief border war, known as the Sino-Vietnamese War. From 1978 to 1979, some 450,000 ethnic Chinese left Vietnam by boat as refugees or were expelled. The devastating impact of Khmer Rouge rule contributed to a 1979 famine in Cambodia, during which an additional 300,000 Cambodians perished.* [36]

Pathet Lao overthrew the royalist government of Laos in December 1975, establishing the Lao People's Democratic Republic.* [374] The conﬂict between Hmong rebels and the Pathet Lao continued in isolated pockets. The government of Laos has been accused of committing genocide against the Hmong in collaboration with the People's Army of Vietnam,* [375]* [376] with up to 100,000 killed out of a population of * * Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia, fell to the commu- 400,000. [377] [378] From 1975 to 1996, the United refugees from Thainist Khmer Rouge on 17 April 1975. Under the leader- States resettled some 250,000 Lao * [379] land, including 130,000 Hmong. ship of Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge would eventually kill 1– 3 million Cambodians in the Killing Fields, out of a pop- Over 3 million people left Vietnam, Laos, and Camboulation of around 8 million.* [37]* [38]* [372]* [373] At dia in the Indochina refugee crisis. Most Asian countries least 1,386,734 victims of execution have been counted were unwilling to accept these refugees, many of whom

158 fled by boat and were known as boat people.* [380] Between 1975 and 1998, an estimated 1.2 million refugees from Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries resettled in the United States, while Canada, Australia, and France resettled over 500,000. China accepted 250,000 people.* [381] In 1988, Vietnam suffered a famine that afflicted millions.* [382] Vietnam played a role in Asia similar to Cuba's in Latin America: it supported local revolutionary groups and was a headquarters for Soviet-style communism.* [383] Unexploded ordnance, mostly from U.S. bombing, continue to detonate and kill people today. The Vietnamese government claims that ordnance has killed some 42,000 people since the war officially ended.* [384]* [385] In 2012 alone, unexploded bombs and other ordnance claimed 500 casualties in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, according to activists and government databases.* [386] Agent Orange and similar chemical substances used by the U.S. have also caused a considerable number of deaths and injuries over the years, including the US Air Force crew that handled them. On 9 August 2012, the United States and Vietnam began a cooperative cleaning up of the toxic chemical on part of Danang International Airport, marking the first time Washington has been involved in cleaning up Agent Orange in Vietnam.* [387]

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM until we know the enemy and know our allies and know ourselves, we'd better keep out of this kind of dirty business. It's very dangerous.”* [390]* [391] President Ronald Reagan coined the term "Vietnam Syndrome" to describe the reluctance of the American public and politicians to support further international interventions after Vietnam. Some have suggested that “the responsibility for the ultimate failure of this policy [America's withdrawal from Vietnam] lies not with the men who fought, but with those in Congress…"* [392] Alternatively, the oﬃcial history of the United States Army noted that "tactics have often seemed to exist apart from larger issues, strategies, and objectives. Yet in Vietnam the Army experienced tactical success and strategic failure…The…Vietnam War …legacy may be the lesson that unique historical, political, cultural, and social factors always impinge on the military…Success rests not only on military progress but on correctly analyzing the nature of the particular conﬂict, understanding the enemy's strategy, and assessing the strengths and weaknesses of allies. A new humility and a new sophistication may form the best parts of a complex heritage left to the Army by the long, bitter war in Vietnam.”* [168]

Eﬀect on the United States

Vietnam War protests at the Pentagon, October 1967

In the post-war era, Americans struggled to absorb the lessons of the military intervention.* [389] As General Maxwell Taylor, one of the principal architects of the war, noted,“First, we didn't know ourselves. We thought that we were going into another Korean War, but this was a diﬀerent country. Secondly, we didn't know our South Vietnamese allies…And we knew less about North Vietnam. Who was Ho Chi Minh? Nobody really knew. So,

A young Marine private waits on the beach during the Marine landing, Da Nang, 3 August 1965

U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote in a secret memo to president Gerald Ford that “in terms of military tactics, we cannot help draw the conclusion that our armed forces are not suited to this kind of war. Even

2.4. VIETNAM WAR the Special Forces who had been designed for it could not prevail.”* [393] Even Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara concluded that “the achievement of a military victory by U.S. forces in Vietnam was indeed a dangerous illusion.”* [394] Doubts surfaced as to the effectiveness of large-scale, sustained bombing. As Army Chief of Staff Harold Keith Johnson noted,“if anything came out of Vietnam, it was that air power couldn't do the job.”* [395] Even General William Westmoreland admitted that the bombing had been ineffective. As he remarked, “I still doubt that the North Vietnamese would have relented.”* [395] The inability to bring Hanoi to the bargaining table by bombing also illustrated another U.S. miscalculation. The North's leadership was composed of hardened communists who had been fighting for thirty years. They had defeated the French, and their tenacity as both nationalists and communists was formidable. Ho Chi Minh is quoted as saying, “You can kill ten of my men for every one I kill of yours…But even at these odds you will lose and I will win.”* [396]

159 By war's end, 58,220 American soldiers had been killed,* [A 2] more than 150,000 had been wounded, and at least 21,000 had been permanently disabled.* [400] The average age of the U.S. troops killed in Vietnam was 23.11 years.* [401] According to Dale Kueter,“Of those killed in combat, 86.3 percent were white, 12.5 percent were black and the remainder from other races.”* [402] Approximately 830,000 Vietnam veterans suﬀered some degree of posttraumatic stress disorder.* [400] An estimated 125,000 Americans left for Canada to avoid the Vietnam draft,* [403] and approximately 50,000 American servicemen deserted.* [404] In 1977, United States president Jimmy Carter granted a full and unconditional pardon to all Vietnam-era draft dodgers.* [405] The Vietnam War POW/MIA issue, concerning the fate of U.S. service personnel listed as missing in action, persisted for many years after the war's conclusion. The costs of the war loom large in American popular consciousness; a 1990 poll showed that the public incorrectly believed that more Americans lost their lives in Vietnam than in World War II.* [406] As of 2013, the U.S. government is paying Vietnam veterans and their families or survivors more than 22 billion dollars a year in war-related claims.* [407]* [408] Impact on the U.S. military

Marine gets his wounds treated during operations in Huế City, 1968

The Vietnam War called into question the U.S. Army doctrine. Marine Corps General Victor H. Krulak heavily criticised Westmoreland's attrition strategy, calling it “wasteful of American lives…with small likelihood of a successful outcome.”* [395] In addition, doubts surfaced about the ability of the military to train foreign forces. Between 1965 and 1975, the United States spent $111 billion on the war ($686 billion in FY2008 dollars).* [397] This resulted in a large federal budget deﬁcit. More than 3 million Americans served in the Vietnam War, some 1.5 million of whom actually saw combat in Vietnam.* [398] James E. Westheider wrote that“At the height of American involvement in 1968, for example, there were 543,000 American military personnel in Vietnam, but only 80,000 were considered combat troops.” * [399] Conscription in the United States had been controlled by the president since World War II, but ended in 1973.

As the Vietnam War continued inconclusively and became more unpopular with the American public, morale declined and disciplinary problems grew among American enlisted men and junior, non-career officers. Drug use, racial tensions, and the growing incidence of fragging—attempting to kill unpopular officers and noncommissioned officers with grenades or other weapons —created severe problems for the U.S. military and impacted its capability of undertaking combat operations. By 1971, a U.S. Army colonel writing in the Armed Forces Journal declared: “By every conceivable indicator, our army that now remains in Vietnam is in a state approaching collapse, with individual units avoiding or having refused combat, murdering their officers and non commissioned officers, drug-ridden, and dispirited where not near mutinous....The morale, discipline, and battleworthiness of the U.S. Armed Forces are, with a few salient exceptions, lower and worse than at any time in this century and possibly in the history of the United States.”* [409] Between 1969 and 1971 the US Army recorded more than 700 attacks by troops on their own officers. Eighty-three officers were killed and almost 650 were injured.* [410] Ron Milam has questioned the severity of the “breakdown”of the U.S. armed forces, especially among combat troops, as reflecting the opinions of“angry colonels” who deplored the erosion of traditional military values during the Vietnam War.* [411] Although acknowledging serious problems, he questions the alleged “near mutinous”conduct of junior officers and enlisted men in com-

160 bat. Investigating one combat refusal incident, a journalist declared, “A certain sense of independence, a reluctance to behave according to the military's insistence on obedience, like pawns or puppets...The grunts [infantrymen] were determined to survive...they insisted of having something to say about the making of decisions that determined whether they might live or die.”* [412]

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM and 2,4-D (virtually identical to America's use in Vietnam) on a large scale throughout the Malayan Emergency in the 1950s in order to destroy bushes, crops, and trees in eﬀort to deny communist insurgents the concealment they needed to ambush passing convoys.* [418] Indeed, Secretary of State Dean Rusk told President John F. Kennedy on 24 November 1961, that "[t]he use of defoliant does not violate any rule of international law concerning the conduct of chemical warfare and is an accepted tactic of war. Precedent has been established by the British during the emergency in Malaya in their use of aircraft for destroying crops by chemical spraying.”* [419]

The morale and discipline problems and resistance to conscription (the draft) were important factors leading to the creation of an all-volunteer military force by the United States and the termination of conscription. The last conscript was inducted into the army in 1973.* [413]* [414] The all-volunteer military moderated The defoliants, which were distributed in drums marked some of the coercive methods of discipline previously with color-coded bands, included the "Rainbow Herbiused to maintain order in military ranks.* [415] cides"—Agent Pink, Agent Green, Agent Purple, Agent Blue, Agent White, and, most famously, Agent Orange, which included dioxin as a by-product of its manufacture. Eﬀects of U.S. chemical defoliation About 12 million gallons (45,000,000 L) of Agent Orange were sprayed over Southeast Asia during the American involvement. A prime area of Ranch Hand operations was in the Mekong Delta, where the U.S. Navy patrol boats were vulnerable to attack from the undergrowth at the water's edge. In 1961 and 1962, the Kennedy administration authorized the use of chemicals to destroy rice crops. Between 1961 and 1967, the U.S. Air Force sprayed 20 million U.S. gallons (75,700,000 L) of concentrated herbicides over 6 million acres (24,000 km2 ) of crops and trees, affecting an estimated 13% of South Vietnam's land. In 1965, 42% of all herbicide was sprayed over food crops. Another purpose of herbicide use was to drive civilian populations into RVN-controlled areas.* [420]

U.S. helicopter spraying chemical defoliants in the Mekong Delta, South Vietnam

Vietnamese victims aﬀected by Agent Orange attempted a class action lawsuit against Dow Chemical and other US chemical manufacturers, but District Court Judge Jack B. Weinstein dismissed their case.* [421] They appealed, but the dismissal was cemented in February 2008 by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.* [422] As of 2006, the Vietnamese government estimates that there are over 4,000,000 victims of dioxin poisoning in Vietnam, although the United States government denies any conclusive scientiﬁc links between Agent Orange and the Vietnamese victims of dioxin poisoning. In some areas of southern Vietnam, dioxin levels remain at over 100 times the accepted international standard.* [423]

One of the most controversial aspects of the U.S. military effort in Southeast Asia was the widespread use of chemical defoliants between 1961 and 1971. They were used to defoliate large parts of the countryside to prevent the Viet Cong from being able to hide their weapons and encampments under the foliage. These chemicals continue The U.S. Veterans Administration has listed prostate to change the landscape, cause diseases and birth defects, cancer, respiratory cancers, multiple myeloma, Diabetes and poison the food chain.* [416]* [417] mellitus type 2, B-cell lymphomas, soft-tissue sarcoma, Early in the American military effort, it was decided that chloracne, porphyria cutanea tarda, peripheral neuropasince the enemy were hiding their activities under triple- thy, and spina bifida in children of veterans exposed to canopy jungle, a useful first step might be to defoliate cer- Agent Orange.* [424] tain areas. This was especially true of growth surrounding bases (both large and small) in what became known as Operation Ranch Hand. Corporations like Dow Chemi- Casualties cal Company and Monsanto were given the task of developing herbicides for this purpose. American officials also See also: Vietnam War casualties pointed out that the British had previously used 2,4,5-T

2.4. VIETNAM WAR

161

Estimates of the number of casualties vary, with Critics Group, Phil Ochs, John Lennon, Nina Simone, one source suggesting up to 3.8 million violent war Neil Young, Tom Paxton, Jimmy Cliff and Arlo Guthrie deaths in Vietnam for the period 1955 to 2002.* [427] 195,000–430,000 South Vietnamese civilians died in the war.* [19]* [20] Extrapolating from a 1969 US intelli- 2.4.18 See also gence report, Guenter Lewy estimated 65,000 North • Aircraft losses of the Vietnam War Vietnamese civilians died in the war.* [19] The military forces of South Vietnam suffered an estimated 254,256 • Awards and decorations of the Vietnam War killed between 1960 and 1974 and additional deaths from * 1954–1959 and in 1975. [428] The official US Depart• Battle of Quang Tri (1968) ment of Defense figure was 950,765 communist forces killed in Vietnam from 1965 to 1974. Defense De• Counterculture of the 1960s partment officials believed that these body count figures need to be deflated by 30 percent. In addition, Guenter • Củ Chi tunnels Lewy assumes that one-third of the reported “enemy” • Đắk Sơn massacre killed may have been civilians, concluding that the actual number of deaths of communist military forces was • Draft lottery (1969) probably closer to 444,000.* [19] A detailed demographic study calculated 791,000–1,141,000 war-related deaths • Kit Carson Scouts for all of Vietnam.* [18] Between 240,000* [38]* [429] and 300,000* [36] Cambodians died during the war. • List of Medal of Honor recipients for the Vietnam About 60,000 Laotians also died,* [430] and 58,300 U.S. War military personnel were killed,* [431] of which 1,596 are still listed as missing as of 2015.* [432] • List of United States servicemembers and civilians missing in action during the Vietnam War (1968– 69) Popular culture • McNamara Line See also: Vietnam War in film, Vietnam War in games and War in popular culture

• Major General Michael D. Healy • Operation Wheeler/Wallowa

The Vietnam War has been featured extensively in television, film, video games, and literature in the participant countries. In American popular culture, the“Crazy Vietnam Veteran”, who was suffering from Posttraumatic stress disorder, became a common stock character after the war. One of the first major films based on the Vietnam War was John Wayne's pro-war film, The Green Berets (1968). Further cinematic representations were released during the 1970s and 1980s, including Michael Cimino's The Deer Hunter (1978), Francis Ford Coppola's Apocalypse Now (1979), Oliver Stone's Platoon (1986) – based on his service in the U.S. Military during the Vietnam War, Stanley Kubrick's Full Metal Jacket (1987), Hamburger Hill (1987), and Casualties of War (1989). Later films would include We Were Soldiers (2002) and Rescue Dawn (2007).* [23]

• Patrol Craft Fast • Protests of 1968 • The Sixties Unplugged • United States Air Force in Thailand • United States Army Special Forces in popular culture • U.S. news media and the Vietnam War • Vietnam War Crimes Working Group Files • Weapons of the Cambodian Civil War • Weapons of the Vietnam War

• Winter Soldier Investigation The war also influenced a generation of musicians and songwriters in Vietnam and the United States, both anti-war and pro/anti-communist. The band Country General: Joe and the Fish recorded “I-Feel-Like-I'm-Fixin'-ToDie Rag”/ The “Fish”Cheer in 1965, and it be• History of Cambodia came one of the most influential anti-Vietnam protest anthems.* [23] Many songwriters and musicians supported • History of Laos the anti-war movement, including Pete Seeger, Joan Baez, Peggy Seeger, Ewan MacColl, Barbara Dane, The • List of conflicts in Asia

162

2.4.19

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM

Annotations

[1] Due to the early presence of American troops in Vietnam the start date of the Vietnam War is a matter of debate. In 1998, after a high level review by the Department of Defense (DoD) and through the efforts of Richard B. Fitzgibbon's family the start date of the Vietnam War according to the US government was officially changed to 1 November 1955.* [41] U.S. government reports currently cite 1 November 1955 as the commencement date of the“Vietnam Conflict”, because this date marked when the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Indochina (deployed to Southeast Asia under President Truman) was reorganized into country-specific units and MAAG Vietnam was established.* [42] Other start dates include when Hanoi authorized Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam to begin a low-level insurgency in December 1956,* [43] whereas some view 26 September 1959 when the first battle occurred between the Viet Cong and the South Vietnamese army, as the start date.* [44] [2] The figures of 58,220 and 303,644 for U.S. deaths and wounded come from the Department of Defense Statistical Information Analysis Division (SIAD), Defense Manpower Data Center, as well as from a Department of Veterans fact sheet dated May 2010* [59] the CRS (Congressional Research Service) Report for Congress, American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics, dated 26 February 2010,* [60] and the book Crucible Vietnam: Memoir of an Infantry Lieutenant.* [61] Some other sources give different figures (e.g. the 2005/2006 documentary Heart of Darkness: The Vietnam War Chronicles 1945–1975 cited elsewhere in this article gives a figure of 58,159 U.S. deaths,* [21] and the 2007 book Vietnam Sons gives a figure of 58,226)* [62] [3] The Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina (with an authorized strength of 128 men) was set up in September 1950 with a mission to oversee the use and distribution of US military equipment by the French and their allies. [4] The Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng had previously formed in Nanjing, China, at some point between August 1935 and early 1936 when the non-communist Vietnamese Nationalist Party (Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng, or Viet Quoc), led by Nguyễn Thái Học, and some members of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) and a number of other Vietnamese nationalist parties formed an antiimperialist united front. This organisation soon lapsed into inactivity, only to be revived by the ICP and Ho Chi Minh in 1941.* [71] [5] On 8 March 1965 the first American combat troops the, Third Marine Regiment, Third Marine Division, began landing in Vietnam to protect the Da Nang airport.* [261]* [262]

2.4.20

Notes

[1] “ALLIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM”. Retrieved 24 September 2011. [2] “Chapter Three: 1957-1969 Early Relations between Malaysia and Vietnam”(PDF). University of Malaya Student Repository. p. 72. Retrieved 17 October 2015.

[3] “Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj (Profiles of Malaysia's Foreign Ministers)" (PDF). Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (IDFR), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Malaysia). 2008. p. 31. ISBN 978-983-222026-8. Archived (PDF) from the original on 16 October 2015. Retrieved 17 October 2015. The Tunku had been personally responsible for Malaya's partisan support of the South Vietnamese regime in its fight against the Vietcong and, in reply to a Parliamentary question on 6 February 1962, he had listed all the used weapons and equipment of the Royal Malaya Police given to Saigon. These included a total of 45,707 single-barrel shotguns, 611 armoured cars and smaller numbers of carbines and pistols. Writing in 1975, he revealed that“we had clandestinely been giving 'aid' to Vietnam since early 1958. Published American archival sources now reveal that the actual Malaysian contributions to the war effort in Vietnam included the following:“over 5,000 Vietnamese officers trained in Malaysia; training of 150 U.S. soldiers in handling Tracker Dogs; a rather impressive list of military equipment and weapons given to Viet-Nam after the end of the Malaysian insurgency (for example, 641 armored personnel carriers, 56,000 shotguns); and a creditable amount of civil assistance (transportation equipment, cholera vaccine, and flood relief)". It is undeniable that the Government's policy of supporting the South Vietnamese regime with arms, equipment and training was regarded by some quarters, especially the Opposition parties, as a form of interfering in the internal affairs of that country and the Tunku's valiant efforts to defend it were not convincing enough, from a purely foreign policy standpoint. line feed character in |quote= at position 964 (help) [4] The Cuban Military Under Castro, 1989. Page 76 [5] Cuba in the World, 1979. Page 66 [6] “Cesky a slovensky svet”. Svet.czsk.net. Retrieved 24 February 2014. [7] “Bilaterální vztahy České republiky a Vietnamské socialistické republiky | Mezinárodní vztahy | e-Polis – Internetový politologický časopis”. E-polis.cz. Retrieved 24 February 2014. [8] “Foreign Affairs in the 1960s and 1970s”. Library of Congress. 1992. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Bulgaria gave official military support to many national liberation causes, most notably in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, (North Vietnam)… [9] “Project MUSE - Sailing in the Shadow of the Vietnam War: The GDR Government and the “Vietnam Bonus” of the Early 1970s” (PDF). [10] Le Gro, p. 28. [11] “Vietnam War : US Troop Strength”. Historycentral.com. Retrieved 17 October 2009. [12] “Facts about the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Collection”. nps.gov. (citing The first American ground combat troops landed in South Vietnam during March 1965, specifically the U.S. Third Marine Regiment, Third Marine Division, deployed to Vietnam from Okinawa to defend the Da Nang, Vietnam, airfield. During the height

2.4. VIETNAM WAR

of U.S. military involvement, 31 December 1968, the breakdown of allied forces were as follows: 536,100 U.S. military personnel, with 30,610 U.S. military having been killed to date; 65,000 Free World Forces personnel; 820,000 South Vietnam Armed Forces (SVNAF) with 88,343 having been killed to date. At the war's end, there were approximately 2,200 U.S. missing in action (MIA) and prisoners of war (POW). Source: Harry G. Summers Jr. Vietnam War Almanac, Facts on File Publishing, 1985.) [13] Vietnam Marines 1965–73. Osprey Publishing. 8 March 1965. Retrieved 29 April 2011. [14] Vietnam War After Action Reports, BACM Research, 2009, page 430 [15] “China admits 320,000 troops fought in Vietnam”. Toledo Blade. Reuters. 16 May 1989. Retrieved 24 December 2013. [16] Roy, Denny (1998). China's Foreign Relations. Rowman & Littleﬁeld. p. 27. ISBN 978-0847690138. [17] China and Vietnam. [18] Charles Hirschman et al.,“Vietnamese Casualties During the American War: A New Estimate,” Population and Development Review, December 1995. [19] Lewy 1978, pp. 450–3. [20] Thayer 1985, chap. 12. [21] Aaron Ulrich (editor); Edward FeuerHerd (producer and director) (2005 & 2006). Heart of Darkness: The Vietnam War Chronicles 1945–1975 (Box set, Color, Dolby, DVD-Video, Full Screen, NTSC, Dolby, Vision Software) (Documentary). Koch Vision. Event occurs at 321 minutes. ISBN 1-4172-2920-9. Check date values in: |date= (help) [22] Rummel, R.J (1997), “Table 6.1A. Vietnam Democide : Estimates, Sources, and Calculations,” (GIF), Freedom, Democracy, Peace; Power, Democide, and War, University of Hawaii System External link in |work= (help)

163

[29] “Asian Allies in Vietnam” (PDF). Embassy of South Vietnam. March 1970. Retrieved 18 October 2015. [30] Associated Press, 3 April 1995, “Vietnam Says 1.1 Million Died Fighting For North.” [31] Soames, John. A History of the World, Routledge, 2005. [32] Dunnigan, James & Nofi, Albert: Dirty Little Secrets of the Vietnam War: Military Information You're Not Supposed to Know. St. Martin's Press, 2000, p. 284. ISBN 0-31225282-X. [33] “North Korea fought in Vietnam War”. BBC News. 31 March 2000. Retrieved 18 October 2015. [34] Shenon, Philip (23 April 1995).“20 Years After Victory, Vietnamese Communists Ponder How to Celebrate”. The New York Times. Retrieved 24 February 2011. The Vietnamese government officially claimed a rough estimate of 2 million civilian deaths, but it did not divide these deaths between those of North and South Vietnam. [35] “fifty years of violent war deaths: data analysis from the world health survey program: BMJ”. 23 April 2008. Retrieved 5 January 2013. From 1955 to 2002, data from the surveys indicated an estimated 5.4 million violent war deaths …3.8 million in Vietnam [36] Heuveline, Patrick (2001). “The Demographic Analysis of Mortality in Cambodia.”In Forced Migration and Mortality, eds. Holly E. Reed and Charles B. Keely. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. [37] Sliwinski 1995. [38] Banister, Judith, and Paige Johnson (1993). “After the Nightmare: The Population of Cambodia.”In Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations and the International Community, ed. Ben Kiernan. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies. [39] Factasy. “The Vietnam War or Second Indochina War” . PRLog. Retrieved 29 June 2013.

[23] Tucker, Spencer E. The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History ABC-CLIO. ISBN 1-85109-961-1

[40] Lind, Michael (1999). “Vietnam, The Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America's Most Disastrous Military Conﬂict”. New York Times. Retrieved 17 January 2014.

[24] “Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund - News”.

[41] DoD 1998

[25] “Australian casualties in the Vietnam War, 1962–72 | Australian War Memorial”. Awm.gov.au. Retrieved 29 June 2013.

[42] Lawrence 2009, p. 20.

[26] “Overview of the war in Vietnam | VietnamWar.govt.nz, VietNew Zealand and the Vietnam War”. namwar.govt.nz. 16 July 1965. Retrieved 29 June 2013.

[44] Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954–1960, The Pentagon Papers (Gravel Edition), Volume 1, Chapter 5, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), Section 3, pp. 314– 346; International Relations Department, Mount Holyoke College.

[27] The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History By Spencer C. Tucker "https: //books.google.com/?id=qh5lffww-KsC" [28] “Chapter III: The Philippines”. History.army.mil. Retrieved 24 February 2014.

[43] Olson & Roberts 1991, p. 67.

[45] “Vietnam War”. Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved 5 March 2008. Meanwhile, the United States, its military demoralized and its civilian electorate deeply divided, began a process of coming to terms with defeat in its longest and most controversial war

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[46] Digital History, Steven Mintz. “The Vietnam War”. Digitalhistory.uh.edu. Archived from the original on 30 October 2011. Retrieved 31 October 2011.

[65] Tucker, Spencer C. (2011) The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History ABCCLIO. ISBN 1-85109-961-1, p. xli

[47] Major General George S. Eckhardt, Vietnam Studies Command and Control 1950–1969, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. (1991), p. 6

[66] Ooi, Keat Gin. Southeast Asia: a historical encyclopedia, from Angkor Wat to East Timor. ABC-CLIO; 2004. ISBN 978-1-57607-770-2. p. 520.

[48] Vietnam War Statistics and Facts 1, 25th Aviation Battalion website.

[67] Rai, Lajpat. Social Science. FK Publications; ISBN 97881-89611-12-5. p. 22.

[49] Thee, Marek (1976).“The Indochina Wars: Great Power Involvement - Escalation and Disengagement”. Journal of Peace Research (Sage Publications) 13 (2): 117. ISSN 1460-3578 – via JSTOR. (subscription required (help)).

[68] Dommen, Arthur J. The Indochinese experience of the French and the Americans: nationalism and communism in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Indiana University Press; 2001. ISBN 978-0-253-33854-9. p. 4–19.

[50] Kolko 1985, pp. 457, 461ﬀ.

[69] Neale 2001, p. 3.

[51] Shenon, Philip (23 April 1995).“20 Years After Victory, Vietnamese Communists Ponder How to Celebrate”. The New York Times. Retrieved 24 February 2011.

[70] Neale 2001, p. 17.

[52] “fifty years of violent war deaths: data analysis from the world health survey program: BMJ”. 23 April 2008. Retrieved 5 January 2013. [53] Warner, Roger, Shooting at the Moon (1996), pp. 366, estimates 30,000 Hmong. [54] Obermeyer,“Fifty years of violent war deaths from Vietnam to Bosnia”, British Medical Journal, 2008, estimates 60,000 total. [55] T. Lomperis, From People's War to People's Rule, (1996), estimates 35,000 total. [56] Small, Melvin & Joel David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars 1816–1980, (1982), estimates 20,000 total. [57] Taylor, Charles Lewis, The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, estimates 20,000 total. [58] Stuart-Fox 1997, p. 144, which estimates 200,000 by 1973. [59] America's Wars (PDF) (Report). Department of Veterans Affairs. May 2010. [60] Anne Leland; Mari–Jana“M-J”Oboroceanu (26 February 2010). American War and Military Operations: Casualties: Lists and Statistics (PDF) (Report). Congressional Research Service. [61] Lawrence 2009, pp. 65, 107, 154, 217 [62] Kueter, Dale. Vietnam Sons: For Some, the War Never Ended. AuthorHouse (21 March 2007). ISBN 9781425969318 [63] Moore, Harold. G and Joseph L. Galloway We Are Soldiers Still: A Journey Back to the Battlefields of Vietnam (p. 57). [64] “Asian-Nation: Asian American History, Demographics, & Issues:: The American / Viet Nam War”. Retrieved 18 August 2008. The Viet Nam War is also called 'The American War' by the Vietnamese

[71] Sophie Quinn-Judge (2003). Ho Chi Minh: the missing years, 1919–1941. C. Hurst. pp. 212–213. ISBN 978-185065-658-6. [72] Tucker 1999, p. 42 [73] Brocheux 2007, p. 198 [74] Neale 2001, p. 18. [75] Koh, David (21 August 2008). “Vietnam needs to remember famine of 1945”. The Straits Times (Singapore). [76] Neale 2001, pp. 18–9. [77] Kolko 1985, p. 36. [78] Neale 2001, p. 19. [79] Neale 2001, p. 20. [80] Interview with Carleton Swift, http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/ vietnam-9dc948-interview-with-carleton-swift

1981,

[81] Stuart-Fox 1997, p. . [82] Interview with Archimedes L. A. Patti, 1981, http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/ vietnam-bf3262-interview-with-archimedes-l-a-patti-1981 [83] Kolko 1985, p. 37. [84] Dommen, Arthur J. (2001), The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans, Indiana University Press, pg. 120. “According to one estimate, 15,000 nationalists were massacred”in the summer of 1946 (pg. 154). In addition,“100,000 to 150,000 [civilians] had been assassinated by the Viet Minh”by the end of the First Indochina war (pg. 252). [85] Willbanks 2009, p. 8 [86] Neale 2001, p. 24. [87] Neale 2001, pp. 23–4. [88] Willbanks 2009, p. 9 [89] “Franco-Vietnam Agreement of March 6th, 1946”. Vietnamgear.com. 6 March 1946. Retrieved 29 April 2011.

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[90] “Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Chapter !, Section 2” [115] Alec Holcombe, Politburo's Directive Issued on May 4, . Mtholyoke.edu. Retrieved 29 April 2011. 1953, on Some Special Issues regarding Mass Mobilization Journal of Vietnamese Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Sum[91] Peter Dennis (1987). Troubled days of peace: Mountbatmer 2010), pp. 243–247, quoting a translated Politburo ten and South East Asia command, 1945–46. Manchester directive from 4 May 1953. This directive was published University Press ND. p. 179. ISBN 978-0-7190-2205-0. in Complete Collection of Party Documents (Van Kien Dang Toan Tap), a 54 volume work authorized by the [92] Neale 2001, p. 25. Vietnamese Communist Party. [93] McNamara 1999, pp. 377–9.

[116] Turner, Robert F. (1975). Vietnamese Communism: Its Origins and Development. Hoover Institution Publica[94] “The Vietnam War Seeds of Conﬂict 1945 – 1960”. The tions. p. 143. ISBN 978-0817964313. History Place. Retrieved 13 May 2013. [95] Pentagon Papers, Gravel, ed, Chapter 2, 'U.S. Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War', p. 54. [96] Ang, Cheng Guan, The Vietnam War from the Other Side, p. 14. Routledge (2002).

[117] cf. Gittinger, J. Price, “Communist Land Policy in Viet Nam”, Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 29, No. 8, 1957, p. 118. [118] Dommen, Arthur J. (2001), The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans, Indiana University Press, p. 340, gives a lower estimate of 32,000 executions.

[97] “The History Place – Vietnam War 1945–1960”. Re[119] trieved 11 June 2008. [120] [98] Herring 2001, p. 18. [121] [99] Zinn, A People's History of the United States, p. 471. [122] [100] Vietnam The Ten Thousand Day War, Thames 1981, Michael Maclear, p. 57. [123]

Appy 2006, pp. 46–7. The Pentagon Papers (1971), Beacon Press, vol. 3, p. 134. The Pentagon Papers (1971), Beacon Press, vol. 3, p. 119. The Pentagon Papers (1971), Beacon Press, vol. 3, p. 140. The Pentagon Papers (1971), Beacon Press, vol. 3, pp. 570–71.

[101] Vietnam at War: The History: 1946–1975, ISBN 978-019-506792-7, p. 263. [124] Dwight D. Eisenhower. Mandate for Change. Garden City, New Jersey. Doubleday & Company, 1963, p. 372. [102] Dien Bien Phu, Air Force Magazine 87:8, August 2004. [125] The Pentagon Papers (1971), Beacon Press, vol. 3, p. 252. [103] Tucker 1999, p. 76 [126] The Pentagon Papers (1971), Beacon Press, vol. 3, p. 246. [104] The U.S. Navy: a history, Naval Institute Press, 1997, [127] Woodruﬀ 2005, p. 6 states: "The elections were not held. Nathan Miller, ISBN 978-1-55750-595-8, pp. 67–68. South Vietnam, which had not signed the Geneva Accords, [105] The Pentagon Papers. Gravel, ed. vol. 1, pp. 391–404. did not believe the Communists in North Vietnam would allow a fair election. In January 1957, the International [106] Press release by the Embassy of the Republic of Vietnam, Control Commission (ICC), comprising observers from Inquoted from the Washington, D.C. press and Information dia, Poland, and Canada, agreed with this perception, reService, vol I. no. 18 (22 July 1955) and no. 20 (18 porting that neither South nor North Vietnam had honored August 1955), in Chapter 19 of Gettleman, Franklin and the armistice agreement. With the French gone, a return to Young, Vietnam and America: A Documented History, pp. the traditional power struggle between north and south had 103–105. begun again." [107] Jacobs, pp. 45–55.

[128] Karnow 1997, p. 224.

[108] Fall 1967, p. .

[129] Gerdes (ed.) Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons: The Vietnam War p. 19.

[109] Vietnam Divided by B.S.N. Murti, Asian Publishing House, 1964. [130] Turner 1975, pp. 193–4, 202–3, 215–7 [110] Turner 1975, p. 102.

[131] McNamara 1999, p. 19.

[111] Karnow 1997, p. 238.

[132] John F. Kennedy. "America's Stakes in Vietnam". Speech to the American Friends of Vietnam, June 1956. Archived 28 March 2014 at the Wayback Machine

[112] Kolko 1985, p. 98.

[113] 1 Pentagon Papers (The Senator Gravel Edition), 247, 328 [133] McNamara 1999, pp. 200–1. (Boston, Beacon Press, 1971). [134] “The Pentagon Papers Gravel Edition Volume 1, Chapter [114] John Prados, “The Numbers Game: How Many Viet5, “Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954– namese Fled South In 1954?" at the Wayback Ma1960"". Mtholyoke.edu. Retrieved 31 October 2011. chine (archived 27 May 2006), The VVA Veteran, January/February 2005. Retrieved 21 January 2007. [135] Kolko 1985, p. 89.

166

[136] Lewy 1978, pp. 294–5.

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[137] Karnow 1997, p. 230.

[163] James Gibson, The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam (Boston/New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986), p. 88.

[138] Excerpts from Law 10/59, 6 May 1959.

[164] Karnow 1997, p. 326.

[139] Marilyn Young, The Vietnam Wars: 1945—1990 (New [165] York: Harper Perennial, 1991), p. 73 [166] [140] Jeﬀrey Race, War Comes to Long An (University of California Press, 1972), pp107, 122. [141] Ang, Cheng Guan (2002). The Vietnam War from the Other Side. RoutledgeCurzon. pp. 16, 58, 76. ISBN 0- [167] 7007-1615-7. [168] [142] Olson & Roberts 1991, p. 67. This decision was made at the 11th Plenary Session of the [169] Lao Dong Central Committee. [170] [143] Military History Institute of Vietnam,(2002) Victory in Vietnam: The Oﬃcial History of the People's Army of [171]

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Vietnam, 1954–1975, translated by Merle L. Pribbenow. [172] U.S. Special Forces: A Guide to America's Special OperUniversity Press of Kansas. p. 68. ISBN 0-7006-1175-4. ations Units : the World's Most Elite Fighting Force, By Samuel A. Southworth, Stephen Tanner, Published by Da [144] “The History Place – Vietnam War 1945–1960”. ReCapo Press, 2002, ISBN 978-0-306-81165-4. trieved 11 June 2008. [145] Victory in Vietnam, p. xi. [146] Prados 2006. [147] The Economist, 26 February 1983.

[173] Shooting at the Moon by Roger Warner – The history of CIA/IAD'S 15-year involvement in conducting the secret war in Laos, 1960–1975, and the career of CIA PMCO (paramilitary case oﬃcer) Bill Lair.

[174] Karnow 1997, pp. 336–9. Johnson viewed many members that he inherited from Kennedy's cabinet with distrust because he had never pen[149] Karnow 1997, p. 264. etrated their circle during Kennedy's presidency; to John[150] The Avalon Project at Yale Law School. Inaugural Adson's mind, those like W. Averell Harriman and Dean dress of John F. Kennedy. Acheson spoke a diﬀerent language. [148] Washington Post, 23 April 1985.

[151] Karnow 1997, p. 265: “Kennedy sidestepped Laos, [175] Shortly after the assassination of Kennedy, when whose rugged terrain was no battleground for American McGeorge Bundy called LBJ on the phone, LBJ resoldiers.” sponded: “Goddammit, Bundy. I've told you that when I want you I'll call you.”Brian VanDeMark, Into the Quag[152] The case of John F. Kennedy and Vietnam Presidential mire (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 13. Studies Quarterly. [176] Karnow 1997, p. 339. [153] Mann, Robert. A Grand Delusion, Basic Books, 2002. Before a small group, including Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., the new president also said,“We should stop playing cops [154] Karnow 1997, p. 267. and robbers [a reference to Diệm's failed leadership] and [155] VTF 1969, IV. B. 4., pp. 1–2 get back to…winning the war…tell the generals in Saigon that Lyndon Johnson intends to stand by our word…[to] [156] McNamara 1999, p. 369. win the contest against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy.” [157] John Kenneth Galbraith. “Memorandum to President Kennedy from John Kenneth Galbraith on Vietnam, 4 [177] Karnow 1997, p. 339: “At a place called Hoa Phu, for April 1962.”The Pentagon Papers. Gravel. ed. Boston, example, the strategic hamlet built during the previous Massachusetts Beacon Press, 1971, vol. 2. pp. 669–671. summer now looked like it had been hit by a hurricane. […] Speaking through an interpreter, a local guard ex[158] “Vietnam War”. Swarthmore College Peace Collection. plained to me that a handful of Viet Cong agents had entered the hamlet one night and told the peasants to tear [159] Tucker 2011, p. 1070. it down and return to their native villages. The peasants [160] International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos. complied without question.” [161] Sheehan 1989, pp. 201–66.

[178] Karnow 1997, p. 340.

[162] Live interview by John Bartlow Martin. Was Kennedy [179] Karnow 1997, p. 341. Planning to Pull out of Vietnam? New York City. John [180] Kolko 1985, p. 124. F. Kennedy Library, 1964, Tape V, Reel 1.

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[181] Kutler 1996, p. 249.

[209] McNamara 1999, pp. 353–4.

[182] Moïse 1996, p. 78.

[210] Karnow 1997, p. 453.

[183] Healy 2009, p. 91.

[211] Karnow 1997, p. 556.

[184] Palmer 1978, p. 882.

[212] Peter Church. ed. A Short History of South-East Asia. Singapore, John Wiley & Sons, 2006, p. 193.

[185] Scott Shane (31 October 2005). “Vietnam Study, Casting Doubts, Remains Secret”. The New York Times. Re- [213] trieved 13 September 2013. [214] [186] Gerdes (ed.) Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons: The Vietnam War p. 25. [215] [187] Herring 2001, p. 121.

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[216] McNamara 1999, pp. 363–5. [188] The United States in Vietnam: An analysis in depth of the history of America's involvement in Vietnam by George [217] Stephen T. Hosmer (1970), Viet Cong Repression and its McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, Delta Books, 1967. Implications for the Future (Rand Corporation), pp.72–8. [189] Hubbel, John G. (November 1968). “The Blood-Red [218] Hands of Ho Chi Minh”. Readers Digest: 61–67. [219] [190] Simon, Dennis M. (August 2002). “The War in Vietnam,1965–1968”. Archived from the original on 26 April 2009. Retrieved 7 May 2009.

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[220] Ankony, Robert C., Lurps: A Ranger's Diary of Tet, Khe Sanh, A Shau, and Quang Tri, Rowman & Littleﬁeld Publishing Group, Landham, MD, (2009): p.104 [192] Earl L. Tilford, Setup: What the Air Force did in Vietnam and Why. Maxwell Air Force Base AL: Air University [221] Villard, Erik B., The 1968 Tet Oﬀensive Battles of Quang Press, 1991, p. 89. Tri City and Hue, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., (2008): p.82 [193] Karnow 1997, p. 468. [191] Nalty 1998, pp. 97, 261.

[194] Courtwright 2005, p. 210. [195] Gen. Curtis E LeMay.

[222]“The Guardians at the Gate”, Time 7 January 1966, vol. 87, no.1.

[223] Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Pen[196] “Generations Divide Over Military Action in Iraq”. Pew guin, 1986), p. 546 Research Center. October 2002. (archived from the original on 2 February 2008). (The archived link is dead, and [224] Witz The Tet Oﬀensive: Intelligence Failure in War pp. 1– the original link is towards another article.) 2. [197] Young 1991, p. 172. [198] McNamara 1999, p. 48. [199] The Pentagon Papers (Beacon Press, 1971), vol. 1, p52. [200] McNamara 1999, pp. 349–51. [201] Moyar 2006, p. 339 [202] McNeill 1993, p. 58. [203] McNeill 1993, p. 94.

[225] Larry Berman. Lyndon Johnson's War. New York, W.W. Norton, 1991, p. 116. [226] Harold P. Ford. CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers pp. 104–123. [227] Keyes, Ralph (2006). The Quote Veriﬁer: Who Said What, Where, and When. St. Martin's Griﬃn. ISBN 978-0-31234004-9. [228] Survivors Hunt Dead of Bentre, Turned to Rubble in Allied Raids nytimes.com.

[204] U.S. Department of Defense, U.S.-Vietnam Relations vol. [229] “Peter Arnett: Whose Man in Baghdad?", Mona Charen, 4, p. 7. Jewish World Review, 1 April 2003. [205] McNamara 1999, p. 353. [206] U.S. Department of Defense, U.S.-Vietnam Relations vol. 5, pp. 8–9.

[230] Moore, Frazier (18 July 2009). “Cronkite, who deﬁned the role of anchor, dies at 92”. News Observer. Associated Press. Retrieved 31 October 2013.

[207] U.S. Department of Defense, U.S.-Vietnam Relations vol. [231] Oberdorfer 2001, p. 251. 4, pp 117–119. and vol. 5, pp. 8–12. [232] Winfrey, Lee; Schaﬀer, Michael D. (17 July 2009). [208] Public Papers of the Presidents, 1965. Washington, D.C. “Walter Cronkite dies”. Philadelphia Inquirer. Retrieved Government Printing Oﬃce, 1966, vol. 2, pp. 794–799. 18 July 2009.

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[233] Wicker, Tom (26 January 1997). “Broadcast News”. [251] Peter Church, ed. A Short History of South-East Asia. SinNew York Times. Retrieved 1 May 2009. gapore. John Wiley & Sons, 2006, pp. 193–194. [234] Sorely 1999, pp. 11–16.

[252] Lunch, W. & Sperlich, P. (1979). The Western Political Quarterly. 32(1). pp. 21–44

[235] Gerdes (ed.) Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons: [253] Louis B. Zimmer, The Vietnam War Debate; pp. 54–55; The Vietnam War p. 27. Hardcover: 430 pages; Publisher: Lexington Books (13 [236] Command Magazine Issue 18, p. 15. October 2011); ISBN 0739137697. [237] McNamara 1999, pp. 366–7.

[254] Louis B. Zimmer, The Vietnam War Debate; pp. 53–54; Hardcover: 430 pages; Publisher: Lexington Books (13 [238] “Vietnamization: 1970 Year in Review”. Upi.com. 27 October 2011); ISBN 0739137697. October 2011. Archived from the original on 31 August 2011. Retrieved 31 October 2011. [255] Videorecording of entire debate proceedings available at the Museum of Radio and Television in New York City. [239]“Ho Chi Minh Dies of Heart Attack in Hanoi”. The Times. 4 September 1969. p. 1. [256] 1969: Millions march in US Vietnam Moratorium. BBC On This Day. [240] Jeff Stein, Murder in Wartime: The Untold Spy Story that Changed the Course of the Vietnam War. (New York: St. [257] Jennings & Brewster 1998: 413. Martin's Press, 1992) 60–62. [258] Bob Fink. “Vietnam – A View from the Walls: a His[241] Seals, Bob (2007) The “Green Beret Affair": A Brief tory of the Vietnam Anti-War Movement”. Greenwich Introduction. Publishing. [242] Sihanouk, Prince Norodom. “Cambodia Neutral: The [259] “History Lesson 8: Refugees From Vietnam and CamDictates of Necessity”. Foreign Affairs 1958: 582–583. bodia”, Immigration in US history, Constitutional Rights Foundation [243] They were: Senators John C. Stennis (MS) and Richard B. Russell Jr. (GA) and Representatives Lucius Mendel [260] Stanton 2003, p. 240 Rivers (SC), Gerald R. Ford (MI), and Leslie C. Arends (IL). Arends and Ford were leaders of the Republican mi- [261] Willbanks 2009, p. 110 nority and the other three were Democrats on either the [262] “Facts about the Vietnam Veterans memorial collection” Armed Services or Appropriations committees. . NPS.gov. 2010. Retrieved 26 April 2010. [244] Dmitry Mosyakov, “The Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese Communists: A History of Their Relations as [263] Karnow 1997, pp. 672–4. Told in the Soviet Archives”, in Susan E. Cook, ed., [264] Karnow 1997, pp. 670–2. Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda (Yale Genocide Studies Program Monograph Series No. 1, 2004), p. 54 [265] “This Day in History 1974: Thieu announces war has resumed”. History.com. Retrieved 17 October 2009. ff. Available online at: www.yale.edu/gsp/publications/ Mosyakov.doc “In April–May 1970, many North Vietnamese forces entered Cambodia in response to the call [266] Karnow 1997, p. 676. for help addressed to Vietnam not by Pol Pot, but by his [267] Clark Dougan, David Fulgham et al., The Fall of the South. deputy Nuon Chea. Nguyen Co Thach recalls: “Nuon Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1985, p. 22. Chea has asked for help and we have liberated five provinces of Cambodia in ten days.” [268] The End of the Vietnam War, 30 Years Ago by Gabriel Kolko, CounterPunch 30 April / 1 May 2005. [245] Joe Angio. Nixon a Presidency Revealed. Television Documentary, The History Channel, 15 February 2007. [269] Tucker 1999, p. 29 [246] USA.gov (February 1997). “The Pentagon Papers Case” [270] U. S. POWER IN ASIA HAS GROWN SINCE VIET. EJournal USA 2 (1). Archived from the original on 12 NAM by Leslie H. Gelb, The New York Times, April 18, January 2008. Retrieved 27 April 2010. 1985 [247] Karnow 1997, pp. 644–5.

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CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM Oxford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-846-03020-8. Roberts, Anthea (2005). “The Agent Orange Case: Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin v. Dow Chemical Co.”. ASIL Proceedings 99 (1): 380–385. JSTOR 25660031. Schandler, Herbert Y. (2009). America in Vietnam: The War That Couldn't Be Won. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littleﬁeld. ISBN 978-0-742-56697-2. Schell, Jonathan. The Time of Illusion (1976). Schulzinger, Robert D. A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941–1975 (1997). Sheehan, Neil (1989). A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New York: Vintage. ISBN 978-0-679-724148. Sliwinski, Marek (1995). Le Génocide Khmer Rouge: Une Analyse Démographique. Paris: L'Harmattan. ISBN 978-2-73843525-5. Sorley, Lewis, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam (1999), based upon still classiﬁed tape-recorded meetings of top level US commanders in Vietnam, ISBN 0-15-601309-6 Spector, Ronald. After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (1992), very broad coverage of 1968. Stanton, Shelby L. (2003). Vietnam order of battle (2003 ed.). Stackpole Books. ISBN 0-8117-0071-2. Stone, Richard (2007). “Agent Orange's Bitter Harvest”. Science 315 (5809): 176–179. doi:10.1126/science.315.5809.176. JSTOR 20035179. Stuart-Fox, Martin (1997). A History of Laos. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780-521-59235-2. Summers, Harry G. On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, Presidio press (1982), ISBN 0-89141-563-7 (225 pages) Thayer, Thomas C. (1985). War Without Fronts: The American Ex-

perience in Vietnam. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. ISBN 9780-813-37132-0. Tucker, Spencer. ed. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War (1998) 3 vol. reference set; also one-volume abridgement (2001). ———(1999). Vietnam. London: UCL Press. ISBN 978-1-85728921-3. • Tucker, Spencer (2011) [1998]. The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History. ABCCLIO. ISBN 978-1851099603. Turner, Robert F. (1975). Vietnamese Communism: Its Origins and Development. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press. ISBN 978-0-817-96431-3. Turse, Nick (2013). Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam. New York: Metropolitan Books. ISBN 978-0805-08691-1. Vietnam Task Force (1969). Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense. Westheider, James E. (2007). The Vietnam War. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press. ISBN 9780-313-33755-0. Willbanks, James H. (2009). Vietnam War almanac. Infobase Publishing. ISBN 978-0-81607102-9. Witz, James J. The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (1991). Woodruff, Mark (2005). Unheralded Victory: The Defeat of The Viet Cong and The North Vietnamese. Arlington, Virginia: Presidio Press. ISBN 0-89141866-0. Young, Marilyn B. (1991). The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990. New York: HarperPerennial. ISBN 9780-060-92107-1. Xiaoming, Zhang. “China's 1979 War With Vietnam: A Reassessment”, China Quarterly. Issue no. 184, (December 2005) “CJO – Abstract – China's 1979 War with Vietnam: A Reassessment”. Retrieved 11 June 2008.

2.4. VIETNAM WAR Primary sources Carter, Jimmy. By The President Of The United States Of America, A Proclamation Granting Pardon For Violations Of The Selective Service Act, 4 August 1964 To 28 March 1973 (21 January 1977) Central Intelligence Agency. "Laos", CIA World Factbook' Cora Weiss Collection (materials related to war resistance and peace activism movements during the Vietnam War), Lloyd Sealy Library Special Collections, John Jay College of Criminal Justice Eisenhower, Dwight D. Mandate for Change. (1963) a presidential political memoir Ho, Chi Minh. “Vietnam Declaration of Independence”, Selected Works. (1960–1962) selected writings LeMay, General Curtis E. and Kantor, MacKinlay. Mission with LeMay (1965) autobiography of controversial former Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force Kissinger, United States Secretary of State Henry A. “Lessons on Vietnam”, (1975) secret memoranda to U.S. President Ford O'Connell, Kim A. (2006). Primary Source Accounts of the Vietnam War. Berkeley Heights, New Jersey: MyReportLinks.com. ISBN 978-1-598-45001-9. McCain, John. Faith of My Fathers: A Family Memoir (1999) :Marshall, Kathryn. In the Combat Zone: An Oral History of American Women in Vietnam, 1966– 1975 (1987) Martin, John Bartlow. Was Kennedy Planning to Pull out of Vietnam? (1964) oral history for the John F. Kennedy Library, tape V, reel 1. Myers, Thomas. Walking Point: American Narratives of Vietnam (1988) Public Papers of the Presidents, 1965 (1966) official documents of U.S. presidents. Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. Robert Kennedy and His Times. (1978) a first-hand account of the Kennedy

177 administration by one of his principal advisors Sinhanouk, Prince Norodom. “Cambodia Neutral: The Dictates of Necessity.”Foreign Affairs. (1958) describes the geopolitical situation of Cambodia Tang, Truong Nhu. A Viet Cong Memoir (1985), revealing account by senior NLF official Terry, Wallace, ed. Bloods: An Oral History of the Vietnam War by Black Veterans (1984) Truong, Như Tảng; David Chanoff, Van Toai Doan (1985). A Vietcong memoir (1985 ed.). Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. ISBN 978-0-15193636-6.- Total pages: 350 The landmark series Vietnam: A Television History, first broadcast in 1983, is a special presentation of the award-winning PBS history series, American Experience. The Pentagon Papers (Gravel ed. 5 vol 1971); combination of narrative and secret documents compiled by Pentagon. excerpts U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States (multivolume collection of official secret documents) vol 1: 1964; vol 2: 1965; vol 3: 1965; vol 4: 1966; U.S. Department of Defense and the House Committee on Armed Services. U.S.-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967. Washington, D.C. Department of Defense and the House Committee on Armed Services, 1971, 12 volumes. Historiography Hall, Simon, “Scholarly Battles over the Vietnam War”, Historical Journal 52 (September 2009), 813–29.

2.4.22 External links • A Vietnam Diary's Homecoming Video produced by the PBS Series History Detectives • Detailed bibliography of Vietnam War • Documents Relating to American Foreign PolicyVietnam primary sources on U.S. involvement

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• Fallout of the War from the Dean Peter Krogh For- Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933–45) eign Affairs Digital Archives • Roosevelt declines repeated requests from the • Glossary of Military Terms & Slang from the VietFrench to assist France's attempts to recolonize nam War Vietnam.* [2] • Impressions of Vietnam and descriptions of the daily life of a soldier from the oral history of Elliott Harry S. Truman (1945–53) Gardner, U.S. Army Milestones of U.S. involvement under President Harry S. • “Perspectives,”Vietnam magazine. Truman. • Stephen H. Warner Southeast Asia Photograph Collection at Gettysburg College • The Effects of Vietnamization on the Republic of Vietnam's Armed Forces, 1969–1972 • Timeline US – Vietnam (1947–2001) in OpenContent project • The U.S. Army in Vietnam the official history of the United States Army • The Vietnam War at The History Channel • UC Berkeley Library Social Activism Sound Recording Project: Anti-Vietnam War Protests • Vietnam Casualties database searchable by first name, last name and location • Vietnam War Bibliography covers online and published resources • Vietnam war timeline comprehensive timeline of the Vietnam War • Virtual Vietnam Archive – Texas Tech University • 1965-1975 Another Vietnam; Unseen images of the war from the winning side - Mashable

2.5 Role of the United States in the Vietnam War The role of the United States in the Vietnam War began after the Second World War and escalated into full commitment during what is termed the Vietnam War from 1959 to 1975.

2.5.1

Timeline

Woodrow Wilson (1913–21) • Wilson ignores petition by Ho Chi Minh for help in creating Vietnam independent from French rule and led by nationalist government.* [1]

• August 15, 1945 —Japan surrenders to the Allies. In Indochina, the Japanese administration allows Hồ Chí Minh to take over control of the country. This is called the August Revolution. Hồ Chí Minh fights with a variety of other political factions for control of the major cities. • August 1945 —A few days after the Vietnamese “revolution”, Nationalist Chinese forces enter from the north and, as previously planned by the allies, establish an administration in the country as far south as the 16th parallel north. • September 26, 1945: Office of Strategic Services (OSS) officer Lieutenant Colonel A. Peter Dewey —working with the Viet Minh to repatriate Americans captured by the Japanese —is mistaken for a Frenchman, shot and killed by the Viet Minh. He thus became the first American casualty in Vietnam. (Not precisely accurate. Prior to 1950 the area later recognized as Viet Nam was known as French Indochina. Thus, LTC Dewey was the first American casualty in French Indochina). • October 1945 —British troops land in southern Vietnam and establish a provisional administration. The British free French soldiers and officials imprisoned by the Japanese. The French begin taking control of cities within the British zone of occupation. • February 1946 —The French sign an agreement with China. France gives up its concessions in Shanghai and other Chinese ports. In exchange, China agrees to assist the French in returning to Vietnam north of the 17th parallel. • March 6, 1946 —After negotiations with the Chinese and the Viet Minh, the French sign an agreement recognizing Vietnam within the French Union. Shortly after, the French land at Haiphong and occupy the rest of northern Vietnam. The Viet Minh use the negotiating process with France and China to buy time to use their armed forces to destroy all competing nationalist groups in the north. • December 1946 —Negotiations between the Viet Minh and the French break down. The Viet Minh are driven out of Hanoi into the countryside.

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• 1947–1949 —The Viet Minh ﬁght a limited insurgency in remote rural areas of northern Vietnam.

end of the Korean War the previous year, causes the French to seek a negotiated settlement to the war.

• 1949 —Chinese communists reach the northern border of Indochina. The Viet Minh drive the French from the border region and begin to receive large amounts of weapons from the Soviet Union and China. The weapons transform the Viet Minh from an irregular large-scale insurgency into a conventional army.

• 1954 —The Geneva Conference (1954), called to determine the post-French future of Indochina, proposes a temporary division of Vietnam, to be followed by nationwide elections to unify the country in 1956.

• May 1, 1950 —After the capture of Hainan Island from Chinese Nationalist forces by the Chinese People's Liberation Army, President Truman approves $10 million in military assistance for anticommunist efforts in Indochina. The Defense Attaché Office was established in Saigon in May 1950, a formal recognition of Viet Nam (vice French IndoChina). This was the beginning of formal U.S. military personnel assignments in Viet Nam. U.S. Naval, Army and Air Force personnel established their respective attaches at this time. • September 1950 —Truman sends the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) Indochina to Vietnam to assist the French. The President claimed they were not sent as combat troops, but to supervise the use of $10 million worth of U.S. military equipment to support the French in their effort to fight the Viet Minh forces. • Following the outbreak of the Korean War, Truman announces “acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indochina...”. and sends 123 noncombat troops to help with supplies to fight against the communist Viet Minh. • 1951 —Truman authorizes $150 million in French support. Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–61) Milestones of the involvement under President Dwight D. Eisenhower. • 1953 —By November, French commander in Indochina, General Navarre, asked U.S. General McArthur to loan twelve Fairchild C-119 aircraft, to be flown by French crews, to facilitate Operation Castor at Dien Bien Phu.

• 1954 —Two months after the Geneva conference, North Vietnam forms Group 100 with headquarters at Ban Namèo. Its purpose is to direct, organize, train and supply the Pathet Lao to gain control of Laos, which along with Cambodia and Vietnam formed French Indochina. • 1955 —North Vietnam launches an 'anti-landlord' campaign, during which counter-revolutionaries are imprisoned or killed. The numbers killed or imprisoned are disputed, with historian Stanley Karnow estimating about 6,000 while others (see the book "Fire in the Lake") estimate only 800. Rudolph Rummel puts the figure as high as 200,000.* [4] • November 1, 1955 —President Eisenhower deploys the Military Assistance Advisory Group to train the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. This marks the official beginning of American involvement in the war as recognized by the Vietnam Veterans Memorial.* [5] • April 1956 —The last French troops leave Vietnam. • 1954–1956 —450,000 Vietnamese civilians flee the Viet Minh administration in North Vietnam and relocate in South Vietnam. Approximately 52,000 move in the opposite direction. • 1956 —National unification elections do not occur. • December 1958 —North Vietnam invades Laos and occupies parts of the country • July 8, 1959 —Charles Ovnand and Dale R. Buis become the first two American Advisers to die in Vietnam.* [6] • September 1959 —North Vietnam forms Group 959, which assumes command of the Pathet Lao forces in Laos. • November 1960 —Coup attempt by paratroopers is foiled after Diệm falsely promises reform, allowing loyalists to crush the rebels.

• 1954 —In January, Navarre's Deputy asked for • December 20, 1960 —The National Liberation additional transport aircraft. Negotiations ended Front of South Vietnam (NLF) is founded. on March 3 with 24 CIA pilots (CAT) to operate 12 U.S. Air Force C-119s, ﬂying undercover using John F. Kennedy (1961–63) French insignia, but maintained by the USAF.* [3] • 1954 —The Viet Minh defeat the French at the bat- Milestones of the escalation under President John F. tle of Dien Bien Phu. The defeat, along with the Kennedy.

180 • January 1961 —Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev pledges support for "wars of national liberation" throughout the world. The idea of creating a neutral Laos is suggested to Kennedy. • May 1961 —Kennedy sends 400 United States Army Special Forces personnel to South Vietnam to train South Vietnamese soldiers following a visit to the country by Vice-President Johnson. • June 1961 —Kennedy meets with Khrushchev in Vienna. He protests North Vietnam's attacks on Laos and points out that the U.S. was supporting the neutrality of Laos. The two leaders agree to pursue a policy of creating a neutral Laos. • June 1961 —Kennedy said, “Now we have a problem making our power credible and Vietnam looks like the place”to James Reston of The New York Times (immediately after meeting Khrushchev in Vienna). • August 10, 1961 —Test run of U.S. herbicidal warfare program in South Vietnam ("Operation Trail Dust") • October 1961 —Following successful NLF attacks, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara recommends sending six divisions (200,000 men) to Vietnam. • February 8, 1962 —The Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) is created by President Kennedy • February 1962 —Attempted assassination of Diệm by two air force officers who bombed his palace, fails. • July 23, 1962 —International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos is signed at Geneva, promising Laotian neutrality. • August 1, 1962 —Kennedy signs the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, which provides "... military assistance to countries which are on the rim of the Communist world and under direct attack”. • October 1962 —Operation Ranch Hand begins. U.S. planes spray herbicides and defoliants over South Vietnam until 1971. • January 3, 1963 —NLF victory in the Battle of Ap Bac. • May 8, 1963 —Buddhists demonstrate in Huế, South Vietnam after the display of religious flags were prohibited, during the celebration of Vesak, Gautama Buddha's birthday; but, Catholic flags celebrating the consecration of Archbishop Ngô Đình Thục, brother of Ngô Đình Diệm were not prohibited. The police of Ngô Đình Cẩn, Diệm's younger brother, open fire, killing nine.

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM • May 1963 —Republican Barry Goldwater declares that the U.S. should fight to win or withdraw from Vietnam. Later on, during his presidential campaign against Lyndon B. Johnson, his Democratic opponents accuse him of wanting to use nuclear weapons in the conflict. • June 11, 1963 —Photographs of protesting Buddhist monk, Thích Quảng Đức, burning himself to death in protest, in Saigon, appear in U.S. newspapers. • Summer 1963 —Madame Nhu, de facto First Lady to the bachelor Diệm makes a series of vitriolic attacks on Buddhists, calling the immolations “barbecues”. Diệm ignores U.S. calls to silence her. • August 21, 1963 —ARVN special forces loyal to Ngô Đình Nhu, younger brother of Diệm, stage raids across the country, attacking Buddhist temples and firing on monks. The cremated remains of Thích Quảng Đức are confiscated from Xá Lợi Pagoda in Saigon. New U.S. ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge rebukes Diệm by visiting Xá Lợi and giving refuge to Buddhist leader Thích Trí Quang. The U.S. calls for Nhu to be dropped by Diệm, and threatens to cut aid to Colonel Lê Quang Tung's Special Forces if they are not sent into battle, rather than used to repress dissidents. • September 2, 1963 —Kennedy criticises the Diệm regime in an interview with Walter Cronkite, citing the Buddhist repression and claiming that Diệm is out of touch. • Late October 1963 —Nhu, unaware that Saigon region commander General Tôn Thất Đính is doublecrossing him, draws up plans for a phony coup and counter-coup to reaffirm the Diệm regime. Đính sends Nhu's loyal special forces out of Saigon on the pretext of fighting communists and in readiness for the counter coup, and rings Saigon with rebel troops. • November 1, 1963 —Military officers launch a coup d'état against Diệm, with the tacit approval of the Kennedy administration. Diệm and Nhu escape the presidential residence via a secret exit after loyalist forces were locked out of Saigon, unable to rescue them. • November 2, 1963 —Diệm and Nhu are discovered in nearby Cholon. Although they had been promised exile by the junta, they are executed by Nguyễn Văn Nhung, bodyguard of General Dương Văn Minh. Minh leads the military junta. • November 1963 —By this time, Kennedy had increased the number of military personnel from the 900 that were there when he became President to 16,000 just before his death.* [7] • November 22, 1963 —Kennedy is assassinated.

2.5. ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE VIETNAM WAR

2.5.2

Under the Kennedy Administration

In 1961 the new administration of President John F. Kennedy remained essentially committed to the bipartisan, anti-communist foreign policies inherited from the administrations of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower. During 1961, his first year in office, Kennedy found himself faced with a three-part crisis: The failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba; the construction of the Berlin Wall by the Soviets; and a negotiated settlement between the pro-Western government of Laos and the Pathet Lao communist movement. Fearing that another failure on the part of the U.S. to stop communist expansion would fatally damage U.S. credibility with its allies, Kennedy realized, “Now we have a problem in making our power credible... and Vietnam looks like the place.”* [8] The commitment to defend South Vietnam was reaffirmed by Kennedy on May 11 in National Security Action Memorandum 52, which became known as “The Presidential Program for Vietnam”. Its opening statement reads: U.S. objectives and concept of operations [are] to prevent communist domination of South Vietnam; to create in that country a viable and increasingly democratic society, and to initiate, on an accelerated basis, a series of mutually supporting actions of a military, political, economic, psychological, and covert character designed to achieve this objective.* [9]

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that the war may be unwinnable, and that it was ultimately a Vietnamese war, not an American war.* [10] Diệm was already growing unpopular with many of his countrymen because of his administration's nepotism, corruption, and its apparent bias in favor of the Catholic minority—of which Diệm was a part—at the expense of the Buddhist majority. This contributed to the impression of Diệm's rule as an extension of the French Colonial regime. Promised land reforms were not instituted, and Diệm's strategic hamlet program for village self-defense (and government control) was a disaster. The Kennedy administration grew increasingly frustrated with Diệm. In 1963, a crackdown by Diệm's forces was launched against Buddhist monks protesting discriminatory practices and demanding a political voice. Diệm's repression of the protests sparked the so-called Buddhist Revolt, during which several monks committed self-immolation, which was covered in the world press. The communists took full advantage of the situation and fueled anti-Diệm sentiment to create further instability.

2.5.3 Americanization Gulf of Tonkin and the Westmoreland expansion For more details on the decision to escalate the American involvement, see Gulf of Tonkin Incident. For more details on U.S. covert activities in Southeast Asia, see Studies and Observations Group. On July 27, 1964, 5,000 additional U.S. military advis-

Kennedy was intrigued by the idea of utilizing United States Army Special Forces for counterinsurgency conflicts in Third World countries threatened by the new “wars of national liberation”. Originally intended for use behind front lines after a conventional invasion of Europe, Kennedy believed that the guerrilla tactics employed by Special Forces would be effective in the“brush fire”war in South Vietnam. He saw British success in using such forces during the Malayan Emergency as a strategic template. Thus in May 1961 Kennedy sent detachments of Green Berets to South Vietnam to train South Vietnamese soldiers in guerrilla warfare. The Diệm regime had been initially able to cope with the insurgency of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF, or derogatively, Viet Cong) in South Vietnam with the aid of U.S. matériel and advisers, and, by 1962, seemed to be gaining the upper hand. Senior U.S. military leaders received positive reports from the U.S. commander, General Paul D. Harkins of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, or MACV. By the following year, however, cracks began to appear in the façade of success. In January a possible victory that was turned into a stunning defeat for government forces at the Battle of Ap Bac caused consternation among both the military advisers in the field and among politicians in Washington, D.C. JFK also indicated to Walter Cronkite

Commandant of the Marine Corps Wallace Greene (left), III MAF commander General Robert Cushman (center), and General Westmoreland (right).

ers were ordered to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN or South Vietnam), bringing the total American troop level to 21,000. Shortly thereafter an incident occurred oﬀ the coast of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) that was destined to escalate the conﬂict to new levels and lead to the full scale Americanization of the war.

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On the evening of August 2, 1964, the destroyer USS Maddox was conducting an electronic intelligence collection mission in international waters (even as claimed by North Vietnam) in the Gulf of Tonkin when it was attacked by three P-4 torpedo boats of the North Vietnamese Navy.* [11] Reports later reached the Johnson administration saying that the Maddox was under attack. Two nights later, after being joined by the destroyer C. Turner Joy, the Maddox again reported that both vessels were under attack (this event, which took place under adverse weather conditions, in fact never occurred). Regardless, President Johnson addressed Congress asking for more political power to utilize American military forces in South Vietnam, using the attack on the Maddox as cause to get what he wanted. There was rampant confusion in Washington, but the incident was seen by the administration as the perfect opportunity to present Congress with“a pre-dated declaration of war”in order to strengthen weakening morale in South Vietnam through reprisal attacks by the U.S. on the North.* [12] Even before conﬁrmation of the phantom attack had been received in Washington, President Johnson U.S. F-105 aircraft dropping bombs. had decided that an attack could not go unanswered. Just before midnight he appeared on television and announced that retaliatory air strikes were underway against North Vietnamese naval and port facilities. Neither Congress nor the American people learned the whole story about the events in the Gulf of Tonkin until the publication of the Pentagon Papers in 1969. It was on the basis of the administration's assertions that the attacks were “unprovoked aggression”on the part of North Vietnam, that the United States Congress approved the Southeast Asia Resolution (also known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution) on August 7. The law gave the President broad powers to conduct military operations without an actual declaration of war. The resolution passed unanimously in the House of Representatives and was opposed in the Senate by only two members.

a sustained strategic bombing campaign targeted against the North by aircraft of the U.S. Air Force and Navy that was inaugurated on March 2, 1965. Its original purpose was to bolster the morale of the South Vietnamese and to serve as a signaling device to Hanoi. U.S. airpower would act as a method of“strategic persuasion”, deterring the North Vietnamese politically by the fear of continued or increased bombardment. Rolling Thunder gradually escalated in intensity, with aircraft striking only carefully selected targets. When that did not work, its goals were altered to destroying North Vietnam's will to fight by destroying the nation's industrial base, transportation network, and its (continually increasing) air defenses. After more than a million sorties were flown and three-quarters National Security Council members, including United of a million tons of bombs were dropped, Rolling Thun* States Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, der was ended on November 11, 1968. [13] Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and General Maxwell Other aerial campaigns (Operation Barrel Roll, Operation Taylor, agreed on November 28 to recommend that Steel Tiger, Operation Tiger Hound, and Operation ComJohnson adopt a plan for a two-stage escalation of the mando Hunt) were directed to counter the flow of men bombing of North Vietnam. and material down the PAVN logistical system that flowed from North Vietnam through southeastern Laos, and into South Vietnam known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Operation Rolling Thunder, 1965–68 Main article: Operation Rolling Thunder

Build-up

President Johnson had already appointed General William C. Westmoreland to succeed General Harkins as Commander of MACV in June 1964. Under Westmoreland, the expansion of American troop strength in South Vietnam took place. American forces rose from 16,000 during 1964 to more than 553,000 by Operation Rolling Thunder was the code name given to 1969. With the U.S. decision to escalate its involvement, In February 1965, a U.S. air base at Pleiku, in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam, was attacked twice by the NLF, resulting in the deaths of over a dozen U.S. personnel. These guerrilla attacks prompted the administration to order retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam.

2.5. ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE VIETNAM WAR ANZUS Pact allies Australia and New Zealand agreed to contribute troops and matériel to the conﬂict. They were quickly joined by the Republic of Korea (second only to the Americans in troop strength), Thailand, and the Philippines. The U.S. paid for (through aid dollars) and logistically supplied all of the allied forces.

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Some officials in Hanoi had favored an immediate invasion of the South, and a plan was developed to use PAVN units to split southern Vietnam in half through the Central Highlands. The two imported adversaries first faced one another during Operation Silver Bayonet, better known as the Battle of the Ia Drang. During the savage fighting that took place, both sides learned important lessons. The North Vietnamese, who had taken horrendous casualties, began to adapt to the overwhelming American superiority in air mobility, supporting arms, and close air support by moving in as close as possible during confrontations, thereby negating the effects of the above. The Americans learned that PAVN (which was basically a light infantry force) was not a rag-tag band of guerrillas, but was instead a highly disciplined, proficient, and well motivated force. Search and destroy, the strategy of attrition

U.S. aircraft bombs NLF positions in 1965.

Meanwhile, political affairs in Saigon were finally settling down —at least as far as the Americans were concerned. On February 14 the most recent military junta, the National Leadership Committee, installed Air Vice-Marshal Nguyễn Cao Kỳ as prime minister. In 1966, the junta selected General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu to run for president with Ky on the ballot as the vice-presidential candidate in the 1967 election. Thieu and Ky were elected and remained in office for the duration of the war. In the presidential election of 1971, Thieu ran for the presidency unopposed. With the installation of the Thieu and Ky government (the Second Republic), the U.S. had a pliable, stable, and semi-legitimate government in Saigon with which to deal. With the advent of Rolling Thunder, American airbases and facilities needed to be constructed and manned for the aerial effort. The defense of those bases would not be entrusted to the South Vietnamese. So, on March 8, 1965, 3,500 United States Marines came ashore at Da Nang as the first wave of U.S. combat troops into South Vietnam, adding to the 25,000 U.S. military advisers already in place. On May 5 the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade became the first U.S. Army ground unit committed to the conflict in South Vietnam. On August 18, Operation Starlite began as the first major U.S. ground operation, destroying an NLF stronghold in Quảng Ngãi Province. The NLF learned from their defeat and subsequently tried to avoid fighting an American-style ground war by reverting to small-unit guerrilla operations.

President Lyndon B. Johnson in Vietnam, 1967

On November 27, 1965, the Pentagon declared that if the major operations needed to neutralize North Vietnamese and NLF forces were to succeed, U.S. troop levels in South Vietnam would have to be increased from 120,000 to 400,000. In a series of meetings between Westmoreland and the President held in Honolulu in February 1966, Westmoreland argued that the U.S. presence had succeeded in preventing the immediate defeat of the South Vietnamese government but that more troops would be necessary if systematic oﬀensive operations were to be conducted. The issue then became in what manner American forces would be used.

The nature of the American military's strategic and tactical decisions made during this period would color the conduct and nature of the conﬂict for the duration of the American commitment. Classical military logic demanded that the U.S. attack the locus of PAVN/NLF in the North. If that country could not be invaded, then the enemy's logistical system in Laos and Cambodia should be cut by ground forces, isolating the southern battleﬁeld. However, political considerations limited U.S. milThe North Vietnamese had already sent units of their reg- itary actions, mainly because of the memory of commuular army into southern Vietnam beginning in late 1964. nist reactions during the Korean War. Ever present in

184 the minds of diplomats, military oﬃcers, and politicians was the possibility of a spiraling escalation of the conﬂict into a superpower confrontation and the possibility of a nuclear exchange. Therefore, there would be no invasion of North Vietnam, the“neutrality”of Laos and Cambodia would be respected, and Rolling Thunder would not resemble the bombing of Germany and Japan during the Second World War.

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM Press International that there was nothing to do in Vietnam and therefore many of the men smoked marijuana. He said, “One of the biggest reasons that a lot of GIs do get high over here is there is nothing to do. This place is really a drag; it's a bore over here. Like right now sitting around here, we are getting loaded. Whereas, it doesn't really get you messed up; that's I guess the main reason why we smoke it.”* [17]

American forces would conduct operations against PAVN forces, pushing them further back into the countryside away from the heavily populated coastal lowlands. In the backcountry the U.S. could fully utilize its superiority in firepower and mobility to bleed the enemy in set-piece battles. The cleaning-out of the NLF and the pacification of the villages would be the responsibility of the South Vietnamese military. The adoption of this strategy, however, brought Westmoreland into direct conflict with his Marine Corps commander, General Lewis W. Walt, who had already recognized the security of the villages as the key to success. Walt had immediately commenced pacification efforts in his area of responsibility, but WestmorePresident Johnson conferring with South Vietnamese President land was unhappy, believing that the Marines were being underutilized and fighting the wrong enemy. In the end, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu in July 1968. MACV won out and Westmoreland's search and destroy These limitations were not foisted upon the military as an concept, predicated on the attrition of enemy forces, won afterthought. Before the first U.S. soldiers came ashore at the day. Da Nang, the Pentagon was cognizant of all of the param- Both sides chose similar strategies. PAVN, which had eters that would be imposed by their civilian leaders, yet been operating a more conventional, large-unit war, they still agreed that the mission could be accomplished switched back to small-unit operations in the face of U.S. within them. Westmoreland believed that he had found a military capabilities. The struggle moved to the villages, strategy that would either defeat North Vietnam or force it where the “hearts and minds”of the South Vietnamese into serious negotiations. Attrition was to be the key. The peasants, whose cooperation was absolutely necessary to general held that larger offensive operations would grind military success, would be won or lost. The U.S. had down the communists and eventually lead to a“crossover given responsibility for this struggle to the Army of the point”in PAVN/NLF casualties after which a decisive (or Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), whose troops and comat least political) victory would be possible. manders were notoriously unfit for the task. It is widely held that the average U.S. serviceman was nineteen years old, as evidenced by the casual reference in a pop song ("19" by Paul Hardcastle); the figure is cited by Lt. Col. Dave Grossman ret. of the Killology Research Group in his 1995 book On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (p. 265). However, it is disputed by the* [14] Vietnam Helicopter Flight Crew Network Website, which claims the average age of MOS 11B personnel was 22. This compares with 26 years of age for those who participated in World War II. Soldiers served a one-year tour of duty. The average age of the U.S. military men who died in Vietnam was 22.8 years old.* [15]

For the American soldier, whose doctrine was one of absolute commitment to total victory, this strategy led to a frustrating small-unit war. Most of the combat was conducted by units smaller than battalion-size (the majority at the platoon level). Since the goal of the operations was to kill the enemy, terrain was not taken and held as in previous wars. Savage ﬁghting and the retreat of the communists was immediately followed by the abandonment of the terrain just seized. Combined with this was the anger and frustration engendered among American troops by the eﬀective tactics of the NLF, who conducted a war of sniping, booby traps, mines, and terror against the Americans.

The one-year tour of duty deprived units of experienced leadership. As one observer put it,“we were not in Vietnam for 10 years, but for one year 10 times.”* [16] As a result, training programs were shortened. Some NCOs were referred to as "Shake 'N' Bake" to highlight their accelerated training. Unlike soldiers in World War II and Korea, there were no secure rear areas in which to get rest and relaxation. One unidentiﬁed soldier said to United

As a result of the conference held in Honolulu, President Johnson authorized an increase in troop strength to 429,000 by August 1966. The large increase in troops enabled MACV to carry out numerous operations that grew in size and complexity during the next two years. For U.S. troops participating in these operations (Operation Masher/White Wing, Operation Attle-

2.5. ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE VIETNAM WAR boro, Operation Cedar Falls, Operation Junction City and dozens of others) the war boiled down to hard marching through some of the most difficult terrain on the planet and weather conditions that were alternately hot and dry or cold and wet. It was the PAVN/NLF that actually controlled the pace of the war, fighting only when their commanders believed that they had the upper hand and then disappearing when the Americans and/or ARVN brought their superiority in numbers and firepower to bear. North Vietnam, utilizing the Ho Chi Minh and Sihanouk Trails, matched the U.S. at every point of the escalation, funneling manpower and supplies to the southern battlefields. During the Vietnam War, the use of the helicopter, known as“Air Mobile”, was an essential tool for conducting the war. In fact, the whole conduct and strategy of the war depended on it. Vietnam was the first time the helicopter was used on a major scale, and in such important roles. Search and destroy missions, for example, would have been nearly impossible without it. Helicopters allowed American commanders to move large numbers of troops to virtually anywhere, regardless of the terrain or roads. Troops could also be easily resupplied in remote areas. The helicopter also provided another new and vital capability: medical evacuation. It could fly wounded soldiers to aid stations very quickly, usually within the critical first hour. This gave wounded soldiers a higher chance of survival in Vietnam than in any previous war. The helicopter was also adapted for many other roles in Vietnam, including ground attack, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare. Without the helicopter, the war would have been fought very differently.* [18]

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point for any future incursion against the Trail system in Laos. During the spring of 1967, a series of small-unit actions near Khe Sanh prompted MACV to increase its forces. These small unit actions and increasing intelligence information indicated that the PAVN was building up significant forces just across the border. Indeed, PAVN was doing just that. Two regular divisions (and later elements of a third) were moving toward Khe Sanh, eventually surrounding the base and cutting off its only road access. Westmoreland, contrary to the advice of his Marine commanders, reinforced the outpost. As far as he was concerned, if the communists were willing to mass their forces for destruction by American air power, so much the better. He described the ideal outcome as a "Dien Bien Phu in reverse”. MACV then launched the largest concentrated aerial bombardment effort of the conflict (Operation Niagara) to defend Khe Sanh. Another massive aerial effort was undertaken to keep the beleaguered Marines supplied. There were many comparisons (by the media, Americans military and political officials, and the North Vietnamese) to the possibility of PAVN staging a repeat of its victory at Dien Bien Phu, but the differences outweighed the similarities in any comparison.

MACV used this opportunity to field its latest technology against the North Vietnamese. A sensor-driven, antiinfiltration system known as Operation Igloo White was in the process of being field tested in Laos as the siege of Khe Sanh began. Westmoreland ordered that it be employed to detect PAVN troop movements near the Marine base and the system worked well. By March, the long-awaited ground assault against the base had failed to materialize and communist forces began to melt back toBorder battles and the Tet Offensive ward Laos. MACV (and future historians) were left with only questions. What was the goal of the PAVN? Was the Main articles: Battle of Khe Sanh and Tet Offensive siege a real attempt to stage another Dien Bien Phu? Or had the battles near the border (which eventually drew in By mid-1967, Westmoreland said that it was conceivable half of MACV's maneuver battalions) been a diversion, that U.S. forces could be phased out of the war within two meant to pull forces away from the cities, where another years, turning over progressively more of the fighting to PAVN offensive would soon commence? the ARVN.* [19] That fall, however, savage fighting broke General Westmoreland's public reassurances that "the out in the northern provinces. Beginning below the DMZ light at the end of the tunnel" was near were countered at Con Tien and then spreading west to the Laotian bor- when, on January 30, 1968, PAVN and NLF forces broke der near Dak To, large PAVN forces began to stand their the truce that accompanied the Tết holiday and mounted ground and fight. This willingness of the communists to their largest offensive thus far, in hopes of sparking a genremain fixed in place inspired MACV to send reinforce- eral uprising among the South Vietnamese. These forces, ments from other sectors of South Vietnam. The Border ranging in size from small groups to entire regiments, atBattles had begun. tacked nearly every city and major military installation in Most of the PAVN/NLF operational capability was pos- South Vietnam. The Americans and South Vietnamese, sible only because of the unhindered movement of men initially surprised by the scope and scale of the offensive, along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. To threaten this flow of quickly responded and inflicted severe casualties on their supplies, the Marine Corps established a combat base on enemies. The NLF was essentially eliminated as a fightthe South Vietnamese side of the Laotian frontier, near ing force and the places of the dead within its ranks were the village of Khe Sanh. The U.S. used the base as a bor- increasingly filled by North Vietnamese. der surveillance position overlooking Route 9, the only The PAVN/NLF attacks were speedily and bloodily reeast-west road that crossed the border in the province. pulsed in virtually all areas except Saigon, where the fightWestmoreland also hoped to use the base as a jump-off

186 ing lasted for three days, and in the old imperial capital of Huế, where it continued for a month. During the occupation of the historic city, 2,800 South Vietnamese were murdered by the NLF in the single worst massacre of the conflict. The hoped-for uprising never took place; indeed, the offensive drove some previously apathetic South Vietnamese to fight for the government. Another surprise for the communists was that the ARVN did not collapse under the onslaught, instead turning in a performance that pleased even its American patrons.

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM Demilitarized Zone and that U.S. representatives were prepared to meet with North Vietnamese counterparts in any suitable place“to discuss the means to bring this ugly war to an end”. A few days later, much to Johnson's surprise, North Vietnam agreed to contacts between the two sides. On May 13, what became known as the Paris peace talks began.* [21] My Lai Massacre Main article: My Lai massacre On March 16, 1968, three companies of Task Force

Final evacuation of Khe Sanh base complex, July 1, 1968.

After the Tet Offensive, influential news magazines and newspapers, including the Wall Street Journal, Time and The New York Times, increasingly began to characterize the war as a stalemate. What shocked and dismayed the American public was the realization that either it had been lied to or that the American military command had been dangerously overoptimistic in its appraisal of the situation in Vietnam. The public could not understand how such an attack was possible after being told for several years that victory was just around the corner. The Tet Offensive came to embody the growing credibility gap at the heart of U.S. government statements. These realizations and changing attitudes forced the American public (and politicians) to face hard realities and to reexamine their position in Southeast Asia. The days of an openended commitment to the conflict were over. The psychological impact of the Tet Offensive effectively ended the political career of Lyndon Johnson. On March 11, Senator Eugene McCarthy won 42 percent of the vote in the Democratic New Hampshire primary. Although Johnson was not on the ballot, commentators viewed this as a defeat for the President. Shortly thereafter, Senator Robert Kennedy announced his intention to seek the Democratic nomination for the 1968 presidential election. On March 31, in a speech that took America and the world by surprise, Johnson announced that “I shall not seek, and I will not accept the nomination of my party for another term as your President”and pledged himself to devoting the rest of his term in office to the search for peace in Vietnam.* [20] Johnson announced that he was limiting bombing of North Vietnam to just north of the

Haeberle photo of Vietnamese civilians killed during the My Lai massacre.

Barker, part of the Americal Division, took part in a search and destroy operation near the village of My Lai, in Quảng Nam Province. One of those three companies, Charlie Company, under the command of Lieutenant William Calley, entered the hamlet of Son My and proceeded to round up, rape, torture and murder as many of the inhabitants as could be found. (Citation needed.) Although not all of the members of the company participated, a significant number of them, led by Calley, did. He personally ordered the executions of hundreds of villagers in large groups. The killings ended only when an American helicopter crew, headed by Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson, Jr., discovered Calley's unit in the act and threatened to attack them with his aircraft's weapons unless they stopped. One of the soldiers on the scene was Ron Haeberle, a photographer for the newspaper Stars and Stripes, who took unobtrusive official blackand-white photos of the operation through the lens of his military-issued camera and color shots of the massacre with his personal camera. Although the operation appeared suspicious to Calley's superiors, it was forgotten. In 1969, investigative journalist Seymour Hersh exposed the My Lai massacre in print, and the Haeberle photos were released to the world media. The Pentagon launched an investigation headed by General William R. Peers to look into the allegations. After a flurry of activity, the Peers Commission issued its report. It declared that“an atmosphere of atrocity”surrounded the event, concluding that a massacre had taken place and the crime had

2.5. ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE VIETNAM WAR

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been covered up by the commander of the Americal Division and his executive oﬃcer. Perhaps 400 Vietnamese civilians, mostly old men, women, and children had been killed by Charlie company. Several men were charged in the killings, but only Calley was convicted. He was given a life sentence by a court-martial in 1970, but after numerous appeals he was ﬁnally set free; he had served just over three years of house arrest.

in American strategy posed by Vietnamization, Abrams pursued a very different approach. The U.S. was gradually withdrawing from the conflict, and Abrams favored smaller-scale operations aimed at PAVN/NLF logistics, more openness with the media, less indiscriminate use of American firepower, elimination of the body count as the key indicator of battlefield success, and more meaningful cooperation with South Vietnamese forces.

Although My Lai generated a lot of civilian recriminations and bad publicity for the military, it was not the only massacre. The Vietnam War Crimes Working Group Files made public in 1994 by the“Freedom of Information Act”reveal seven, albeit much smaller, massacres previously unacknowledged by the Pentagon, in which at least 137 civilians had died. Cover-ups may have occurred in other cases, as detailed in the Pulitzer Prizewinning series of articles concerning the Tiger Force of the 101st Airborne Division by the Toledo Blade in 2003.

Vietnamization of the war, however, created a dilemma for U.S. forces: the strategy required that U.S. troops ﬁght long enough for the ARVN to improve enough to hold its own against Communist forces. Morale in the U.S. ranks rapidly declined during 1969–1972, as evidenced by declining discipline, worsening drug use among soldiers, and increased "fraggings" of U.S. oﬃcers by disgruntled troops.

2.5.4

Vietnamization, 1969–75

Richard Nixon had campaigned in the 1968 presidential election under the slogan that he would end the war in Vietnam and bring“peace with honor”. However, there was no plan to do this, and the American commitment continued for another five years. The goal of the American military effort was to buy time, gradually building up the strength of the South Vietnamese armed forces, and re-equipping it with modern weapons so that they could defend their nation on their own. This policy became the cornerstone of the so-called Nixon Doctrine. As applied to Vietnam, it was labeled Vietnamization. Nixon's papers show that in 1968, as a presidential candidate, he ordered Anna Chennault, his liaison to the South Vietnam government, to persuade them to refuse a ceasefire being brokered by President Lyndon Johnson. This action violated the Logan Act, banning private citizens from intruding into official government negotiations with a foreign nation, and has been said to constitute treason.* [22]

President Johnson in conversation with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staﬀ Earle Wheeler (center) and General Creighton Abrams (right).

One of Nixon's main foreign policy goals had been the achievement of a breakthrough in U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. An avowed anti-communist since early in his political career, Nixon could make diplomatic overtures to the communists without being accused of being “soft on communism”. The result of his overtures was an era of détente that led to nuclear arms reductions by the U.S. and Soviet Union and the beginning of a dialogue with China. In this context, Nixon viewed Vietnam as simply another limited conflict forming part of the larger tapestry of superpower relations; however, he was still determined to preserve South Vietnam until such time as he could not be blamed for what he saw as its inevitable collapse (or a “decent interval”, as it was known). To this end he and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger employed Chinese and Soviet foreign policy gambits to successfully defuse some of the anti-war opposition at home and secured movement at the negotiations that had begun in Paris. China and the Soviet Union had been the principal backers of North Vietnam's effort through large-scale military and financial aid. The two communist superpowers had competed with one another to prove their “fraternal socialist links”with the regime in Hanoi. The North Vietnamese had become adept at playing the two nations off against one another. Even with Nixon's rapprochement, their support of North Vietnam increased significantly in the years leading up to the U.S. departure in 1973, enabling the North Vietnamese to mount full-scale conventional offensives against the South, complete with tanks, heavy artillery, and the most modern surface-to-air missiles.

Pentagon Papers

The credibility of the U.S. government again suﬀered in 1971 when The New York Times, The Washington Post Soon after Tet, General Westmoreland was promoted to and other newspapers serially published The Pentagon Army Chief of Staﬀ and he was replaced by his deputy, Papers (actually U.S.-Vietnam Relations, 1945–11967). General Creighton W. Abrams. Because of the change This top-secret historical study of the American commit-

188 ment in Vietnam, from the Franklin Roosevelt administration until 1967, had been contracted to the RAND Corporation by Secretary of Defense McNamara. The documents were leaked to the press by Daniel Ellsberg, a former State Department oﬃcial who had worked on the study.

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM World War, including the bombs that struck Hiroshima and Nagasaki. According to historians Ben Kiernan and Taylor Owen, “Cambodia may well be the most heavily bombed country in history.”* [23]

The Pentagon Papers laid out the missteps taken by four administrations in their Vietnam policies. For example, they revealed the Johnson administration's obfuscations to Congress concerning the Gulf of Tonkin incidents that had led to direct U.S. intervention; they exposed the clandestine bombing of Laos that had begun in 1964; and they detailed the American government's complicity in the death of Ngô Đình Diệm. The study presented a continuously pessimistic view of the likelihood of victory and generated fierce criticism of U.S. policies. The importance of the actual content of the papers to U.S. policy-making was disputed, but the window that they provided into the flawed decision-making process at the highest levels of the U.S. government opened the issue for other questions. Their publication was a news event and the government's legal (Nixon lost to the Supreme Court) and extra-legal efforts (the “Plumbers”break-in at the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist committed to gain material to discredit him, was one of the first steps on the road to Watergate) carried out to prevent their publication —mainly on national security grounds—then went on to generate yet more criticism and suspicion of the government by the American public.

President Nixon explains the expansion of the war into Cambodia.

On March 18, 1970, Sihanouk, who was out of the country on a state visit, was deposed by a vote of the National Assembly and replaced by General Lon Nol. Cambodia's ports were immediately closed to North Vietnamese military supplies, and the government demanded that PAVN/NLF forces be removed from the border areas within 72 hours. On March 29, 1970, the Vietnamese had taken matters into their own hands and launched an offensive against the Cambodian army. A force of North Vietnamese quickly overran large parts of eastern Cambodia Operation Menu and the Cambodian campaign, reaching to within 15 miles (24 km) of Phnom Penh allowing their allies, the Chinese-supported Khmer Rouge 1969–70 to extend their power. Nixon ordered a military incurMain articles: Operation Menu and Cambodian Cam- sion into Cambodia by U.S. and ARVN troops in order to both destroy PAVN/NLF sanctuaries bordering South paign Vietnam and to buy time for the U.S. withdrawal. During For more details on the PAVN logistical system, see the Cambodian Campaign, U.S. and ARVN forces disSihanouk Trail. covered and removed or destroyed a huge logistical and For more details on the conflict in Cambodia, see intelligence haul in Cambodia. Cambodian Civil War. By 1969 the policy of non-alignment and neutrality had worn thin for Prince Sihanouk, ruler of Cambodia. Pressures from the right in Cambodia caused the prince to begin a shift away from the pro-left position he had assumed in 1965–1966. He began to make overtures for normalized relations with the U.S. and created a Government of National Salvation with the assistance of the pro-American General Lon Nol. Seeing a shift in the prince's position, President Nixon ordered the launching of a top-secret bombing campaign, targeted at the PAVN/NLF Base Areas and sanctuaries along Cambodia's eastern border. The massive B-52 strikes conducted over 14 months were the beginning of a deluge that delivered approximately 2,756,941 tons of bombs on Cambodia over the next five years. This was more than the total tonnage that the Allies dropped during all of the Second

The incursion also sparked large-scale demonstrations on and closures of American college campuses. The expansion of the conﬂict into Cambodia was seen as an expansion of the conﬂict into yet another country, nullifying Nixon's promises of de-escalating the war. During the ensuing protests, four students were killed and a score were wounded by Ohio National Guardsmen during a demonstration at Kent State University. Two other students were killed at Jackson State University in Mississippi. In an effort to lessen opposition to the U.S. commitment, Nixon announced on October 12 that the U.S. would withdraw 40,000 more troops from Vietnam before Christmas. Following the coup, Sihanouk arrived in Beijing, where he established and headed a government in exile, throwing his substantial personal support behind the Khmer Rouge, the North Vietnamese, and the Laotian Pathet Lao.

2.5. ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE VIETNAM WAR Lam Son 719 Main article: Operation Lam Son 719 In 1971 the U.S. authorized the ARVN to carry out an offensive operation aimed at cutting the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southeastern Laos. Besides attacking the PAVN logistical system (which would buy time for the U.S. withdrawal) the incursion would be a significant test of Vietnamization. Backed by U.S. air and artillery support (American troops were forbidden to enter Laos), the ARVN moved across the border along Route 9, utilizing the abandoned Marine outpost of Khe Sanh as a jumpingoff point. At first, the incursion went well, but unlike the Cambodian operation of 1970, the PAVN decided to stand and fight, finally mustering around 60,000 men on the battlefield.

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power to support ARVN defensive operations and to conduct Operation Linebacker, the first offensive bombing of North Vietnam since Rolling Thunder had been terminated in 1968. The PAVN attacks against Huế, An Lộc, and Kon Tum were contained and the ARVN launched a counteroffensive in May to retake the lost northern provinces. On September 10, the South Vietnamese flag once again flew over the ruins of the Citadel of Quảng Trị City, but the ARVN offensive then ran out of steam, conceding the rest of the occupied territory to the North Vietnamese. South Vietnam had countered the heaviest attack since Tet, but it was very evident that it was totally dependent on U.S. airpower for its survival. Meanwhile, the withdrawal of American troops, who numbered less than 100,000 at the beginning of the year, was continued as scheduled. By June only six infantry battalions remained. On August 12, the last American ground combat division left the country. However, the U.S. continued to operate the base At Long Binh. Combat patrols continued there until November 11 when the U.S. handed over the base to the South Vietnamese. After this, only 24,000 American troops remained in Vietnam and President Nixon announced that they would stay there until all U.S. POW's were freed.

The North Vietnamese first struck the flanks of the ARVN column, smashed its outposts, and then moved in on the main ARVN force. Unlike previous encounters during the conflict, the PAVN fielded armored formations, heavy artillery, and large amounts of the latest anti-aircraft artillery. After two months of savage fighting, the ARVN retreated back across the border, closely At the beginning of the North Vietnamese invasion, pursued by the North Vietnamese. One half of the inthe media, including conservative commentator William vasion force was killed or captured during the operation, F. Buckley, predicted the downfall of the Republic of and Vietnamization was seen as a failure. Vietnam; Buckley even called for the firing of General On August 18, Australia and New Zealand decided to Creighton Abrams as an incompetent military leader. But withdraw their troops from the conflict. The total number the ARVN succeeded in defeating General Giap and his of U.S. forces in South Vietnam dropped to 196,700 on huge invading army. His forces were shattered at the October 29, 1971, the lowest level since January 1966. Battle of An Lộc, where he threw several divisions at On November 12, 1971, Nixon set a February 1, 1972 the entrenched South Vietnamese forces, ultimately losdeadline for the removal of another 45,000 troops. ing over half of his army as casualties. General Giap's loss and subsequent retreat was viewed as so great a failure by the North Vietnamese Communist Party that Giap was relieved of his command. Although ARVN troops Easter Offensive withstood and repelled the massive PAVN attack at An Vietnamization received another severe test in the spring Lộc, American air power seems to have been a key to the of 1972 when the North Vietnamese launched a massive ARVN success, just as it had been a key factor in supconventional offensive across the Demilitarized Zone. porting U.S. ground forces when they operated in South Beginning on March 30, the Easter Offensive (known Vietnam prior to 1972. Thus, the 1973 withdrawal of as the Nguyễn Huệ Offensive to the North Vietnamese) U.S. military support and passage of Congressional resquickly overran the three northernmost provinces of olutions cutting off U.S. funding for combat activities in South Vietnam, including the provincial capital of Quảng Indochina (H.R. 9055 and H.J.Res. 636) opened the way for the 1975 defeat of the Republic of Vietnam. Trị City. PAVN forces then drove south toward Huế. Early in April, PAVN opened two additional operations. The first, a three-division thrust supported by tanks and heavy artillery, advanced out of Cambodia on April 5. The North Vietnamese seized the town of Loc Ninh and advanced toward the provincial capital of An Lộc in Bình Long Province. The second new offensive, launched from the tri-border region into the Central Highlands, seized a complex of ARVN outposts near Dak To and then advanced toward Kon Tum, threatening to split South Vietnam in two.

Election of 1972 and Operation Linebacker II Main article: Operation Linebacker II

During the run-up to the 1972 presidential election, the war was once again a major issue. An antiwar Democrat, George McGovern, ran against President Nixon. The president ended Operation Linebacker on October 22 after the negotiating deadlock was broken and a tentative The U.S. countered with a buildup of American air- agreement had been hammered out by U.S. and North

190 Vietnamese representatives at the peace negotiations in Paris. The head of the U.S. negotiating team, Henry Kissinger, declared that “peace is at hand”shortly before election day, dealing a death blow to McGovern's already doomed campaign. Kissinger had not, however, counted on the intransigence of South Vietnamese President Thieu, who refused to accept the agreement and demanded some 90 changes in its text. These the North Vietnamese refused to accept, and Nixon was not inclined to put too much pressure on Thieu just before the election, even though his victory was all but assured. The mood between the U.S. and North further turned sour when Hanoi went public with the details of the agreement. The Nixon Administration claimed that North Vietnamese negotiators had used the pronouncement as an opportunity to embarrass the President and to weaken the United States. White House Press Secretary Ron Ziegler told the press on November 30 that there would be no more public announcements concerning U.S. troop withdrawals from Vietnam since force levels were down to 27,000.

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM pledged to work toward a compromise political solution, possibly resulting in a coalition government. To maximize the area under their control, both sides in South Vietnam almost immediately engaged in land-grabbing military operations, which turned into ﬂashpoints. The signing of the Accords was the main motivation for the awarding of the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize to Henry Kissinger and to leading North Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho. A separate cease-ﬁre had been installed in Laos in February. Five days before the signing of the agreement in Paris, President Lyndon Johnson, whose presidency had been tainted with the Vietnam issue, died.

The first U.S. prisoners of war were released by North Vietnam on February 11, and all U.S. military personnel were ordered to leave South Vietnam by March 29. As an inducement for Thieu's government to sign the agreement, Nixon had promised that the U.S. would provide financial and limited military support (in the form of air strikes) so that the South would not be overrun. But Nixon was fighting for his political life in the growing Watergate scandal and facing an increasingly hostile Because of Thieu's unhappiness with the agreement, pri- Congress that withheld funding. The President was able marily the stipulation that North Vietnamese troops could to exert little influence on a hostile public long sick of the remain“in place”on South Vietnamese soil, the negoti- Vietnam War. ations in Paris stalled as Hanoi refused to accept Thieu's Thus, Nixon (or his successor Gerald Ford) was unable changes and retaliated with amendments of its own. To to fulfill his promises to Thieu. At the same time, aid to reassure Thieu of American resolve, Nixon ordered a North Vietnam from the Soviet Union increased. With massive bombing campaign against North Vietnam uti- the U.S. no longer heavily involved, both the U.S. and lizing B-52s and tactical aircraft in Operation Linebacker the Soviet Union no longer saw the war as significant II, which began on December 18 with large raids against to their relations. The balance of power shifted deciboth Hanoi and the port of Haiphong. Nixon justified sively in North Vietnam's favor, and the North subsehis actions by blaming the impasse in negotiations on quently launched a major military offensive, the Ho Chi the North Vietnamese, causing one commentator to de- Minh Campaign, against the South that culminated in the scribe his actions as “War by tantrum”. Although this surrender of the Republic of Vietnam to PAVN forces on heavy bombing campaign caused protests, both domesti- April 30, 1975. cally and internationally, and despite significant aircraft losses over North Vietnam, Nixon continued the operation until December 29. He also exerted pressure on 2.5.5 See also Thieu to accept the terms of the agreement reached in October.

2.5.6 Notes

Return to Paris On January 15, 1973, citing progress in peace negotiations, Nixon announced the suspension of all offensive actions against North Vietnam, to be followed by a unilateral withdrawal of all U.S. troops. The Paris Peace Accords on “Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam”were signed on January 27, officially ending direct U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. The agreement called for the withdrawal of all U.S. personnel and an exchange of prisoners of war. Within South Vietnam, a cease-fire was declared (to be overseen by a multi-national, 1,160-man International Control Commission force) and both ARVN and PAVN/NLF forces would remain in control of the areas they then occupied, effectively partitioning South Vietnam. Both sides

[1] D. R. Sar Desai, Vietnam: The Struggle for National Identity (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), p. 50. [2] http://vi.uh.edu/pages/buzzmat/ hessrooseveltandindochina.pdf [3] “Presentation of the Insignia of Knights of the Legion of Honor to seven CAT pilots at Dien Bien Phu” (Embassy of France in the United States, February 25, 2005) [4] Hawaii University. [5] CUNY. [6] Touch the Wall. [7] “Vietnam War”. Swarthmore College Peace Collection. [8] “John Kennedy's Vietnam Rhetoric”

2.6. DOI MOI

191

[9] Gibbons, William Conrad: The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War; Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Vol. 2, p. 40 [10] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uG7jjF6xuKM BAD LINK

[11] Nalty, Bernard C. The Vietnam War: the history of America's conﬂict in Southeast Asia. Salamander Books, 1998, p. 155. [12] Terrence Maitland, Setphen Weiss, et al., Raising the Stakes. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1982, p. 161. [13] Earl L. Tilford, Setup: What the Air Force did in Vietnam and Why. Maxwell Air Force Base AL: Air University Press, 1991, p. 89. [14] “Statistics about the Vietnam War”. Vietnam Helicopter Flight Crew Network. Archived from the original on 2008-01-27. Retrieved 2008-10-05.(archived from the original on 27 January 2008). [15] Vietnam: Looking Back - At the Facts - by K. G. Sears, Ph.D. [16] John Paul Vann. John Paul Vann: Information from Answers.com. [17] “Vietnamization: 1970 Year in Review”, UPI.com. [18] . D. Coleman (1988). Choppers: The Heroic Birth Of Helicopter Warfare. New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press. 1-288. [19] Don Oberdorfer (December 17, 1967). “The 'Wobble' on the War on Capitol Hill”. The New York Times.

• The short ﬁlm Big Picture: Big Picture: The Unique War is available for free download at the Internet Archive • The short ﬁlm Big Picture: U.S. Army Advisor in Vietnam is available for free download at the Internet Archive

2.5.8 Declassified Primary Sources Defense Department The Office of the Secretary of Defense & Joint Staff, FOIA Requester Service Center • Vietnam & Southeast Asia (very large document collection) CIA • CIA and the Generals, Covert Support to Military Government in South Vietnam • CIA and the House of Ngo, Covert Action in South Vietnam, 1954–63 • CIA and Rural Pacification • Good Questions, Wrong Answers CIA's Estimates of Arms Traffic through Sihanoukville, Cambodia, During the Vietnam War.

[20] Text and audio of speech

• The Way We Do Things, Black Entry Operations into Northern Vietnam

[21] R. K. Brigham, Guerrilla Diplomacy: the NLF's foreign relations and the Vietnam War, pp. 76-7

• Undercover Armies, CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos

[22] Fitrakis, Bob; Wasserman, Harvey (August 12, 2014). “George Will Conﬁrms Nixon's Vietnam Treason”. Common Dreams.

• CIA collection of Vietnam War documents released under the Freedom Of Information Act

[23] Kiernan, Ben; Owen, Taylor. Bombs over Cambodia.

2.5.7

External links

• CIA's collection of declassiﬁed Air America documents State Department

• Why Did Vietnamization of The Vietnam War Fail? Foreign Relations Series • The short ﬁlm President John Kennedy's Press Conference on South Vietnam (1963) is available for free download at the Internet Archive

2.6 Doi Moi

• The short film Laos: The Not So Secret War (1970) is available for free download at the Internet Archive Đổi Mới (pronounced [ɗoi mə̌ ːi]; English: Renovation) • The short film Big Picture: Why Vietnam? is avail- is the name given to the economic reforms initiated in Vietnam in 1986 with the goal of creating a "socialistable for free download at the Internet Archive oriented market economy". The term đổi mới itself is a • The short film Big Picture: Operation Montagnard is general term with wide use in the Vietnamese language, available for free download at the Internet Archive however the Doi Moi Policy (Chính sách Đổi Mới) refers

192

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM

speciﬁcally to these reforms. The communist government in the north, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), adopted a centrally planned economy since its inception. Under the command economy, the central government decided output targets and prices, input supplies, domestic wholesale and retail trade, and international trade; the state was aiming at creating a vertically integrated economy where there was no commercial contact among individual production units horizontally.* [1]* :200 In the agricultural sector, the government formed cooperatives in three stages; production solidarity groups, lowerlevel cooperatives where land and equipment were shared, and higher-level cooperatives in which a system of workpoints determined distribution of all income.* [2] However, the command economy was abolished by the late 1980s following the 6th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

2.6.1

Background

It was de facto a top-down reform program that required a handful of most influential high-ranking political figures of Vietnam in mid-1980s.* [3] Prior to the Doi Moi, Vietnam faced an economic crisis; inflation soared to over 700 per cent, economic growth slowed down, and export revenues covered only less than the total value of imports. They resulted in intense debate about past faults under the central planning system and the need to introduce a major change in the run up to the 6th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam.* [4]

2.6.2 Early reforms While Doi Moi was launched at the 6th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1986, the state had initiated reforms in the early 1980s. When Vietnam faced economic problems insulating the centralized planning system in the late 1970s, early signs of reforms were observed. There was three important groups with different interests which negotiated for reform: those of central authorities depending on the planning system for their power but facing outside economy, those of local authorities and enterprise managers attempting to secure as much surplus as possible from higher levels, and those enjoying little benefits under the planning system as they lacked access to the kinship and party networks.* [1] In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the process of negotiation among those groups began to shift, leading to a number of key reforms which permitted some outside activities.* [1] Indeed, provincial governments demanded that they be allowed to export and import, as the state prioritized industrial plant and equipment, not agricultural inputs such as fertilizer, while the central government feared that the permission of horizontal trade would result in losing control over the economy. Moreover, there was endorsement from Ministry of Trade for reform in order to obtain agricultural inputs, spare parts, food and consumer goods.* [8] In October and November 1978, cooperative leaders in the north were permitted to rent out fields to members during the winter as long as the latter produced winter crops collectively for required number of days and return the land in time for growing paddy in the spring. Moreover, with the party's Central Executive Committee and the government's Council of Ministers, farmers were able to grow small parts of a cooperative's poorest field for five years. These tiny measures were among the initial steps which contributed to the restoration of agricultural land to private households.* [9]

Moreover, one of the important developments which provoked change was the death of Party Secretary, Lê Duẩn, in July 1986.* [5] Long time party leaders including Lê Duẩn, Trường Chinh and Pham Van Dong were deemed attributed to part of the crisis of Vietnamese state socialism.* [5] As a result, the Sixth Party Congress elected At the Six Party Plenum in August 1979, there was as Party Secretary more liberal Nguyễn Văn Linh at the debate starting about decentralization of some decision Sixth Party Congress in December 1986. making and provisions of more incentives for producIn addition, there were three political movements which tion expansion.* [10] In 1980, with Decree 40 issued, urged Viet Nam’s leaders to take reforms. First, there provincial governments were permitted to establish tradwas strong pressure from technocrats and pro-market reing firms. Since foreign trading constituted the primacy formists for a final solution to the DRV model, based of the planned economy, this was one of areas where the upon the political collapse of hard reform socialism af- state launched serious reforms. The monopoly of foreign ter the 1985 debacle. Second, those benefiting from trade by the state in Vietnam was broken by this decicommercial activities thanks to partial reforms were in sion.* [8] In 1981, other important measures were issued. favour of further reform as reform brought economic ben- One of them was guidelines directive 100 with respect efits. Third, southern liberals supported reform as they to contracts in the agricultural sector. This new contract wished to return to the pre 1975 system.* [6] Fforde elab- system had four main features. First, farmland was disorated the second point; during the transition period since tributed to individual working age members. Second, inthe early 1980s, state enterprises accessible to cheap re- dividual worker or group was able to be in charge of sevsources earned profits by diverting them onto the free eral phases of farming under contract with cooperatives. market, which were shared among various groups includ- Third, each person or group was obliged to sell part of the ing workers, manager, and higher levels. This profit shar- output grown in the assigned field. Last, farmers could ing provided a power basis for reform and commercial- retain all production beyond the quota.* [9] In addition, there was a decision issued by the state, Decree 25-CP ization in the party, pushing for a market economy.* [7]

2.6. DOI MOI allowing state enterprises to produce beyond planned output with the adaptation of the three plan system. According to the system, a single plan was composed of three elements, Plan A, Plan B and Plan C. Once state enterprises produce and sell to the state using inputs supplied, Plan B would allow them to dispose of their products freely. Moreover, state enterprises would be allowed to produce the minor under Plan C. This system was one of the contributors to the recovery in state industrial output of the early 1980s.* [6] Following these measures, numerous consumer products were removed from the ration list so as to increase trade at market prices and ease shortages of them within the state trade system.* [8]

193 in state enterprises in relation to production, human resources and ﬁnancial decisions making, to eliminate allocation of budgets and inputs to state enterprises, as well as restrictions on selling on the free market, to provide subsidies only in the form of loans by state-owned commercial banks, and to allow for retaining depreciation charges other than large public projects.* [13]

2.6.4 Ideology behind reforms

Doi Moi reforms led to the development of what is now referred to as the Socialist-oriented market economy,* [14] where the state plays a decisive role in the economy, but private enterprise and cooperatives play a significant role in commodity production. On the one 2.6.3 Subsequent reforms hand, the Communist Party of Vietnam has reaffirmed Facing these economic problems, it was agreed at 6th its commitment to the socialist economic orientation, and of the economy are intended to National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam that Doi Moi renovations * strengthen socialism. [15] in December 1986 that the centrally management system dependent on state subsides was abolished and a fo- On the other hand, Doi Moi was inspired not only by cus was shifted to the creation of a market driven econ- socialist conceptions but also by the example of the omy with different sectors where competitions between newly industrialized countries in East and Southeast Asia. the private sector and the state in non-strategic sectors Indeed, in 1987–1989, the withdrawal of Vietnamese would exist.* [10] In 1987 there were significant reduc- troops from Cambodia enabled Hanoi to improve its retions in the number of checkpoints set to prevent domes- lations with the various ASEAN countries, and thanks tic trade.* [10] Markets where private agricultural prod- to this rapprochement, the Vietnamese leadership gained ucts were allowed to be sold were rapidly growing. substantial insight into the modernization process of these Privately owned enterprises were permitted in commod- states. ity production (and later encouraged) by the Communist Party of Vietnam. The first half of the 1990s observed changes in the legal framework for the private sector.* [11] In 1990, Law on Private Enterprises which provided a legal basis to private firms was enacted, while Companies Law acknowledged Joint-stock company and private limited liability company. The constitution established in 1992 officially recognized the role of the private sector.

For instance, in November 1987 a Vietnamese economic delegation headed by Deputy Premier Võ Văn Kiệt visited Indonesia with the aim of studying the recent development of the Indonesian economy. The delegation drew the following lessons from Indonesia's experiences. First, they concluded that priority should be given to the development of agriculture, particularly food production. Second, industry should serve and assist agriculture. Third, oil production would stimulate the development of With respect to reforms in the agricultural sector, Land chemical industry and other branches of manufacturing. should be provided for forLaw was enacted in 1988, stipulating the recognition of Fourth, favorable conditions * eign direct investment. [16] private land use rights by the state. In addition, Central Committee Resolution 10 was issued; according to this resolution, farmers were permitted to use land for long term and sell their products on the free market and not 2.6.5 Impact obliged to participate in cooperatives.* [10] Households in almost all the cooperatives in the Red River delta were Almost overnight the“big bang”economic liberalization into a vibrant, given rights to agricultural fields by late 1988. Their use transformed a stagnant peasant economy * [17] The apparent and market-driven, capitalist system. rights last for less than ten years in the majority of farmsudden swelling of ranks of petty entrepreneurs produced * land. [9] a boom in local markets and the emergence of 'street front One of measures regarding state owned enterprises was capitalism' in urban areas. Decree 217-HDBT in November 1987. This was a crucial part of Doi Moi as they enjoyed more independence and autonomy with full rights over capital.* [12] The De- Industry cree would change operations of state enterprises in a number of ways; to introduce an accounting system based Before 1988, there were no private enterprises operating on profits, to replace output targets with profit targets for in Vietnam, apart from family firms that did not employ most enterprises, to provide more autonomy to managers wage labor. * [18] With the Company Law in 1990 en-

194 acted, the number of private enterprises increased; there were 190 joint stock companies and 8,900 limited liability companies registered by 1996.* [10] Private sectors played an important role in the service sector as the share in the retail trade activity increased from 41% to 76% in 1996. Moreover, the enactment of Enterprise Law in 2002 which eliminated 150 business licenses and permits and lowered the time and cost for registration, led to a steady increase in the number of private companies; the number of newly registered private enterprises reached 36,000 in 2004 up from 14,457 in 2000.* [19] By June 2004, the total number of firms registered under the Enterprise Law reached to 95,357. With regard to the impact on state enterprises, initial measures such as a pilot equitisation program did result in little progress in terms of the number of state owned enterprises equitised; they were only 15 state enterprises equitized by 1997. In order to speed up the process, the state established a Central Steering Committee on Equitisation chaired by the Ministry of Finance.* [10] Moreover, the state transferred to relevant ministries or provincial leaders decisions on the equitisation of SOEs with a total of VND 10 billion. As a result, state enterprises were constantly equitized between 1998 and 2000; over 100 in 1998, 250 in 1999, and 210 in 2000.* [12] Furthermore, the total number of SOEs experiencing equitilization between 2001 and 2005 reached 2,188.* [20] Social impact However, the economic liberation has brought negative effects on the Vietnam's society. First, income inequality between urban and rural areas have grown since the adoption of Doi Moi. Beresford suggests that income disparity between industrial and more urbanized provinces and agricultural based provinces widened since 1988.* [21] There were two main reasons. First, while industry was restructured following the demise of budget subsidies and liberation of all industrial prices in the late 1980s, centrally managed industries mainly located in small number of cities, were highly protected with special privileges such as access to land. On the other hand, provincially owned state firms were more affected by the restructuring process. Another possible reason for the interprovincial inequality she gave was the concentration of Foreign Direct Investment. With Foreign Investment Law enacted in 1988, foreign investment grew; nevertheless, two third of the capital went to Ho Chin Minh city and three neighboring provinces, and the rest was invested in Hanoi and Haiphong as of 1993. Luong also highlights the concentration of FDI, particularly in terms of sector. Since nearly 90 percent of FDI in 2000 were invested in industries, construction and services, it was urban areas which benefited more.* [22]

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM Now, Vietnam is the second largest coffee exporter after Brazil. To achieve the goal, numerous ethinic Vietnamese entrepreneurs established private coffee plantations, encroaching land cultivated by ethnic minorities in the 1990s. The coffee acreage expanded rapidly ten times for ten years from just 44,700 hectares in 1985 up to 516,700 in 2000. Vietnamese coffee exports increased in line with the expansion of the land; there was a significant increase from 12,300 tons in 1985 to 910,000 tons in 2001. It reached 1.26 million tons in 2011.* [23] Consequently, ethnic minorities dependent on swidden agriculture moved to more unfabourable mountainous areas * [24] More recently, it was reported that with demand for lands growing, an increasing number of cases have emerged that farmers have had their land seized by local officials without proper compensation; it was far lower than market value. Indeed, there were some fisherman in Haiphong who clashed with the police as they were opposed to eviction by a local official.* [25] Relating to agricultural commodities such as coffee, while growing exports contribute to household income, integration into the global market can have negative effects on local farmers. The Mekong delta and the Central Highlands were highly susceptible to fluctuations in prices of agricultural commodity products determined by the world market. Indeed, export price of robust coffee fall one tenth in the 1990s; it dropped from 4,000 dollars a ton in 1994 to 380 dollars in 2001. This worsened the living condition of farmers in the Central Highlands as it accounted for only a half of the production cost.* [22]

2.6.6 Alternative views Shadow economies Some sources claim that there was already a shadow market of unregulated enterprises operating in Vietnam before Doi Moi. They were often family oriented commercial and peasant enterprises, ﬁnanciers, currency traders and smugglers.

There were three reasons pointed out for the prolonged existence of the outside economy in Vietnam since the inception of the planned economy.* [26] First, due to loosening monetary policies, there was an increase in procumbent prices of rice and in workers’wage, boosting the demand for food consumption. Second, the party was not capable enough of managing agricultural collectivization. Agriculture cooperative members attempted to produce beyond the so-called ‘5 percent land’while the state found it hard to punish them by force due to concerns about losing their popular support in the midst of war. Third, the state lacked in experiences of governing the system. Due to poor experiences, SOEs did not follow what they were ordered to do by line ministers, and Another impact of Doi Moi on the society is an increasing rather became active about obtaining inputs in order to number of landless people. Luong explains the impact meet plan targets and amass capital necessary for future on people in the Central Highlands in the 1990s.* [22] unplanned economies.

2.6. DOI MOI State enterprises In the industrial sector, state enterprises could manufacture ‘non-list’goods outside the plan by utilizing technologies which required little fixed capital.* [27] While the state attempted to control the sector to alleviate this outside activities, petty producers resisted the imposition and rather diverted inputs obtained at low prices to the free market.* [27] Farmers Looking at the agriculture sector, villagers had their own private fields to grow crops outside the collective lands. It was reported that villagers worked the whole day on their individual household plots; however, they devoted little effort to collective fields.* [9] The Government Agriculture Commission reported in 1974 that due to preoccupations with provisions of food to their families, leaders of cooperatives in Hai Hung were able to deploy only 30-40% of the required labour force for collective work.* [9] Consequently, the share of average income from collective work for farmers dropped to 30% in 1971 from 38% in the early 1960s, while the state predicted that it would rise 60% by late 1960s.* [9] Furthermore, when the state enlarged cooperatives in the wake of the reunification, one of ways to survive was to make earning other than collective farming.* [9]

195 demise of collective farming.* [9] Farmers in the north resisted collective farming as the state enlarged it following the reunification.* [9] Means by which they were opposed included criticizing leaders in public, stealing grains, and showing laziness about working on collective fields and attempting to earn as much as outside the collective farming with diligent farming and more fertilizer.* [9] With cooperative situations worsening, the state conducted investigations; the Communist Party’s Agriculture Committee acknowledged the stagnation of agricultural and livestock production.* [9] Moreover, officials working at a research institute of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Committee emphasized that material incentives and more opportunities to do family farming be given to farmers, which was backed by some of high ranking party and government officials.* [9] Changes in the government stance toward collective farming led to the adaptation of Directive 100 (product contract) in January 1981. The product contract arrangement initially brought positive impact on production; nevertheless, villagers continued to express their frustration with the system, particularly high quotas and corruption.* [9] Furthermore, cooperatives were not able to conduct assigned work under the product contract arrangement. As family farming increasingly took place of the contract arrangement, National leaders gave up collective farming completely with Land Law in 1987 and resolution 10 in 1988.* [9]

Traders Regarding foreign trade activities, while foreign trade was centrally controlled by the state, consumer goods were sent back home by Vietnamese who worked 2.6.7 See also or studied in the socialist countries in the first stages up to the reunification.* [8] The sources of commercial goods • Five-Year Plans of Vietnam diversified since then; these varied from gifts shipped by overseas Vietnamese to their families, to goods left over • Economic history of Vietnam during the US occupation of the south which were trad• Socialist commodity economy able in the Soviet for raising capital.* [8] Further, neighboring countries such as Laos and Cambodia provided • Socialist-oriented market opportunities to smuggle goods into Vietnam. There were two types of goods smuggling from Cambodia; the first • Transition economy one included those left behind by victims of the Khmer Rouge, while the other were those imported from Thai• Socialism with Chinese characteristics land. For instance, Thai beer being imposed high duties was usually smuggled by the sea route into Vietnam.* [8]

Thus, the informal sector was not spawned by 1986 Doi 2.6.8 References Moi policy reform, as some observers have assumed. The [1] Melanie Beresford, Vietnam: the Transition for Central existing shadow economy helped set the stage for ecoPlanning. In Garry Rodan et al(Eds.), The Political Econnomic reforms by supporting peasant agriculture, fosteromy of South-East Asia: Markets, power and contestation. ing the accumulation and productive investment of local Oxford University Press. Third Edition. 2006. capital, creating urban goods and services, maintaining a spirit of entrepreneurship, and proving to the government [2] Beresford Melanie, Vietnam: Politics, Economics and Society, London: Pinter. 1988. that an alternative path to national development was pos* sible. [28] Resistance from farmers While it is widely believed that top communist leaders initiated reforms since 1986, it is also argued that villagers brought changes in national politics, resulting in the

[3] Vuong, Q.H.; Dam, V.N,; Van Houtte, D.; and Tran, T.D. (Dec 2011). “The entrepreneurial facets as precursor to Vietnam's economic renovation in 1986”(PDF). The IUP Journal of Entrepreneurship Development VIII (4): 6–47. Retrieved 25 December 2012. [4] Brian Van Arkadie and Raymond Mallon, VIET NAM: a transition tiger. Asia Paciﬁc Press, January 2004

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[5] Jonathan London, Vietnam and the making of marketLeninism, Pacific Review, Vol 22, No 3, pp 375–399. 2009 [6] Adam Fforde and Stefan de Vylder. From Plan to Market: The Economic Transition in Vietnam, Boulder: Westview Press. 1996 [7] Fforde Adam. The Political Economy of “Reform”in Vietnam-Some Reflections. In Ljunggren, B. (Eds.), The Challenge Reform in Indochina. Cambridge, USA: Harvard Institute for International Development. 1993 [8] Melanie Beresford and Dang Phong, Economic Transition in Vietnam: Trade and Aid in the Demise of a Centrally Planned Economy, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 2000 [9] Benefict J. Tria Kerkvliet. The Power of Everyday Politics: How Vietnamese Peasants Transformed National Policy. Ithaca, USA: Cornell University Press. 2005. [10] Brian Van Arkadie and Raymond Mallon,VIET NAM: a transition tiger. Asia Pacific Press, January 2004 [11] Katariina Hakkala and Ari Kokko. The State and The Private Sector in Vietnam. Working Paper 236. June 2007 [12] Scott Colin Cheshier, The new class in Vietnam, PhD dissertation, School of Business and Management, Queen Mary, University of London, 2010. [13] Brian Van Arkadie and Raymond Mallon,VIET NAM: a transition tiger. Asia Pacific Press, January 2004 P.124 [14] http://www.tapchicongsan.org.vn/details_e.asp?Object= 29152838&News_ID=18459436 [15] http://www.cpv.org.vn/cpv/Modules/News/NewsDetail. aspx?co_id=30107&cn_id=144322 [16] Balázs Szalontai, The Diplomacy of Economic Reform in Vietnam: The Genesis of Doi Moi, 1986-1989. Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. 51, Issue 2 (June 2008), pp. 199-252. Downloadable at https://www.academia.edu/ 6097480/The_Diplomacy_of_Economic_Reform_in_ Vietnam_The_Genesis_of_Doi_Moi_1986-1989 . [17] Freeman, Donald (April 1996). “Doi Moi Policy and the Small-Enterprise Boom in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam”. The Geographical Review 86: 178–197. doi:10.2307/215955. [18] Wolff, Peter (1999). Vietnam: The Incomplete Transformation. pp. 73–80. ISBN 978-0-7146-4931-3. [19] Katariina Hakkala and Ari Kokko. The State and The Private Sector in Vietnam. Working Paper 236. June 2007 [20] Scott Cheshier, Jago Penrose and Nguyen Thi Thanh Nga The State as Investor: Equitisation, Privatisation and the Transformation of SOEs in Vietnam, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Policy Dialogue Paper 2006/3, September. Hanoi. [21] Melanie Beresford. Economic Transition, Uneven Development, and the Impact of Reform on Regional Inequality. In H. V. Luong, Postwar Vietnam: Dynamics of a Transforming Society (pp. 55-80). Oxford : Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. 2003

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM

[22] HY V Luong. Wealth, Power, and Inequality: Global Market, the State, and Local Sociocultural Dynamics. In H. V. Luong, Postwar Vietnam: Dynamics of a Transforming Society (pp. 81-106). Oxford : Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. 2003 [23] Vietnam General Statistical Office 2014, http://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=472& idmid=3&ItemID=15939 [24] A. Terry Rambo and Neil L. Jamieson. Upland Areas, Ethnic Minorities. In H. V. Luong, Postwar Vietnam: Dynamics of a Transforming Society (pp. 81-106). Oxford : Rowman and Littlefield Publisher. 2003 [25] Losing the plot; Land-grabs in Vietnam (2013, March 12). The Economist. [26] Adam Fforde and Suzanne Paine. The Limits of National Liberation, London: Croom Helm. 1987. [27] Adam Fforde, Vietnamese State Industry and the Political Economy of Commercial Renaissance: Dragon’s Tooth or Curate’s Egg? Chandos Publishing, Oxford. 2007 [28] Napier, Nancy K.; Vuong, Quan Hoang. What we see, why we worry, why we hope: Vietnam going forward. Boise, ID: Boise State University CCI Press, October 2013. ISBN 978-0985530587.

2.6.9 Further reading • Murray, Geoﬀrey. Vietnam : Dawn of a New Market. New York : St. Martin's Press, 1997. • Pham, Minh Chinh, and Vuong, Quan Hoang. Kinh te Viet Nam - Thang tram va Dot pha. Hanoi: NXB Chinh Tri Quoc Gia, 2009. • Chen, J and Vu, A. Vietnam after the regional economic crisis. • Vuong, Quan Hoang. Financial Markets in Vietnam's Transition Economy: Facts, Insights, Implications. ISBN 978-3-639-23383-4, VDM-Verlag, Feb. 2010, 66123 Saarbrücken, Germany.

2.6.10 External links • Vietnam : “Doi moi”and the World Crisis • Vuong, Quan Hoang and Tran, Tri Dung. “The Cultural Dimensions of the Vietnamese Private Entrepreneurship”. ICFAI Journal of Entrepreneurship Development, VI(3&4), pp. 54-78, Sept.-Dec. 2009. © ICFAI University Press. (article) • Fulbright Economics Teaching Program in Vietnam

2.7. POLITICS OF VIETNAM

2.7 Politics of Vietnam The politics of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam are defined by a single-party socialist republic framework, where the President of Vietnam is the head of state and the Prime Minister of Vietnam is the head of government, in a one-party system led by the Communist Party of Vietnam. Executive power is exercised by the government and the President of Vietnam. Legislative power is vested in the National Assembly of Vietnam (Vietnamese: ốc hội). The Judiciary is independent of the executive. The parliament adopted the current Constitution of Vietnam; its fourth, on 15 April 1992, and it has been amended once since then. The President (Chủ tịch nước) is elected by the National Assembly for a five-year term and acts as the commanderin-chief of the Vietnam People's Armed Forces and Chairman of the Council for Defence and Security. The government (Chính phủ), the main executive state power of Vietnam, is headed by the Prime Minister, who has several Deputy Prime Ministers and several ministers in charge of particular activities. The executive branch is responsible for the implementation of political, economic, cultural, social, national defence, security and external activities of the state. The National Assembly is a unicameral legislative body. The National Assembly has 500 members, elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms. The legislature is, according to the constitution, the highest organ of the state. Its powers includes the enactment and amendment of the constitution and laws; the adoption of the government budget; supervising the Government of Vietnam and other holders of public powers responsible to the National Assembly; and appointing members of the judiciary. The Vietnamese constitution and legislation provide for regular elections for the office of the President of the Socialist Republic, the National Assembly and the People's Councils. Vietnam has, officially at least, an independent judicial system governed by the Constitution of Vietnam and national legislation enacted by National Assembly. The Supreme People's Court (Tòa án Nhân dân Tối cao) is the highest court of appeal in Vietnam. There are other specialised courts in Vietnam, including the Central Military Court, the Criminal Court, the Civil Court and the Appeal Court. The Supreme People's Procuracy observes the implementation of state organs and makes sure that Vietnamese citizens follow the law.

2.7.1

Legal framework

Main article: Constitution of Vietnam Vietnam is a one-party socialist republic.* [1] The current Vietnamese state traces its direct linage back to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and the 1945 August Revolution led by Hồ Chí Minh. The

197 current constitution was adopted on 15 April 1992 by the National Assembly of Vietnam. There have been three other constitutions in Vietnamese history: the 1946, 1959 and 1980 constitutions.* [2] The current constitution has been amended once, during the 10th session of the National Assembly on 25 December 2001.* [1] The Communist Party of Vietnam, the leading non-State organ, operates in accordance with the laws. Government powers in Vietnam are divided into legislative, executive and judiciary powers. Vietnam's legal system is based upon socialist legality according to Article 12 of the constitution.* [3]

2.7.2 State ideology Vietnam is a socialist republic with a one-party system led by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). The CPV espouses Marxism–Leninism and Hồ Chí Minh Thought, the thoughts of the late Hồ Chí Minh. The two ideologies function as a ﬁrm ideological basis and serve as guidance for the activities of the Party and state.* [2] According to the Constitution, Vietnam is “in the period of transition to socialism”.* [1] Marxism–Leninism was introduced to Vietnam in the 1920s and 1930s, and Vietnamese culture has been led under the banner of patriotism and Marxism–Leninism.* [4] Hồ Chí Minh's beliefs were not systematised during his life, nor quickly following his death. Trường Chinh's biography of “Chairman Hồ" in 1973 emphasised his revolutionary policies. The thoughts of Hồ Chí Minh were systematised in 1989, under the leadership of Nguyễn Văn Linh.* [5] Hồ Chí Minh Thought, alongside Marxism–Leninism, became the ofﬁcial ideology of the CPV and the state in 1991.* [6] The CPV's claim to legitimacy was retained following the collapse of communism in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 by its commitment to the thoughts of Hồ Chí Minh, according to Sophie QuinnJudge.* [7] According to Pierre Brocheux, the author of Ho Chi Minh: a Biography, the current state ideology is Hồ Chí Minh Thought, with Marxism–Leninism playing a secondary role.* [8] While some claim that Hồ Chí Minh Thought is used as a veil for the Party leadership since they, according to this version, have stopped believing in communism, however this is false when considering that Hồ Chí Minh was an avid supporter of Vladimir Lenin and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Others see Hồ Chí Minh Thought as a political umbrella term whose main function is to smuggle in non-socialist ideas and policies without challenging socialist legality.* [6] Since its foundation, the key ideology has been Marxism– Leninism, but since the introduction of a mixed economy in the late 1980s and 1990s, it has lost its monopolistic ideological and moral legitimacy.* [9] Marxism– Leninism, which is a class-based ideology, lost its legitimacy because of the mixed economy. As became clear because of the Đổi Mới reforms, the Party could not base its rule on defending only the workers and the peasants,

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CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM

which was officially referred to as the “working classpeasant alliance”.* [10] In the constitution introduced in 1992, the State represented the “workers, peasants and intellectuals”.* [9] In recent years, the Party has stopped representing a specific class, but instead the“interests of the entire people”, which includes entrepreneurs.* [9] The final class barrier was removed in 2002, when party members were allowed to engage in private activities. In the face of de-emphasising the role of Marxism–Leninism, the Party has acquired a broader ideology, laying more emphasis on nationalism, developmentalism and becoming the protector of tradition.* [11]

2.7.3

The Party

Main article: Communist Party of Vietnam According to the oﬃcial version, the Communist Party

ideas.”* [2] The CPV is organised on the principles of democratic centralism. It practices “criticism, self-criticism, and strict discipline”and pursues "collective leadership and individual responsibility, and promoting comradeship and solidarity in line with the Party's political programs and statutes.”* [2] The CPV is subject to Vietnamese laws and the Constitution. It is the country's ruling party, and promotes the "mastery of the people over the country". The Party is under the supervision of the people. It is dependent on having the people contributing the party, by strengthening, uniting and leading the people in the revolutionary cause. The political system in Vietnam is led by the CPV, and it“leads, respects and promotes the role of the State, the Vietnamese Fatherland Front (VFF) and other socio-political organisations.”* [2] Congress Main article: National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam

The National Congress is the party's highest organ.* [12] The direction of the Party and the Government is decided at the National Congress, held every fifth year. The Central Committee is elected by the National Congress.* [13] Delegates vote on policies and candidates posts within the central party leadership. Following ratification of the decisions taken at the National Congress, the National Congress dissolves itself. The Central Committee, which The flag of the Communist Party is elected by the National Congress every fifth year, implements the decisions of the National Congress in the of Vietnam (Vietnamese: Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam) five-year period. Since the Central Committee only meets is leading the Vietnamese people “in carrying out the twice a year, the Politburo implements the policies of the country's renovation, modernisation and industrialisa- National Congress.* [12] tion.”* [2] According to the Party's statute, amended at the 9th National Congress on 22 April 2001, the CPV was“established and trained by President Hồ Chí Minh, Central Committee has led the Vietnamese people to carry out successfully the August Revolution, establishing the Democratic Republic of Việt Nam, now the Socialist Republic of Việt Nam, to defeat foreign invaders, to abolish the colonial and feudalist regime, to liberate and reunify the country, and then carry out the cause of renovation and socialist construction and firmly defend national independence.”* [2] It believes in socialist internationalism of the working class, and supports the “struggle for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress of the world's people.”* [2] The CPV acts as the vanguard of the working people and the whole nation by representing their interests. Its aim is to create“a strong, independent, prosperous and democratic country with an equitable and civilized society, to realise socialism and ultimately, communism.”The Party's ideological foundation is Marxism– Communist Party billboard marking the 30th Anniversary of the Leninism and Hồ Chí Minh Thoughts. These ideologies reunification of the country in 1975. guide the activities of the Party, while promoting “the nation's traditions, and absorbing other nations' essential Main article: Central Committee of the Communist

2.7. POLITICS OF VIETNAM

199

Party of Vietnam

3rd Trần Quốc Vượng - Head of the PCC Commission on Inspection

The Central Committee (CC) is the CPV's most powerful institution.* [14] It delegates some of its powers to the Secretariat and the Politburo when it is not in session.* [15] When the Vietnam War ended in 1975, the Vietnamese leadership, led by Lê Duẩn, began to centralise power. This policy continued until the 6th National Congress, when Nguyễn Văn Linh took power. Linh pursued a policy of economic and political decentralisation.* [16] The party and state bureaucracy opposed Linh's reform initiatives; because of this, Linh tried to win the support of provincial leaders. This caused the powers of the provincial chapters of the CPV to increase in the 1990s. The CPV lost its power to appoint or dismiss provincial-level oﬃcials in the 1990s; this is proven by the fact that Võ Văn Kiệt tried to wrestle this power back to the centre during the 1990s without success. These developments led to the provincialisation of the Central Committee; for example, more and more CC members have a background in provincial party work. Because of these changes, power in Vietnam has become increasingly devolved.* [17] The number of Central Committee members with a provincial background increased from a low of 15.6 percent in 1982 to a high of 41 percent in 2001. The current President of the Socialist Republic, Trương Tấn Sang, was directly elected from the provinces at the 8th Party Congress, held 1996.* [18] Because of the devolution of power, the powers of the Central Committee have increased substantially; for instance, when a two-thirds majority of the Politburo voted in favour of retaining Lê Khả Phiêu as General Secretary (the leader of Vietnam), the Central Committee voted against the Politburo's motion and voted unanimously in favour of removing Lê Khả Phiêu from his post of General Secretary.* [19] The Central Committee did this because the majority of its members were of provincial background, or were working in the provinces; because of this, these members were the ﬁrst to feel the pinch when the economy began to stagnate during Lê Khả Phiêu's rule.* [20]

4th Phạm Minh Chính

The Central Committee elects the Politburo in the aftermath of the Party Congress. Since the full Central Committee meets only once a year, the Politburo functions as the Party's leading collective decision-making body.* [21] The Secretariat is also elected by the Central Committee, and is headed by the General Secretary. It is responsible for solving organisational problems and implementing the demands of the Central Committee. The Secretariat oversees the work of the Departments of the Central Committee.* [22] Secretariat: 1st Nguyễn Phú Trọng –General Secretary of the Central Committee and Secretary of the Central Military Commission 2nd Đinh Thế Huynh - permanent member of the Party Central Committee’s Secretariat

5th Võ Văn Thưởng 6th Trương Thị Mai 7th Lương Cường 8th Nguyễn Văn Nên 9th Nguyễn Hòa Bình

2.7.4 Vietnamese Fatherland Front Main article: Vietnamese Fatherland Front The Vietnamese Fatherland Front (VFF) is an umbrella group of pro-communist movements. According to Article 9 of the Constitution, the VFF and its members constitute“the political base of people's power”.* [24] The state must create a favorable environment for the VFF and its member organisations.* [24] The VFF is a voluntary mass organisation of political, socio-political and social organisations and“individuals from all classes, social strata, ethnic groups, and religions, including overseas Vietnamese.”* [2] Its main objectives are to gather and build a people unity bloc,“strengthen the people's political and spiritual consensus, encourage the people to promote their mastership, to implement the CPV's guidelines and policies, and to abide by the Constitution and laws.” * [2] The VFF is governed on the principles of “democratic consensus, coordinated and united action.”* [2] Its organisation has been modelled after the state structure, and the VFF has its own independent statute.* [2] Notable member organisations of the VFF include the General Confederation of Labour, the Hồ Chí Minh Communist Youth Union and the Veteran Association, among others.* [25]

2.7.5 Executive Main articles: President of Vietnam, Prime Minister of Vietnam and Government of Vietnam The President of the Republic (Vietnamese: Chủ tịch nước Việt Nam) is the head of state, elected to a ﬁve-year term by the National Assembly, and is not limited by the Constitution to a maximum tenure.* [26] In addition to being the Chairman of the Council for Defence and Security and commander-in-chief of the Vietnam People's Armed Forces, the president has the procedural duty of appointing or proposing the appointment or dismissal of the Vice Presidents, Prime Minister, Deputy Chief Judge of the Supreme People's Court and Head of the Supreme People's Procuracy,* [2] with the consent of the National Assembly through a simple majority vote. The President has some inﬂuence on foreign policy, and has the right

200 to declare a state of emergency and to declare war.* [27] The most recent presidential elections were held on 25 July 2011, when Trương Tấn Sang, the incumbent, was re-elected by the deputies (members) of the National Assembly.* [28]

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM year,* [35] and its Standing Committee represents it between sessions.* [2] The membership of the Standing Committee consists of the chairman, deputy chairmen and other members; these members are elected by the National Assembly.* [36] Standing Committee members cannot simultaneously be members of the Government. Members work on a fulltime basis, and their terms of oﬃce correspond with the term of the National Assembly. The Standing Committee continues to function until a new National Assembly is elected. According to the constitution, the Standing Committee is responsible for 12 duties. Of these, the most important are the powers to announce, convene and chair the National Assembly sessions, to interpret the constitution, laws and ordinances, and to issue ordinances on those matters assigned by the National Assembly. It supervises and guides the People's Councils and their activities, and directs, regulates and coordinates the activities of the Ethnic Council and the committees of the National Assembly.* [37]

The government (Vietnamese: Chính phủ) is the executive arm of the National Assembly and the highest administrative body of the Vietnamese state. It is headed by the prime minister, and consists of deputy prime ministers, ministers and other members. The government is a unified administration responsible for the implementation of political, economic, cultural, social, national defence, security and external activities of the state. It is also responsible for the effectiveness of the state apparatus itself from the top down, stabilisation in the country and the observance of the constitution.* [29] As with the President, the government is elected by the deputies of the National Assembly for a five-year term.* [30] The Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic is elected or dismissed by the National Assembly, at the request of the president.* [2] Since 27 June 2006, the prime minister of the govern- There are seven committees of the National Assembly. ment has been Nguyễn Tấn Dũng.* [31] Committee membership is determined by the National Assembly. They are responsible for the studying and examination of bills, legislative initiatives, drafts of or2.7.6 Legislative dinances and other drafts of legal documents and reports assigned by the National Assembly or the StandMain articles: Standing Committee of the National As- ing Committee. The committees provide the National sembly and National Assembly of Vietnam Assembly and its Standing Committee with their opinThe National Assembly (Vietnamese: oc hoi) is a ions on the legislative programme. The committees supervise and conduct investigations within their respective competency and exercise powers which are stipulated by law.* [38] The National Assembly elects the Ethnic Council, which consists of a Chairman, Deputy Chairmen and other members. The Ethnic Council studies and recommends actions to the National Assembly; the National Assembly has to consult with the Ethnic Council before issuing any decisions on ethnic policy. The Chairman of the Ethnic Council has to attend meetings of the Government which concern ethnic policy. The powers of the Ethnic Council are comparable to those of the committees.* [39]

2.7.7 Elections The National Assembly convened at the Ba Đình Hall until 2007, when the building was demolished

Main article: Elections in Vietnam

unicameral legislative body, and is governed on the basis of democratic centralism.* [32] It is the highest representative organ and the highest state organ. The National Assembly is the only organ vested with constitutional and legislative powers. It is responsible for fundamental domestic and foreign policies, socio-economic policies, defence and security issues, and it exercises supreme control over all state activities.* [33] Deputies (members) of the National Assembly are elected through secret ballots in democratic elections* [34] which are held every ﬁfth year.* [35] The National Assembly is convened twice a

Article 6 of the Constitution states that“The people make use of state power through the agency of the National Assembly and the People's Councils, which represent the will and aspirations of the people, are elected by them and responsible to them”.* [32] Deputies (members) of the National Assembly are directly elected on a democratic basis through secret ballots. All citizens who are 18 or older, regardless of ethnic group, gender, social position, belief, religion, level of education, occupation or length of residency have the right to vote, the exceptions being the mentally disabled and those people who have

2.7. POLITICS OF VIETNAM

201

been deprived of the right to vote by law. People aged 2.7.8 Judiciary 21 or older have the right to stand as a candidate at elections. Three election commissions have been established Main article: Judiciary of Vietnam to manage elections; at the central level is the Election The Vietnamese judicial system is based upon Socialist Council, at the provincial level and in centrally-run cities the Election Committee is responsible for election monitoring and the Election Commission is responsible for election monitoring at constituencies.* [40] The current 500 members of the National Assembly were elected during the 2011 parliamentary election, and they have a ﬁve-year term. Despite foreign criticism, it is generally believed that the National Assembly has become more powerful in recent years.* [41] The last election was held, according to the authorities, in a democratic, fair, lawful and safe manner and was considered a success. Voter turnout was 99.51 percent; nearly 62 million people voted. In their respective constituencies, Nguyễn Phú Trọng, the General Secretary, was elected to the National Assembly with 85.63 percent of the votes, Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng was elected with 95.38 percent and President Trương Tấn Sang was elected with 80.19 percent. Outside the ruling troika, it was Nguyễn Xuân Phúc, the Chairman of the Government Oﬃce, who was elected with the highest margin, with 94.59 percent of the votes. The number of self-nominated candidates was four times higher than the previous election.* [42] Fifteen out of the 182 candidates nominated by the central government and the central party leadership were defeated in the elections. Lê Thị Thu Ba, a member of the Party's Central Committee and Chairman of the Committee of Law during the 12th National Assembly (2007–2011), was not re-elected to the National Assembly. Several capitalists were elected to the assembly, but due to the socialist ideology of the state, they are not allowed to sit on the assembly's Committee on Economy and Budget.* [43] Nguyễn Sinh Hùng, the Chairman of the National Assembly, nominated Trương Tấn Sang for the Presidency.* [44] 487 deputies of the National Assembly,* [45] meaning 97.4 percent, voted in favour of Trương Tấn Sang.* [46] In his victory speech, Trương Tấn Sang said, “I pledge to improve my moral quality and study the example of the late President Hồ Chí Minh to cooperate with the government to bring Vietnam to become a fully industrialized country by 2015.”* [47]

Latest parliamentary election Main article: Vietnamese parliamentary election, 2011

Latest presidential election Main article: Vietnamese presidential election, 2011

The emblem of the Vietnam People's Army Military Court

legality. The country's highest judicial organ is the Supreme People's Court (SPC). The composition of the SCP includes the Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Judge, jurors and court secretaries. The structure of the SCP (from the top down) is as follows: Council of Judges, Commission of Judges, Central Military Court, Criminal Court, Civil Court, Appeal Court, and assisting staﬀ. The Chief Judge of the SCP is elected by the National Assembly, while the President of the Socialist Republic has the power to nominate and dismiss the Deputy Chief Judge and judges at the Chief Judge's request. The Central Committee of the Vietnamese Fatherland Front introduces People's Jurors, which are in turn appointed by the Standing Committee of the National Assembly. According to the Government Web Portal, the operating principles of the courts are, during hearings, that the “judges and jurors are independent and only obey the laws.”Justice and democracy within the system is supposedly ensured because legal decision-making is an open process. Jurors play an essential role, and defenders have the right of defence and to hire a lawyer.* [2] The Supreme People's Prosecutor (SPP), the Vietnamese equivalent to an attorney general, observes the implementation process of the Ministries, ministerial-level agencies, government organs, local authorities, social and economic organisations, the armed forces, security forces and the Vietnamese citizens in general. The SPP respects the Constitution and state laws, practices public prosecution as stated by the law and ensures law enforcement. The head of the SPP is elected, dismissed, or removed from oﬃce by a proposal of the President. The Deputy Heads, prosecutors and inspectors appointed by the SPP

202

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM

head can be dismissed by the President on the Head's re- decides the plans for socio-economic development, dequest.* [2] cides the budget and is responsible for national defence * The SPC is the highest court for appeal and review, and and security at the local level. [52] The deputy (memit reports to the National Assembly, which controls the ber) of* the People's Council acts on the behalf of the judiciary's budget and confirms the president's nominees people, [53] and has the right to make proposals to the to the SPC and SPP. The SPP issues arrest warrants, People's Council and other local State organs. In turn, sometimes retroactively. Below the SPC are district and officials of these local organs *have the responsibility to provincial people's courts, military tribunals, and admin- receive and to examine them. [54] The People's Council have to elect a People's Committee, the executive oristrative, economic and labor courts. The people's courts are the courts of first instance. The Ministry of Defence gan of the People's Council. It is the People's Committee which has the responsibility to implement “the Con(MOD) has military tribunals, which have the same rules as civil courts. Military judges and assessors are selected stitution, the law, the formal written orders of superior State organs and the resolutions of the People's Council.” by the MOD and the SPC, but the SPC has supervisory * responsibility. Although the constitution provides for in- [55] The People's Committee is headed by a Chairman, dependent judges and lay assessors (who lack adminis- who acts as the body's leader. All decisions of the Peotrative training), the United States Department of State ple's Committee are taken through a collegial decisionmaintains that Vietnam lacks an independent judiciary, making process,* and have to “conform to the will of in part because the Communist Party selects judges and the majority.” [56] The chairman has *the power to anvets them for political reliability. Moreover, the party nul decisions of lower standing organs. [56] Local offiseeks to influence the outcome of cases involving per- cials of the Vietnamese Fatherland Front, its local head, ceived threats to the state or the party's dominant posi- and officials from other mass organisations in the localtion. In an effort to increase judicial independence, the ity have the right to attend the meetings of the People's People's Committee if relevant problems government transferred local courts from the Ministry of Council and the * are discussed. [56] According to Article 125 of the conJustice to the SPC in September 2002. However, the Destitution, “The People's Council and the People's Compartment of State saw no evidence that the move actually mittee shall make regular reports on the local situation in achieved the stated goal. Vietnam's judiciary is also hamall fields to the Fatherland Front and the mass organisapered by a shortage of lawyers and by rudimentary trial tions; shall listen to their opinions and proposals on local procedures. The death penalty often is imposed in cases power building and socio-economic development; shall * of corruption and drug trafficking. [49] cooperate with them in urging the people to work together with the State for the implementation of socio-economic, national-defence, and security tasks in the locality.”* [57]

2.7.9

Local government

Main article: Provinces of Vietnam

List of provinces

Provinces and municipalities are subdivided into towns, 2.7.10 References districts and villages. Provinces and municipalities are [1] “Preamble of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic centrally controlled by the national government. Towns, of Vietnam”. Government of the Socialist Republic of districts and villages are locally accountable to some deVietnam. Retrieved 20 April 2012. gree through elected people's councils.* [49] Certain cities and provinces are under direct control of the central gov- [2] “Political system”. Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Retrieved 20 April 2012. ernment. The provinces are divided into districts, provincial cities and towns; cities under direct rule are divided [3]“Article 12 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic into towns, urban and rural districts. In turn, the district of Vietnam”. Government of the Socialist Republic of is divided into communes and townlets. In the words of Vietnam. Missing or empty |title= (help); Article 118 of the Constitution, the “provincial city and the town are divided into wards and communes; the urban [4]“Vietnam culture overview”. Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Retrieved 16 April 2012. district is divided into wards.”* [50] The establishment of People's Council and People's Committees is determined [5] Quinn-Judge 2002, p. 2. by law.* [50] In the provinces, the People's Council is the“local organ [6] of State power”, and it represents the “aspirations, and [7] mastery of the people”. The People's Council is democratically elected, and is accountable to the people and to [8] superior organs of the state.* [51] It must pass resolutions [9] which are formal orders of superior organs of state, and it acts on behalf of the constitution. The People's Council [10]

Gillespie 2006, p. 90. Quinn-Judge 2002, p. 256. Brocheux 2007, p. 186. Gillespie 2006, p. 91. Gillespie 2006, p. 92.

2.7. POLITICS OF VIETNAM

[11] Gillespie 2006, pp. 91–92. [12] Van & Cooper 1983, p. 56. [13] Ashwill & Thai 2005, p. 47. [14] East & Thomas 2003, p. 574. [15] Rowley 2008, p. 187. [16] Abuza, Zachary (16 November 2001). “The Lessons of Le Kha Phieu: Changing Rules in Vietnamese politics”. Vietnamese Professionals of America. The Catholic University of America. p. 9. [17] Abuza, Zachary (16 November 2001). “The Lessons of Le Kha Phieu: Changing Rules in Vietnamese politics”. Vietnamese Professionals of America. The Catholic University of America. p. 10. [18] Abuza, Zachary (16 November 2001). “The Lessons of Le Kha Phieu: Changing Rules in Vietnamese politics”. Vietnamese Professionals of America. The Catholic University of America. p. 11. [19] Abuza, Zachary (16 November 2001). “The Lessons of Le Kha Phieu: Changing Rules in Vietnamese politics”. Vietnamese Professionals of America. The Catholic University of America. p. 12. [20] Abuza, Zachary (16 November 2001). “The Lessons of Le Kha Phieu: Changing Rules in Vietnamese politics”. Vietnamese Professionals of America. The Catholic University of America. pp. 11–12. [21] Van & Cooper 1983, p. 69. [22] Porter 1993, pp. 66–67. [23] Nguyen Phu Trong re-elected Party General Secretary [24] Hasan & Onyx 2008, p. 42. [25] Staﬀ writer.“TIN HOẠT ĐỘNG CỦA CÁC TỔ CHỨC THÀNH VIÊN”[Activities of member organisations] (in Vietnamese). Vietnamese Fatherland Front. Retrieved 8 May 2012. [26]“Article 102 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam”. Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Missing or empty |title= (help); [27]“Article 103 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam”. Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Missing or empty |title= (help);

203

[31] Central Intelligence Agency. “East & Southeast Asia: Vietnam”. The World Factbook (Directorate of Intelligence). Retrieved 10 April 2012. [32]“Article 6 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam”. Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Missing or empty |title= (help); [33]“Article 83 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam”. Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Missing or empty |title= (help); [34]“Article 7 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam”. Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Missing or empty |title= (help); [35]“Article 85 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam”. Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Missing or empty |title= (help); [36]“Article 90 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam”. Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Missing or empty |title= (help); [37] “Standing Committee”. National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Retrieved 11 April 2012. [38] “Committees”. National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Retrieved 11 April 2012. [39] “Ethnic council”. National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Retrieved 11 April 2012. [40] “Election”. National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Retrieved 11 April 2012. [41] Timberlake, Ian (21 May 2011). “One-party Vietnam votes in national election”. Associated Press. Retrieved 11 April 2012. [42] “Election results for NA and People's Council deputies announced”. Voice of Vietnam. 3 June 2011. Retrieved 11 April 2011. [43] Ruwitch, John (4 June 2011).“Party wins big in Vietnam, but with a few twists”. Retrieved 11 April 2012. [44] Staﬀ writer (25 July 2011).“Truong Tan Sang nominated as Vietnam's State President”. Association of Southeast Asian Nations–China. Retrieved 11 April 2012. [45] Staﬀ writer (25 July 2011). “National Assembly elects new State President”. en.vietnamplus.vn. Retrieved 11 April 2011. [46] Yang, Lina (25 July 2011). “Truong Tan Sang elected Vietnamese state president”. Xinhua News Agency. Xinhuanet. Retrieved 11 April 2011.

[28] Staﬀ writer (25 July 2011). “Truong Tan Sang elected Vietnamese state president”. People's Daily. Communist Party of China. Retrieved 10 April 2012.

[47] Staﬀ writer (25 July 2011). “Truong Tan Sang elected Vietnamese state president”. People's Daily. Communist Party of China. Retrieved 11 April 2011.

[29]“Article 110 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam”. Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Missing or empty |title= (help);

[48] “Election results for NA and People’s Council deputies announced”. Voice of Vietnam. 3 June 2011. Retrieved 11 April 2011.

[30]“Article 113 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam”. Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Missing or empty |title= (help);

[49] “Country Proﬁle: Vietnam” (PDF). Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. December 2005. p. 16. Retrieved 12 April 2012.

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[50]“Article 118 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam”. Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Missing or empty |title= (help); [51]“Article 119 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam”. Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Missing or empty |title= (help); [52]“Article 120 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam”. Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Missing or empty |title= (help); [53]“Article 121 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam”. Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Missing or empty |title= (help); [54]“Article 122 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam”. Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Missing or empty |title= (help); [55]“Article 123 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam”. Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Missing or empty |title= (help); [56]“Article 124 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam”. Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Missing or empty |title= (help); [57]“Article 125 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam”. Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Missing or empty |title= (help); [58] “Report on completed census results: The 1/4/2009 Population and Housing Census”. General Statistics Oﬃce of Vietnam. Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 1 April 2009. Retrieved 11 April 2012.

• Napier, Nancy K.; Vuong, Quan Hoang (2013). What We See, Why We Worry, Why We Hope: Vietnam Going Forward. Boise State University CCI Press. ISBN 9780985530587. • Quinn-Judge, Sophie (2002). Ho Chi Minh: The Missing Years, 1919–1941. University of California Press. ISBN 9780520235335. • Rowley, Chris (2008). The Changing Face of Management in South East Asia. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9780415405447. • Van, Canh Nguyen; Cooper, Earle (1983). Vietnam under Communism, 1975–1982. Hoover Press. ISBN 9780817978518.

2.7.12 External links • Active Citizens under Political Wraps: Experiences from Myanmar/Burma and Vietnam pub. by the Heinrich Böll Vietnam Government Foundation, Chiang Mai, Thailand, November 2006, pp 201 • VUFO-NGO, Directory of Vietnam government ministry and agency websites This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the Library of Congress Country Studies.

2.8 People's Army of Vietnam 2.7.11

Bibliography

• Ashwill, Mark; Thai, Ngoc Diep (2005). Vietnam Today: A Guide To A Nation At A Crossroads. Intercultural Press. ISBN 9781931930093. • Brocheux, Pierre (2007). Ho Chi Minh: a Biography. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521850629. • East, Roger; Thomas, Richard (2003). Proﬁles of People in Power: The World's Government Leaders. Routledge. ISBN 9781857431261.

The People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN; Vietnamese: ân Đội Nhân Dân Việt Nam), also known as the Vietnamese People's Army and the Vietnam People's Army, is the military forces of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. PAVN is a part of Vietnam People's Armed Forces and includes: Ground Force (including Strategic Rear Forces), Navy, Air Force, Border Defence Force, and Coast Guard. However, Vietnam does not have a speciﬁc separate Ground Force or Army branch. All of the ground troops, army corps, military districts, and specialised arms belong to the Ministry of Defence (Vietnam), directly under command of the Central Military Commission, Minister of Defence, and General Staﬀ of the Vietnam People's Army.

• Porter, Gareth (1993). Vietnam: The Politics of Bureaucratic Socialism. Cornell University Press. The military ﬂag of the PAVN is the ﬂag of the Socialist ISBN 9780801421686. Republic of Vietnam with the words Quyết thắng (Deter• Gillespie, John Stanley (2006). Transplanting mination to Win) added in yellow at the top left. Commercial Law Reform: Developing a 'Rule of Law' in Vietnam. Ashgate Publishing. ISBN During the French Indochina War (1946–1954), the PAVN was often referred to as the Việt Minh. In the 9780754647041. context of the Vietnam War (1959–1975), the army was • Hasan, Samiul; Onyx, Jenny (2008). Compara- referred to as the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). This tive Third Sector Governance in Asia: Structure, allowed writers, the US military, and the general pubProcess, and Political Economy. Springer. ISBN lic, to distinguish northern communists from the south9780387755663. ern communists, or Viet Cong. However, both groups

2.8. PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM ultimately worked under the same command structure. According to Hanoi's oﬃcial history, the Vietcong was a branch of the VPA.* [3] In 2010 the PAVN undertook the role of leading the 1,000th Anniversary Parade in Hanoi by performing their biggest parade in Vietnam's history.

2.8.1

Establishment

205 this point, it had about 1,000 soldiers.* [6] In 1950, it ofﬁcially became the People's Army of Vietnam. Võ Nguyên Giáp went on to become the ﬁrst full General of the VPA on 28 May 1948, and famous for leading the PAVN in victory over French forces at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and being in overall command against US backed South Vietnam at the Fall of Saigon on 30 April 1975.

2.8.2 French Indochina War Main article: First Indochina War

General Võ Nguyên Giáp on the date of the PAVN's establishment in 1944. Chief of General Staﬀ Hoàng Văn Thái wearing a pith helmet and holding the ﬂag.

Vietnam General Staﬀ in First Indochina War and Vietnam War, from left: Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng, President Ho Chi Minh, General Secretary Trường Chinh and General Võ Nguyên Giáp

The PAVN was first conceived in September 1944 at the first Revolutionary Party Military Conference as“armed propaganda brigades”to educate, recruit and mobilise the Vietnamese to create a main force to drive the French colonial and Japanese occupiers from Vietnam.* [4] Under the guidelines of Hồ Chí Minh, Võ Nguyên Giáp was given the task of establishing the brigades and the Armed Propaganda Unit for National Liberation came into existence on 22 December 1944. The first formation was made up of thirty one men and three women, armed with two revolvers, seventeen rifles, one light machine gun, and fourteen breech-loading flintlocks.* [5]

On 7 January 1947, its first regiment, the 102nd 'Capital' Regiment, was created for operations around Hanoi.* [7] Over the next two years, the first division, the 308th Division, later well known as the Pioneer Division formed by the 88th Tu Vu Regiment and the 102nd Capital Regiment. By late 1950 the 308th Division had a full three infantry regiments, when it was supplemented by the 36th Regiment. At that time, the 308th Division was also backed by the 11th Battalion that later became the main force of the 312th Division. In late 1951, after launching three campaigns against three French strongpoints in the Red River Delta, the PAVN refocused on building up its ground forces further, with five new divisions, each of 10–15,000 men, created: the 304th Glory Division at Thanh Hóa, the 312th Victory Division in Vinh Phuc, the 316th Bong Lau Division in the northwest border region, the 320th Delta Division in the north Red River Delta, the 325th Binh Tri Thien Division in Binh Tri Thien province. Also in 1951, the first artillery Division, the 351st Division was formed, and later, before Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, for the first time in history, it was equipped by 24 captured 105mm US howitzers supplied by the Chinese People's Liberation Army. The first six divisions (308th, 304th, 312nd, 316th, 320th, 325th) became known as the original PAVN 'Steel and Iron' divisions. In 1954 four of these divisions (the 308th, 304th, 312nd, 316th, supported by the 351st Division's captured US howitzers) defeated the French Union forces at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, ending 83 years of French rule in Indochina.

2.8.3 Vietnam War

Main article: Vietnam War Soon after the 1954 Geneva Accords, the 330th and 338th Divisions were formed by southern Vietminh members who had moved north in conformity with that agreement, and by 1955, six more divisions were formed: the 328th, 332nd, and 350th in the north of the DRV, the 305th and the 324th near the DMZ, and the 335 Division The group was renamed the“Vietnam Liberation Army” of soldiers repatriated from Laos. In 1957, the theatres of in May 1945.* [6] In September, the army was again re- the war with the French were reorganised as the ﬁrst ﬁve named the “Vietnam National Defence Army.”* [6] At military regions, and in the next two years, several divi-

206

PAVN victory in Battle of Dien Bien Phu

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM Regular formations were sent to Southern Vietnam from 1965 onwards; the 325th Division's 101B Regiment and the 66th Regiment of the 304th Division met US forces on a large scale, a first for the PAVN, at the Battle of Ia Drang Valley in November 1965. The 308th Division's 88A Regiment, the 312th Division's 141A, 141B, 165A, 209A, the 316th Division's 174A, the 325th Division's 95A, 95B, the 320A Division also faced the US forces which included the 1st Cavalry Division, the 101st Airborne Division, the 173d Airborne Brigade, the 4th Infantry Division, the 1st Infantry Division, and the 25th Infantry Division. Those PAVN formations were seen as extremely brave forces by the US forces. Many of those formations later became main forces of the 3rd Division (Yellow Star Division) in Binh Dinh (1965), the 5th Division (1966) of 7th Military Zone (Capital Tactical Area of ARVN), the 7th (created by 141st and 209th Regiments originated in the 312th Division in 1966) and 9th Divisions (first Division of National Liberation Front of Vietnam in 1965 in Mekong Delta), the 10th Dakto Division in Dakto – Highland in 1972 south of Vietnam. General Trần Văn Trà one-time commander of the B2 Front (Saigon) HQ confirms that even though the PAVN and the NLFV were confident in their ability to defeat the regular ARVN forces, US intervention in Vietnam forced them to reconsider their operations. The decision was made to continue to pursue “main force”engagements even though“there were others in the South – they were not military people – who wanted to go back to guerrilla war,”but the strategic aims were adjusted to meet the new reality.

“We had to change our plan and make it different from when we fought the Saigon regime, because we now had to fight two adversaries —the United States and South Vietnamese troops in Vietnam War, 1967 Vietnam. We understood that the U.S. Army was superior to our own logistically, in weapons and in all things. So strategically we did not hope to defeat the U.S. Army sions were reduced to brigade size to meet the manpower completely. Our intentions were to fight a long time and requirements of collective farms. cause heavy casualties to the United States, so the United see that the war was unwinnable and would By 1958 it was becoming increasingly clear that the South States would * leave.” [8] Vietnamese government was solidifying its position as an independent republic under Ngô Đình Diệm who During the Vietnamese Lunar New Year Tết holiday staunchly opposed the terms of the Geneva Accord that starting on 30 January 1968, the PAVN launched a genrequired a national referendum on unification of north eral offensive in more than 60 cities and towns throughand south Vietnam under a single national government, out south of Vietnam against the US Army and Army of and North Vietnam prepared to settle the issue of unifi- the Republic of Vietnam-(ARVN), beginning with opcation by force. erations in the border region to try and draw US forces In May 1959 the first major steps to prepare infiltra- and ARVN troops out of the major cities. In sequention routes into South Vietnam were taken; Group 559 tial coordinated attacks, the United States Embassy in was established, a logistical unit charged with establishing Saigon, Presidential Palace, Headquarters of ARVN and routes into the south via Laos and Cambodia, which later ARVN's Navy, TV and Radio Stations, Tan Son Nhat Inbecame famous as the Ho Chi Minh trail. At about the ternational Airport in Saigon were attacked and invaded same time, Group 579 was created as its maritime coun- by commando forces known as “Dac Cong”. terpart to transport supplies into the South by sea. Most This offensive became known as the "Tet Offensive.” of the early infiltrators were members of the 338th DiThe offensives caught the world's attention day-by-day vision, former southerners who had been settled at Xuan and demoralised the US public and military, both at home Mai from 1954 onwards.

2.8. PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM and abroad. The PAVN sustained heavy losses of its main forces in southern military zones. Some of its regular forces and command structure had to escape to Laos and Cambodia to avoid counterattacks from US forces and ARVN, while local guerrillas forces and political organisations in South Vietnam were exposed and had a hard time remaining within the Mekong Delta area due to the extensive use of the Phoenix Program and were never restored. Although the PAVN lost militarily to the US forces and ARVN in the south, the political impact of the war in the United States was strong.* [9] Public demonstrations increased in ferocity and quantity after the Tet Offensive. Onwards from 1970, the 5th, 7th, and 9th divisions had fought in Cambodia against US forces, ARVN, and Cambodian Prime Minister Lon Nol's troops but they had gained new allies: the Khmer Rouge and guerrilla fighters supporting deposed Prime Minister Sihanouk. In 1975 the PAVN were successful in aiding the Khmer Rouge in toppling the Lon Nol's US-backed regime, despite heavy US bombing. Nearly two years after the United States' withdrawal from Indochina in accord with the terms of the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, the PAVN launched a Spring Offensive aimed at uniting Vietnam. Without direct support of its US ally, and suffering from stresses caused by dwindling aid, the ARVN was ill prepared to confront the highly motivated PAVN, and despite numerical superiority of the ARVN in tactical aircraft, armoured vehicles and overwhelming three to one odds in regular troops, the PAVN quickly secured victory within two months and captured Saigon on 30 April 1975, effectively ending the 70 years of conflict stemming from French colonial invasion of the 19th century and unifying Vietnam.

2.8.4

Military activities (1975–1990)

207 forces of Vietnam would participate in organised incursions to protect its citizens and allies against aggressive military factions in the neighbouring Indochinese countries of Laos and Cambodia, and the defensive border wars with China. • The PAVN had forces in Laos to secure the Ho Chi Minh Trail and to militarily support the Pathet Lao. In 1975 the Pathet Lao and NVA forces succeeded in toppling the Royal Laotian regime and installing a new, and pro-Hanoi government, the Lao People's Democratic Republic,* [10] that rules Laos to this day. • Parts of Sihanouk's neutral Cambodia were occupied by troops as well. A pro US coup led by Lon Nol in 1970 led to the foundation pro-US Khmer Republic state. This marked the beginning of the Cambodian Civil War. The PAVN aided Khmer Rouge forces in toppling Lon Nol's government in 1975. In 1978, along with the FUNSK Cambodian Salvation Front, the Vietnamese and Ex-Khmer Rouge forces succeeded in toppling Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea regime and installing a new government, the People's Republic of Kampuchea.* [11] • During the Sino-Vietnamese War and the SinoVietnamese conﬂicts 1979–90, Vietnamese forces would conduct cross-border raids into Chinese territory to destroy artillery ammunition. This greatly contributed to the outcome of the Sino-Vietnamese War, as the Chinese forces ran out of ammunition already at an early stage and had to call in reinforcements. • While occupying Cambodia, Vietnam launched several armed incursions into Thailand in pursuit of Cambodian guerillas that had taken refuge on the Thai side of the border.

Main articles: Cambodian–Vietnamese War and Sino- Both in Cambodia and in Laos, the heavily armed and Vietnamese conﬂicts 1979–90 battle-hardened People's Army of Vietnam were a valuTowards the second half of the 20th century the armed able ally to the Pathet Lao and the Khmer Rouge forces, providing economic and military aid, also with new weapons, technologies and intelligence. Some claimed that just like the US Army's relationship with the ARVN, Kingdom of Laos and the Khmer Republic, the PAVN was the real power standing behind them and played key roles in bringing both the Khmer Rouge and Pathet Lao to power.

2.8.5 Peacetime During peaceful periods, the PAVN has actively been involved in Vietnam's workforce to develop the economy of Vietnam, to co-ordinate national defence and the econVPA-led forces defeat Khmer Rouge forces and take Phnom Penh omy. The PAVN has regularly sent troops to aid with natin 1979 ural disasters such as ﬂooding, landslides etc. The PAVN

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CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM

is also involved in such areas as industry, agriculture, forestry, fishery and telecommunications. The PAVN has numerous small firms which have become quite profitable in recent years. However, recent decrees have effectively prohibited the commercialisation of the military. Conscription is in place for every male, age 18 to 25 years old, though females can volunteer to join.

2.8.6

International presence

The Foreign Relations Department of the Ministry of National Defence organises international operations of the PAVN.

real power is assumed by the Central Military Commission of the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam. The secretary of Central Military Commission (usually the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam) is the de facto Commander and now is Nguyễn Phú Trọng. The Minister of National Defence oversees operations of the Ministry of Defence, and the PAVN. He also oversees such agencies as the General Staﬀ and the General Logistics Department. However, military policy is ultimately directed by the Central Military Commission of the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam.

Apart from its occupation of half of the disputed Spratly Islands, which have been claimed as Vietnamese territory since the 17th century, Vietnam has not officially had forces stationed internationally since its withdrawal from Cambodia and Laos in early 1990. The Center for Public Policy Analysis and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) as well as Laotian and Hmong human rights organisations, including the Lao Human Rights Council, Inc. and the United League for Democracy in Laos, Inc., have provided evidence that since the end of the Vietnam War, significant numbers of Vietnamese military and security forces continue to be sent to Laos, on a repeated basis, to quell and suppress Laotian political and religious dissident and opposition groups including the peaceful 1999 Lao Students for Democracy protest in Vientiane in 1999 and the Hmong rebel- Insignia of the General Staff lion.* [12]* [13]* [14]* [15]* [16]* [17]* [18]* [19]* [20]* [21]* [22] Rudolph Rummel has estimated that 100,000 Hmong • Ministry of Defence: is the lead organisation, highperished in genocide between 1975 and 1980 in collabo* est command and management of the Vietnam Peoration with PAVN. [23] For example, in late November ple's Army. 2009, shortly before the start of the 2009 Southeast Asian Games in Vientiane, the PAVN undertook a major troop • General Staff Department: is leading agency all surge in key rural and mountainous provinces in Laos levels of the Vietnam People's Army, command all where Lao and Hmong civilians and religious believers, of the armed forces, which functions to ensure comincluding Christians, have sought sanctuary.* [24]* [25] bat readiness of the armed forces and manage all military activities in peace and war.

2.8.7

Organisation

• General Political Department: is the agency in charge of Communist Party aﬀairs – political work within PAVN, which operates under the direct leadership of the Secretariat of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the Central Military Party Committee. • General Military Intelligence Department: is an intelligence agency of the Vietnamese government and military. • General Logistical Department: is the agency in charge to ensure the full logistical and military unit.

PAVN's structure

The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces is the President of Vietnam, though this position is nominal and

• General Technical Department: is the agency in charge to ensure equipped technical means of war for the army and each unit.

2.8. PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM

209

• General Military Industry Department: is the Vietnam People's Ground Forces agency in charge guide task to defence perform and Within PAVN the Ground Forces have not been estabproduction. lished as a full Command, thus all of the ground troops, army corps, military districts, specialised arms belong to the Ministry of Defence (Vietnam), under directly com2.8.8 Service branches mand of the General Staﬀ (Vietnam People's Army). The Vietnam Strategic Rear Forces (Lực lượng dự bị chiến lược) is also a part of the Ground Forces. Structure

Signal of Vietnam People's Army

The Vietnamese People's Army is subdivided into the following service branches:

•

Vietnam People's Ground Forces (Lục quân Nhân dân Việt Nam)

•

Vietnam People's Navy (Hải quân Nhân dân Việt Nam)

•

Vietnam People's Air Force (Không quân Nhân dân Việt Nam)

•

Vietnam Border Defence Force (Biên phòng Việt Nam)

•

Vietnam Map with eight Military Districts and four Corps

Vietnam Coast Guard (Cảnh sát biển Việt Nam) PAVN soldiers during a parade in 2015.

The People's Army of Vietnam is a“triple armed force” composed of the Main Force, the Local Force and the Military regions Border Force. As with most countries' armed forces, the • 1st Military Region: command the North East of PAVN consists of standing, or regular, forces as well as Vietnam. Headquarters: Thái Nguyên reserve forces. During peacetime, the standing forces are • 2nd Military Region: command the North West of minimised in number, and kept combat-ready by regular Vietnam. Headquarters: Việt Trì, Phú Thọ physical and weapons training, and stock maintenance.

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CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM as educational institutions for logistics, oﬃcer training, and technical training. In 1991, Conboy et al. stated that the PAVN Ground Force had four 'Strategic Army Corps' in the early 1990s, numbering 1–4, from north to south.* [27] 1st Corps (Vietnam People's Army), located in the Red River Delta region, consisted of the 308th (one of the six original 'Steel and Iron' divisions) and 312th Divisions, and the 309th Infantry Regiment. The other three corps, 2 SAC, 3 SAC, and 4 SAC, were further south, with 4th Corps (Vietnam People's Army), in what was South Vietnam, consisting of two former PLAF divisions, the 7th and 9th.

The IISS Military Balance 2008 attributes the Vietnamese ground forces with an estimated 412,000 personnel.* [1] Formations, according to the IISS, include nine military districts, 14 corps headquarters (10 being military's economic corps), 10 armoured brigades, three mechanised infantry divisions, and 67 infantry divisions whose strengths range from 5,000 to 12,500. The 2008 IISS estimate of 14 corps headquarters appears to be too Vietnam self-produced Scud-B tactical ballistic missiles* [26] high. Vietnamese Wikipedia entries suggest that a number of other corps headquarters, including the 5th, 14th, • 3rd Military Region: command the Red River and 68th, have indeed existed in the past, but now have been disbanded. Delta. Headquarters: Hai Phong Smaller formations include 17 independent infantry reg• 4th Military Region: command the North Central iments, one airborne brigade, various đặc công brigades of Vietnam. Headquarters: Vinh, Nghệ An and battalions of both of land combat – Đặc công bộ, ur• 5th Military Region: command the South Central ban combat – Đặc công biệt động and water-based comVietnam include the Central Highlands and South- bat – Đặc công nước (special task force units with unique ern Central coastal provinces. Headquarters: Da high-level guerrilla offensive combat tactics, sometimes incorrectly identified as “Sappers"; previously there had Nang been a commando hunting force of this branch during • 7th Military Region: command the South East Vietnam war, which has now evolved into an anti-terrorist Vietnam. Headquarters: Ho Chi Minh City force), more than 10 brigades of field artillery, eight divisions and more than 20 independent brigades of engi• 9th Military Region: command the Mekong Delta. neers, and 10–16 economic construction divisions. Headquarters: Cần Thơ • High Command of Capital Hanoi: command the capital of the state. Headquarters: Ha Noi

1st Corps - Binh đoàn Quyết thắng (Corps of Determined Victory): First organised on 24 October 1973 during the Vietnam War, 1st Corps had a major role in the Ho Chi Minh Campaign that ended the war. Stationed in Tam Điệp District, Ninh Bình. The combat forces of the corps include:

PAVN soldiers in 2015.

Main force The Main Force of the PAVN consists of combat ready troops, as well as support units such

•

308th Division

•

312th Infantry Division

•

390th Division

•

367th Air Defence Division

•

202nd Tank Brigade

•

45th Artillery Brigade

2.8. PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM

•

299th Engineer Brigade

2nd Corps - Binh đoàn Hương Giang (Corps of the Perfume River): First organised on 17 May 1974 during the Vietnam War, 2nd Corps had a major role in the Ho Chi Minh Campaign that ended the war. Stationed in Lạng Giang District, Bắc Giang. The combat forces of the corps include:

211

•

312th Air Defence Regiment

•

273rd Tank Regiment

•

675th Artillery Regiment

•

198th Commando Regiment

•

29th Signal Regiment

•

545th Engineer Regiment

•

304th Division

•

306th Infantry Division

•

325th Division

•

673rd Air Defence Division

•

203rd Tank Brigade

•

164th Artillery Brigade

•

7th Infantry Division

•

219th Engineer Brigade

•

9th Infantry Division

•

324th Infantry Division

•

71st Air Defence Regiment

•

24th Artillery Regiment

•

429th Commando Regiment

•

550th Engineer Regiment

4th Corps - Binh đoàn Cửu Long (Corps of Mekong): First organised 20 July 1974 during the Vietnam War, 4th Corps had a major role in the Ho Chi Minh Campaign and the Cambodian–Vietnamese War. Stationed in Dĩ An, Bình Dương. The combat forces of the corps include:

Local forces Local forces are an entity of the PAVN that, together with the militia and “self-defence forces,” act on the local level in protection of people and local auVietnamese troops on Spratly Island thorities. While the local forces are regular VPA forces, the people's militia consists of rural civilians, and the people's self-defence forces consist of civilians who live in 3rd Corps - Binh đoàn Tây Nguyên (Corps of urban areas and/or work in large groups, such as at conCentral Highland): struction sites or farms. The current number stands at 3–4 First organised on 26 March 1975 during the Vietnam million part-time soldiers. War, 3rd Corps had a major role in the Ho Chi Minh Campaign and the Cambodian–Vietnamese War. StaVietnam People's Navy tioned in Pleiku, Gia Lai. The combat forces of the corps include: Main article: Vietnam People's Navy •

10th Infantry Division

•

31st Infantry Division

•

320th Infantry Division

Vietnam People's Air Force Main article: Vietnam People's Air Force

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CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM

Vietnam Border Defence Force Main article: Vietnam Border Defence Force

Vietnam Coast Guard

• 3,000+ tanks: 990 T-54/55, 220 T-62, 360 Type 59, and an unknown number of PT-76B light tanks. • 4,000+ APC: details below, ex Soviet and ex US origin • 24300 Artillery • 200 Helicopters

Main article: Vietnam Coast Guard As mentioned above, reserves exist in all branches and are organised in the same way as the standing forces, with the same chain of command, and with oﬃcers and noncommissioned oﬃcers.

2.8.9

Ranks and insignia

Main article: Vietnamese military ranks and insignia

• The Highest ranks – General Oﬃcers:

2.8.10

Equipment

2.8.11 Notes [1] International Institute for Strategic Studies (3 February 2014). The Military Balance 2014. London: Routledge. pp. 287–289. ISBN 9781857437225. [2] “HISTORY – The Hmong”. Cal.org. Retrieved 13 November 2011. [3] Military History Institute of Vietnam,(2002) Victory in Vietnam: The Oﬃcial History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975, translated by Merle L. Pribbenow. University Press of Kansas. p. 68. ISBN 0-7006-1175-4. [4] [5] Macdonald, Peter (1993). Giap: The Victor in Vietnam, pp. 32 [6] Early Day: The Development of the Viet Minh Military Machine" [7] Conboy, Bowra, and McCouaig, 'The NVA and Vietcong', Osprey Publishing, 1991, p.5 [8] “Interview with PAVN General Tran Van Tra”. [9] “Political lessons – The Vietnam War and Its Impact” . Americanforeignrelations.com. Retrieved 13 November 2011. [10] Christopher Robbins, The Ravens: Pilots of the Secret War in Laos. Asia Books 2000. [11] David P. Chandler, A history of Cambodia, Westview Press; Allen & Unwin, Boulder, Sydney, 1992

BM-21 launch vehicle (Russian: БМ−21 "Град"), (Grad) a Soviet truck-mounted 122 mm multiple rocket launcher

[12] Centre for Public Policy Analysis, (CPPA),(30 August 2013), Washington, D.C.,http://www. centerforpublicpolicyanalysis.org

See also: List of equipment of the Vietnam People's [13] THE HMONG REBELLION IN LAOS: Victims of ToGround Forces talitarianism or terrorists?, by Gary Yia Lee, PhD

From the 1960s to 1975, the Soviet Union was the main supplier of military hardware to North Vietnam. After the latter's victory in the war, it remained the main supplier of equipment to Vietnam. The United States had been the primary supplier of equipment to South Vietnam; much of the equipment abandoned by the United States Army and Army of the Republic of Vietnam came under control of the re-uniﬁed Viet Nam's government. The PAVN captured large numbers of South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) weapons on 30 April 1975 after Saigon was merged (integrated).

[14] “Vietnamese soldiers attack Hmong in Laos”. Factfinding.org. Retrieved 13 November 2011. [15] “Joint-Military Co-operation continues between Laos and Vietnam”. Factfinding.org. Retrieved 13 November 2011. [16] “Combine Military Effort of Laos and Vietnam”. Factfinding.org. Retrieved 13 November 2011. [17] “Vietnam, Laos: Military Offensive Launched At Hmong”. Rushprnews.com. Retrieved 13 November 2011.

2.9. FOREIGN RELATIONS OF VIETNAM

[18] 2008May20: Laos, Vietnam: Attacks Against Hmong Civilians Mount

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2.9 Foreign relations of Vietnam

[19] “Laos, Vietnam: New Campaign to Exterminate Hmong” . Prlog.org. Retrieved 13 November 2011. [20] “President Obama Urged To Address Laos, Hmong Crisis During Asia Trip, Student Protests in Vientiane”. Prinside.com. Retrieved 13 November 2011. [21] “Hmong: Vietnam VPA, LPA Troops Attack Christians Villagers in Laos”. Unpo.org. 26 January 2010. Retrieved 13 November 2011. [22] “Laos, Vietnam Peoples Army Unleashes Helicopter Gunship Attacks on Laotian and Hmong Civilians, Christian Believers”. Nickihawj.blogspot.com. 11 February 2010. Retrieved 13 November 2011. [23] Statistics of Democide Rudolph Rummel [24] “Vietnam, Laos Crackdown: SEA Games Avoided By Overseas Lao, Hmong in Protest”. Onlineprnews.com. 7 December 2009. Retrieved 13 November 2011.

Foreign relations of Vietnam Socialist Republic of Vietnam Nations Vietnam recognizes and has diplomatic relations with Nations Vietnam does not have diplomatic relations with States with which Vietnam has unoﬃcial relations

[25] Media-Newswire.com – Press Release Distribution (26 November 2009). “SEA Game Attacks: Vietnam, Laos Military Kill 23 Lao Hmong Christians on Thanksgiving” . Media-newswire.com. Retrieved 13 November 2011. [26] http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/missiles#3 [27] See also http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/ showthread.php?t=6367

2.8.12

References

• Conboy, Bowra, and McCouaig, 'The NVA and Vietcong', Osprey Publishing, 1991. • Military History Institute of Vietnam,(2002) Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975, translated by Merle Foreign ministry in Hanoi L. Pribbenow. University Press of Kansas. ISBN 0-7006-1175-4. As of July 2013, Vietnam (officially the Socialist Re• Tran, Doan Lam (2012). How the Vietnamese Peo- public of Vietnam) maintains diplomatic relationships ple's Army was Founded. Hanoi: World Publishers. with 184 nations throughout the world, including permanent members of United Nations Security Council. In ISBN 978-604-7705-13-9. 2011 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, at the 11th National Congress of the Com2.8.13 Notes munist Party of Vietnam, released an official statement about Vietnam's foreign policy and a section of the state[1] In the Vietnam People's Army, the Ground Force hasn't ment stated: “Vietnam is a friend and reliable partbeen established the Command, all of the ground forces, ner of all countries in the international community, acarmy corps, specialised arms belong to the Ministry of tively taking part in international and regional cooperaDefence (Vietnam), under directly command of General tion processes. Deepen, stabilize and sustain established Staff (Vietnam People's Army). international relations. Develop relations with countries and territories in the world, as well as international organizations, while showing: respect for each other's in2.8.14 External links dependence; sovereignty and territorial integrity; non• Ministry of Defence Vietnam interference in each other's international affairs; non-use or threat of force; settlement of disagreements and dis• People's Army of Vietnam English Edition putes by means of peaceful negotiations; mutual respect, • Center for Public Policy Analysis, Washington, D.C. equality and mutual benefit.”* [1]

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2.9.1

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM

Soviet era

During the Vietnam War (1959–75), North Vietnam balanced relations with its two major allies, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. In 1964, Zhou Enlai, worried about the escalation of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, made an informal agreement with the North. The agreement stipulated that if U.S. and South Vietnamese forces invaded North Vietnam, the Chinese would respond by loaning pilots to the North. During the invasion, Mao Zedong failed to send as many trained pilots as he promised. As a result, the North became more reliant on the Soviet Union for its defense.* [2]

ber of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Asian Development Bank. The country has expanded trade with its East Asian neighbors as well as with countries in Western Europe and North America. Of particular signiﬁcance was Vietnam's acceptance into ASEAN in July 1995. Vietnam joined the AsiaPaciﬁc Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) in November 1998 and also hosted the ASEAN summit the following month. In 2005, Vietnam attended the inaugural East Asia Summit. Vietnam became a member of the World Trade Organization in November 2006.

2.9.3 Current issues

By 1975, tension began to grow as Beijing increasingly viewed Vietnam as a potential Soviet instrument to encircle China. Meanwhile, Beijing's increasing support for Cambodia's Khmer Rouge sparked Vietnamese suspicions of China's motives. Vietnamese-Chinese relations deteriorated signiﬁcantly after Hanoi instituted a ban in March 1978 on private trade, a move that particularly aﬀected the SinoVietnamese sector of the population. Following Vietnam's December 1978 invasion of Cambodia, China launched a retaliatory invasion of Vietnam's northern border region. Faced with severance of Chinese aid and strained international relations, Vietnam established even closer ties with the Soviet Union and its allies in the Comecon member states. Throughout the 1980s, Vietnam received nearly US$3 billion a year in economic and military aid from the Soviet Union and conducted most of its trade with the U.S.S.R. and Comecon countries. Soviet and Eastern bloc economic aid, however, ceased after the break-up of the Soviet Union.

2.9.2

'Doi Moi'

Vietnam did not begin to emerge from international isolation until it withdrew its troops from Cambodia in 1989. Within months of the 1991 Paris Agreements, Vietnam established diplomatic and economic relations with Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states and also with most countries of Western Europe and Asia's Far East. China re-established full diplomatic ties with Vietnam in 1991. The two nations concluded a land border demarcation agreement in 1999. In the past decade, Vietnam has recognized the importance of growing global economic interdependence and has made concerted efforts to adjust its foreign relations to reflect the evolving international economic and political situation in Southeast Asia. The country has begun to integrate itself into the regional and global economy by joining international organizations. Vietnam has stepped up its efforts to attract foreign capital from the West and regularize relations with the world financial system. In the 1990s, following the lifting of the US veto on multilateral loans to the country, Vietnam became a mem-

Vietnamese troops on Spratly Island

While Vietnam has remained relatively conflict-free since its Cambodia days, tensions have arisen in the past between Vietnam and its neighbors, especially in the case of China since both nations assert claims to the Spratly Islands, an archipelago in a potentially oil-rich area of the South China Sea. Conflicting claims have produced over the years small scale armed altercations in the area. In 1988, more than 70 Vietnamese troops were killed during a confrontation with Chinese forces, when China occupied several islands under Vietnamese control in the Spratly Islands. China's assertion of control over the Spratly Islands and the entire South China Sea has elicited concern from Vietnam and its Southeast Asia neighbors. The territorial border between the two countries is being definitively mapped pursuant to a Land Border Agreement signed in December 1999, and an Agreement on Borders in the Gulf of Tonkin signed in December 2000. Vietnam and Russia declared a strategic partnership in March 2001 during the first visit ever to Hanoi of a Russian head of state, largely as an attempt to counterbalance China's growing profile in Southeast Asia. Disputes - international: maritime boundary with Cambodia not defined; involved in a complex dispute over the Spratly Islands with the People's Republic of China (PRC), Malaysia, Philippines, and possibly Brunei; maritime boundary with Thailand resolved in August 1997; maritime boundary dispute with the PRC in the Gulf of Tonkin resolved in 2000; Paracel Islands occu-

2.9. FOREIGN RELATIONS OF VIETNAM

215

pied by the PRC; oﬀshore islands and sections of boundary with Cambodia are in dispute; agreement on land border with the People's Republic of China was signed in December 1999.

range of donors, trading partners, and investors independent of Vietnam's attempts to accomplish the same goal. Thus, Vietnam remains in the shadows as a mentor and emergency ally, and the tutelage of Laos has shifted Illicit drugs: minor producer of opium poppy with 21 dramatically* to development banks and international enkm2 cultivated in 1999, capable of producing 11 metric trepreneurs. [7] tons of opium; probably minor transit point for Southeast Asian heroin destined for the US and Europe; growing Indonesia opium/heroin addiction; possible small-scale heroin production Main article: Indonesia–Vietnam relations

2.9.4

Southeast Asia

Vietnam and Indonesia are both members of ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

President Megawati Sukarnoputri of Indonesia visited Vietnam in June 2003. At this time the two countries signed a“Declaration on the Framework of Friendly and Main article: Brunei–Vietnam relations Comprehensive Cooperation Entering the 21st Century” . In May, 2005 President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Brunei has an embassy in Hanoi, and Vietnam has an emIndonesia visited Vietnam. In the December of the same bassy in Bandar Seri Begawan.* [3] Relations between the year festivities were organized in the respective capital two countries have always been friendly especially in pocities to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the establishlitical ﬁeld.* [4] ment of diplomatic ties.* [8] Brunei

Cambodia

Malaysia

Main article: Cambodia–Vietnam relations

Main article: Malaysia-Vietnam relations

Since the 1990s, relations between both nations have begun to improve. Both Vietnam and Cambodia are members of multilateral regional organizations such as ASEAN and the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation. Both nations have opened and developed cross-border trade and sought to relax visa regulations to that end.* [5] Both governments have set oﬃcial targets of increasing bilateral trade by 27% to USD 2.3 billion by 2010 and to USD 6.5 billion by 2015.* [5]* [6] Vietnam exported USD 1.2 billion worth of goods to Cambodia in 2007. While Cambodia is only the 16th largest importer of Vietnamese goods, Vietnam is Cambodia's third-largest export market.* [5]

Vietnam has an embassy in Kuala Lumpur, and Malaysia has an embassy in Hanoi. Myanmar Main article: Myanmar-Vietnam relations Vietnam has an embassy in Yangon, and Myanmar has an embassy in Hanoi. Philippines

Laos

Main article: Philippines–Vietnam relations

Main article: Laos-Vietnam relations

Ever since the end of the Cold War relations between the Philippines and Vietnam has warmed rapidly. Today the Philippines and Vietnam are economic allies and have a free trade deal with each other. Both nations are a part of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The Philippines and Vietnam have conducted joint military exercises together in the South China Sea and are trying to find ways to turn the Spratly Islands from an area of conflict to an area of cooperation. Vietnam is also sometimes called the only communist military ally of the Philippines. The Philippines and Vietnam are also monitoring China's expansion into the South China Sea making sure

Although Vietnam's historical record of leadership in the revolution and its military power and proximity will not cease to exist, Laos struck out ahead of Vietnam with its New Economic Mechanism to introduce market mechanisms into its economy. In so doing, Laos has opened the door to rapprochement with Thailand and China at some expense to its special dependence on Vietnam. Laos might have reached the same point of normalization in following Vietnam's economic and diplomatic change, but by moving ahead resolutely and responding to Thai and Chinese gestures, Laos has broadened its

216

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM

that China is no threat to either Philippine or Vietnamese islands in the South China Sea. The Philippines also imports a large amount of writing material, clothes and other products from Vietnam. On May 2009, The Philippines has inked an agreement with Vietnam to cooperate in the ﬁght against crimes and ensuring social order. On January 2010, the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) has signed a memorandum of understanding with the Vietnam bourse “for mutual collaboration and communication of information and experience”to facilitate the development and eﬃcient operations of both securities markets. Singapore

bodian parties, Indonesia (as co-chair with France), and the ﬁve permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, Japan promptly established diplomatic relations and ended economic restrictions with Cambodia and Vietnam. In November 1992, Tokyo oﬀered Vietnam US$370 million in aid. Japan also took a leading role in peacekeeping activities in Cambodia. Japan's Akashi Yasushi, UN undersecretary for disarmament, was head of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, and Japan pledged US$3 million and even sent approximately 2,000 personnel, including members of the SDF, to participate directly in maintaining the peace. Despite the loss of a Japanese peacekeeper killed in an ambush, the force remained in Cambodia until the Cambodians were able to elect and install a government.

Thailand

Japan is the single biggest country donor to Vietnam. It has pledged $US890 million in aid for the country Vietnam has an embassy in Bangkok, and Thailand has this year, or 6.5 percent higher than the 2006 level of an embassy in Hanoi. $US835.6 million.

2.9.5

East Asia

China

North Korea Main article: North Korea–Vietnam relations

Main article: People's Republic of China – Vietnam Diplomatic relations between Vietnam and North Korea relations dated back to 1950, and students from North Vietnam began studying in North Korea as early as the 1960s. ReAfter both sides resumed trade links in 1991, growth in lations later declined due to investment and trade disputes bilateral trade has increased from USD $32 million in in the 1990s and 2000s.* [11] 1991 to almost USD 7.2 billion by 2004.* [9] Both governments have set the target of increasing trade volume to USD 10 billion by 2010.* [9] Vietnam's exports to China South Korea include crude oil, coal, coﬀee and food, while China exports pharmaceuticals, machinery, petroleum, fertilizers Main article: South Korea–Vietnam relations and automobile parts to Vietnam. China has become Vietnam's second-largest trading partner and the largest source of imports.* [9]* [10] Both nations are working to • 1994 August Prime Minister Lee Young-deok establish an “economic corridor”from China's Yunnan • 1996 November President Kim Young-sam province to Vietnam's northern provinces and cities, and similar economic zones in the Gulf of Tonkin and con• 1998 December President Kim Dae-jung necting the Nanning of Guangxi province, Lang Son province, Hanoi, Haiphong and Quang Ninh province of • 2002 April Prime Minister Lee Han-dong Vietnam.* [9] Air and sea transport as well as railway have • 2004 October President Roh Moo-hyun been opened between the two countries, so have the 7 pairs of national-level ports in the frontier provinces and • 2006 January Speaker of National Assembly Kim regions of the two countries.* [10] Both sides have also Won-ki launched joint ventures such as the Thai Nguyen Steel Complex, which produces hundreds of thousands of tones • 2006 November President Roh Moo-hyun (APEC) of steel products.* [9] • 2008 April Speaker of National Assembly Lim Chae-jung Japan • 2009 May Presidential Envoy Lee Byung-suk Main article: Japan-Vietnam relations • 2009 October President Lee Myung-bak Following the 23 October 1991 Final Act of the International Paris Conference on Cambodia among the Cam-

• 2009 November Speaker of National Assembly Kim Hyong-o

2.9. FOREIGN RELATIONS OF VIETNAM

217

• 2010 October President Lee Myung-bak • 2013 January Speaker of National Assembly Kang Chang Hee • 2013 September hye(G20).* [12]

2.9.6

Europe

2.9.7

Rest of world

2.9.8

See also

President

Park

Geun-

[12] http://www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/countries/asiapacific/ countries/20070802/1_24415.jsp?menu=m_30_10 [13] http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/cn_vakv/euro/ nr040819105821/ns070924160837 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam [14] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia [15] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam [16] Belarusiam embassy in Hanoi [17] Vietnamese embassy in Minsk [18] Bulgarian embassy in Hanoi

• List of diplomatic missions in Vietnam

[19] "- Bulgaria”. Retrieved 21 February 2015.

• List of diplomatic missions of Vietnam

[20] “Bulgaria, Vietnam to Cooperate in Healthcare”. Retrieved 21 February 2015.

• Visa requirements for Vietnamese citizens

2.9.9

References

[21]“Belgium - Countries - Oﬃce of the Historian”. Retrieved 21 February 2015. [22] “Danmark i Vietnam”. Retrieved 21 February 2015.

[1] “Viet Nam Foreign Policy”. Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs. Press and Information Department - Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs. 11 May 2012. Retrieved 31 July 2013.

[23] Antonio G. Filipazzi, Rappresentanze e Rappresentanti Pontiﬁci dalla seconda metà del XX secolo (Libreria Editrice Vaticana 2006 ISBN 88-209-7845-8), p. X, XII, XV, 189

[2] Zhai, Qiang. China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000

[24] “Embassy Information”, EmabssyInformation.com, retrieved 28 April 2009.

[3] “Brunei-Vietnam Relations”. Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs and Trade (Brunei). Retrieved 12 February 2014.

[25] “List of Vietnamese Embassies and Consulates abroad” , 48th International Mathematical Olympiad, retrieved 28 April 2009.

[4] “VIETNAM – BRUNEI DARUSSALAM RELATIONS”. Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in Brunei Darussalam. Retrieved 12 February 2014.

[26] “Portugal – Vietname, 500 anos de História - Jornal O Clarim”. Retrieved 21 February 2015.

[5] “Viet Nam-Cambodia trade set to increase 27%". Vietnam Business News. 18 January 2008. Retrieved 11 June 2008. [6] “Cambodia, Viet Nam target $2.3 billion in bilateral trade by 2010”. Vietnam News. 21 January 2008. Retrieved 11 June 2008. [7] Brown, MacAlister and Joseph J. Zasloﬀ.“Relations with Vietnam”. Laos: a country study (Andrea Matles Savada, editor). Library of Congress Federal Research Division (July 1994). This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.

[27] http://www.secomunidades.pt/web/guest/listapaises/VM [28] “Vietnam-Russia traditional ties reach new heights”. Embassy of Vietnam in the United States of America. 5 March 2001. Retrieved 8 August 2007. [29] “Spain - Countries - Oﬃce of the Historian”. Retrieved 21 February 2015. [30] “The United Kingdom - Countries - Oﬃce of the Historian”. Retrieved 21 February 2015. [31] http://vietnam.mfa.gov.ua/en/ukraine-vn/diplomacy [32] Argentine embassy in Hanoi

[8] Vietnam Indonesia aim for all round cooperation, development [9] “China, Vietnam ﬁnd love”. Asia Times. 21 July 2005. Retrieved 3 June 2008. [10] “China-Vietnam Bilateral Relations”. Sina.com. 28 October 2005. Retrieved 3 June 2008. [11] Pham Thi Thu Thuy (2013-08-02). “The colorful history of North Korea-Vietnam relations”. NKNews.org. Retrieved 2013-08-03.

[33] "- Thông tin cơ bản về các nước, khu vực và quan hệ với Việt Nam”. Retrieved 21 February 2015. [34] “Costa Rica - Countries - Oﬃce of the Historian”. Retrieved 21 February 2015. [35] “Guatemala - Countries - Oﬃce of the Historian”. Retrieved 21 February 2015. [36] “Vietnam backs India for APEC membership”. The Hindu. 7 November 2000. Retrieved 16 June 2008.

218

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM

[37] “Vietnam, India issue joint declaration on strategic partnership”. VietNamNet Bridge. Retrieved 16 June 2008.

[58] "- State President receives Venezuelan oil corp.’s vice president”. Retrieved 21 February 2015.

[38] “India and Vietnam in changing East Asia”. Institute of Peace and Conﬂict Studies. Archived from the original on 20 August 2007. Retrieved 16 June 2008.

[59] "- Venezuela, Vietnam cooperate in agriculture”. Retrieved 21 February 2015.

[39] “India-Vietnam: Developing a Strategic Partnership” (PDF). Asian Aﬀairs. Retrieved 16 June 2008.

2.9.10 External links

[40] “India, Vietnam sign MoU for bilateral cooperation on security”. Times of India. 24 March 2008. Retrieved 16 June 2008. [41] “Error-2010-f3”. Retrieved 21 February 2015. [42] Lưu, Văn Lợi. Fifty Years of Vietnamese Diplomacy, 1945-1995. Volume II, 1975-1995. Hanoi: Thê Gioi Publishers, 2002. p. 246 [43] “The Vietnam-Kuwait Relations”. Kuwait Times. Retrieved 1 February 2016. [44] Embassy of Mexico in Hanoi (in English, Spanish and Vietnamese) [45] Embassy of Vietnam in Mexico City (in English, Spanish and Vietnamese) [46] “Vietnamese agency reviews Mongolia ties before president's visit”. Hanoi. Vietnam News Agency. 11 April 2000. [47]“Mongolia, Vietnam sign new cooperation document.”. Financial Times. 14 January 2003.

• Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs • Vietnam - US trade

2.10 Provinces of Vietnam Vietnam is divided into 58 provinces (Vietnamese: tỉnh Chữ nôm: 省) and 5 municipalities existing at the same level as provinces (thành phố trực thuộc trung ương). The provinces are divided into districts (huyện), provincial cities (thành phố trực thuộc tỉnh), and districtlevel towns (thị xã), which are subdivided into communelevel towns (thị trấn) or communes (xã). The municipalities are divided into rural districts (huyện) and urban districts (quận), which are subdivided into wards (phường).

2.10.1 Governance People's Council

Vietnamese provinces are controlled by a People's Council, elected by the inhabitants. The number of councilors varies from province to province, depending on the [49] “Mongolia, Vietnam sign transport, scientiﬁc, technical population of that province. The People's Council apcooperation agreements.”. Financial Times. 26 May points a People's Committee, which acts as the executive 2004. arm of the provincial government. This arrangement is [50] “Vietnam – New Zealand Relations”. Wellington: a somewhat simpliﬁed version of the situation in VietEmbassy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in New nam's national government. Provincial governments are Zealand. expected to be subordinate to the central government. [48] “Vietnam, Mongolia aim for 10 million USD in trade”. Vietnam News Agency. 13 December 2008.

[51] “Việt Nam thiết lập quan hệ ngoại giao với Swaziland” . XãLuận.com Tin Nóng. 21 May 2013. Retrieved 21 People's Committee February 2015.

[53] http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ ALeqM5jkkCD4fkPFweyP2V8SDQJkGOFu8A

The People's Committee is, as mentioned previously, the executive arm of a provincial government, and is responsible for formulating and implementing policy. It may be thought of as the equivalent of a cabinet. The People's Committee will have a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman, and between nine and eleven ordinary members.

[54] "- VIETNAM – VENEZUELA RELATIONS”. Retrieved 21 February 2015.

2.10.2 List and statistics

[52] Napier, Nancy K.; Vuong, Quan Hoang. What we see, why we worry, why we hope: Vietnam going forward. Boise, ID: Boise State University CCI Press, October 2013. ISBN 978-0985530587.

[55] "- Vietnam-Venezuela relations bear fruit”. Retrieved 21 February 2015. [56] http://www.nhandan.com.vn/english/news/201108/ domestic_p.htm [57] http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ ALeqM5jL1WR-f-SEhFKgCGZTgXb4LzG1hQ

A clickable map of Vietnam exhibiting its 58 provinces and 5 centrally controlled municipalities.

According to the census results of April 1, 2009, the population of Vietnam is 85,789,573 people. The most populous top-level administrative unit in Vietnam is Hồ Chí

2.10. PROVINCES OF VIETNAM Minh City, one of the ﬁve centrally governed cities. It has 7,123,340 people living within its oﬃcial boundaries. The second most populous administrative unit is the recently expanded Hà Nội with 6,448,837 people. Prior to the expansion of the capital city, this rank belonged to Thanh Hóa with 3,400,239 people. The least populous is Bắc Kạn, a mountainous province in the remote northeast with 294,660 people.* [1]

219 highly populated Red River lowlands. Red River Delta (Đồng Bằng Sông Hồng) contains nine provinces that are small but populous – based around the Red River, including the national capital Hanoi, and the municipality of Hải Phòng (both of which are independent of any provincial government).

North Central Coast (Bắc Trung Bộ) contains six provinces in the northern half of Vietnam's narrow cenIn terms of land area, the largest province is Nghệ An, tral part. All provinces in this region stretch from the which runs from the city of Vinh up the wide Sông Cả coast in the east to Laos in the west. valley. The smallest is Bắc Ninh, located in the populous South Central Coast (Nam Trung Bộ) contains eight Red River Delta region. coastal provinces in the southern half of Vietnam's cenThe following is a table of Vietnam's provinces broken tral part. Vietnam is wider at this point than in the North * down by population and area, April 1, 2009. [2] Central Coast region, so the inland areas are separate See also List of postal codes in Vietnam provinces. The region also includes the independent municipality of Đà Nẵng.

2.10.3

Regions

Central Highlands (Tây Nguyên) contains the ﬁve inland provinces (much of whose terrain is mountainous) of south-central Vietnam, mostly inhabited by ethnic minorities, although many Viet people live there as well. Southeast (Đông Nam Bộ) contains those parts of lowland southern Vietnam which are north of the Mekong Delta. There are seven provinces, plus the independent municipality of Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon). Mekong Delta (Đồng Bằng Sông Cửu Long) is Vietnam's southernmost region, and contains twelve mostly small but populous provinces in the delta of the Mekong, plus the independent municipality of Cần Thơ. The other name of this region is Southwestern (Tây Nam Bộ).

2.10.4 Historical provinces of Vietnam • Hà Nam Ninh - then divided into 3 provinces: Hà Nam, Nam Định and Ninh Bình • Hà Sơn Bình (divided into Hà Tây and Hòa Bình then on August 1, 2008, Hà Tây and 4 communities of Hòa Bình became a part of expanded capital city Hà Nội) • Hà Bắc Province - divided into Bắc Giang Province and Bắc Ninh Province • Châu Đốc • Long Hồ The Vietnamese government often groups the various provinces into eight regions. These regions are not always used, and alternative classiﬁcations are possible. The regions include: Northwest (Tây Bắc Bộ) contains four inland provinces in the west of Vietnam's northern part. Two of them border with Laos, and one borders China. Northeast (Đông Bắc Bộ) contains eleven provinces (many of which are mountainous) that lie to north of the

• Nghệ Tĩnh (divided into Nghệ An and Hà Tĩnh), most noted for being the site of the Nghe Tinh Soviet Republic declared September 1930 and lasted into 1931, a short-lived bastion against colonial French rule. • Minh Hai (divided into Cà Mau and Bạc Liêu) • Vĩnh Phú (divided into Vĩnh Phúc and Phú Thọ • Hà Tây - annexed into Hà Nội since August 1, 2008.

220

2.10.5

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM

See also

• ISO 3166-2:VN

2.10.6

References

[1] http://www.chinhphu.vn/portal/page?_pageid=439, 1090462&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&pers_id= 1091147&item_id=33638381&p_details=1 [2] General Statics Oﬃce of Vietnam

2.10.7

External links

• CityMayors.com article • (English) (Chinese) Comprehensive Map of Vietnam’s Provinces from around 1890

2.11 Municipalities of Vietnam Municipalities (Vietnamese: ành phố trực thuộc Trung ương; literally cities centrally directed) are the highest-ranked cities in Vietnam.* [1] They are centrallycontrolled cities as province level. 1. Municipalities 2. Provincial cities 3. Town Three levels of cities in Vietnam:

2.11.1

Subdivisions

The municipalities are divided into urban districts and rural districts or district-level towns. In turns, urban districts are divided into wards, and rural districts are divided into communes and commune-level towns (thị trấn).

2.11.2

Current Vietnamese municipalities

2.11.3

Proposed municipalities

Map of Centrally governed cities in Vietnam

• Khánh Hòa (2015)* [6] • Quảng Ninh (2020)* [7] • Thái Nguyên (2020)* [8]* [9]* [10]

2.11.4 See also • Provinces of Vietnam

• Thừa Thiên–Huế is proposed as a new municipality to be established by 2014* [2] 2.11.5 • Đắk Lắk Province will be divided into the new Đắk Lắk province and Buôn Ma Thuột municipality (Central Highlands region).* [3] • 4 provinces will become municipalities: • Bình Dương (2015-2020)* [4]* [5]

References

[1] ISO 3166-2:VN [2] Xây dựng Thừa Thiên-Huế thành TP trực thuộc TW [3] theo kết luận số 60-KL/TW của Bộ Chính trị ban hành ngày 27/11/2009 về đề án “Xây dựng Buôn Ma Thuột thành đô thị trung tâm vùng Tây Nguyên”

2.12. LIST OF DISTRICTS OF VIETNAM

[4] Báo Bình Dương Điện Tử

221

2.12.2 Bà Rịa–Vũng Tàu Province

[5] Chạy đua nâng cấp đô thị - Chay dua nang cap do thi Saigon Times Online - Thời báo Kinh tế Sài gòn - Thoi bao Kinh te Sai gon

• Bà Rịa

[6] Báo Khánh Hòa

• Côn Đảo

[7] Kỳ họp thứ hai, HĐND tỉnh khóa XII: thảo luận nhiều vấn đề quan trọng của tỉnh

• Đất Đỏ

• Châu Đức

• Long Điền [8]

• Tân Thành [9] [10]

2.12 List of districts of Vietnam The provinces of Vietnam are divided into districts (Vietnamese: huyện), provincial cities (thành phố trực thuộc tỉnh), and district-level towns (ị xã). The administrative unit of the huyện dates from the 15th Century. The centrally-controlled municipalities are subdivided into rural districts (huyện), district-level towns (ị xã), and urban districts (quận), which are further subdivided into wards (phường). The various subdivisions (cities, towns, and districts) are listed below, by province:

• Vũng Tàu • Xuyên Mộc

2.12.3 Bắc Giang Province • Bắc Giang • Hiệp Hòa • Lạng Giang • Lục Nam • Lục Ngạn • Sơn Động • Tân Yên

2.12.1 An Giang Province

• Việt Yên

• An Phú

• Yên Dũng

• Châu Đốc

• Yên Thế

• Châu Phú

2.12.4 Bắc Kạn Province • Châu Thành • Chợ Mới • Long Xuyên • Phú Tân • Tân Châu

• Ba Bể • Bắc Kạn • Bạch Thông • Chợ Đồn • Chợ Mới

• Thoại Sơn

• Na Rì

• Tịnh Biên

• Ngân Sơn

• Tri Tôn

• Pác Nặm

222

2.12.5 Bạc Liêu Province

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM • Qui Nhơn

• Bạc Liêu

• Tây Sơn

• Đông Hải

• Tuy Phước

• Giá Rai

• Vân Canh

• Hòa Bình

• Vĩnh Thạnh

• Hồng Dân • Phước Long • Vĩnh Lợi

2.12.9 Bình Dương Province • Bến Cát • Dầu Tiếng

2.12.6 Bắc Ninh Province

• Dĩ An

• Bắc Ninh

• Phú Giáo

• Gia Bình

• Tân Uyên

• Lương Tài

• Thủ Dầu Một

• Quế Võ

• Thuận An

• Thuận Thành

• Bàu Bàng

• Tiên Du

• Bắc Tân Uyên

• Từ Sơn • Yên Phong

2.12.10

Bình Phước Province

• Bình Long

2.12.7 Bến Tre Province

• Bù Đăng

• Ba Tri

• Bù Đốp

• Bến Tre

• Chơn Thành

• Bình Đại

• Đồng Phú

• Châu Thành

• Đồng Xoài

• Chợ Lách

• Lộc Ninh

• Giồng Trôm

• Phước Long

• Mỏ Cày

• Hớn Quản

• Thạnh Phú

• Bù Gia Mập

2.12.8 Bình Định Province

2.12.11

Bình Thuận Province

• An Lão

• Bắc Bình

• An Nhơn

• Đức Linh

• Hoài Ân

• Hàm Tân

• Hoài Nhơn

• Hàm Thuận Bắc

• Phù Cát

• Hàm Thuận Nam

• Phù Mỹ

• La Gi

2.12. LIST OF DISTRICTS OF VIETNAM

223

• Phan Thiết

• Phục Hòa

• Phú Quý

• Quảng Uyên

• Tánh Linh

• Thạch An

• Tuy Phong

2.12.12 Cà Mau Province • Cà Mau • Đầm Dơi • Cái Nước • Năm Căn • Ngọc Hiển

• Thông Nông • Trà Lĩnh • Trùng Khánh

2.12.15

Đà Nẵng

• Cẩm Lệ • Hải Châu

• Phú Tân

• Hòa Vang

• Thới Bình

• Hoàng Sa

• Trần Văn Thời

• Liên Chiểu

• U Minh

• Ngũ Hành Sơn

2.12.13 Cần Thơ • Bình Thủy • Cái Răng • Cờ Đỏ • Cần Thơ • Ninh Kiều • Ô Môn

• Sơn Trà • Thanh Khê

2.12.16

Đắk Lắk Province

• Buôn Đôn • Buôn Ma Thuột • Cư M'gar

• Phong Điền

• Cư Kuin

• Thốt Nốt

• Ea H'leo

• Vĩnh Thạnh

• Ea Kar

• Thới Lai

• Ea Súp

2.12.14 Cao Bằng Province • Bảo Lạc • Bảo Lâm • Cao Bằng • Hạ Lang

• Krông Ana • Krông Bông • Krông Buk • Krông Năng • Krông Pắk

• Hà Quảng

• Lắk

• Hòa An

• M'Đrăk

• Nguyên Bình

• Buôn Hồ

224

2.12.17 Đắk Nông Province

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM

2.12.20

Đồng Tháp Province

• Cư Jút

• Cao Lãnh

• Đắk Glong

• Châu Thành

• Đắk Mil

• Hồng Ngự

• Đắk R'Lấp

• Lai Vung

• Đắk Song

• Lấp Vò

• Gia Nghĩa

• Sa Đéc

• Krông Nô

• Tam Nông

• Tuy Đức

• Tân Hồng

2.12.18 Điện Biên Province • Điện Biên • Điện Biên Đông • Điện Biên Phủ • Mường Chà • Mường Nhé • Tủa Chùa • Tuần Giáo

2.12.19 Đồng Nai Province • Biên Hòa • Cẩm Mỹ

• Thanh Bình • Tháp Mười

2.12.21

Gia Lai Province

• Ayun Pa • An Khê • Chư Păh • Chư Prông • Chư Sê • Đắk Đoa • Đắk Pơ • Đức Cơ

• Định Quán

• Ia Grai

• Long Khánh

• Ia Pa

• Long Thành

• K'Bang

• Nhơn Trạch

• Kông Chro

• Tân Phú

• Krông Pa

• Thống Nhất

• Mang Yang

• Trảng Bom

• Phú Thiện

• Vĩnh Cữu

• Pleiku

• Xuân Lộc

• Chư Pưh

2.12. LIST OF DISTRICTS OF VIETNAM

2.12.22 Hà Giang Province

225 • Ba Vì

• Bắc Mê

• Chương Mỹ

• Bắc Quang

• Đan Phượng

• Đồng Văn

• Hà Đông

• Hà Giang

• Hoài Đức

• Hoàng Su Phì

• Mỹ Đức

• Mèo Vạc

• Phú Xuyên

• Quản Bạ

• Phúc Thọ

• Quảng Bình

• Quốc Oai

• Vị Xuyên

• Sơn Tây

• Xín Mần

• Thạch Thất

• Yên Minh

• Thanh Oai • Thường Tín

2.12.23 Hà Nam Province

• Ứng Hòa

• Bình Lục • Duy Tiên

2.12.25

Hà Tĩnh Province

• Kim Bảng

• Cẩm Xuyên

• Lý Nhân

• Can Lộc

• Phủ Lý

• Đức Thọ

• Thanh Liêm

• Hà Tĩnh • Hồng Lĩnh

2.12.24 Hà Nội

• Hương Khê

• Ba Đình

• Hương Sơn

• Cầu Giấy

• Kỳ Anh

• Đông Anh

• Nghi Xuân

• Đống Đa

• Thạch Hà

• Gia Lâm

• Vũ Quang

• Hai Bà Trưng • Hoàn Kiếm

2.12.26

Hải Dương Province

• Hoàng Mai

• Bình Giang

• Long Biên

• Cẩm Giàng

• Sóc Sơn

• Chí Linh

• Tây Hồ

• Gia Lộc

• Thanh Trì

• Hải Dương

• Thanh Xuân

• Kim Thành

• Từ Liêm

• Kinh Môn

226 • Nam Sách • Ninh Giang • Thanh Hà • Thanh Miện • Tứ Kỳ

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM

2.12.29

Hồ Chí Minh City

• Bình Chánh • Bình Tân • Bình Thạnh • Cần Giờ • Củ Chi • District 1

2.12.27 Hải Phòng • An Dương • An Lão

• District 2 • District 3 • District 4 • District 5

• Bạch Long Vĩ

• District 6

• Cát Hải

• District 7

• Đồ Sơn • Hải An

• District 8 • District 9 • District 10

• Hồng Bàng

• District 11

• Kiến An

• District 12

• Kiến Thuỵ • Lê Chân

• Gò Vấp • Hóc Môn • Nhà Bè

• Ngô Quyền

• Phú Nhuận

• Thủy Nguyên

• Tân Bình

• Tiên Lãng

• Tân Phú • Thủ Đức

• Vĩnh Bảo • Dương Kinh

2.12.30

Hòa Bình Province

• Cao Phong

2.12.28 Hậu Giang Province • Châu Thành • Châu Thành A

• Đà Bắc • Hòa Bình • Kim Bôi • Kỳ Sơn

• Long Mỹ

• Lạc Sơn

• Phụng Hiệp

• Lạc Thủy

• Vị Thanh

• Lương Sơn • Mai Châu

• Vị Thủy

• Tân Lạc

• Ngã Bảy

• Yên Thủy

2.12. LIST OF DISTRICTS OF VIETNAM

2.12.31 Hưng Yên Province • Ân Thi • Hưng Yên • Khoái Châu • Kim Động

227

2.12.34

Kon Tum Province

• Đắk Glei • Đắk Hà • Đắk Tô

• Mỹ Hào

• Kon Plông

• Phù Cừ

• Kon Rẫy

• Tiên Lữ

• Kon Tum

• Văn Giang • Văn Lâm • Yên Mỹ

• Ngọc Hồi • Sa Thầy • Tu Mơ Rông

2.12.32 Khánh Hòa Province • Cam Lâm • Cam Ranh • Diên Khánh • Khánh Sơn • Khánh Vĩnh

2.12.35

Lai Châu Province

• Lai Châu • Mường Tè • Phong Thổ

• Nha Trang

• Sìn Hồ

• Ninh Hòa

• Tam Đường

• Trường Sa

• Than Uyên

• Vạn Ninh

2.12.33 Kiên Giang Province • An Biên • An Minh

• Tân Uyên

2.12.36

Lâm Đồng Province

• Bảo Lâm

• Châu Thành

• Bảo Lộc

• Giồng Riềng

• Cát Tiên

• Gò Quao • Giang Thành • Hà Tiên

• Đạ Huoai • Đà Lạt

• Hòn Đất

• Đạ Tẻh

• Kiên Hải

• Đam Rông

• Kiên Lương

• Di Linh

• Phú Quốc • Rạch Giá • Tân Hiệp

• Đơn Dương • Đức Trọng

• Vĩnh Thuận

• Lạc Dương

• U Minh Thượng

• Lâm Hà

228

2.12.37 Lạng Sơn Province • Bắc Sơn • Bình Gia • Cao Lộc • Chi Lăng

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM

2.12.40

Nam Định Province

• Giao Thủy • Hải Hậu • Mỹ Lộc

• Đình Lập

• Nam Định

• Hữu Lũng

• Nam Trực

• Lạng Sơn

• Nghĩa Hưng

• Lộc Bình • Tràng Định • Văn Lãng • Văn Quân

• Trực Ninh • Vụ Bản • Xuân Trường • Ý Yên

2.12.38 Lào Cai Province • Bắc Hà • Bảo Thắng • Bảo Yên • Bát Xát • Lào Cai

2.12.41

Nghệ An Province

• Anh Sơn • Con Cuông • Cửa Lò

• Mường Khương

• Diễn Châu

• Sa Pa

• Đô Lương

• Si Ma Cai

• Hưng Nguyên

• Văn Bàn

2.12.39 Long An Province

• Kỳ Sơn • Nam Đàn

• Bến Lức

• Nghi Lộc

• Cần Đước

• Nghĩa Đàn

• Cần Giuộc

• Quế Phong

• Châu Thành • Đức Hòa • Đức Huệ

• Quỳnh Lưu • Quỳ Châu

• Mộc Hóa

• Quỳ Hợp

• Tân An

• Tân Kỳ

• Tân Hưng

• Thanh Chương

• Tân Thạnh • Tân Trụ • Thạnh Hóa

• Tương Dương • Vinh

• Thủ Thừa

• Yên Thành

• Vĩnh Hưng

• Thái Hòa

2.12. LIST OF DISTRICTS OF VIETNAM

2.12.42 Ninh Bình Province • Gia Viễn • Hoa Lư • Kim Sơn

229

2.12.45

Phú Yên Province

• Đông Hòa • Đồng Xuân • Phú Hòa • Sơn Hòa

• Nho Quan

• Sông Cầu

• Ninh Bình

• Sông Hinh

• Tam Diệp

• Tây Hòa

• Yên Khánh • Yên Mô

• Tuy An • Tuy Hòa

2.12.46 2.12.43 Ninh Thuận Province

Quảng Bình Province

• Bố Trạch

• Ninh Hải

• Đồng Hới

• Ninh Phước

• Lệ Thủy

• Ninh Sơn • Phan Rang–Tháp Chàm • Thuận Bắc • Thuận Nam

2.12.44 Phú Thọ Province • Cẩm Khê • Đoan Hùng

• Minh Hóa • Quảng Ninh • Quảng Trạch • Tuyên Hóa

2.12.47

Quảng Nam Province

• Bắc Trà My • Đại Lộc • Điện Bàn • Đông Giang

• Hạ Hòa

• Duy Xuyên

• Lâm Thao

• Hiệp Đức

• Phù Ninh • Phú Thọ • Tam Nông

• Hội An • Nam Giang • Nam Trà My • Núi Thành

• Tân Sơn

• Phước Sơn

• Thanh Ba

• Quế Sơn

• Thanh Sơn • Thanh Thủy

• Tam Kỳ • Tây Giang • Thăng Bình

• Việt Trì

• Tiên Phước

• Yên Lập

• Nông Sơn

230

2.12.48 Quảng Ngãi Province • Ba Tơ • Bình Sơn • Đức Phổ • Lý Sơn

CHAPTER 2. STATE OF VIETNAM

2.12.50

Quảng Trị Province

• Cam Lộ • Cồn Cỏ • Đa Krông • Đông Hà • Gio Linh

• Minh Long

• Hải Lăng

• Nghĩa Hành

• Hướng Hóa

• Quảng Ngãi

• Quảng Trị

• Sơn Hà • Sơn Tây • Sơn Tịnh

• Triệu Phong • Vĩnh Linh

2.12.51

Sóc Trăng Province

• Tây Trà

• Châu Thành

• Trà Bồng

• Cù Lao Dung

• Tư Nghĩa

2.12.49 Quảng Ninh Province • Ba Chẽ • Bình Liêu • Cẩm Phả • Cô Tô • Đầm Hà • Đông Triều

• Kế Sách • Lo

History of Vietnam and Socialist Republic of Vietnam-Ed. Oğuzhan Yılmaz - PDFCOFFEE.COM (2024)